Pit One Side Against the Other - Stalin's 1939 Plan for Soviet Domination of Europe

[Steve]

“I wanted first of all to establish a tolerable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But this plan, which appealed to me, could not be executed, as fundamental points had changed. It became clear to me that, in the event of a conflict with the West, Poland would attack us.
August 22, 1939, Obersalzberg Speech”

The dye had been cast by August; one of the fundamental points that had changed was obviously the treaty with Britain.

I’m sure Stalin wasn’t concerned about saving Poland but he probably was concerned about German expansion. If Stalin had made a military agreement with the western powers it made no sense for the Red Army to sit on Poland’s eastern border waiting for the Germans to set a foot over it. The Red Army needed to enter Poland and support the Polish army before it was beaten which everyone knew was inevitable. When did the Soviets only offer the same number of divisions as directly engaged on the Western front?

At a Congress of Soviets in January 1935 Molotov warned delegates that Hitler’s stated intention was territorial conquest in the east. The American ambassador Davies was told by Litvinov in early 1937 that Hitler was consumed by a lust for conquest and for the domination of Europe. From Russia’s war by Richard Overy

“Or take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they let her have the Sudeten region; they abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, thereby violating all their obligations; and then began to lie vociferously in the press about "the weakness of the Russian army," "the demoralization of the Russian air force," and "riots" in the Soviet Union, egging the Germans on to march farther east, promising them easy pickings, and prompting them : "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all right." It must be admitted that this too looks very much like egging on and encouraging the aggressor”.
Part of Stalin’s speech to the 18th Party Congress March 1939

A blockade of Germany by three major European powers would have needed a military commitment by them (teeth) as it would probably have led to war.

“What's wrong with this agreement?”
There was no commitment to launching a land offensive in the west. The British couldn’t launch one and the French would probably sit behind the Maginot line with the Germans sitting behind the west wall. Talk of sea communications and air communications etc was just so much froth. Most of the German army would be available to fight Russia whose army was presumably supposed to advance into Poland against the wishes of the Poles. There is no mention of what would trigger military action so presumably in theory an attack on Holland by Germany would bring in Russia but an attack on Russia by Japan wouldn’t bring in France and the UK.

Voroshilov was spot on with his questions which General Doumenc could not answer.

[Yuri]

In addition to this:
The claim that the Soviet Government allegedly demanded the introduction of Red Army troops into Poland before the war began is a blatant and cynical lie that is actively exploited by Western propaganda, especially its Polish branch.

However, the example of Japan is not a good one. To curb speculation, the Soviet Government immediately indicated that it would not require Great Britain and France to fulfill their obligations in the event of a war between Japan and the USSR. Initially, the United Kingdom and France did not include the Baltic states, Finland and Turkey, but they included Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Please note that there were no diplomatic relations between Switzerland and the USSR. From the Anglo-French version, it followed that the USSR had to go to war because of a state that did not even recognize it. At the same time, Britain and France did not include the Baltic states in the list.

[wm]

The dye had been cast by August; one of the fundamental points that had changed was obviously the treaty with Britain.

Rather, Hitler initiated Fall Weiss at the beginning of April 1939 after almost six-month-long negotiations with Poland and being refused at least eight times.

I’m sure Stalin wasn’t concerned about saving Poland but he probably was concerned about German expansion. If Stalin had made a military agreement with the western powers it made no sense for the Red Army to sit on Poland’s eastern border waiting for the Germans to set a foot over it. The Red Army needed to enter Poland and support the Polish army before it was beaten which everyone knew was inevitable. When did the Soviets only offer the same number of divisions as directly engaged on the Western front?

And entering Poland and travelling a half thousand kilometres toward the front lines without air-cover made sense? Or leaving the safety of the Stalin Line and exposing the Red Army in the open?
Which army in the world was capable of that in a few weeks without being annihilated?

Actually, the Soviets didn't even offer that! They demanded the right to occupy two parts of Poland - the only two connections with the outside world Poland had - leaving Poland at their mercy. And offered they would fight Hitler from there - G-d willing.
The Soviet plan was all smoke and mirrors.

At a Congress of Soviets in January 1935 Molotov warned delegates that Hitler’s stated intention was territorial conquest in the east. The American ambassador Davies was told by Litvinov in early 1937 that Hitler was consumed by a lust for conquest and for the domination of Europe. From Russia’s war by Richard Overy

“Or take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they let her have the Sudeten region; they abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, thereby violating all their obligations; and then began to lie vociferously in the press about "the weakness of the Russian army," "the demoralization of the Russian air force," and "riots" in the Soviet Union, egging the Germans on to march farther east, promising them easy pickings, and prompting them : "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all right." It must be admitted that this too looks very much like egging on and encouraging the aggressor”.
Part of Stalin’s speech to the 18th Party Congress March 1939

Please, that's contemporary Soviet propaganda, not history.

There was no commitment to launching a land offensive in the west.

The French Army wasn't capable of that, they needed at least a year to prepare. If something was impossible the plan must have accommodated it.
The French plan was the only realistic one. The only one which accommodated weaknesses of both France and the USSR - which wasn't capable of a major opposed offensive either.

[Steve]

“Rather, Hitler initiated Fall Weiss at the beginning of April 1939 after almost six-month-long negotiations with Poland and being refused at least eight times.”

It was the guarantee that decided him to give up on negotiations but he was probably running out of patience anyway.

"And entering Poland and travelling a half thousand kilometres toward the front lines without air-cover made sense? Or leaving the safety of the Stalin Line and exposing the Red Army in the open?
Which army in the world was capable of that in a few weeks without being annihilated?”

There is a reason why countries that enter into military agreements with each other hold staff talks. After holding staff talks you should have a plan of what each side will do in the event of war and in theory you avoid the scenario wm has given.

“Actually, the Soviets didn't even offer that! They demanded the right to occupy two parts of Poland - the only two connections with the outside world Poland had - leaving Poland at their mercy. And offered they would fight Hitler from there - G-d willing.
The Soviet plan was all smoke and mirrors.”

As far as I am aware the Soviets never demanded to occupy two parts of Poland they asked about passage of their troops across the Vilna coridor, Galicia and Rumania. This took place at a meeting with the British and French in August. The Soviet delegation was led by Voroshilov with the chief of the General staff of the Red Army Shaposhnikov which shows the importance the Soviets attached to the meeting. Their instructions were that if this was not granted they would not participate in an undertaking that was doomed to failure. The French and British delegates could not give an answer and referred the matter back to their governments. Chamberlain was given a report written by the Deputy Chiefs of Staff which among other things said "It is perfectly clear that without early and effective Russian assistance, the Poles cannot hope to stand up to a German attack".

From 1939 The Alliance That Never Was by Michael Jabara Carley.

“Please, that's contemporary Soviet propaganda, not history.” very amusing.

[wm]

"Without early and effective Russian assistance" - something the Soviets were incapable of and was against their most vital national interests.
What about early and effective French assistance - something the French were incapable of either but the Soviets demanded - and needed to have at least slim chance of survival.

Do we have to believe that this Stalin (who had just finished killing +100,000 Soviet Poles) was going to help fascist Poland and imperialist Britain and France - or at least to do that for free?

- We see nothing wrong in their having a good hard fight and weakening each other.
- It would be fine if at the hands of Germany the position of the richest capitalist countries (especially England) were shaken.
- We can manoeuvre, pit one side against the other to set them fighting with each other as fiercely as possible.
- The ... pact is to a certain degree helping Germany. Next time we’ll urge on the other side.
- The annihilation of [Poland] under current conditions would mean one fewer bourgeois fascist state to contend with!
- What would be the harm if as a result of the rout of Poland we were to extend the socialist system onto new territories and populations?

Military agreements can't produce miracles, the French plan was the only realistic one.

the conversations reveal what was to become apparent in 1940 and 1941: neither the French nor the Russian army was ready for modern war.
The Russians were to learn from the Polish and French campaigns, but in 1939 they still thought that cavalry was an important offensive weapon. The Soviet military confrontation with Germany in 1941 was to be disastrous enough; in 1939 it would have been a catastrophe.
Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73 by Adam B. Ulam

[wm]

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
No. 2213
Moscow, March 30, 1939.
[Received April 20.]

Sir: ... I have the honour to discuss below certain aspects of that portion of Stalin’s speech which deals with the international situation and Soviet foreign relation

In the section devoted to the Soviet Union and its relations with the capitalist countries, Stalin, after referring to the armaments race in progress, ...
[h]e concludes with the statement that the tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy are:

(1) To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries;
(2) To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflict by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them;
...
In comparison with recent utterances in respect of Soviet foreign relations prior to the September crisis, it may be argued that Stalin’s speech comes close to expressing the real intentions of the Soviet Government in respect of foreign affairs in the light of the foreign situation which existed on the date of its delivery.

He makes it clear that the Soviet Union will maintain normal and even friendly relations with any country without exception, provided that country does not directly threaten the interests of the Soviet Union, and it is perhaps significant that Stalin, by indirection it is true, associates these interests very closely with the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

He likewise places high among the principal tasks in the sphere of foreign policy the necessity of exercising extreme caution to prevent the Soviet Union from being drawn into a conflict in which these interests are not directly affected. Taken in conjunction with his accusation of attempts on the part of other countries to poison relations between the Soviet Union and Germany this statement can be taken to mean that the Soviet Government has no intention of becoming involved in a war with Germany in defence of the interests of other countries.

[Yuri]

Military agreements can't produce miracles, the Frech plan was the only realistic one.

the conversations reveal what was to become apparent in 1940 and 1941: neither the French nor the Russian army was ready for modern war.
The Russians were to learn from the Polish and French campaigns, but in 1939 they still thought that cavalry was an important offensive weapon. The Soviet military confrontation with Germany in 1941 was to be disastrous enough; in 1939 it would have been a catastrophe.
Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73 by Adam B. Ulam

The Russians call it: "putting the cart in front of the horse" or "running ahead of the engine".
In 1939, the Russians, as well as the Poles, the French, the Germans, the British and the Americans, were not ready for a modern war. In 1939, the German Wehrmacht conducted combat "training" in Poland, and in 1940 in Norway, Belgium and France.
Thanks to the unwise policy of the leaders of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1939-40, the German Wehrmacht received ideal conditions for gaining experience in modern warfare. Thus, in the summer of 1941, the German Wehrmacht was significantly better (stronger) in terms of quality and quantity than the Wehrmacht before the outbreak of the German-Polish War.
The Wehrmacht of the September 1, 1939 model was a pitiful shadow of the Wehrmacht of the June 22, 1941 model. Further, in the summer of 1941, the Red Army was attacked by the German Wehrmacht together with troops from Finland, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Croatia, and in the fall parts of France and Spain joined. The attack of the European hordes on the Red Army in the summer of 1941, (known as Operation Barbarossa), remains to this day the greatest attack in the history of wars.
The Red Army repulsed this attack and launched a devastating counter-attack near Moscow, from which the European horde could not recover.
What reasonable grounds are there to believe that the Red Army of the 1939 model is significantly weaker than the Wehrmacht of the 1939 model?
So:
1. In quantitative terms, the Wehrmacht of the September 1, 1939 model is less than half of the European horde that attacked the Red Army on June 22, 1941.
2. In qualitative terms, the Wehrmacht of the June 22, 1941 model is better than the Wehrmacht of the September 1, 1939 model, just as the Wehrmacht of the 1941 model is better than the Red Army of 1941. On September 1, 1939, the German Wehrmacht and the Red Army were comparable in quality.

The book by Adam B. Ulam is a typical example of Western propaganda fabrications about the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Your mistake is that you present the fabrications by Adam B. Ulam as the truth. In addition, Mr. Adam B. Ulam demonstrates a complete lack of knowledge regarding the development and structure of the Red Army.

"1939. The Alliance That Never Was " by Michael Jabara Carley is the best of what is created in the West about the pre-war period. The work of Mr. Michael Jabara Carley is of high quality and he is honest. There are mistakes in this work, but these are natural," working " mistakes, which will necessarily be because any person is subjective.
I am very surprised at how much Western propaganda allowed to print the book " 1939. The Alliance That Never Was".

[wm]

In Carley's book, there are about 600 references - none of them leads to Polish sources. None.
From the historical method point of view - because he violates its cardinal tenants (impartiality, completeness of sources especially in this case the primary ones) - his book is junk.

Yes, nobody was ready for modern war especially the Red Army which just had killed almost all its military commanders, no?
I don't say they were all Napoleons but they were experienced leaders.
A leader with many years of military service under his belts is much better than a new green one, no?


"Thanks to the unwise policy of the leaders of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth"

What would you do in their place, O brave one? Handed over Poland to Stalin?

[Steve]

“He makes it clear that the Soviet Union will maintain normal and even friendly relations with any country without exception, provided that country does not directly threaten the interests of the Soviet Union, and it is perhaps significant that Stalin, by indirection it is true, associates these interests very closely with the frontiers of the Soviet Union.”

Stalin also said in that speech which I presume was on March 10 that the Soviet Union stood “for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country”. Would I be right in thinking that Poland fell into that category? How is it that when I quote from the March 10 speech it is “Please, that's contemporary Soviet propaganda, not history.” But when the US ambassador did it’s not?

The French never intended to provide “early and effective” assistance; they had not built the Maginot line as an exercise in fortification construction.

Stalin was thinking of helping “fascist Poland and imperialist Britain and France” because he knew what was in Mein Kampf. By the summer of 1939 Austria was gone, Czechoslovakia was gone Poland would soon be gone without military aid and it was a possibility the Baltic States would enter the German camp. It was likely that Hitler coveted large parts of the Soviet Union so Stalin was acting out of self interest. Of course from Stalin’s point of view it would be great if Germany became embroiled in a war against France and the UK.

What was apparent in 1940 and 1941 is irrelevant to 1939. The French plan was a draft plan (says so at the top) so am I right in thinking it was never presented to the Soviets?

Apparently when the Soviet delegation headed by the commissar for defence Voroshilov met with the British and French in Moscow in August they had the authority to negotiate and sign a military convention. The instructions to Voroshilov included:- “If it becomes clear that free passage of our troops across the territory of Poland and Romania is excluded then declare that without this stipulation agreement is impossible since without free passage across the said territories defence against aggression in any contingency is doomed to fail, and we do not contemplate participating in an undertaking which is doomed to failure.”

If they could have read the report by the British deputy Chiefs of Staff they would have found that they agreed with them:- “It is perfectly clear that without early and effective Russian assistance, the Poles cannot hope to stand up to a German attack . . . for more than a limited time. The same applies to the Romanians except that the time would be still more limited.
The supply of arms and war material is not enough. If the Russians are to collaborate in resisting German aggression against Poland or Romania they can only do so effectively on Polish or Romanian soil; and . . . if permission for this were withheld till war breaks out, it would be too late. The most the allies could then hope for would be to avenge Poland and Romania and perhaps restore their independence as a result of the defeat of Germany in a long war.
Without immediate and effective Russian assistance . . . the longer that war would be, and the less chance there would be of either Poland or Romania emerging at the end of it as independent states in anything like their original form.”

From 1939 The Alliance That Never Was by Michael Jabara Carley.

The following is from Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919 -1939 Third Series Volume V11 page 237.

“The methods, however, by which the operation of Soviet troops within Poland might be supervised, limited and controlled are not to be underrated. There appears to be no reason why Great Britain and France should not both be strongly represented by liaison officers attached to Soviet formations in Poland. The function of these officers might be clearly laid down, so as to give them the ability to report on and influence the activities of the Red troops. Furthermore, the operation of the Red Army within Poland might be confined to some well-defined objective, and their concentration area in Poland restricted. A possible hypothetical operation might envisage, for instance, the use of the railways leading via Lida and Baranowicze to a concentration area bounded by approximately Grodno in the north and Bialystok in the south. Arrangements similar to those controlling traffic between Germany and East Prussia might conceivably be made, by which Soviet troops should not be permitted to leave the railways until detrained within the concentration area. Operations might then be directed against the eastern frontier of East Prussia, the Soviet troops being bounded by the Lithuanian frontier in the north and the railway Bialystok-Lyck in the south.
The above outline provides an indication of the manner in which the whole question of the co-operation of Soviet land forces might be studied.”

There are many references to Poland in the index of Carley’s book but as Poland was not a participant in the negotiations that took place between the Soviet Union, France and the UK it would have been very difficult to use Polish sources on the negotiations.

[wm]

Stalin said that there were freedom of speech and freedom of religion in the USSR too, not only that "the Soviet Union stood for the support". Let's not bring Stalinist propaganda here.

When did Stalin say he was afraid of a German invasion? Because never. Actually, he generally regarded as highly improbable that Germany would attack the USSR, didn't he?
An attack on Poland would trigger a war with the Allies. Something he desired and couldn't wait for it. For all he knew he would be safe for the next few years as France and Germany would massacre each other. It would be utter stupidity to help the Allies, regarded as the much stronger party, to win the not-his war.

Did really Hitler say in Mein Kampf he would invade Poland and then Russia? Where?
Did he even say he was going to invade Russia? Where?

But he wrote this in his book:

The future goal of our foreign policy ought not to involve an orientation to the East or the West, but it ought to be an Eastern policy which will have in view the acquisition of such territory as is necessary for our German people. To carry out this policy we need that force which the mortal enemy of our nation, France, now deprives us of by holding us in her grip and pitilessly robbing us of our strength.

Therefore we must stop at no sacrifice in our effort to destroy the French striving towards hegemony over Europe.
As our natural ally today we have every Power on the Continent that feels France's lust for hegemony in Europe unbearable. No attempt to approach those Powers ought to appear too difficult for us, and
no sacrifice should be considered too heavy, if the final outcome would be to make it possible for us to overthrow our bitterest enemy.

What did he say to his generals a week before the war?

I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only after that against the East.
I wanted first of all to establish a tolerable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But this plan, which appealed to me, could not be executed, as fundamental points had changed. It became clear to me that, in the event of a conflict with the West, Poland would attack us.

Nothing changed it was France first again!


He even anticipated the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in Mein Kampf!

No attempt to approach those Powers ought to appear too difficult for us, and no sacrifice should be considered too heavy, if the final outcome would be to make it possible for us to overthrow our bitterest enemy.

Yes, Stalin knew what was in Mein Kampf, in contrast to that guy Carley. And it was "France then the East."

And there was another indispensable condition there - sympathetic or at least neutral Britain.
Was France destroyed in 1939? No.
Was Britain neutral? No.

[wm]

Yes, the French plan was presented to the Soviets - verbally.
Actually, they did the same with their own plans.

The methods, however, by which the operation of Soviet troops within Poland might be supervised, limited and controlled are not to be underrated.

It was not going to happen:

The party and military authorities in the USSR consider it as absolutely impossible, from the point of view of maintaining the Red Army's combativeness and morale, for the Soviet military units located on foreign territory to be subordinated to 'bourgeois norms of wartime criminal law and generally to political norms that are entirely contrary to the socialist credo of a Red Army soldier.

In Carley's book, only several pages are dedicated to the negotiations and he uses no Polish sources anywhere in his book.

[Yuri]

Yes, nobody was ready for modern war especially the Red Army which just had killed almost all its military commanders, no?
I don't say they were all Napoleons but they were experienced leaders.
A leader with many years of military service under his belts is much better than a new green one, no?

With the tenacity of a worthy better application, you continue to ignore the facts. So I repeat it again, and this is the last time.
The Red Army of the 1939 model was better prepared than any other army for modern warfare.
However, in the summer of 1941, the Wehrmacht already surpassed the Red Army in quantitative and qualitative terms because it conducted combat training in the period from September 1939 to June 1941 (that is, in two years):
in 1939 in Poland, in 1940 in Norway, in France, Belgium and Holland, in 1941 in Yugoslavia and Greece.
The leaders of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth helped the German Wehrmacht.

The best preparation of the Red Army for modern war in 1939 is due to the fact (but not only) that from its ranks were removed generals and officers unsuitable for the assimilation of modern methods of warfare, as well as those generals who, instead of dealing with military issues, got into politics and conspiracy.

Napoleon's example works against your point of view. At the end of the 18th century, the French shot many of their generals and the French immediately began to defeat other armies, and if the French shot all their generals, their army would become even better. Napoleon was a lieutenant at that time, he became a general because the old generals were shot. If the old generals were not shot, we would never have known that there was such a Napoleon.
Thus, the history of the French army of the late 18th and early 19th centuries and the history of the Red Army of the 30s-40s of the 20th century allow us to establish the following law of victory in a large-scale war:
- before the start of hostilities, you must first shoot most of your generals, because no one interferes with your victory in the war as much as the old general of your own army.

The speculative constructions of Western propaganda that you repeat here have long been exposed.

[wm]

Nothing like true progressivism, no? Kill all the old fashioned folks, unsuitable for the assimilation of modern thinking, and enjoy the resulting nirvana.

Didn't the Soviets learn anything invading Finland and fighting at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol?

[wm]

The future, as envisioned by Hitler at the end of September 1939. Germany ends at the Vistula - more, maybe after a few decades.
No invasion, nothing.

[Hitler] wants to divide the territory that has now been defined [Poland] into three strips:

1. Between the Vistula and the Bug: all the Jews (also from the Reich), as well as all elements that are unreliable in some way. Along the Vistula, an impregnable eastern line of fortifications [Ostwall]—even stronger than in the West.

2. Along the former border, a broad belt of Germanization and colonization. Here a large task awaits the entire Volk: creating a German breadbasket, a community of sturdy farmers, and resettling good Germans from all over the world.

3. In between, a form of Polish "statehood" [Staatlichkeit]. Whether the [German] settlement zone can be pushed forward after a few decades is something the future will reveal.
The Political Diary of Alfred Rosenberg

[Steve]

“Did really Hitler say in Mein Kampf he would invade Poland and then Russia? Where?
Did he even say he was going to invade Russia? Where?”

And so, we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy tendency of our pre–War period. We take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the land in the East. At long last, we break off the colonial and commercial policy of the pre–War period and shift to the soil policy of the future.
If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states.

Taken from Mein Kampf Vol.2 Chapter 14.

In the quote from Rosenburg it is not very clear if it is Hitler saying “Whether the [German] settlement zone can be pushed forward after a few decades is something the future will reveal.” or whether these are Rosenburg’s thoughts on the matter. However by July 31 1940 Hitler was talking to his military leaders about smashing Russia.

I have read a review of Carly’s book by a Polish reviewer George Suboczewski which really did leave me wondering if we had read the same book. It would be a shame if people in Poland who have clearly not read the book have formed their opinion of it from Polish reviewers to whom the mere mention of the Red Army entering Poland throws into a tizzy.