Soviet Rifle Division Anti-Tank defense in 1944-1945

[Dunnigan]

I know the majority of the Soviet Rifle Divisions still had 45mm guns in their Anti-Tank battalion late war. These were obviously ineffective against late war enemy tanks. The 76mm DA's like the ZiS-3 were employed in the independent Anti-Tank Artillery Regiments and Brigades (along with the 57mm). The Soviets counted the number of anti-tank guns per kilometer as a measure of how dense their anti-tank defenses were, but I have a few questions as to how the usage and effectiveness. Setting aside Anti-Tank Rifles and self-propelled guns like SU-76M's that some Rifle Divisions would have:

Were the 45mm Anti-Tank guns of the Anti-Tank battalion still be used to support frontline defenses? Would these even be considered effective against German armor (given a lucky shot) or considered a threat by the Panzers? Or is this weapon really just an afterthought by 1944 and 1945.

Were the 76mm Division Artillery in the Artillery Regiment of Rifle Divisions used in any anti-tank defense?

Would the 76mm DA's in Light Artillery Regiments and Brigades also be used for anti-tank defense?

Would it be a matter of how many AP shells were allotted to the Rifle Divisions versus the dedicated Anti-Tank units that determined if 76mm DA's in Rifle Divisions would be used in an Anti-tank role?

Were the 76mm DA and 57mm guns in the independent Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment and Brigades be considered the primary anti-tank weapons for frontline Rifle Divisions (if they were assigned to the division or corps)? Then would the 45mm in the Rifle Divisions be just a tertiary to the anti-tank defense?

Thanks.

[Gary Kennedy]

Well there was some consideration to bettering the capability of the Div Atk Bn with the December 1943 Shtat 04/569, which swapped the 45-mm guns for 76-mm weapons while keeping the Atk Rifle Coy. How widespread or otherwise the change was others will be better placed to tell.

Gary

[Dunnigan]

Well there was some consideration to bettering the capability of the Div Atk Bn with the December 1943 Shtat 04/569, which swapped the 45-mm guns for 76-mm weapons while keeping the Atk Rifle Coy. How widespread or otherwise the change was others will be better placed to tell.

Gary

Thanks Gary. A number of sources, including Zaloga's states that the conversion/upgrade never did gain much traction where the 76mm DA's went primarily to the independent anti-tank artillery units.

Also, I've been reviewing the 2nd Ukrainian and 3rd Ukrainian Front's strength figures for January 1945, and the rifle divisions at least in those Fronts have a large number of 45mm in addition to 76mm DA where the latter I assume to be found in the artillery regiment.

[Der Alte Fritz]

Soviet AT defences were a layered defence in depth, utilising a variety of different weapons to counter the combined arms teams used by the German Panzer Divisions. You cannot equate a single weapon with another weapon especially as the Germans deployed all kinds of light armour that were vulnerable to even AT Rifles while 45mm AT guns and AT Rifles could have an effect against tracks, optics and other vulnerable points on even the heaviest armour. See http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/d ... lantz2.pdf

By later war, things had not changed significantly, except that the AT gun units were better equipped with vehicles making them able to keep up with the advancing infantry. When attacked by German armour, the Rifle Corps would halt and dig in, the first line of defence were physical obstacles such as AT ditches, abattis, road blocks, etc, behind this were mine fields and minefield laid rapidly infront of the direction of advance by lorry mounted sappers. Rifle Divisions would dig in company positions in depth with echelons of Divisions one behind the other with further Divisions brought in to set up along the direction of advance. The Divisions would have their own AT 45mm gun and ATR units and the guns would be deployed in pairs often in multi-gun strong points. Guns would be protected from observation and fire from the front and would be spaced at 3-400m intervals. A direct attack on a strong point would expose the attack to flanking fire from the two strong points on either side.
Army level 76mm gun armed units would reinforce strong points and would operate on the joints between divisional positions and would move to take up ambush positions along the direction of advance. Similar flanking attacks would be made by armoured units with tanks or SAU in the rear of the divisional positions.
The infantry would seek to strip the enemy armour from their infantry by artillery fire, mortar fire and machine gun fire, company strong points would be defended with infantry weapons and enemy armour attacked with close in weapons such as AT grenades like the RPG-4, explosives and captured panzerfausts.

This is not a defence by deploying a super weapon and killing the enemy tank with a single shot. This is a wearing down defence, depleting the weaker and vulnerable parts of the enemy force, the infantry, light vehicles, medium tanks and leaving the heavy tanks isolated. A flank shot from a 45mm 1943 gun was perfectly capable of disabling medium tanks at medium range.

[Der Alte Fritz]

76mm DA weapons supplied to Divisional Artillery Regiment was given AT rounds and would engage enemy armour in the AT role at the rear of the Divisional position. Ones supplied to AT Regiments would have a greater load of AT rounds.

Interesting to compare this approach to the German defence doctrine evolved in 1917 - the elastic defence - as this is a fixed defence behind which units are deployed on the enemy axis of advance once it has become established. The later German doctrine of Paschendale was similar in that the German positions were over looked by British artillery observers, which meant that movement was far more difficult, so the men were pre-positioned and only advanced to meet the enemy when they were very close. In this scheme, the HKL was lightly held and the density of forces increased the further that you penetrated into the HKF until you reached the B-Stellung of the Artillery Protection Trench.

Soviet defences are not laid out in this way, you have 2 companies up and 1 back, 2 battalions up and 1 back, 2 Regiments up and 1 back. This gives you 8 companies in the First Line with 4 in support, 4 companies in the Second Line with 2 in support for a Rifle Division. There is limited ability to counter attack from within the Division that main reason for the Second line is to engage an enemy that is assaulting the First Line. The counter attack function is given to mobile units attacking the flanks of enemy units already enmeshed within the web of Rifle Division positions. Reinforcing Rifle Divisions make the web deeper or establish a second echelon defence further back. Again this goes back to the idea of wearing down the enemy before an armoured counter attack.

[Art]

There were many reports from battle commanders with analysis and proposals regarding infantry organization and weapons prepared at the war end. An almost unanimous opinion was that both 45-mm ATG and AT rifle were obsolete weapons and very little effect can be expected from them against modern armor. Most officers argued that 45-mm gun should be entirely replaced with 57 or 76-mm guns and AT rifles - with captured panzerfausts or their analogues. The minority opinion was that due to certain tactical advantages (small size, mobility etc) some numbers of them should be retained for use against soft targets or light armored vehicles.
You can find virtually hundreds of corps-divisional level anti-tank plans, schemes and tables from 1944-45 in online documents. The simple conclusion from them is that 45-mm ATG and ATR still mattered a lot in anti-tank defenses and and made a large share of weapons. Also one should mention 76-mm regimental cannon which had a respectable penetration capability with a HEAT shell despite a low muzzle velocity and limited horizontal traverse. Regimental guns were universally included in anti-tank plans.

[Sheldrake]

According to the US Handbook on USSR Military Forces: Chapter V, Tactics. 1 November 1945

The Soviets compute the minimum required density of antitank weapons in defensive sectors on the basis of the suspected number of enemy tanks, the number and characteristics of tank approaches, and the average number of rounds necessary for a tank kill. On the basis of experience against enemy armor, the Red Army figures on six rounds of fire from 76.2-mm antitank guns, or 12 rounds from 45-mm antitank guns, for the destruction of one medium tank.
......Antitank guns continue firing until overrun, since the Red Army considers that the destruction of a large number of enemy tanks represents the successful execution of the mission even when all of its own pieces are lost. The Soviets consider that each antitank gun is capable of destroying an average of 2 to 3 enemy tanks before it is put out of action.

http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/dodmilintel/26/

Many Soviet infantry units were well below establishment in 1944-45. I suspect that the anti tank rifle teams would be one of the last filled vacancies.

[Art]

Were the 76mm Division Artillery in the Artillery Regiment of Rifle Divisions used in any anti-tank defense?

Formally speaking usually all artillery was included in the anti-tank plan. Even guns on closed position in the rear were supposed to engage tanks penetrating to their position area. But, yes, assigning some parts of batteries to direct-fire positions in the forward zone would not be an unusual arrangement.

Would the 76mm DA's in Light Artillery Regiments and Brigades also be used for anti-tank defense?

For example, from the instructions on the anti-tank defense organization issued by the 3 Ukrainian Front command (25.2.1945):
"Anti-tank artillery regiments and light artillery regiments must be used in defense to destroy enemy tanks with direct fire as a part of anti-tank regions both on the forward line and in depth. First of all they must be employed as an anti-tank reserve, in this case no division of regiments should be permitted"
https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D ... 0%B2/16/27

[Dunnigan]

Thanks all, these responses has been very helpful in firming up my understanding of Soviet Anti-tank defenses.

[Reigo2]

If one takes the fighting at Ńarva in February 1944 as an example, then my answers to some of the questions:

Were the 45mm Anti-Tank guns of the Anti-Tank battalion still be used to support frontline defenses? Would these even be considered effective against German armor (given a lucky shot) or considered a threat by the Panzers? Or is this weapon really just an afterthought by 1944 and 1945.

45mm AT guns were considered as not effective against German medium or heavy armour but were still used to support defending or advancing frontline troops. Besides having potential against light armor and possible lucky shots against medium armor, they were used also against soft targets (infantry etc).

Were the 76mm Division Artillery in the Artillery Regiment of Rifle Divisions used in any anti-tank defense?

Not often but sometimes a gun or two were sent to the frontline for AT role.

Would the 76mm DA's in Light Artillery Regiments and Brigades also be used for anti-tank defense?

Yes, this happened often.