Notes on tactics

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Art
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Notes on tactics

#1

Post by Art » 21 Jan 2018, 23:22

Various wartime documents dealing with tactical experience or tactical instructions.

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Re: Notes on tactics

#2

Post by Art » 21 Jan 2018, 23:33

Instruction for company and platoon commanders issued by the 42 Army/Leningrad Front in January 44 (somewhat abbreviated)
Organization of attack in a breakthrough of an enemy fortified position
(Instruction for company and platoon officers of the Army)


The purpose of the instruction is to establish unity in training of infantry for execution of the attack and the connect provision of manuals with combat experience and practice of troops training.

1. Attack of infantry on enemy position can be made
a) From a starting line prepared in advance– trenches of the main line of resistance or combat outposts
b) From a line occupied in the course of offensive

2. Distance from the attacks objective can be the most different. It is essential that our artillery and mortars would be able to prepare the attack with their fire without hitting own infantry.
If the attack start line has not been preapred in advance and it is at the distance from the enemy larger than 150 m, and artillery and 120-mm mortars cannot deliver oblique fire, infantry must advance to the start line only after our fire is shifted to the depth of enemy positions.

3. If the start line is chosen in front of [our] trenches, than the method of infantry advance to it is determined by:
a) distance
b) visibility, and
c) our fire and enemy fire
and proceed according the Combat Infantry Manual part 1 (articles 256, 259-261, 264-270, 472-477)
Company and platoon commanders should determine the attack start line and clearly designate it to squad commanders and soldiers.
In case of limited visibility, strong fire of own artillery and mortars one should prefer even at close distance from the enemy a parallel advance of company and platoon skirmish lines with their attached weapons. At night and in fog silence should be kept.

4. Timing of the general attacks will be designated in advance as hour and minutes. In addition the platoon commander will give a flare signal “to attack”.
The company commander duplicates the signal.
Platoon and squad commanders receive those signals and immediately give a voice command “to attack”.

5. Officers should know duration of the artillery preparation in order to prepare soldier for attack.

6. In the course of the artillery preparation and especially at 15-5 minutes before its end infantry unleashes fire from all weapons on the enemy combining salvos with rapid and slow - with a designated number of cartridges – fire. Every machine gun, anti-tank rifle, sniper is assigned own target. One or two minutes before the attack starts platoon commanders cease fire and gives a command “ready for attack”
Machine guns and snipers that are left at the start position to support advancing infantry don’t cease fire.

7. Upon “ready for attack” command soldiers arm grenades and load their weapons, take accessories needed to pass obstacles (ladders, mates, boards, scissors, explosive, flags for signaling), ammunition carriers take boxes with cartridges and grenades and each soldiers reports from his spot to the squad leader – ‘Soldier … is ready to attack”.

8. After taking a starting position in trenches soldiers immediately adapt trenches for prompt departure (making steps in the forward wall, install ladders etc). Commanders should pay a serious attention to it, especially in wintertime, in case of frozen earth and in deep trenches.

9. The order of execution of the command “To attack – forward”: soldiers are preparing to promptly jump out of the trench – they put a foot on a step and clutch a breastwork with a free hand, and if a sloped exit is made in the trench they go to its middle in a bent position.
If the attack is made from the ground – soldiers assume position to get up fast. Upon an additional command “forward” soldiers repeat this command and simultaneously jump out of the trench or get up from the ground and start movement.

10. Out regulation demands a fast movement in the attack. In troops training a method is still practiced when men walk by fast pace and only from a distance of 40-50 meters make a rush forward. That method is to be kept for attacks on large distances.
At close distances movement until the final rush with “Hurrah” should be made by steady calm running.
Movement to attack by running in case of good training was successfully practiced in our Army from a distance of 200 meters.
Officers should inform soldiers in advance about the method of movement: fast pace or steady run.

11. During movement to attack soldiers every 6-10 paces say “Forward” or some other encouraging words to each other.

12. Fire from attacking skirmish lines. When walking to attack all soldiers deliver fire at trench breastworks and embrasures making snap shots. Unaimed shooting must be categorically prohibited.
Every soldier should calculate to have 2-3 cartridges per rifle and 3-4 magazines per light machine gun or submachine gun at the moment hand-to-hand fighting starts.
When attacking by running the fire is delivered by the best trained submachine gunners, they run 10-7 paces forward and deliver a burst of fire and then continue a movement with the others.
When attacking at night or in limited visibility attacking skirmish lines don’t open fire, all soldiers must warned about it and safety catches must be switched off.

13. In order to press the enemy to the ground with fire by an attacking company and prevent him from delivering aimed fire the submachine gun platoon must be placed by groups and squads in intervals between platoons and by squads on flanks.
Submachine gunners attack together with riflemen.
Submachine gun platoon commander must provide for command of the platoon, to organize infiltration of submachine gunners to the depth of enemy defense and to gather them if needed.

14. After closing to enemy trenches upon a “Grenades” command by squad leaders and also without commands soldiers through grenades and without stop rush to attack objectives.
Grenades can also be thrown when passing through obstacles and minefields. To destroy obstacles one should through grenade bundles or antitank grenades, for that an increased number of grenades must be carried. To destroy a wire barrier it us useful to attach two cord pieces 20-25 cm long with screw-nuts on their end to a grenade bundle to make them cling to wires.

15. “Hurrah” – powerful, united and long. “Hurrah” is only shouted when closing at 50-40 meters to the enemy.
The regulation prescribes that the night attack is made without shouting “Hurrah”. However, it is not a mandatory rule. Special consideration of the superior commanders can dictate making a night attack with “Hurrah” shout.

16. Intervals in the attack are 6-8 paces between soldiers. In the attack troops close to the base platoon in a company, When attacking from a trench soldiers are situated at the start line 4-6 paces from each other, when attacking at night – 3-4 paces.

17. Troops shouldn't be allowed to hit the ground. Commands "Stop" and "Hit the ground"should be executed during the attack until the first trench is reached.
Once an attack begins it must only end inside enemy position with a victory.
Troops must understand that taking a prone position in the attack means not only a failure of the attack but also unnecessary casualties.
Neither fire, nor obstacles and minefields must stop an infantry attack. Regardless of losses it must progress forward to destroy enemy stunned by our artillery preparation. Officers must know positions and marks of lanes in obstacles and show them to troops.

18. If a unit is stopped by an intact obstacle, only light machine gunners, submachine gunners and snipers designated by a commander take cover and deliver fire on enemy embrasures and weapons pits, after passing the obstacle they must immediately get up and catch up with attackers.

19. Minefields should be passed without any stops regardless of losses. With minefields the German tries to make our infantry to lie down and destroy it with his artillery and mortar fire.
Soldiers should be trained to make passes with grenades and to pass minefields stepping on spots from grenade and mortar rounds and shells craters.

20. Attackers pass the first enemy trench line without lingering at it and attack the second trench line to which the Germans usually withdraw their soldiers during out artillery preparation and attack further on. A delay at the first trench line gives time for the Germans to leave shelters and meet attackers with fire. Moreover, the Germans usually concentrate mortar and artillery fire on the first trench line.
When communication trenches leading to the depth of enemy positions are available some squads specially designated by platoon and company commanders move to the second and further trench lines along these communication trenches. Submachine gunners should use communication trenches to infiltrate to the depth of enemy defenses.

21. Communication trenches going at oblique angle to our attack direction must be closed by specially detached groups or squads and blocked to prevent the enemy from infiltrating the rear of the attacking company.

22. Mop-up of trenches and search for enemy hiding in foxholes, shelters is performed by specially designated squads which catch up with the company after their work is finished unless they left to defend trenches. The company commander designates a trench commander responsible for the mop-up, who also watches that other soldiers don’t stay in trenches passed by the infantry.

23. When performing mop up of enemy trenches a specially designated squad inspects trenches and destroys enemies in shelters, foxholes if they don’t surrender. The order of mop-up – one soldier ahead with a grenade and a submachine gun, the other watches from the trench to the right, the third – to the left, the fourth – to the rear.
Upon a command of the forward soldier “grenades forward” the others pass grenades to him to replenish his grenade supply.
When entering a bunker or shelter to captivate their garrison or entering a trench branch one or two soldiers should be left outside. For that the group leader commands “…, …. - guard!”, otherwise our soldier from the next wave can throw grenade to the shelter or our soldiers entering shelters can be blocked by stray Germans staying in the trench.

24. A place of the commander during the attack. Squad leaders – in the middle of his squad. Platoon commanders at 15-20 paces behind their platoon’s skirmish line to watch regularity of the attack and control the going of the combat.
Company commanders go to the first enemy trench line as soon as the company advances 100 meter past it.

25. Platoon and company commanders closely watch their neighbor units assisting them if needed with fire and flanking attacks by a part of their forces and also watch enemy counterattacks repulsing them with fire and immediately launching a counterattack.
Any officer who notices a counterattacking enemy at long or medium distance immediately concentrates on him fire of heavy weapons, directs artillery and mortar fire, and without stopping his infantry closes with the enemy for hand-to-hand combat.
Germans launch frequent counterattacks to strike but to through our infantry off balance; as experience demonstrates they fear hand-to-hand combat and evade it.
Sudden counterattacks from close distances should be repulsed with fire.
A repulsed enemy counterattack presents the best moment to destroy the enemy and advance forward.

26. An impetus to go forward, alignment along the foremost troops, the use by single submachine gunners of any gaps in enemy position for an attack from the flank and read – such are provisions of our regulations.
The Germans as the war experience demonstrates, especially in the present time, fear attacks from flanks and rear.
The duty of any commander is to support those who advanced furthest.

27. In successive attacks in depth of enemy defenses company, platoon, and squad commanders should skillfully chose timing of the attack finding such a moment when enemy us suppressed and disorganized by our fire.

28. Attack on successive trench lines is made in the same manner as attack on the first line, when needed it is prepared by infantry fire. Any shifts of our artillery and mortar fire and our concentrated fire ahead of infantry give a signal to advance forward. Swiftness of combat inside enemy defensive belt, courage and audacity guarantee a victory and defeat of the enemy.

29. The order of execution of the successive attacks in depth of enemy positions.
Soldiers after reaching a firing line or a designated attack start line open fire by their discretion.
Any squad leader or platoon officer who reaches the line immediately organizes rapid salvo fire. Then he switches fire to a steady rate by a designated number of shots, for example: 15-20 cartridges from rifles and submachine guns, 5-10 series from a light machine gun. At the same time the platoon commander shows an attack objective to each squad, squad leaders explain them to soldiers are reports their squad’s readiness to attack.
After that the platoon commander opens salvo and rapid fire, gives a whistle signal or a signal to cease fire and commands “Ready for attack”

30. When organizing an attack, company and platoon commanders should assign a line 80 meters in front of the attack objective to supporting 50-mm and 82-mm mortars and designate an order of shifting fires to the depth of flanks when infantry reaches this line. Company commanders should teach mortars to deliver fire by themselves.

31. If an attack is supported by tanks, infantry should close to them as far as possible, guarding them from tank destroyers and showing them obstacles and detours. If the tanks stop – infantry moves ahead of tanks. Now you help tanks, then the tanks will help you.

32. When designating a base unit, one must check their ability to keep direction using local objects.
If a commander in the course of battle decides to change direction to assist his neighbor unit, he must report it to his superior and secure the old direction with at least a part of his forces. After giving assistance to the neighbor he must return to his unit.

33. Soldiers should keep their place in combat formation of their squads, and squads – of their platoon. The commander should attach any soldiers from other units who happen to be in his area.

34. Specially assigned soldiers designate captured bunkers and trenches by pre-arranged signals, for example red flags. Officers should instruct them. Signals are installed so that they are not observed by the enemy.

35. Command of a company and platoon is executed by signals, flags and whistles (horns) with mandatory duplication by voice.
It is useful for a company commander to send his liaisons on the track of the base platoon. These liaisons form a chain 80-40 meters from each other and transmit company commander’s orders and situation reports by voice. Company commanders use foxholes prepared by those liaisons for their advance forward and extend the chain with remaining messengers.

36. All officers should explain soldiers that in the trench combat and advance to the reserve positions they should not take any belongings left by the enemy which are unnecessary for combat, and also food and vine. Germans specially leave vine and broad, frequently poisoned, to detract our soldiers from combat mission, they plant booby traps in things left in shelters: watches, cigarette cases etc, and thus inflict casualties and disorganization to our troops.
One should be careful when using German weapons and ammunition; they can have booby traps as well.

37. When consolidating one should first of all organize observation and fire and from this base proceed to building trenches. One should always strive to occupy terrain favorable for observation and fire with a rear protected from enemy observation. Any stop is only a respite before a further offensive.

38. To fight off counterattacking tanks, in addition to squad tank destroyers the company create 1-2 tank destroyer teams composed of 1-2 anti-tank rifles, 2 soldiers with Molotov cocktails and anti-tank grenades, 1 pioneer, and 2 submachine gunners.
It is especially important to move forward guns attached to the company for consolidation.
To expedite hauling of gun in combat the company commander attaches to them riflemen and submachine gunners already on the stage of attack preparation.

39. German infantry cannot sustain night attacks. In development of offensive one should actively use night for audacious attacks and maneuver.

40. Swiftness of movement and decisions, swiftness of opening fire, cooperation with tanks, artillery and other weapons are essential. Swiftness stuns enemy and deprives him time to organize resistance and counterattacks.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134769027


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Re: Notes on tactics

#3

Post by Art » 30 Jan 2018, 10:10

Circular letter of the 42 Army’s staff, 23 February 1944 (synopsis)
To commanders of rifle corps, divisions, and regiments.

This letter is to summarize conclusions from tactical experience of the 42 Army in the recent operations

I. Breakthrough of enemy fortified position


1. The army’s offensive on 15 January 1944 was a surprise for the Germans, since jump-off positions were occupied secretly and with measures of concealment:
a) Jump-off positions were moved forward under the guise of preparing a forward defense position
b) Each unit occupied its own sector on the jump-off positions without passing through neighbor’s trenches
c) The sound of tanks going to jump-off positions was masked by explosions made in old wire barriers in a no man’s land; we intentionally didn’t destroy German wire before the artillery preparation started.
d) Occupation of jump-off positions by infantry was thoroughly planned and organized

2. Attacks on intermediate positions were prepared in a short time, prompt and effective reconnoitering was and would be of great importance

3. In all cases thorough reconnoitering of both jump-off positions and attack objectives is essential and must proceed according to a plan made in advance.

4. Panoramic sketches of enemy positions were used in a number of rifle and artillery units. Officers and even soldiers studied them even before reconnoitering (86, 125, 63 Guards Rifle Divisions). Unfortunately, this measure wasn’t employed widely enough.

5. Infantry density in the attack – no more than 5 paces per men. Intervals for heavy weapons supporting the attack, if overhead fire is impossible due to terrain conditions, are made by packing the attacking skirmish line even more closely.
Timely start of attack, swiftness of movement and aimed fire of attacking infantry provide of attack’s success.
63 Guards, 45 Guards and 125 Division were well trained to comply with this demand and achieved the biggest progress with minimal casualties.

6. The malign effect of infantry hitting the ground during the attack and prolonged stay in front of enemy positions was confirmed once again. If an attack fails the attackers must retreat to the start line and reorganize for a new attack – that is a duty of regimental commanders.
Regimental commanders must cover regrouping of infantry with fire of mortars and supporting artillery groups, prepare a new attack and give a new attack direction if needed. As a rule the attacks failed where regimental commander didn’t observe the battlefield in person (196, 291, 376, 109 and 86 Divisions)

7. Fire of heavy infantry weapons, in particular regimental cannons, proved its worth in preparation of attack. The biggest advance was where infantry cannons were used efficiently. In 109 Rifle divisions were direct fire guns were employed unskillfully and in 196, 291 and 376 Divisions, where none were employed at all, the attack failed. The infantry suffered excessive and unjustified losses and lost it spirit and confidence.

8. In preparation for attack every direct fire gun must be assigned its own target – a weapon emplacement or trench sector, and its fire must be supported by a medium or light machine gun, or an anti-tank rifle or sometimes a sniper.
Battalion commanders must give a certain target to every gun.

9. An experience of demolishing enemy wire barriers confirmed that two 76-mm guns and 120-130 HE shells are needed to make a pass 10-15 meters wide. Since wire barriers are placed close (25-35 meters) to enemy trenches and mines are normally installed in trenches’ parapet, the same rounds that were used to make passes in wire also demolished closest portions of trenches.

10. Small-arms fire 10-15 minutes before the attack proved its worth (125, 63 Guards, 45 Guards Divisions). Fire aimed at parapets and embrasures contributed to disorganization of enemy system of fire.

11. Experience confirmed that infantry should be trained in making passes in obstacles and minefields. We will never have enough engineers for all infantry units. German trenches in the area Uritsk, Novo-Panovo in addition to wire barrier in front of them had also wire spirals installed on parapets and wire traps 2-3 meters wide behind trenches. An increase supply of hand grenades would allow neutralizing them. A character of enemy obstacles must be clarified in advance by reconnaissance.

12. Infantry squads detached for hauling regimental guns proved their value. Direct fire guns swiftly advanced with infantry of 125 and 72 Rifle Divisions and broke resistance on fall-back positions and repulsed enemy tank counterattacks. However, in some units regimental guns lagged behind infantry.

II. [Combat in depth]

An experience confirmed that fall-back positions must be attacked swiftly but only after sufficient reconnaissance and reorganization.

1. It is important to attack the fallback position at night without making a pause until dawn. Examples: 63 Guards Rifle Division at Duderhof Heights, 125 Rifle Division at Hill 112.0, and 72 Rifle Division at Lemedimyaki-Solozi Ridge.

2. Reconnaissance of bypasses, flanking routes, and gaps between strongpoints is of great importance. A diversionary frontal attack contributes to success of outflanking movement.

3. When making outflanking movement it is important to give enemy no time to organize covering positions. Example: 72 Rifle Division when it bypassed Pushkin entered a forest and spent a night there, in the morning an enemy position was already organized in the forest, thus envelopment of the Pushkin group failed.

4. Continuous reconnaissance and maintenance of contact with enemy forces are mandatory. Reconnaissance is performed by both dedicated recon elements and usual units. Example: 109 Rifle Divison lost contact with enemy retreating from Uritsk to Staro-Panovo.
Reconnaissance is to be organized by forward companies and battalions.
In one case a screening force of 15 pioneers was deployed on a 1,5-km frontage and two our regiment during a whole night couldn’t determine its strength

5. No enemy strongpoints should be left behind advancing units, they must be encircled or at least pinned down by our units.


7. Every repulsed enemy counterattack must be used to go to all-out offensive. Hill 122 and the castle of Kirchehof were taken as a result of a combination of an outflanking movement with our frontal attack launched after an enemy counterattack was repulsed.

III. Pursuit

Germans retreat along the main roads and avoid local and poorly developed roads. They detach covering forces to counter a pursuit along parallel roads.

1. Every officer must be ready to start a pursuit immediately. Inform a superior officer. Audacity is preferred to caution.

2. Sometimes, when a pursuit by an entire unit is impossible it should be started with the most fresh and ready elements. The rest of the force is to prepare to support them.

3. Strong anti-tank weapons must be given to vanguards. Example: 103 Rifle Regiment/85 Rifle Division was in a critical situation at Krasnaya Gorka – Gridino without sufficient AT weapons.

4. Engineers must follow vanguard to repair roads and to guard them if necessary. Sometimes 1/3 of the column must be employed to clear a road. Example: pursuit of the 86 Rifle Division from Lyady to Mezhnik was efficiently supported by engineers.

5. Communications between outflanking detachments and units making a frontal movement are mandatory. Secrecy when using radio. Examples: open radio messages by 72 Rifle Division betrayed its flanking movement to the enemy.

6. Sometimes it is needed to leave screening forces against separate enemy groups and to continue pursuit with the bulk of own force. Also screens against enemy relief columns.

7. Parallel roads as far as possible from the main roads must be used for pursuit. Engagements with enemy screening groups must be avoided they must be pinned down and the bulk of own pursuit force must go forward to cut off enemy retreat routes in chosen points. These points must be defiles or road junctions when strong forces are available. When they are reached a hedgehog defense should be organized around them, screening forces should be sent, and if possible the enemy must be attacked in cooperation for forces attacking from a front and flank. Large pursuit forces organize several strongpoints on enemy retreat routes.

8. In pursuit by parallel roads various surprise occurrences are possible. They must force a commitment of the pursuit force earlier than expected. Reconnaissance, security and concealment of our movement always give us an advantage. Swift deployment of our units and weapons are of decisive importance.

9. Movement without roads, in forests or marches is a usual and frequent occurrence. Forces must be conserved and our troops – lightened as war as possible without compromising their battle strength. Detachment should be sent in advance to prepare trails.
Ski units are of greatest importance in winter pursuit. Unfortunately ski troops were not employed as they should be, since most divisions left their skis in Leningrad.

IV. Cooperation between infantry and artillery


1. In almost all divisions cooperation with artillery was properly organized in accordance with provisions of out manuals. Only 109 Rifle Division was worse in this respect, also it didn’t organize a proper employment of direct fire guns.

2. Registration of a mass of artillery was organized so that there was no mutual interference.

3. As the battle developed infantry commander frequently didn’t pay enough attention to artillery, didn’t give it tasks and didn’t employ its fire to support units whose attacks stuck or who were counterattacked.

4. Positioning of battery, battalion and group commanders with respective infantry commanders at their observation posts, well organized radio communications with firing positions played a positive role.

5. Designation of forward units’ positions with flares produced a beneficial effect, especially in cooperation with air forces.

6. There were cases when captured enemy guns were employed in combat. Artillery should provide for such cases, detaching special crews and, if needed, means of traction.

V. [Employment of tanks]

1. Experience demonstrated that tanks frequently advance far ahead and lose contact with infantry. That situation should be blamed on slow movement of some infantry units.

2. A tank units’ tendency for frontal attacks was noted (battle for Volosovo). Tank should maneuver on the battlefield and make attacks from flanks and rear.

3. There were cases when tanks stuck in holes, craters, sands etc. Every infantryman should show the best route to tanks that follow him. Special signals to designate routes should be prearranged.

4. Tanks were effectively used in the depth of enemy defense. For example, the tank group in a night attack at Russko-Vysotskoye overran enemy infantry and artillery columns retreating from Uritsk and Volodarsky and Bezzabotniy and connected with units of the 2 Shock Army.
It is worth to mention that tanks operated at night with their light one, which shook enemy morale.

5. Cooperation between tanks and artillery and designation of tanks and infantry at night by pre-arranged signals are of great importance.

VI. Forced marches

In pursuit of enemy to the Luga River line the Army advanced 22 km per day in average, some units made 40-45 km daily marches in a desolate roadless and marshy area during a snowfall.
[Measures to maintain march discipline, avoid traffic jams and straggling are described.]

By 3.3.44 this letter is to be studied by all officers, and certain parts also by sergeant and privates.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134075144

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Re: Notes on tactics

#4

Post by Eugen Pinak » 31 Jan 2018, 12:24

Art - thank you for posting those interesting documents here.

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Re: Notes on tactics

#5

Post by Art » 02 Feb 2018, 15:51

Conclusions from tactical experience of the 44 Guards Tank Brigade (December 43 - January 44 in Ukraine, Zhitomir/Berdichev operation)
1. To ensure continuous command and communication brigade HQ was at closest position to battle elements. On the march HQ was with the column of the brigade's main forces. Communications in mobile operations - mostly by radio and liaisons. Wire communications were set up at stops longer than 4 hours.

2. Battle experience demonstrated that every tank attack must be preceded by an artillery preparation. When no supporting artillery was available a short preparation was made by tanks deployed in battle formations, also by organic anti-tank battery. Own infantry usually couldn't provide a strong fire support due to limited number of ammunition.

3. Sappers (organic and attached) were placed on tanks as tank-riders and were instrumental in clearing mines, marking passes in minefields, and making dugouts for tanks.

4. Tanks were fully filled was fuel and there were 130 cannon rounds inside tanks and 3-4 boxes of ammunition loaded on tanks. Refueling was made after every march or combat. These measures ensure that no shortage was felt.

5. Typical combat methods:

a) Tank attack before dawn or at dusk when enemy anti-tank gun or tanks are not capable of delivering aimed fire. Attacks at dawn are preferable, since consolidation, mop-up, refueling and repair would be made in daylight.
b) Tanks attack at night with lights on.
c) Tanks deployed in line deliver a powerful fire strike at the attack objective from a standing position. Especially useful, when few or no supporting artillery is available.
d) In case of enemy tank attack, several out tanks concentrate their fire at the leading vehicle. When it is knocked out the fire is shifted to other vehicles.
e) Combined attack with infantry: tanks advance by leaps from one position to another, at each position they wait until infantry catches up, then make another leap.

6. Problems/shortcomings:

a) Infantry of rifle units is not trained for combined actions with tanks. Organic infantry of the brigade provides more efficient support but is too weak. A stronger infantry element in the brigade is needed.
b) Brigade reconnaissance elements are too weak. A reconnaissance company with tanks, armor cars and motorcycles, and equipped with radio is needed.
c) Officers frequently cannot read maps and lose orientation and direction.
d) Troops use to look back at neighbors and lack resolution in attack.

7. Measures to counter enemy new tactical methods:
Enemy started to use small groups of tanks in ambush positions in rearguards to cover retrograde movements. Hence:
a) Brigade needs 1-2 battery of self-propelled guns to combat enemy tanks.
b) Smoke rounds should be introduced to tank ammunition load to blind enemy tank ambushes.
c) Fire with incendiary shells and bullets on suspected ambush positions.
Synopsis from an after-action report of the 44 GTBr:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=113131495

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Re: Notes on tactics

#6

Post by Art » 03 Feb 2018, 14:46

Tactical formations of platoon and company in attack on trench (from experience of the 96 Guards Rifle Division, January 1944
At Stalingrad, Mius and Molochnaya River units usually attacked trenches deployed in one skirmish line. This formation had a number of flaws, especially considering that division usually had only 40-50% of authorized personnel:
a/ Slow movement
b/ Large losses are suffered when attacking a strongly fortified position
c/ Lack of maneuverability
d/ Impossible to rpobe a weak spot in enemy positions
e/ Problems with control even in squad level
f/ No support can be given to attacking elements from the rear

Experience demonstrated:
1. Company and platoon usually approached to a distance 100-120 m. from enemy position in line formation, and from a distance of 80-100 m bunched in close formations, especially when approaching trenches.
2. Squads rushed forward in non-conventional [not covered by manuals] formations under leadership of sergeants.
3. Support groups (usually a platoon) were sent to places of break-in to develop success and destroy enemy in trenches.
4. Platoons in most cases formed a compact file at a distance of 80-100 meters from enemy trenches.
5. There were cases when small groups infiltrated enemy positions and opened fire on enemy groups from the rear.
6. Compact formations allow massed and concentrated fire in every directions with all kinds of weapons (grenades, rifles, submachine guns)
7. Enemy can easily handle attacks by single men but when attacked by compact groups loses moral strength and flees.
8. Close contact gives a moral boost to own soldiers.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=151900453
In other words they invented a bicycle (group tactics) almost 30 years after it was first invented .

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Re: Notes on tactics

#7

Post by Pips » 05 Feb 2018, 04:55

Brilliant Art. Makes for fascinating reading - and quite scary if one was in the PBI.

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Re: Notes on tactics

#8

Post by Eugen Pinak » 05 Feb 2018, 15:03

Art wrote:In other words they invented a bicycle (group tactics) almost 30 years after it was first invented .
Actually, the story here is way more complicated. In October 1942 Red Army infantry was ordered to use firing line as its' sole tactical formation in the attack. Of course, it wasn't practical, but you can't simply ignore order, signed by comrade Stalin. So troops in the field had to make excuses why firing line is bad and normal group tactic is good.

Pips wrote:Makes for fascinating reading - and quite scary if one was in the PBI.
Show me the war that was easy on the infantry ;)

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Re: Notes on tactics

#9

Post by Art » 08 Feb 2018, 14:07

Some conclusion from operations of the 31 Army, March 1944
1. During artillery preparation infantry advanced without being noticed to passes in engineer obstacles and when fires were lifted (there was a pause in fire 5-7 minutes long) it moved to attack and captured the first trench line. Germans couldn’t sustain an onslaught and retreated to the second trench.
2. Instead of sweeping and uninterrupted advance the infantry lingered at the first trench line. The enemy took use of this pause to reorganize and arrange a system of fire.
3. Infantry attack wasn’t accompanied by continuous artillery fire. In the most critical moment of the attack artillery stop firing for 5-7 minutes when it shifted its fires to the depth, so the enemy was given an opportunity to organize resistance on the second trench line.
4. A complete inability of infantry to combine fire with movement became obvious. Movement to attack wasn’t supported by machine gun fire. During attack heavy infantry weapons were in movement and didn’t deliver fire.
5. Numerous marshy areas restricted maneuver of tanks which could only move straight ahead at low speed.
6. Support guns lagged behind infantry and couldn’t neutralize in a timely manner enemy weapons that impeded its advance. Commanders of rifle units didn’t take care of hauling attached guns.
7. A number of shortcomings in organization of command and control were revealed. Unit commanders didn’t keep personal observation, so they didn’t know a real situation, false situation reports were given, ammunition was expended in vain, cooperation with tanks and artillery couldn’t be organized.
8. Artillery observers lagged behind infantry, didn’t observe targets and couldn’t neutralize them.
9. 5-6 days were allotted to prepare the operation, so there was a lack of time to study terrain and enemy.
10. Rifle divisions had 3400-4440 men, that means no more than 500-800 men in infantry. Thus, attack power of divisions was very weak. Artillery, especially heavy, experienced a shortage of ammunition.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133165689

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Re: Notes on tactics

#10

Post by Art » 14 Feb 2018, 18:12

German tactical methods in counterattacks and methods of repelling counterattacks (from experience of the 72 Rifle Corps, March 1944)
1. German methods of counterattacks
In local operations the corps encountered a number of instances when enemy lost some localities (trenches, hills) and tried to restore situation with counterattacks. Character of counterattacks is as follows:
1. Every counterattack is preceded by short but powerful fire strike on the forward line and artillery and mortar positions and communications in depth, then there is methodical but rather strong artillery fire in depth and on flanks of attacked locality. Infantry up to a company strong advances after the fire strike in a narrow sector, accompanied by 2-4 tanks or self-propelled guns. According to a common trait of enemy tactics [SP] guns advance in battle formations of infantry or behind it and support the attack from a standing position. SP guns and tanks depending on terrain deliver fire from covered positions or from behind hill crests, trying to stay protected from our anti-tank fire.
2. There is also a second frequently employed method of counterattack. The enemy, as it is commonly known, positions separate outposts on the forward line, keeping the bulk of his garrison in shelters 200-250 meters behind.
After our artillery preparation infantry in shelters frequently stays unscathed, since local operations are mostly supported by mortar fire, but weapons on the forward line are neutralized and our infantry manages to break in the first trench line.
In a short while enemy infantry leaves shelters and without any artillery or mortar preparation counterattacks our infantry. There were cases when our troops, who were outnumbered and didn’t have time to consolidate, were driven back.

Our methods of repelling counterattacks
1. All counterattacks preceded by an artillery preparation were repulsed mostly by artillery and mortar fire and also by flanking machine guns, since machine guns of neighbor units stay intact and not neutralized.
2. Counterattacks of the second type were repulsed by fire of infantry and sometimes by artillery and mortar fire. It’s not always possible to employ artillery and mortars, since our infantry is close to the enemy and its precise position is not known. In such cases our attacking infantry was driven back.

27.3.44
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=287673488

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Re: Notes on tactics

#11

Post by Art » 20 Feb 2018, 09:27

Analysis of German counterattacks, 5 Army/West Front.
In February-March 1944 the enemy launched 52 counterattacks. Of them 43 in daytime and 9 at night. Only 4 counterattacks were fully successful, of them 3 in daytime and 1 at night. 14 counterattacks were associated with special conditions of weather (fog, snow, rain), of them two achieved surprise and were successful.
Counterattacks were mostly launched by company-battalion sized forces. Of 52 counterattacks 33 were made by forces up to a company strong, 15 – up to a battalion, and only 4 by forces less than a company. As a rule counterattacks were preceded by short but powerful artillery and mortar strikes on the object of attack, then fires were shifted to flanks and rear. In nighttime counterattacks were started without artillery preparation, that were for the most part counterattacks launched to regain sectors of trenches previously lost.
Of 52 counterattacks 23 were supported by small groups of tanks or self-propelled guns (2-12). Tanks and SP guns delivered fire using semicovered positions on short stops. In some instances they tried to take flanking positions to take use of oblique fire. In three cases backpack flamethrowers were used to clear trenches. The best means to counter flamethrowers were employment of hand grenades, concentrated fire of submachine guns or machine guns concentrated, mines installed in fire or communication trenches.
Well-organized observation and reconnaissance are essential for repulsing counterattacks. The principal means of fighting counterattacks was concentrated fire of artillery and mortars on enemy infantry and fire of anti-tank guns against tanks and SP guns.
Of 52 counterattacks in February-March 48 were repulsed by concentrated fire of artillery, mortars and machine guns and only 4 by individual infantry weapons.
Conclusions
Enemy usually counterattacks from a flank with forces of company-battalion strength supported by artillery, mortars, machine guns and small groups of tanks and SP guns. The most reliable means to fight counterattacks is thoroughly organized fire of artillery, mortars and machine guns in combination with short and surprise strikes of reserves against flanks of attacking enemy.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136064208

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Re: Notes on tactics

#12

Post by Art » 21 Feb 2018, 17:43

Conclusions on winter operations of tanks and self-propelled guns in marshy and forested areas (from experience of the 6 Guards Army).
The number of trails suitable for tanks is usually limited to no more than two per kilometer of the front. The corresponding number of tanks that could operate in such areas was 10-15 tanks supported by a self-propelled battery per km on the sector of main attack and 4-5 tanks and 2-3 SP guns per km for secondary attacks. Groups of 8-12 tanks and 3-5 SP guns advanced along every trail.
Every operation was preceded by combined training exercise of infantry and tanks on a terrain similar to the future area of operation.
For better liaison with infantry a tank unit commander should be collocated with a commander of supported infantry unit.
Special measures against German heavy tanks and tanks destroyers should be arranged in advance; otherwise our tanks would suffer heavy losses as a result of superiority in range of the German 88-mm tank gun.

In marshy and forested areas where maneuver of tanks is constrained, the most efficient formation would be tanks behind infantry (200-400 m behind infantry lines). Battle experience has demonstrated that when tanks attacked ahead of infantry they suffered large losses and were not capable of giving sufficient assistance to infantry.
In most cases movement was only possible along single trails and the column of tanks was the only suitable battle formation. Tanks that deviated from trails bogged down and were knocked out by enemy. In few instances small groups (4-5) could be deployed in line with a good effect.
In some cases tanks supported the initial infantry attack by fire from static positions and only started movement when the first trenches were captured. Another tactical method was employment of tanks and SP guns in two echelons. The first echelon advanced with infantry, the second deployed 300-400 meters behind supported the first echelon by fire and developed its success. In case of good cooperation between echelons this formation proved efficient (Nevel, December 1943 and January 1944).
Appropriate compositions of echelons: first echelon - medium tanks (T-34) in battle lines of infantry or 200-300 km behind them. Second echelon – light tanks 300-400 m behind the first echelon. Third echelon – heavy tanks and SP guns 500-600 m behind the second. Another possible formations: medium and light tanks, SU-76, SU-85 in the first echelon, KV and SU-152 in the second echelon 600 meters behind.

In many cases attacks were checked because German anti-tank guns were not neutralized or destroyed by artillery preparation. Every unit of 15-20 tanks should be assigned an artillery group composed of 122-152-mm howitzers or 120-mm mortars to combat enemy tanks and anti-tank guns as attack progresses. Tank unit commander should command them via a radio and an artillery observer should be placed with him on the observation post for fire direction.
Engineer works before the offensive should be performed on a broad front in order not to reveal the actual place of tank attack. Special attention to the engineer preparation of tanks’ movement from assembly positions to the forward line of enemy defenses. Also tank should carry sappers that would support them at the forward line and in further depth. Admittedly, as confirmed by practical experience in such cases sappers suffer heavy losses, but no better solution is available. Tanks especially need sappers when passing the belt of engineer obstacles.
In recent operations reconnoitering of terrain wasn’t sufficiently effective as some number of tanks bogged down already on the way from assembly areas to the forward line, especially in bad weather and at night. Reconnoitering should be made in such a way that every tank would reach the forward line without any stops caused by terrains. All difficult or ill-passable areas must be marked by signs or – a night - by traffic controllers with torches.
All tanks should be equipped with pioneer tools and crews should be trained to use them. It is useful to equip each tank with two logs, about 30 cm in diameter and 6 m long, two bundles of fascines and a steel rope to help negotiate turfy soil and engineer obstacles.
Diversity of tank types created certain problems: bridges passable by light and medium tanks were crushed by heavy vehicles (KVs and SU-152), hence attacks were halted.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136105039

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Re: Notes on tactics

#13

Post by Art » 24 Feb 2018, 19:27

Brief report on battle experience of the Belorussian Front's armored forces in January 1944

From experience of operation of the 36 Separate Tank Regiment on 4-5 January 1944

The regiment operated in the area Uzniki-Nikonovichi with well developed field fortifications. The area had many marshy areas and small streams, which couldn't be seen under snow cover, so intensive terrain reconnaissance was needed.
Two day before the attack the regiment concentrated at an assembly area 4-5 km from the frontline, so that opportunity for intensive reconnoitering was provided. Tank occupied a starting position only 10 minutes before the beginning of infantry attack. Movement to the starting position was made at slow speed; sound of tanks was masked by artillery preparation. As a result employment of tanks achieved a complete surprise, and the enemy couldn’t regroup his AT guns to counter tanks.
The regiment was employed in two groups: a smaller group of 5 tanks was attached to a neighbor division. Such employment was dictated by the need to bypass a forested area and enemy strongpoints.
Tank attack started only after infantry achieved a break-in and secured crossings over a stream at the forward line and breached enemy anti-tank defenses. As a result tanks penetrated enemy defenses almost without losses and by the end of the day advanced 15 km from the initial position and severed Mogilev-Gomel road.

1. Battle formations
Terrain conditions didn’t allow deploying the regiment in line. Also the regiment had a variety of vehicles types: T-34, KV, T-60 and one SU-152, so a formation was needed that would allow taking use of specific characteristics of each vehicle.
A combat reconnaissance group – 4 T-34 with 4-5 riders (including 2-3 sappers with mine-detectors) on each tank was deployed forward. First echelon – 8 T-34 each with 8 riders 200-250 meters behind the reconnaissance group. Second echelon – 2 KVs, 3 T-60s and 1 SU-152 300 meters behind the first echelon. T-60 tanks were detached at some stages to destroy separate groups of infantry or were used as liaison vehicles.

Image

Scheme 1. Battle formations of the 36 Tank Regiment

2. Joint actions with tank riders.
In the first phase the tanks advanced meeting little resistance. When tanks received machine gun fire, riders dismounted. Machine guns were destroyed by specially assigned tanks, and then infantry mounted tanks again.
When tanks received gun fire from the hill 1 km NW of Gayevsky they retreated behind cover (a hill north of Gayevsky), riders dismounted and started to advance forward outflanking gun positions. When infantry bypassed guns from flanks and rear they paralyzed them with machine-pistol fire and gave a pre-arranged signal (white flare). Tanks first supported infantry with fire from a standing position and attacked after receiving a signal. The enemy battery was destroyed by a simultaneous attack of tanks from the front and infantry riders from flanks and rear. The same method with a similar effect was repeated on this day at Hill 158.6. Characteristically the regiment lost only 2 tanks on this day, and tank riders suffered no losses at all.

In addition to well-established methods of joint actions of tanks and infantry described in out manuals, one should mention a method successfully employed by 36 and 223 Tank Regiment in January operations.
Operating in depth of enemy defenses tanks detached as far as 1-1.5 km from infantry. Tanks advanced by leaps of 1-1.5 km from one position to another. Owing to its weakness infantry advanced only slowly and was delayed by machine gun and mortar fire. In order to propel the attack tanks made a leap (up to 1.5 km long) forward to a suitable firing position, where they maneuvered waiting for infantry to catch up. A part of tanks was detached to destroy enemy weapons they stayed behind them and delayed infantry advance. When infantry reached them tanks made another leap. It should be noted that this method was practiced in the right sector of the front where terrain was more accessible for tanks. In the center and especially on the left wing [Pripyat marshes], the principal and frequently the only possible method was employment of small groups of tanks (3-5 vehicles) in lines of infantry or behind them.

Special remarks.

1. Tanks that were damaged on the battlefield successfully used smoke handgrenades to imitate burning. Typically the enemy stopped fire at damaged tanks so that they could be repaired or evacuated.
2. Operations in marshy and forested area place heavy demands on engineer support. Bringing up construction materials for building bridges over streams, channels or marshes was frequently problematic due to tactical situation. Tank brigades of the 1 Guards Tank Corps successfully employed sledges loaded with logs 25-30 cm in diameter which were hauled by tanks. Tanks with sledges moved at the column tail and brought logs to sites where crossings where arranged. Frequently channels were simply filled with logs.
From:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=152127216

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Re: Notes on tactics

#14

Post by Art » 04 Mar 2018, 12:56

Directive of the 39 Army’s command, November 1943
I propose to adopt the following principles of battle employment of infantry and other arms

Infantry
1. Infantry is the principal arm upon which victory in battle depends. Density of infantry must be sufficiently large, not less than 400-500 men per km.
2. Regimental sector in attack – not more than 500-700 meters, or 300-350 in sectors of the main attack.
3. Battle formations of the regiment – three echelons in the main attack, and two echelons in secondary sectors. All infantry heavy weapons (guns, mortars, machine guns) must be placed forward to support the first echelon. Heavy infantry must create a “sea of fire” to pin down enemy troops, so they won’t be able to resist our infantry attack. Every echelon in the regiment must be assigned a specific and clear objective.
4. To increase shock strength of infantry tanks should be attached to every echelon. As a rule every first-line company is reinforced by 2-3 tanks. Regardless of availability of tanks the first echelon of infantry should have 1/3 of all tanks, the second and others – 2/3.
5. Ski battalions shouldn’t be employed for breakthrough but should be in the divisional reserve instead.
6. Offensive should go on day and night. For this end it is desirable to have one fresh battalion in a division for night operations, this battalion is not employed in daytime combat.
7. Every regiment should have special units for consolidation of conquered territory. They should be reinforced with single guns, AT rifles, machine guns, sappers, mines and trench tool.
8. Infantry must attack standing up straight. For this end artillery and aviation most bombard the enemy positions so strongly that his weapons would be destroyed or at least neutralized for the first hour of combat.
A harmful practice of infantry lingering at first trench lines must be discontinued. Infantry should pass the first trench lines and advance further. Capture of prisoners and mop-up of trenches should be assigned to scouts.
9. One have to demand from infantry an unstoppable advance even through narrow corridors which are to be broadened by flanking actions of neighbor units.

Artillery
1. Artillery should have a large number of pieces to ensure success of infantry. In shock sectors not less than 150 pieces per km.
2. Every attacking infantry company should be supported but at least an artillery battalion. One of battery commanders is placed with infantry for liaison and coordination. In this way infantry would be supported by massed artillery fire both in the artillery preparation and attack itself.
3. Infantry support groups have to be created not only in divisions but also in corps where they should include heavy artillery. Battle grouping of artillery:
a/ Regimental artillery and heavy weapons
b/ Divisional support groups
c/ Corps support groups
d/ Counterbattery groups
Grouping of artillery must provide for concentrated fire of any number of batteries, battalions, and regiments on any spot.
4. Artillery commander must have all targets numerated. Every artillery officer should have a map or scheme of targets.
5. Special attention to artillery observation and reconnaissance. Thorough organization of communications inside artillery and with infantry.
6. Normal order of artillery preparation and support of attack:
a/ 3-5 minute fire strike including rocket launchers.
b/ Registration and fire for destruction – 60 min
c/ Fire strike for neutralization – 20 minutes, including all calibers, at maximal tempo. Do not spare ammunition.
d/ Second salvo of rocket launchers before the attack.
e/ Support of infantry with successive concentrations or rolling barrage, depending on availability of ammunition.

Tanks
1. Tanks should lead infantry, not the other way around.
2. Tanks of the first echelon must deliver continuous unaimed fire in movement to create noise boosting infantry’s spirit and suppressing enemy morale. Tanks of the second echelon deliver aimed fire.
3. Cooperation with infantry must be thoroughly organized. Every company should know which tanks support it and vice versa. Every tank crew should know which guns support it.

Aviation reinforces artillery fire. Targets are not divided between artillery and aviation but their strike overlap instead. Aviation strike should coincide with the end of artillery preparation. First strike according to a plan, others – on call.

Command and communications. From experience of previous operations communications on the level of army-corps-division-brigade were adequate. However, on the level of division-regiment, and especially regiment-battalion-company wire communications were constantly interrupted and such means as flares, flags, horns, whistles, messengers were in little use or were not used at all. As a result command was lacking clarity, information frequently came too late, and commanders of all levels couldn’t make timely decisions.
1. Signal units must be supplied with necessary personnel, transport and communication equipment.
2. Check availability and readiness of rifle companies’ command sections. Command section should include 2 signalers, 3 messengers, and 1 observer. Sections must be equipped with simplest means of communications – flags, horns, whistles, flares etc.
….
Commander of the 39 Army lieutenant general Berzarin
Member of the military council major general Romko
Chief of staff colonel Siminovsky

28.11.43
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=2305091

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Re: Notes on tactics

#15

Post by Art » 07 Mar 2018, 10:10

Some conclusions from the Ribshevo operation of the 43 Army/Kalinin Front (August 1943)
….
II. German defenses doesn’t include any permanent fortifications. They consist of a maze of trenches skillfully adapted to terrain (concealment, observation, fields of fire) and requirements of defensive combat.
For example, at Matveyevo, Ivoshino there were more than 16 000 meters of trenches. Instead of concrete or wooden-earth pillboxes the Germans build numerous open fire positions in trenches 15-20 meters from each other. It seems that Germans believe and for a good reason that those positions provide for wide maneuver of weapons which cannot be said about pillboxes. For the same effect pillboxes must be built in the same numbers as positions in trenches which is not practically possible (*)

* This notion is true on regard to field defense on directions of secondary importance. It can also be applied to mobile or hastily occupied defense. As far as fortified regions and strongly fortified positions are concerned permanent fortifications retain their value.

Sooner or later the attacker must discover most of pillboxes and since they are immobile, he will destroy them with his artillery, in particular with direct fire guns, which is not difficult to make. Moreover, open fire positions are easy to mask, and it is difficult to detect them, wide maneuver with weapons – all that makes reconnaissance of system of defensive fire problematic. As a result during artillery preparation the attacker has no choice but to shell areas or expected targets which is practically the same. This type of fire, as it is commonly known, produces little effect.
A system of deep and narrow trenches makes it easy to maneuver with personnel and also facilitates command of units. Trenches serve as shelters for personnel from artillery and aviation bombardment. Senior commanders can use trenches for maneuver in the process of battle. Therefore durability of German defenses rests on artillery and mortar fire and also maneuver of personnel and weapons in defensive positions consisting of trench system protected by strong minefields and wire fences. Naturally such defense requires sufficiently trained troops capable of sustaining a shock of attack.
As experience demonstrated this defense is rather durable. Its durability is proportional to strength and concentration of defender’s artillery and mortar fire. Sufficient to say that of all number of wounded lost by the 306 and 179 Rifle Divisions in the first two days of the battle equal to 1673 – 75-80% fall to splinter wounds. The rest 20-25% are bullet wounds (*)
* It is indicative that a large part of officers’ wounds fall to bullets. That gives a ground to suspect that enemy snipers take part in defense against our attacks. Snipers rifles captured from German have 5-digit serial numbers. This fact indicates that sniping is widely practiced in the German Army.

A large percentage of losses to shell splinters shows that enemy artillery and mortar batteries are not sufficiently destroyed or neutralized by our fire. Here follows a conclusion that struggle with enemy artillery and mortars in offensive should be intensified, first of all during the attack on the enemy forward line.
According to witnesses of many commanders the main reason why advance of our infantry was delayed or stopped altogether “was defensive barrage of enemy artillery and mortars” (colonel Shkurin) (*)

* during the same two day these two divisions lost 812 men killed in action or 2485 together with wounded which makes about 1/3 of their bayonet strength (7575) or 17% of the total number of troops including support units (15 086)

Commander of the 179 Rifle Division colonel Shkurin expressed the following idea: “infantry can easily pass through machine gun fire. The main obstacle for attackers is the fire of artillery and mortars, hence we should destroy enemy mortar and artillery batteries”

The notion that enemy machine guns are not dangerous for attackers may sound like a paradox considering that already in the World War I automatic weapons were capable of wearing down enemy attack strength, and attacks in most cases were unsuccessful. As it is commonly known, that was a reason for invention of tanks as a new offensive weapon. However, now combatants learned how to knock out machine guns with direct fire cannons integrated into battle formations of infantry. From battle experience 1-2 cannons attached to a rifle company and one howitzer per battalion provide sufficient firepower to combat machine guns. Moreover, part of machine guns are destroyed by artillery preparation or neutralized by a rolling barrage. Consequently under these conditions the problem of destruction or neutralization of enemy batteries comes to the forefront. Also destroying or even blinding enemy artillery observers would also strongly reduce effectiveness of artillery fire. Meanwhile this problem doesn’t get sufficient attention. We don’t even have smoke rounds in ammunition load of artillery and mortars. A periodical shelling of suspected observation posts with smoke rounds can strongly obstruct aimed fire.

Another reason of large losses to artillery and mortar fire is infantry’s lack of ability to pass through a zone of fire, which we haven’t overcome thus far.
Instead of energetic advance forward the infantry lies down and suffers excessive losses. Commanders forget that energetic movement toward the attack objective reduces causalities and also facilitates the attack. In this case enemy gunners and mortar crews don’t have time to change aiming, or they can cease fire altogether for a fear to engage their own troops as the distance between attackers and defenders shortens. That is especially relevant if attack starts from a position of close contact with enemy. Moreover, a fast advance regardless of defensive fire creates a feeling of inevitable impending clash. And since attacker is always far numerous than defender, the latter is more prone to lose his courage seeing a fast attack movement. Therefore a fast advance toward the enemy under artillery fire is of tremendous psychological meaning.

When infantry lies down under artillery fire it only creates immobile targets which are easy to hit (*)
* That problem was especially prominent in the March operation of the 43 Army.

Battle formations of infantry are still too congested, which is explained by a herd instinct and a poor leadership of commanders in lower and medium echelons, and that makes casualties even larger.

Further on, infantry in attack sparsely uses its fire. 179 Rifle Division expended 332 000 rifle cartridges, whereas expenditure of artillery and mortar rounds (excluding 50-mm mortars) was 31 000. Hence we have 10-11 cartridges per every round or 20-21 counting machine-pistols ammo. 306 Rifle Division during the same period expended 12-13 rifle cartridges per every round or 22-23 with machine-pistols. For comparison in the most intensive period of the Brusilov’s offensive (June 1916) the same quantity was 450-500 cartridges per round. Admittedly the nature of battle is entirely different now. Still these numbers provide some idea of intensity of small weapons fire in this operation.
In the 179 Rifle Division average expenditure was 140-150 rifle cartridges per riflemen or 70-75 in one day, that is equivalent to only 14-15 minutes of rifle fire with a normal rate.

179 and 306 Rifle Divisions suffered most losses when they passed so-called critical zone, i.e. during movement to the attack objectives. That tendency is typical for every offensive combat. It is felt most acutely when most enemy weapons are not neutralized and enemy infantry and heavy weapons manage to prepare themselves to meet the attack. Consequently when artillery fire is lifted the enemy should be kept in his shelters (in this case in trenches) for a time needed for infantry to pass a distance from a start line to a forward line of defenses (forward trenches). The closer is the start line occupied by the infantry to the enemy the smaller this time is. In this moment it is of utmost importance to prevent enemy infantry from even raising their heads above trenches. That is the moment when no other arm can do as much as infantry itself. For that purpose it should deliver a massed rifle fire aimed at trench parapets, each rifleman choosing an individual aiming point in front of him. In this case skirmish lines of infantry produce neutralization fire on a wide frontage which would save it from excessive casualties and facilitates combat in trenches.

III. Returning to the question of struggle for German defensive positions one should pay special attention to the period of artillery preparation we call “fire on targets”. In the eyes of artillery commander the defensive position with all its trenches looks like a desert. He doesn’t see targets suitable for his weapons (*). The enemy doesn’t have bunkers and pillboxes. During our artillery fire machine guns take shelter in deep trenches. Consequently there is only one target left – the trench itself. But fire from cannons, as experience demonstrated, due to flatness of their trajectory doesn’t produce good effect on a trench. Tens thousand rounds fired at German trenches couldn’t demolish them. There were only single direct hits. The bulk of ammunition was expended by cannon artillery. Cannon rounds produced the bulk of splinters that kept enemy infantry and weapons hiding in trenches were they were reliably protected from fire. Only a smaller part of ammunition expenditure belonged to howitzers or heavy mortars, and lack of accuracy in fire against trenches only reinforced this tendency.

* Commander of the 179 Rifle Division’s artillery colonel Vinokurov said on 27.8.43 “20 minute fire on targets is nothing but a waste of ammunition”

Therefore cannon artillery produced mostly a morale effect on the enemy, but didn’t inflict much harm with its splinters. Hence wee have a problem of finding suitable weapons for combating enemy defending trenches. As demonstrated by experience howitzers and heavy mortars with their steep trajectory can inflict a higher percentage of casualties on the enemy and speed up the battle tempo.
In this respect a massed fire of 122-mm howtizers and 120-mm mortars on enemy trenches (938 Rifle Regiment at Gorokhovo) with preliminary registration which produced good effect deserves a closer study and circulation. Also a high quality fire from 82-mm mortars needs to be fostered. The rifle regiment has 27 of these mortars and they account for the bulk of steep-trajectory firepower. Meanwhile personnel of 82-mm mortar companies are not subject to special selection and the crews always suffer from a shortfall of men. For this reason and also as a result of losses they don’t have sufficient manpower to haul heavyweight weapons which are simply abandoned on the battlefield. It is time to admit that leaving a 82-mm mortar on the battlefield is the same as leaving a cannon or howitzer.
Moreover, composition of mortar crews is fluid and consists of ill-trained men. That is the reason they are not capable of accurate fire, whereas fire on trenches, as demonstrated by experience, requires very accurate fire.
50-mm mortars can be employed for the same task. Here we arrive to an idea of massing their fire as a supplement to artillery groups. For the sake of experiment all 50-mm mortars in a regiment should be combined in a 18-piece battery. Or, like it was done in the 179 Rifle Division, 50-mm mortars should be combined in three batteries of 6 pieces, each subordinated to a battalion commander. They are best to be employed for salvo fire.
The bottom line is that to combat enemy taking shelter in trenches one has to employ steep-trajectory weapons, first of all mortars and also 122-mm howitzers. In this respect the rifle regiment possesses a sufficient number of steep-trajectory weapons (18 50-mm, 27 82-mm and 7 120-mm, total 52 mortars). Moreover it can expect to be supported by 12-18 howitzers when it makes a main attack (*)

* It is also needed to increase proportion of howitzer shells in ammunition expenditure.

As concerns cannons the effect of their fire on trenches can be increased with shrapnel rounds. It should be mentioned that of 172 000 rounds expended during the operation, there wasn’t a single shrapnel round, and it looks likely that gunners forgot how to use a time fuse.

When engaging trenches with howitzers and mortars a well-organized cooperation between flat- and steep-trajectory weapons seems useful, so that the first keep the enemy in shelters, and the latter destroy him in shelters (*)

* Although it is an old rule, it is, as experience suggests, always forgotten despite being relevant both for artillery and infantry weapons.

IV. A special instruction for infantry combat inside fortified positions seems to be needed. Topics of special importance: cooperation between infantry and heavy weapons and command of heavy weapons, cooperation between platoons in a company and between companies in a battalion, and command of these units.

V. Battle experience suggests a notion that tanks, when they are available in small numbers, are best to be employed as assault guns. In this case tanks advance by bounds from one ridge to another and engage the most dangerous enemy weapons emplacements from hull-down positions. Besides, tanks that advance behind infantry and take cover behind terrain features draw the bulk of artillery and mortars fire on them, thus facilitating infantry advance (*). For tanks themselves artillery-mortar fire doesn’t present any danger except direct fire guns. This notion contradicts the basic principle of tanks tactics: tanks should attack in high tempo. But this principle was formulated for a case when tanks attack in large numbers and for this reason is not relevant here.

(*) 179 Rifle Division even developed a fear of own tanks, because they draw more casualties to the infantry.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=152136935
That's an interesting discussion of several topics which are also regularly encountered in other documents.

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