Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

[Art]

At the close of 7/27 we have 807 tanks in 2 TA's roster;

Yes, but of them 70 were listed "irrevocable losses, not written off (yet)". Which means that they were already damaged beyond repair or totally lost in some other way (e.g. captured). As correctly said above vehicles were typically written off several days or even weeks after there were actually lost and they continued to be formally included in the tank strength. Apparently the number tanks to be written off listed in the tank strength of the 2 TA's staff is a more adequate indicator of the number of losses. Nobody guarantees that it was perfectly accurate, but at least it gives some basis to start with. According to this source 70 tank became irrevocable losses by the end of the day 27 July. Probably there was also some lag in reporting, and the actual number is higher somewhat, but it is difficult to ascertain.

[Vasilyev]

At the close of 7/27 we have 807 tanks in 2 TA's roster;

Yes, but of them 70 were listed "irrevocable losses, not written off (yet)". Which means that they were already damaged beyond repair or totally lost in some other way (e.g. captured). As correctly said above vehicles were typically written off several days or even weeks after there were actually lost and they continued to be formally included in the tank strength. Apparently the number tanks to be written off listed in the tank strength of the 2 TA's staff is a more adequate indicator of the number of losses. Nobody guarantees that it was perfectly accurate, but at least it gives some basis to start with. According to this source 70 tank became irrevocable losses by the end of the day 27 July. Probably there was also some lag in reporting, and the actual number is higher somewhat, but it is difficult to ascertain.

Yes the accuracy of the daily strength reports matches pretty well with AARs. For example, 8 GTC was reported as having 36 АFVs irrecoverably lost by the close of 7/27 and its war diary gives losses of 32 up to the end of 7/25.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... 004cb64ev7

The report for the end of 7/31 lists 75 irrecoverable losses, while 8 GTC's own report for the same date gives 82.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... 004cb64ev7

The documents of 2 TA say that 97 tanks total were written off from 7/22-8/12 (Going from 282 on the roster to 187), whereas the war diary of 8 GTC gives 141 lost up to 8/6. That would imply 22 losses from 8/1 onward going off 2 TA's materials, whereas 8 GTC's documents would say losses were 59 tanks. Using 8/8 instead of 8/12 for 2 TA yields 94 writeoffs for 8 GTC, so it's not a matter of dates.

[Vasilyev]

IMO sending it across at Demblin/Pulawy on 7/25 before most of 17 ID arrives would be the best plan. 8 GA and 69 A arrive shortly thereafter and you get a hefty bridgehead in the Vistula bend.

According to the 2 TA war dairy (entry of 23 July 1944):
"Commander of the 1 Belorussian Front gave the task of preparing the Army for operations to capture the areas of Deblin, Pulawy, movement to the west bank of Vistula and further advance toward Warsaw"

It seems that this plan wasn't carried out because Vistula bridges were not captured intact but were blown up. Crossing of the river against the opposition seemed problematic. The war diary and the after-action report of the 2 Tank Army further speculates that crossing of Vistula would face serious German opposition while surprise advance to Warsaw along the eastern bank would hit a void. That was apparently a situation appraisal made about this time. Accordingly the tasks were modified somewhat:
"Commander of the front gave the Army the task: advance along the highway in the overall direction to Garwolin-Praga, take Praga, capturing bridges over the Vistula in this region"
(war diary entry of 27 July)

Some more quotes about the decision not to cross from 2 TA's report on the operation to the CoS of the Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Red Army/1 BelF.

Page 65, conclusions:

... In contrast to the enemy's plan [To deploy troops to block the Garwolin-Warsaw road], the decision of the Military Council was based on the main strike east of the Warsaw highway, in order to bypass the Prague fortified area and avoid losses from aviation [As occurred at Deblin and Pulawy].

Page 67:

12. The breakout of troops of the 2nd Tank Army to the approaches to Praga, Warsaw diverted large forces of the enemy’s tank troops which contributed to the successful actions of the remaining armies of the front to defeat the Bialystok and Brest enemy groupings and to force the Vistula in the areas of Demblin, Pulawy.

This conclusion appears mostly unjustified, as the two cities were taken on 7/27 as the drive on Praga was just getting underway. The operation did temporarily divert HG and 19th Panzer from 8th Guards Army's bridgehead, albeit only for a few days due to the Army's transition to the defense. Seems like a bit of saving face.

Page 80, Army HQ order from the morning of 7/27:

1. In the battles for the capture of Deblin, Pulawy, in addition to the remnants of the 5 Jaeger Division, 26 Infantry Division, 213 Security Division departing from Lublin, parts of 17 Infantry Division were identified. From the morning of 7/26, 1944, these units retreated to the western bank of the Vistula.

When moving towards the Warsaw area along the eastern bank of the Vistula River, it is possible to throw operational reserves from the region to Brest, Warsaw.

2. 2 TA from the morning of 27/7 1944 advances in a northerly direction, with the immediate task of capturing the Stochek and Garwolin areas by the end of the day 27/7 1944, the further objective is to capture the Praga region and cut the Bialystok-Warsaw, Sedlec-Warsaw railways.

Page 222, the Army's rear report:

Since the crossings of Pulawy and Deblin were broken, the western bank of the Vistula was heavily fortified, and the infantry was not yet subdued, the Army received the task of turning northwest in the general direction of Prague.

The report also notes that the Army's supply station couldn't be transferred from east of Kovel' to the Lublin region by 7/27 because the track hadn't been repaired and converted to Soviet gauge.

The report also notes that (Page 65):

...The exit to the Vistula was excellently organized, the organization of the battle for capturing populated areas was unsatisfactory, which shows the inability of senior officers to plan a battle for capturing large populated areas.

Similar criticism is given for the Lublin battle, where heavy armored losses were suffered because the Army attacked the city without adequate infantry support.

Given the context of these recent missteps when attacking urban areas, the Army's distance from its supply base, and the known concentration of German reserves in the Warsaw region even at this date, the decision not to force the Vistula in the Pulawy-Deblin region on 7/26 (in cooperation with 8th Guards Army) and advance on Praga in isolation (ie without infantry support) instead seems questionable. The reports seems to greatly overestimate the strength of the German defenses along the river's western bank as well as the fortifications in place.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=287673556