British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Discussions on all aspects of the USSR, from the Russian Civil War till the end of the Great Patriotic War and the war against Japan. Hosted by Art.
Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 4248
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by Richard Anderson » 07 Aug 2021 18:15

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
07 Aug 2021 18:00
That's not something I'd ever considered before so thanks. German capture of SU oil resources wouldn't necessarily be a huge bonus from the perspective of the LW then?
Exactly. It might help the German ground forces and economy, but even then only after they manage to get refined output from the Caucasus to Germany, or crude from the Caucasus to Romania, since the German refinery system was inadequate. Of course, they could invest in building Bergius process refineries, assuming they can afford it in terms of capital and time, and that the Soviet crude was suitably sweet.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 2631
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 11 Aug 2021 07:29

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
07 Aug 2021 18:00
That's not something I'd ever considered before so thanks. German capture of SU oil resources wouldn't necessarily be a huge bonus from the perspective of the LW then?
This is something spread abroad on AHF but entirely lacking any proof. I have a CIA report from 1949 on the Soviet oil/gas industry, including discussion of the war. I gave the link here but it now appears dead. Here's some relevant excerpts:

Image
Image

The Soviets didn't make high-grade avgas in WW2 because they lacked the technology and the chemical industry infrastructure for necessary blending agents (e.g. benzene), not because their oil couldn't be refined by someone else (i.e. Germany) in possession of more technology a bigger chemicals industry. Already by 1949, SU was making small quantities of 95-100 avgas domestically. They didn't make a lot but it unambiguously establishes that they had crude that could make high grade avgas.

Occupied Europe had, unsurprisingly, millions of tons of idle refining capacity (ten million IIRC). Building refineries would have been far cheaper than building synthgas plants.

Another point of obfuscation will be, if patterns hold, that German avgas was lower-grade than American. That's true but irrelevant: the question is whether Soviet crude would have helped the LW by giving it more German-quality fuel, not whether new Russian fuel would yield American-style fuel.

Note that the LW used 87-rated avgas, which isn't far from the 85 that SU was producing during WW2. By 1944 LW's 87-octane, used in conjunction with methanol-water injection, gave performance near to that of 100+ octane.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 4248
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by Richard Anderson » 11 Aug 2021 15:33

Gee, I wonder what the problem could be with using a 1949 CIA analysis of Soviet refinery capability in 1949 to assess Soviet refinery capability in 1941 and thereafter without Lend-Lease? Or what the problem might be in assessing German refinery capability based upon assumptions. Germany made no effort to develop Houdry process or FCC refineries during the 1930s, instead choosing to expend that chemical capital on developing synthetic plant. Based upon the experience of those who did choose to build Houdry and FCC refining capability, two years or more is the likely elapsed time from breaking ground to meaningful output.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 2631
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 11 Aug 2021 18:32

Again we have an inability to follow the logical distinction between a feedstock issue and refining issue. :roll:
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

Tom from Cornwall
Member
Posts: 2629
Joined: 01 May 2006 19:52
Location: UK

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 13 Aug 2021 19:42

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
11 Aug 2021 07:29
Note that the LW used 87-rated avgas, which isn't far from the 85 that SU was producing during WW2.
Thanks for enlightening me, although a little bit of further "google-fu" suggests that the situation was, as is so often the case, much more complicated than that. The good news, though, is that it helped me towards a better understanding of these references from DEFE3/745:
Ref. CX/MSS/452/T5 MK 52/AL 51 AIC

Following fuel stocks in tons held by G.A.F. on November 20: BENGHAZI 120 B4, 40 C3. BENINA 200 B4, 2 C3. DERNA 150 B4, 120 C3.

1845/21/11/41 GMT.
The information I picked up on the 12 o'clock high website suggested that the C3 fuel was actually roughly 96 octane but only used in certain types:

http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=24915
In short, B-4 and C-3 are designations for German synthetic fuel. B-4 is roughly 87 octane, whereas C-3 is roughly 96 octane. Take note that the Germans measured octane number by a different method than the Allies, and that to composition and performance of especially C-3 changed during the course of the war. Briefly, early was C-3 was equivalent to 96/130 Grade Allied fuel, and from late-1942, 96/145 Grade fuel.
A further link from that forum takes us to a website packed full of all the technical information that we could ever want to read on mid-20th Century aviation fuel:

http://www.kurfurst.org/Engine/Fuel/Ger ... ction.html

and which includes a post-war Allied report on German aviation fuel production which states that:
The relative volumes of production of the two grades cannot be accurately given, but in the last war years the major volume, perhaps two-thirds (2/3) of this total has the C-3 grade. Every effort was being made toward the end of the war to increase isoparaffin production so that C-3 volume could be increased for fighter plane use. The isoparaffin usage in that grade had already been cut to a minimum.
My (somewhat limited) understanding of all this is that it would actually seem that Nazi Germany was trying to produce high-octane aviation fuel to a similar grade to that produced by the Allies. I'd need to re-read the technical report a few times though before I could begin to understand what that means for any discussion on the use Nazi Germany made of Soviet fuel in reality (i.e. imports up to June 1941) or after in the case of captured Soviet stocks.

Regards

Tom

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 2631
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 14 Aug 2021 00:43

Tom from Cornwall wrote:much more complicated than that
Not on the issue we were discussing: whether Russian oil would have helped the LW.

There are always more issues that one can discuss, such as whether LW had better fuels than 87-octane B4, and whether it was trying to develop even better fuels yet.

These are all interesting topics...
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 4248
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by Richard Anderson » 14 Aug 2021 01:03

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
13 Aug 2021 19:42
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
11 Aug 2021 07:29
Note that the LW used 87-rated avgas, which isn't far from the 85 that SU was producing during WW2.
Thanks for enlightening me,
Enlightening or obfuscating? The Luftwaffe used three grades of aviation gasoline, but only two were for operational use in combat. B-4 (89 MON) and C-3 (95 MON) were the operational fuels, A-3 (80 MON) was for non-combat use in training aircraft. There were also specifications in 1939 for a low-octane (67-72 MON) aviation gasoline produced by IG Farben through the hydrogenation of lignite coal, designated VT, but it is unclear how much was produced or used.

The best domestically produced Soviet aviation gasoline was B-87 (87 MON), so slightly inferior in lean mixture performance to the Luftwaffe's B-4. In 1940, all of about 35,000 tons of B-87 were produced, followed by about 317,250 tons in 1941. I haven't tracked down the B-87 production 1942-1945, but it remained a small fraction of total domestic aviation gasoline, which contracted during the war (1940 - 883,600 tons, 1941 - 1,269,000, and 1942 - 912,000 tons). Overall, domestic Soviet production decreased 37.7% 1940-1945. All Soviet refineries were based on thermal cracking, as were the few German crude refineries, and were thus limited in the amount of high-octane spirit they could yield from a run.


although a little bit of further "google-fu" suggests that the situation was, as is so often the case, much more complicated than that. The good news, though, is that it helped me towards a better understanding of these references from DEFE3/745:
The information I picked up on the 12 o'clock high website suggested that the C3 fuel was actually roughly 96 octane but only used in certain types:
C-3 was supposed to be minimum 95 MON, but as the war went on aromatic content increased, going for zero in June 1939 to 45% in October 1943 and thereafter.
In short, B-4 and C-3 are designations for German synthetic fuel. B-4 is roughly 87 octane, whereas C-3 is roughly 96 octane. Take note that the Germans measured octane number by a different method than the Allies, and that to composition and performance of especially C-3 changed during the course of the war. Briefly, early was C-3 was equivalent to 96/130 Grade Allied fuel, and from late-1942, 96/145 Grade fuel.
There was no "96/130 Grade Allied fuel" or "96/145 Grade fuel". The standard introduced in 1942-1943 was 100/130 Grade (lean/rich MON) and then in January 1944 100/150 Grade (PPF 44-1) was introduced, becoming standard by June 1944
A further link from that forum takes us to a website packed full of all the technical information that we could ever want to read on mid-20th Century aviation fuel:
Or, you could go to the source for Luftwaffe (and other German fuel specifications) at http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_ ... 8_appB.pdf
My (somewhat limited) understanding of all this is that it would actually seem that Nazi Germany was trying to produce high-octane aviation fuel to a similar grade to that produced by the Allies. I'd need to re-read the technical report a few times though before I could begin to understand what that means for any discussion on the use Nazi Germany made of Soviet fuel in reality (i.e. imports up to June 1941) or after in the case of captured Soviet stocks.
Importing Soviet aviation gasoline does not solve the problem, since B-87 production was limited by Soviet refinery technology and capacity. The Soviet Union relied almost entirely for Lend-Lease for high-octane aviation gasoline. As early as June 29, 1941, Foreign Minister Molotov sent a telegram to Konstantin Umansky, the then Soviet ambassador to the United States, in which he stated "You will now have to go to Roosevelt or Hull (or Welles) and ask him about the possibility of aiding the Soviet Union with deliveries of the following: (1) single-engine fighter aircraft, 3,000; (2) bombers, 3,000; ... (5) cracking and other installations for producing high-octane aviation fuel and lubricants [my bold].... It would be desirable if they granted five years' worth of credit for these goods."

From June to the end of October 1941, $92-million worth of strategic goods were delivered from the United States, including 156,335 short tons of aviation gasoline, of which 25,185 tons were 99+ octane; 130,729 tons were 87-99; and 87,421 tons were up to 87 octane. So a total of 51,106 metric tons of aviation gasoline as good or better than B-87, delivered in five months, compared to the 317,250 tons of B-87 domestically produced in 1941. For the entire war, Lend-Lease delivered 1,197,587 metric tons of aviation gasoline, including 558,428 tons of 99+ octane gas...as well as the equipment for four entire refineries, including at least one state-of-the-art catalytic cracking refinery, which did not become operational until the end of the war, but soon enough to inflate Soviet capability to that assessed by the CIA in 1949.

In short, no, if the Germans somehow managed to get Soviet-produced B-87 to the Luftwaffe it would only increase their supply of a B-4 analog, when what they wanted - and needed - was more C-3.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 2631
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 14 Aug 2021 01:15

In short, no, if the Germans somehow managed to get Soviet-produced B-87 to the Luftwaffe
Again we have an inability to follow the logical distinction between a feedstock issue and a refining issue. :roll:
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

CF Geust
Member
Posts: 129
Joined: 05 Sep 2006 12:48
Location: Helsinki, Finland

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by CF Geust » 14 Aug 2021 08:59

Here an extract of Gennadiy Petrov´s and my book Red Stars Vol.4 (Lend-lease aircraft in Russia), Apali (Finland), 2002; which tells about the need for American high-octane fuel for the P-39 Airacobras:

---
Several of the Soviet top aces flew the American fighter during the major part of WW II (including triple HSU A.I. Pokryshkin and double HSUs A.V. Alelukhin, S. Amet-Khan, D.B. and B.B. Glinka, N.D. Gulyayev, A.F. Klubov, P.S. Kutakhov, V.D. Lavrinenkov, A.I. Pokryshkin, G.A. Rechkalov, N.M. Skomorokhov, A.V. Vorozhejkin). The importance of the Airacobra for the total Soviet war effort is well proven by the only recently published fact that Stalin himself intervened in summer 1944 in order to ensure uninterrupted supply of 100 octane fuel for Pokryshkin’s fighter division 9 GIAD during Operation Bagration which commenced 23 June 1944 in White Russia. (At that time Soviet refineries produced only low-grade fuel, which did not generate maximum output of the Allison engine, why necessary additional American iso-octane chemicals were hastily collected from supply reserves along the ALSIB route in Siberia.) Pokryshkin was well aware of the defiencies of the Airacobra, and had received repeated proposals to re-equip his division with newer Soviet fighters. However, after weighing pros and cons he refused to withdraw his fighter division for conversion, as the Airacobra had already proven to be a formidable weapon in the hands of competent pilots and precious time would be lost during the conversion training.
---

Carl
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 4248
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by Richard Anderson » 15 Aug 2021 00:38

CF Geust wrote:
14 Aug 2021 08:59
Here an extract of Gennadiy Petrov´s and my book Red Stars Vol.4 (Lend-lease aircraft in Russia), Apali (Finland), 2002; which tells about the need for American high-octane fuel for the P-39 Airacobras:

---
Several of the Soviet top aces flew the American fighter during the major part of WW II (including triple HSU A.I. Pokryshkin and double HSUs A.V. Alelukhin, S. Amet-Khan, D.B. and B.B. Glinka, N.D. Gulyayev, A.F. Klubov, P.S. Kutakhov, V.D. Lavrinenkov, A.I. Pokryshkin, G.A. Rechkalov, N.M. Skomorokhov, A.V. Vorozhejkin). The importance of the Airacobra for the total Soviet war effort is well proven by the only recently published fact that Stalin himself intervened in summer 1944 in order to ensure uninterrupted supply of 100 octane fuel for Pokryshkin’s fighter division 9 GIAD during Operation Bagration which commenced 23 June 1944 in White Russia. (At that time Soviet refineries produced only low-grade fuel, which did not generate maximum output of the Allison engine, why necessary additional American iso-octane chemicals were hastily collected from supply reserves along the ALSIB route in Siberia.) Pokryshkin was well aware of the defiencies of the Airacobra, and had received repeated proposals to re-equip his division with newer Soviet fighters. However, after weighing pros and cons he refused to withdraw his fighter division for conversion, as the Airacobra had already proven to be a formidable weapon in the hands of competent pilots and precious time would be lost during the conversion training.
---

Carl
Indeed. There seems to be an odd belief that the Germans could produce high-octane aviation gasoline through the triumph of the will.

It apparently works this way? B-87 Soviet aviation gas is run through a thermal cracking refinery, apparently in Ploesti since Germany has no excess refinery capacity, as "feedstock" and because it is now German controlled what comes out at the end is 96 octane C-3 aviation gasoline.

Sadly, in real life doing so actually produces 87-0ctane aviation gas, gummy residues, and fractional amounts of the iso-octanes required for producing the alkylates, hydrocodimers, isopentanes, and neohexates, which are necessary as blending agents and for producing the alkylates required for blending to produce 100 octane fuel. The simple fact that thermal cracking - the standard refinery method in Europe (aside from a single small-capacity Houdry prototype catalytic plant in France) - was incapable of producing large quantities of high octane fuel is why high octane fuel produced by thermal cracking originally cost $30 per gallon in 1930, when motor gas was $0.20 per gallon. By 1934, Shell, using high quality crude and the addition of large amounts of TEL, got the price down to $2 per gallon when motor gas was $0.19, but it remained uneconomical until Humble Oil built a large-scale catalytic cracking plant at Baytown, Texas in 1938, which was capable of producing large quantities of blending agents. It was followed by four others in the western hemisphere, which became operational during 1939 and 1940.

Initial production remained small, about 4.822-million barrels in 1940 and 13.553-million in 1941, which barely met demand. However, with the entry of the US into the war the industry expanded rapidly, with 72 new facilities specializing in aviation blends opening by November 1943, while another 20 were under construction. By then, monthly production had increased from 1.996-million barrels in January 1940 to 6.470-million barrels. By March 1944, just over $900-million had been expended on high-octane production facilities, with plants taking 12 to 18 months for completion from ground breaking to first run, and production for the month was 8.676-million barrels. Peak production was in May 1945, when 15.944-million barrels were produced.

Meanwhile, Germany had sunk its bets on synthetic fuel production in its quest for autarky after the Nazis came to power. They expended millions of Reichmarks, millions of tons of steel, and threw massive numbers of workers at the project during the first Four Year Plan and then more into the wartime expansion, yet never achieved its goals. They also left the German refineries in the 1920s. While they could of course throw Reichsmarks, steel, and people at manufacturing catalytic cracking plants after an unexplained victory over the Soviets sometime in 1943, by that time they were about eight years behind Anglo-American technological development. I think it unlikely even if they somehow managed to throw American style quantities of money, steel, and people at the project that they would be able to exceed the American timeline, which means they might start getting American quantities out of the refineries sometime in mid 1945 at the earliest...assuming, of course, the refineries aren't pounded into rubble like the synthetic plants.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 2631
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 15 Aug 2021 05:34

Richard Anderson wrote:B-87 Soviet aviation gas is run through a thermal cracking refinery
Soviet oil. Once again:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
14 Aug 2021 01:15
Again we have an inability to follow the logical distinction between a feedstock issue and a refining issue. :roll:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
11 Aug 2021 18:32
Again we have an inability to follow the logical distinction between a feedstock issue and a refining issue. :roll:
---------------------------------
Richard Anderson wrote:Germany had sunk its bets on synthetic fuel production
Sunk cost fallacy.
Richard Anderson wrote: to produce 100 octane fuel.
Nope.
Richard Anderson wrote:might start getting American quantities out of the refineries sometime in mid 1945
Irrelevant, spurious. The whole post is.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 2631
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 15 Aug 2021 05:50

CF Geust wrote:
14 Aug 2021 08:59
Here an extract of Gennadiy Petrov´s and my book Red Stars Vol.4 (Lend-lease aircraft in Russia), Apali (Finland), 2002; which tells about the need for American high-octane fuel for the P-39 Airacobras:

---
Several of the Soviet top aces flew the American fighter during the major part of WW II (including triple HSU A.I. Pokryshkin and double HSUs A.V. Alelukhin, S. Amet-Khan, D.B. and B.B. Glinka, N.D. Gulyayev, A.F. Klubov, P.S. Kutakhov, V.D. Lavrinenkov, A.I. Pokryshkin, G.A. Rechkalov, N.M. Skomorokhov, A.V. Vorozhejkin). The importance of the Airacobra for the total Soviet war effort is well proven by the only recently published fact that Stalin himself intervened in summer 1944 in order to ensure uninterrupted supply of 100 octane fuel for Pokryshkin’s fighter division 9 GIAD during Operation Bagration which commenced 23 June 1944 in White Russia. (At that time Soviet refineries produced only low-grade fuel, which did not generate maximum output of the Allison engine, why necessary additional American iso-octane chemicals were hastily collected from supply reserves along the ALSIB route in Siberia.) Pokryshkin was well aware of the defiencies of the Airacobra, and had received repeated proposals to re-equip his division with newer Soviet fighters. However, after weighing pros and cons he refused to withdraw his fighter division for conversion, as the Airacobra had already proven to be a formidable weapon in the hands of competent pilots and precious time would be lost during the conversion training.
---

Carl
Thanks for the excerpt; your work is appreciated.

While 100 octane fuel was of course immensely beneficial to aerial warfare, the question that I was answering in this thread is whether the LW would benefit from having more of the fuels it actually used in real combat (B4 and C3). It is self-evident to me - though not to all participants in this thread, apparently - that the Luftwaffe had fuel shortages and that more of its historical fuel would have helped it. I won't bore or condescend towards you by making that argument; I'll assume it's self-evident to you as well. Hitler obviously had no need to choose between American supplies of 100 octane fuel or other Lend Lease goods but, had he faced such choices, he probably would have chosen as did Stalin.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 4248
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by Richard Anderson » 15 Aug 2021 17:29

Yep, denial isn't just a river in Egypt, and the apparent belief is that the Germans were capable of producing the petroleum derivatives necessary for high octane aviation gasoline, the iso-octanes required for producing the alkylates, hydrocodimers, isopentanes, and neohexates needed, from thin air. In reality, their choices were to massively expand the synthetic production program or engage in a similarly massive expansion and modernization of their refinery capability, both requiring more time, capital, and manpower than they are likely to have from a cold start sometime after an unexplained collapse of the Soviet Union at some time in 1943.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 2631
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 16 Aug 2021 00:40

Someone is wasting precious hours raving that Germany couldn't make B4 and C3 fuels. The absurd notion requires obfuscation via US refining practices (uncited of course). Obfuscators are entitled to only a few sentences, ideally none.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 4248
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: British Assessment of Soviet Union oil supplies/usage - Aug 41

Post by Richard Anderson » 16 Aug 2021 16:06

Interesting, an ad hominem (I have never said any such thing) and a bleat for sources, rather than an actual rebuttal. Obfuscate rather than elucidate.

On the industrial processes:

American Chemical Society, The Houdry Process for Catalytic Cracking. http://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/educa ... oudry.html
Dr. Semih Eser, "The Catalytic Refinery (1940-1970)", FSC 432: Petroleum Processing, Penn State College of Earth and Mineral Sciences, Pennsylvania, 2020.
Heinz Heinemann, A Brief History of Industrial Catalysis, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, California, June 1979.

On the history of German production:

USSBS Report No. 109, Oil Division Final Report.

On the history of Allied production:

Bruce K, Brown and D. P. Barnard, "How Will the 100-Octane Aviation Gasoline Program Affect Post-War Motor Gasoline?" SAE Transactions 52 (1944): 87-93.
Rodney P. Carlisle and August W. Giebelhaus, "World War II and the Response of Oil Technology, 1941-1946" in Bartlesville Energy Center, Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Department of Energy, 1985.
Civilian Production Administration, Official Munitions Production of the United States, May 1, 1947.
Alexander R. Ogston, "A Short History of Aviation Gasoline Development, 1903—1980." SAE Transactions 90 (1981).
U.S. Army Air Forces Historical Study No. 65, Aviation Gasoline Production and Control, Air Historical Office, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, September 1947.

On the history of Soviet production:

Oleg Anatolyev, "Lend-Lease Oil Dimension", Oil in Russia Magazine, No. 2, 2010.
Alexander Matveichuk, "A High-Octane Weapon for Victory", Oil in Russia Magazine, No. 2, 2011.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Return to “The Soviet Union at War 1917-1945”