Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

[Vasilyev]

Doing a cursory check of whats been published, it seems like there haven’t been a lot of new Russian material in the past decade on the RKKA’s operations around Warsaw. Русский архив. Великая Отечественная, СССР и Польша and Ставка ВГК, 1944-1945 гг. seem to have been the limit of high-level military documents published. There have been several documentary collections of diplomatic and NKVD materials concerning the uprising in the late 2000s/early 2010s, but little relating to the military situation.

ЦАМО РФ has many of the operational materials of 1st Belorussian Front and its subordinate armies published online. You can get a sense of each formation’s daily strength/supply situation as well as their combat orders/actions, but many communications between the Front and higher/subordinate bodies which convey its intent and plans haven’t been published. One can still infer a lot from what’s there, but it requires more legwork.

Does that seem like an accurate roundup? It seems like the 2010s haven’t contributed a lot of new information on the RKKA’s military response to the uprising.

[Art]

Doing a cursory check of whats been published, it seems like there haven’t been a lot of new Russian material in the past decade on the RKKA’s operations around Warsaw.

You mean primary sources?

ЦАМО РФ has many of the operational materials of 1st Belorussian Front and its subordinate armies published online. You can get a sense of each formation’s daily strength/supply situation as well as their combat orders/actions, but many communications between the Front and higher/subordinate bodies which convey its intent and plans haven’t been published.

It looks that online publication was not complete, even when documents of the operations directorate of the 1 BF are concerned. "Russkiy Arkhiv" series includes the report by Zhukov and Rokossovsky on proposed operation in the Warsaw area from 8 August 1944 (archival requisites TsAMO RF f. 233, op. 2356. d.26, ll.181-183). This report and the file itself is lacking in the online database (*). However, there is an online publication elsewhere from the same folder - report on the plan of Bobruisk operation from 7 June 1944 (TsAMO RF f. 233, op. 2356, d. 26, ll.59-66):
https://histrf.ru/read/documents/item/p ... -podlinnik
It appears that the folder 26 contains various plans of operations developed by the 1 Belorussian Front's command. One can only wonder why this key folder hasn't been digitized and published, whereas less important and essential files have been.

* Curiously, the map attached to the 8 August's report was digitized and uploaded online:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=112905583

In addition to operational plans other stuff of interest includes directives, combat orders, appraisals of the situation and telegrams of the Front's command. Rather few of them are available in the online database. I suppose they must exist in a paper form in files of the military council or encoding department (neither of which were digitized and published online). Fortunately, the war diary of Front records some of the directives and orders.

[Vasilyev]

Doing a cursory check of whats been published, it seems like there haven’t been a lot of new Russian material in the past decade on the RKKA’s operations around Warsaw.

You mean primary sources?

Right, there's been next to no "big picture" documents published.

ЦАМО РФ has many of the operational materials of 1st Belorussian Front and its subordinate armies published online. You can get a sense of each formation’s daily strength/supply situation as well as their combat orders/actions, but many communications between the Front and higher/subordinate bodies which convey its intent and plans haven’t been published.

It looks that online publication was not complete, even when documents of the operations directorate of the 1 BF are concerned. "Russkiy Arkhiv" series includes the report by Zhukov and Rokossovsky on proposed operation in the Warsaw area from 8 August 1944 (archival requisites TsAMO RF f. 233, op. 2356. d.26, ll.181-183). This report and the file itself is lacking in the online database (*). However, there is an online publication elsewhere from the same folder - report on the plan of Bobruisk operation from 7 June 1944 (TsAMO RF f. 233, op. 2356, d. 26, ll.59-66):
https://histrf.ru/read/documents/item/p ... -podlinnik
It appears that the folder 26 contains various plans of operations developed by the 1 Belorussian Front's command. One can only wonder why this key folder hasn't been digitized and published, whereas less important and essential files have been.

* Curiously, the map attached to the 8 August's report was digitized and uploaded online:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=112905583

In addition to operational plans other stuff of interest includes directives, combat orders, appraisals of the situation and telegrams of the Front's command. Rather few of them are available in the online database. I suppose they must exist in a paper form in files of the military council or encoding department (neither of which were digitized and published online). Fortunately, the war diary of Front records some of the directives and orders.

It's really baffling, especially since random operational planning maps appear in different folders (I've found Bobruisk, Kovel/Lublin-Brest and Vistula-Oder). I've just been trying to follow the actions of the Front's armies in the 2nd half of August to see if they were complying with the outline of the 8/8 plan. On the right wing it seems like they were, but on the left wing Vistula bridgeheads the daily orders I've seen (From 69th Army, for example) are entirely focused on improving their tactical position rather than pursuing deeper objectives. Which makes sense with the constant counterattacks they experienced in mid-August and problems they had making the bridgeheads sustainable (Here's 8th Guards Army with no bridges and relying on barges on 8/10: https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133368926). Plus 1st Tank Army never got the chance to swing to the NE like the 8/8 plan proposed.

69th Army in particular has a bunch of reports about restrictions on ammunition supply and expenditure starting in mid-August and continuing until the end of September (Haven't seen anything similar for 8th Guards):

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... a0e99894v2

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... a0e99894v2

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... a0e99894v2

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... a0e99894v2

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... f9a39474v2

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/?use ... %B2&page=3

[Art]

Right, there's been next to no "big picture" documents published.

Not that I know. Online docs at Pamyat-naroda give a more or less coherent idea of operations (what were the objectives, what was made to attain them and whan happened as a result), but that tell little about decision making. Decision making is a difficult thing to trace. For example, I don't know if any minutes of telephone conversations between Stalin and Zhukov, Rokossovsky or other top commanders were made. And by that moment telephone was a primary means of communication between them and unlike telepgraph and teletype it didn't leave any physical records.

It's really baffling, especially since random operational planning maps appear in different folders (I've found Bobruisk, Kovel/Lublin-Brest and Vistula-Oder). I've just been trying to follow the actions of the Front's armies in the 2nd half of August to see if they were complying with the outline of the 8/8 plan. On the right wing it seems like they were, but on the left wing Vistula bridgeheads the daily orders I've seen (From 69th Army, for example) are entirely focused on improving their tactical position rather than pursuing deeper objectives.

Zhukov and Rokossovsky envisaged the operation consisting of two phases:
- phase one - build-up and consolidation of bridgeheads on the Vitula and Narew
- phase two - general attack from these bridghehads.
The phase two simply never happened because the offensive ran out steam before it became possible.
Consequently the objectives on the west side of Vistula were limited to uniting Magnuszew and Pulawy bridgeheads into a larger bridgehead. Yet, this attempt failed with considerable casualties although with some territorial gains as described in another topic:
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=231325

[Vasilyev]

Right, there's been next to no "big picture" documents published.

Not that I know. Online docs at Pamyat-naroda give a more or less coherent idea of operations (what were the objectives, what was made to attain them and whan happened as a result), but that tell little about decision making. Decision making is a difficult thing to trace. For example, I don't know if any minutes of telephone conversations between Stalin and Zhukov, Rokossovsky or other top commanders were made. And by that moment telephone was a primary means of communication between them and unlike telepgraph and teletype it didn't leave any physical records.

It's really baffling, especially since random operational planning maps appear in different folders (I've found Bobruisk, Kovel/Lublin-Brest and Vistula-Oder). I've just been trying to follow the actions of the Front's armies in the 2nd half of August to see if they were complying with the outline of the 8/8 plan. On the right wing it seems like they were, but on the left wing Vistula bridgeheads the daily orders I've seen (From 69th Army, for example) are entirely focused on improving their tactical position rather than pursuing deeper objectives.

Zhukov and Rokossovsky envisaged the operation consisting of two phases:
- phase one - build-up and consolidation of bridgeheads on the Vitula and Narew
- phase two - general attack from these bridghehads.
The phase two simply never happened because the offensive ran out steam before it became possible.
Consequently the objectives on the west side of Vistula were limited to uniting Magnuszew and Pulawy bridgeheads into a larger bridgehead. Yet, this attempt failed with considerable casualties although with some territorial gains as described in another topic:
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=231325

Great thread, I had the same idea as you re: comparing munitions expenditures. 69 Army was a bit challenging but the breakdown I got was (For units involved in its 8/20 offensive):

61 SK (134, 247, 274 SD, supported by 256 MP and 243 MP, 107 and 492 IPTAP from 8 IPTABR, 256 and 243 MP, still trying to find numbers for 56 GMP)
8/19, 8/20, 8/21, 8/22
82mm mortar - 115, 1832, 2248, 94
120 mm mortar – 200, 2663, 674, 46
45mm – 0, 1140, 50, 116
76mm divisional – 244, 3241, 414, 37
76mm regimental – 0, 474, 103, 12
122mm howitzer – 36, 606, 155, 88

91 SK

370 SD
50mm mortar - 148, 0, 0, 130
82mm mortar – 200, 1660, 300, 190
120mm mortar – 0, 352, 306, 75
45 – 10, 40, 40, 13
76 div – 78, 627, 55, 35
76 reg – 0, 15, 13, 0
122 – 14, 413, 67, 11

117 SD
82 – 0, 1850, 0, 0
120 –0, 600, 124, 0
45 – 0, 1190, 46, 0
76 div – 0, 516, 584, 104
76 reg – 0, 445, 9, 0
122 – 0, 198, 70, 100

312 SD
82 – 0, 4200, 0, 120
120 – 250, 619, 0, 10
76 div – 33, 1313, 447, 78
76 reg – 0, 450, 0, 0
122 –12, 680, 9, 62

41 SD (Inc. 36 MBr)
82- 0, 2960, 3000, 285
120 – 212, 4493, 2051, 180
45 – 0, 2380, 1114, 0
76 div – 154, 1595, 568, 176
76 reg – 0, 482, 910, 0
122 – 25, 586, 347, 76


22 IPTAP (91 SK 8/19-8/21)
76mm div – 0, 850, 0, 0

435 IPTAP, 8 IPTABR (91 SK 8/20)
76 div – 0, 363, 0, 0

12 Breakthrough Artillery Division:
11 Mbr
120 mm mortar – 150, 3560, 853, 166

32 GABR
122mm howitzer – 20, 1902, 789, 88

41 PABR
125 PAP
122mm gun – 30, 927, 75, 7
155 PAP
152mm gun – 6, 1313, 133, 11

46 LABR
76mm div – 106, 3056, 120, 119

89 TGABR
152mm howitzer – 40, 579, 0, 0

_________________________________________

62 PABR (Long range artillery group w/41 PABR)
152mm gun – 47, 1523, 0, 131

303 GMP
82mm mortar (Rocket): 0, 0, 125, 0
132mm mortar (Rocket): 0, 233, 217, 0

115 GMP
132mm mortar (Rocket): 10, 602, 52, 377

16 GMBR (Supporting both 61 SK and 91 SK)
300mm mortar (Rocket): 0, 1009, 0, 0

Total:

8/19, 8/20, 8/21, 8/22
50mm mortar - 148, 0, 0, 130
82mm mortar - 315, 12502, 5548, 685
120mm mortar – 812, 12287, 4008, 477
45mm – 10, 4,750, 1250, 129
76mm divisional – 615, 10461, 1288, 549
76mm regimental – 0, 1866, 1035, 12
122mm howitzer – 137, 4,385, 1437, 425
122mm gun - 30, 927, 75, 7
152mm howitzer - 40, 579, 0, 0
152mm gun - 53, 2,836, 133, 142
82mm rocket: 0, 0, 125, 0
132mm rocket: 10, 835, 269, 377
300mm rocket: 0, 1009, 0, 0

Total - 2,160; 52,437; 15,168; 2,933

Had to go through summaries for each artillery HQ for 91 SK's units because their artillery reports weren't online. Can't guarantee I didn't miss a unit, but it's pretty close to the totals reported for all of 69 Army (~55k fired by all units for 8/20 vs 52,437 for the units here). I'll triple check for typos tomorrow and add 17 ID's numbers.

The numbers broadly show what you'd expect - very heavy expenditures on day 1 (In many cases units fired 1/2 - 3/4 of their stocks on 8/20), but tapering off very quickly as stockpiled munitions were exhausted and targets became harder to find. 69 Army’s objectives were limited and reached on 8/20, so this wasn’t a major problem. Almost half of fires on 8/20 were mortars, ~75% were mortars and shells up 76mm (Even more if including rockets).

[Vasilyev]

Made corrections above - there were a bunch of errors with rocket artillery which should be fixed now.

For 17 ID, rounds and tons for 8/19-8/22 were:

81-mm mortars - 500, 800, 900, 700
120-mm mortars - 80, 210, 160, 170
75-mm infantry guns - 100, 200, 100, 150
150-mm infantry guns - 50, 60, 52, 40
105-mm howitzers - 950, 1250, 1342, 1202
150-mm howitzers - 0, 0, 0, 0
105-mm guns - 130, 100, 500, 160,
210-mm howitzers - 60, 160, 190, 90
150-mm rockets - 0, 0, 0, 0
300-mm rockets - 0, 0, 0, 0
Total - 1670, 2780, 3244, 2512
Tons (US) - 52.91, 79.37, 103.07, 66.14

From: https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/9

For Soviet tonnage (US again):

50mm mortar - 0.15, 0, 0, 0.13
82mm mortar - 1.13, 45.01, 19.97, 2.57
120mm mortar – 14.21, 215.02, 70.14, 8.35
45mm – 0.02, 7.6, 2, 0.21
76mm divisional – 4, 68, 8.37, 3.57
76mm regimental – 0, 12.13, 6.73, 0.08
122mm howitzer – 3.29, 105.24, 34.49, 10.2
122mm gun - 0.72, 22.25, 1.8, 0.17
152mm howitzer - 1.92, 27.79, 0, 0
152mm gun - 2.54, 136.13, 6.38, 6.82
82mm rocket: 0, 0, 0.09, 0
132mm rocket: 0.05, 4.51, 1.45, 2.04
300mm rocket: 0, 32.14, 0, 0

Total - 27.98, 675.82, 179.21, 34.14

Comparison:

8/19 - 52.91:27.98
8/20 - 79.37:675.82
8/21- 103.07:179.21
8/22 - 66.14:34.14

As with 8 Guards Army's offensive, munitions expenditures mirror how the tactical situation evolved for 69 Army.

[Vasilyev]

For comparison, on day 1 of the Vistula-Oder Operation (1/14) 69 Army fired:

82mm mortar - 44,292, 159.45t
120mm mortar – 32,223, 563.9t
45mm – 10,485, 16.78t
57mm - 4,225, 27.46t
76mm divisional – 47,765, 310.47t
76mm regimental – 7,852, 51.04t
122mm howitzer and gun - 21,805, 523.32t
152mm howitzer and gun - 7,005, 336.24t
82mm rocket: 788, 0.56t
132mm rocket: 852, 4.6t
300mm rocket: 1,156, 36.83t

Total: 179,644, 2,030.58t

A massive increase in firepower getting dropped.

[Art]

Another relevant document which was not published for some reasons (although it should).

From the war dirary of the 1 Belorussian Front, 12 August 1944:

In view of conituing enemy's retreat to the north-west and in order to prevent him from organizing defense on new positions the Front's commander ordered:
....
4. To the commander of the 47 Army
Continue swift offensive with the right wing formations along the overall direction Krzywica, Nadma, Pludy with the immediate objective of reaching the line Radzymin, Kobylka, Gurow [Turow?], Ossow.
Further on seize Praga with the strike from the noth and north-east and reach the line of the Vistula River with the main forces of the army.
(combat order of the 1st BF's staff No. 00846/OP of 12.8.44)

In other words this order expicitly called for occupation of the Vistula bank opposite of Warsaw just few hundred meters from the city's center. Which obviously contradicts to a popular legend about an alleged halt order. In reality more than a month passed before Praga was taken and the Vistula line reached, yet that happened for objective reasons rather due to a lack of will.

[henryk]

In other words this order expicitly called for occupation of the Vistula bank opposite of Warsaw just few hundred meters from the city's center. Which obviously contradicts to a popular legend about an alleged halt order. In reality more than a month passed before Praga was taken and the Vistula line reached, yet that happened for objective reasons rather due to a lack of will.

What are the "objective reasons"?

[Art]

Forces didn't suffice, or the battle plan was inadequate to available resources - call it as you want.

[LAstry]

Berlings 1st Polish Army of the East had 5,560 casualites in the 1944 Uprising...was this high, low or about average casualty rate for red Army offensives?

[Vasilyev]

Berlings 1st Polish Army of the East had 5,560 casualites in the 1944 Uprising...was this high, low or about average casualty rate for red Army offensives?

From September 10-30 (Reporting period for when 1st Polish Army was engaged in combat) it suffered 4,414 casualties. 47 Army suffered 10,060 casualties and 70 Army suffered 5,657 casualties. The other armies were on the defensive and suffered 2-3k losses. On page 232 of the Front’s war diary for September:

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... 7042b45bv1

[Art]

Total numbers are misleading. Normally at least 3 of 4 battle casualties are survivors. Yet the Poles lost more than 2000 men missing in action as well as nearly 500 men killed. Several infantry battalions were almost completely wiped out over a course of several days.

[Vasilyev]

Total numbers are misleading. Normally at least 3 of 4 battle casualties are survivors. Yet the Poles lost more than 2000 men missing in action as well as nearly 500 men killed. Several infantry battalions were almost completely wiped out over a course of several days.

According to memoirs of participants from 8 Regiment 3 Polish Infantry Division, which suffered the worst, a few of those missing were able to slip away and join AK/AL formations around Warsaw. But as you say, the casualties were disproportionally KIA/POW/MIA because of the nature of the fighting.

Committing 1 Polish Army to the crossing was a mistake, especially after it had already failed in early August at forcing the Vistula around Demblin. But there weren’t any other reserves to draw on. Maybe if 61 Army had been released from Stavka reserve instead of being sent up to Riga that would’ve produced a crossing with real force behind it.

Zhukov criticizes Stalin in his memoirs for not reinforcing the attack on East Prussia in August, leaving them with a much harder fight later on. You could say the same for 1st Belorussian Front - the insistence on stripping it of 70 Army (Returned in early August) and 61 Army in late July after Brest falls seems shortsighted. Especially since the Front was committed to fighting on 3 directions (Defending the Vistula bridgeheads, seizing Narew bridgeheads, and closing up with Warsaw and seizing Praga).

[Vasilyev]

Related to 1st Belorussian Front's commitment to too many directions relative to resources available, we have the aftermath of the Battle of Radzymin (One of many names for the battle). Most accounts describe 2nd Tank Army as combat ineffective following the battle.

At the end of the day on 7/30 the army reported 482 tanks operational, compared to 810 tanks at the end of the day on 7/13 (No distinction about operability, but one can assume a high level of readiness). Just the wear and tear of the advance and combat before getting to the Warsaw area had burnt out a large part of 2 TA's strength.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... 1b5d633cv4

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... a9baf02cv4

At the end of the day on 8/7, when 2 TA had fully disengaged from the area, it had 392 tanks operational - 396 at the end of the day on 8/6. So the net loss of vehicles was around ~90 tanks. By the end of the day on 8/9 it had 434 tanks operational and 457 by 8/12.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... a9baf02cv4

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... a9baf02cv4

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... 1b5d633cv4

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... 1b5d633cv4

The exception is 3rd Tank Corps, which had a strength of 134 tanks on 7/30. At the end of 8/5 its 53 Tank Brigade had just 1 T-34 operational, while its 51 TBr had 11. It was down to 69 tanks at the end of 8/7.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... a9baf02cv4

Obviously fog of war means these numbers aren't 100% exact. But the picture they paint is one of 2 TA damaged - it lost 20% of its strength - but not destroyed. It quickly recovered to its pre-battle tank strength with short term repairs.

What really hurt 2 TA was the decision to detach its 16 Tank Corps and commit it to 8 Guards Army's bridgehead. Combined with sending the 11 Tank Corps to the Pulawy bridgehead on 7/31, 1 Belorussian Front had lost 2 of its strongest armored formations. While 8 Guards Tank Corps and 3 Tank Corps would be recommitted to support the push to the Bug River by 47/70 Armies in mid-August, they weren't up to the task.

The decisions made from 7/20-31 to commit 1 BF to multiple different directions (The Vistula bridgeheads, the Narew, and Warsaw) forced it to dilute its strength in early-mid August in order to achieve geographically divergent objectives. Formations were also withdrawn from the Front at inopportune moments - 70/61 Armies after Brest was taken,11 TC on 7/31 after Siedlce was taken - which dangerously weakened its main blow against Warsaw, giving Army Group Center the opportunity to organize a strong counterattack.

The Battle of Radzymin was less decisive (IMO) than the bad decisions which created the conditions for it to happen and dictated 1 BF's strategy for the rest of August.