The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
- Der Alte Fritz
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Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
I am impressed, but very negatively by Sokolov .
Some points :
It is almost impossible to compare the GDP of a communist and a capitalist power .
I find it very dubious to use the strength of the GDP in a discussion about WWII. The same about military expenditures: what means 42 % of the GDP used for the military ? The same for the cost of the production .
About the role of the SU in WWII : of the 3 opponents, the SU was the only who could defeat Germany on its own, it is dubious that the US could do it,because of the distances (the US needed an unsinkable carrier (Britain ) ,Britain could not do it .
But,did the SU defeat Germany on its own ? NO .
Some points :
It is almost impossible to compare the GDP of a communist and a capitalist power .
I find it very dubious to use the strength of the GDP in a discussion about WWII. The same about military expenditures: what means 42 % of the GDP used for the military ? The same for the cost of the production .
About the role of the SU in WWII : of the 3 opponents, the SU was the only who could defeat Germany on its own, it is dubious that the US could do it,because of the distances (the US needed an unsinkable carrier (Britain ) ,Britain could not do it .
But,did the SU defeat Germany on its own ? NO .
Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
For the record B.Sokolov studied geography in university and got his PhD in history for the thesis entitled "British metaethnic community outside the British Isles". Then for a long time was a scholar in the Institute of World Literature in Moscow. How he became a military and economical expert is beyond my understanding.
Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
He claims to be a military and economic expert, but, in an interview with a Polish newspaper, he said that the SU lost 42 million people in the war and that,excluding civilian casualties,the SU lost 10 men for 1 German .
This is not the language of a military expert .
This is not the language of a military expert .
Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
The best military analysts I know are engineers, economists and physicists. I agree, Sokolov likes to cause furore but he has always been more transparent than his counterparts. That the Soviets faked their numbers is nothing new, in fact various economists came to the same conclusions, you will observe manipulations in every system to some degree. Today, China fakes its numbers regularly.How he became a military and economical expert is beyond my understanding.
They did in certain periods when the Germans were in the defence but the overall average was 4.7.he SU lost 10 men for 1 German
Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
Sokolov claimed that for every fallen German soldier,there were 10 fallen Soviet soldiers . This is not true .
- Der Alte Fritz
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Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
I would agree with you, in his efforts to correct the historical balance of the old Soviet accounts, he goes too far.
Have just finished reading his article in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies about Lend Lease. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1 ... 9408430160
He makes some good points but is rather cavalier with his figures.
For instance he quotes USSR production of vehicles as 205,000 and then states that Lend Lease delivered 409,500 by 1st May 1945. Looks good, doesn't it except for the fact that this numbers is taken from the Report to Congress on Lend Lease and is what was exported not delivered and it is all machines including motorcycles and trailers, etc. Deduct about 14,712 for losses and 4,932 for diversions enroute and 33,400 for motorcycles et al and you end up with a figure of 355,000 which is much closer to the Soviet figure of 312,000. You can make further deductions for other issues along the way, machines not accepted due to faults or utilised in the Iran corridor.
Similarly he estimates that the Soviet production of aircraft is over stated by a factor of 2.5 times because he links this to aluminium production and then compares it to German production.
Same methodology with tanks and armour plate.
For railways, he takes the Lend Lease export figures compares them to Soviet production and concludes the USSR had a huge shortage of railway capacity during the war made up by LL. He fails to understand that the NKPS rescued most of the rolling stock from the Germans grasp in 1941 and lost around 40% of its network so that it ended up with a huge surplus of rollings stock. If anything the Lend Lease orders were placed to provide extra rolling stock for the invasion of Poland, the Balkans and Germany with the expectation that the Germans would withdraw their rolling stock before the Soviets could capture it. In the event the Soviets captured huge amounts of rolling stock and were able to run a Standard gauge service across the whole of Eastern Europe quite effectively. The Lend Lease engines were used to replace Soviet engines that required capital repair so reducing the burden on the railway workshops.
But for all that he does pose some interesting questions.
Have just finished reading his article in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies about Lend Lease. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1 ... 9408430160
He makes some good points but is rather cavalier with his figures.
For instance he quotes USSR production of vehicles as 205,000 and then states that Lend Lease delivered 409,500 by 1st May 1945. Looks good, doesn't it except for the fact that this numbers is taken from the Report to Congress on Lend Lease and is what was exported not delivered and it is all machines including motorcycles and trailers, etc. Deduct about 14,712 for losses and 4,932 for diversions enroute and 33,400 for motorcycles et al and you end up with a figure of 355,000 which is much closer to the Soviet figure of 312,000. You can make further deductions for other issues along the way, machines not accepted due to faults or utilised in the Iran corridor.
Similarly he estimates that the Soviet production of aircraft is over stated by a factor of 2.5 times because he links this to aluminium production and then compares it to German production.
Same methodology with tanks and armour plate.
For railways, he takes the Lend Lease export figures compares them to Soviet production and concludes the USSR had a huge shortage of railway capacity during the war made up by LL. He fails to understand that the NKPS rescued most of the rolling stock from the Germans grasp in 1941 and lost around 40% of its network so that it ended up with a huge surplus of rollings stock. If anything the Lend Lease orders were placed to provide extra rolling stock for the invasion of Poland, the Balkans and Germany with the expectation that the Germans would withdraw their rolling stock before the Soviets could capture it. In the event the Soviets captured huge amounts of rolling stock and were able to run a Standard gauge service across the whole of Eastern Europe quite effectively. The Lend Lease engines were used to replace Soviet engines that required capital repair so reducing the burden on the railway workshops.
But for all that he does pose some interesting questions.
Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
How relevant are these remarks by Sokolov? That the actual Soviet tank production for the war was around 50,000 seems unbelievable. On the other hand, 1942 tank production figures are suspiciously high to me. It's like the Soviets never had to relocate their factories...Der Alte Fritz wrote: Similarly he estimates that the Soviet production of aircraft is over stated by a factor of 2.5 times because he links this to aluminium production and then compares it to German production.
Same methodology with tanks and armour plate.
Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
Soviet tank production during the war was some 100000.Not all factories had to be relocated .
Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
About a half of tanks produced in late-1941 or early 1942 were light T-60 manufactured by automotive factories. As for T-34 there were two major plants producing them when the war started. By late 1942 there were five.Hiryu- wrote:[
On the other hand, 1942 tank production figures are suspiciously high to me. It's like the Soviets never had to relocate their factories...
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/ ... .htm#Start
Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
What about the discrepency between tank production and armored steel production?
Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
From an official handbook the production of armor plate in 1942 was more than 500 000 tons. Obviously that must be enough to produce 24 000 tanks.
Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
The whole point of Sokolov is that this figure isn't reliable.Art wrote:From an official handbook the production of armor plate in 1942 was more than 500 000 tons. Obviously that must be enough to produce 24 000 tanks.
Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
He doesn't support it with something of substance. Frankly I don't see much value in his reasoning. Tank production numbers are interconnected with a plethora of various documents on losses, shipments, production of components etc. Any contradiction would become obvious sooner or later. Just to give an example, the production of tank guns in 1942 according to an original report submitted to Stalin by Beria and others (and published in 2010) was 16.327 76-mm and 5.100 45-mm. Which was even larger than the number of KV/T-34 and T-70 tank produced. I would be simply impossible to falsify all related sources.
Re: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War - Sokolov
A. Yermolov ("Soviet tank industry") gives the following numbers for annual allocation and consumption of the armored plate by the People's Commissariat for Tank Industry
1942 - 507.000 tons allocations/480.000 consumption
1943 - 422.000/448.000
1944 - 562.000/545.000
As calculated by the author those tonnages were sufficient to produce the reported numbers of tanks.
1942 - 507.000 tons allocations/480.000 consumption
1943 - 422.000/448.000
1944 - 562.000/545.000
As calculated by the author those tonnages were sufficient to produce the reported numbers of tanks.