Pre-war manuals and doctrinal gap

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Pre-war manuals and doctrinal gap

#1

Post by Art » 17 Dec 2022, 22:33

Information from the V.A. Zhilin’s book (“System of military command organs…”) (key points)
On 10 November 1931 K.Ye. Voroshilov as a Commissar for Defense issued a directive to commanders of districts and separate armies, chiefs of the RKKA Staff, Air and Naval Forces, Political and Combat Training Administrations. This directive ordered to develop the following doctrinal documents: regulation on field command of military forces, instruction “Organization and command of the army’s operation”, instruction on operations of rear services, instruction on operation of fronts’ and armies’ staffs in wartime. This work was to be completed in 1931-32. Editorial commissions were created in the same year and proceeded to work, yet soon it turned out that the deadline was unrealistic. Only in 1933 the project of instruction “Field service of staffs” and “Provisional instructions on organization of the deep combat” were issued, in 1934 – “Provisional instruction on deep combat”, which in 1935 was modified and published as Instruction on deep combat. In the same 1935 the “Provisional instruction on field service of troop staffs” were issued, and finally in 1936 – “Provisional field regulation of the RKKA of 1936”. In 1939 it was succeeded by the project of the Field Manual of 1939. Most of these manuals and instruction focused on tactical formation and units, i.e. on the corps and lower echelons, whereas higher military organs lacked strict regulations.

Renewed attempts to develop official operational manuals followed. On 13 December 1933 the People’s Commissar of Defense ordered to the RKKA Staff to develop a project of “Instruction on employment of the higher formations of the RKKA (army)”. Preliminary work started in the winter of 1934, by 1935 the project of the instruction, which covered key questions of the operational art and preparation and conduct of front and army-level operations, was completed, but not disseminated. The project was published in 1000 copies, almost all were later confiscated, a single copy survived in the Russian State Military Archive. According to kombrig Isserson one copy was given to the General Staff Academy where it was used as a basis for the course on operational art. Some chapters were used in an unofficial textbook entitled “Principles of conduct of operations”.
In 1935 another draft instruction which regulated organization of command of the front, army and tactical formations was completed.

In May 1940 the Main Military Council [of the RKKA] issued a resolution on «Provision of the Red Army with manuals based on experience of recent wars” (*), which prescribed to “rewrite active manuals and instruction of the Red Army” and develop “Regulation on field command of military forces”, “Instruction on employment of Red Army forces (army – army group), rewrite the project of the Field Manual of 1939. As a result projects of the Field Manual of 1939 and later 1940 emerged which were subjected to prolong editing process and hadn’t been officially approved before the war. As for Regulation and Instructions mentioned above, none was actually completed.

* Actually it was a draft resolution from 5 May 1940 which wasn’t officially adopted by the Military Council. See
http://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/ ... e/1/zoom/6

This text raises interesting questions, namely a lack of doctrinal documents and even abolishment and destruction of some of these documents for political reasons after 1937.

Some comments: theoretically the hierarchy of military manuals looked as follows:
- Battle manuals of arms (e.g. manuals of infantry, artillery, cavalry, tank troops etc), describing employment of units of a single arm
- Field manuals describing employment of combined arms with a focus of higher tactical formations (e.g. brigade, division and corps)
- Manuals or instructions on employment and command of higher echelon formations (armies and group of armies)

Battle manuals of arms were periodically updated prior to 1941, and some new battle manuals, e.g manuals of infantry and tank troops were reissued in 1942 or later.
The last permanent pre-war field manual was published in 1929, the next field manual issued in 1936 was designated as “provisional”. It was followed by successive projects developed in 1939, 1940 etc which were disseminated for evaluation but not officially approved. Only in 1943 a permanent field manual was approved and published.
As for manuals/instructions for higher formations none apparently existed, although development of such instructions was explicitly defined as one of the key functions of the Red Army’s [General] Staff. According to Zhilin a draft instruction existed but revoked during the purges. As a result higher staffs and commanders existed in a sort of doctrinal vacuum.

Manuals had to be supplemented by various regulations and instructions in specific questions. As far as organization of high military command, higher staffs, their structure and functions are concerned the last such instruction was adopted in 1928 (“Basics of structure of field command of military forces in wartime” approved by the Revolutionary Military Council on 23 March 1928).
http://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/ ... rta-1928-g
No other document of such types followed after 1928, although, as described above, attempts were undertaken.
In a similar vein the last regulation defining the structure and functions of the People’s Commissariat for Defense as a key body in command of the army was approved in 1934, yet it was hopelessly outdated by 1941. The project of the new regulation was prepared in 1940 after Timoshenko took the office and subsequent reorganization, but for some reasons this project was not officially approved either.

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Re: Pre-war manuals and doctrinal gap

#2

Post by Art » 18 Dec 2022, 19:23

The document summarizing situation in the People’s Commissariat for Defense in May 1940 when Timoshenko took the office from Voroshilov gave the following description:
1. The acting regulation on the People’s Commissariat for Defense, approved by the government in 1934, is outdated and doesn’t correspond to the present structure and doesn’t reflect the modern tasks entrusted to the Commissariat for Defense.
Newly created administrations… operate by provisional regulations. The structure of other administrations … has been changed, and regulations on these changes were not approved.
The Commissar for Defense has 34 administrations and departments directly subordinated to him. Under these conditions and a lack of clear division of responsibility between deputies of the Commissar delays in solving the problems arising in administrations of the PCD took place.

2. In development and publication of manuals, regulations and instructions, regulating life and activity of troops there is no clear system. The army has up to 1080 items of acting manuals, regulations and instructions, many if them are provisional and outdated and require renewal.
The principal manuals: field service manual, battle manuals of arms, internal service manual, disciplinary manual – are also outdated and require renewal. Along with presence of many manuals and instructions absent are: instruction on employment of large military formations (army), instruction on attack and defense of fortified regions and instruction on operations in mountains.
https://military.wikireading.ru/9472

Similar points were echoed by other observers:

Komandarm Voronov, chief of the Red Army’s artillery writing on the Soviet-Finnish War experience in April 1940:
Based on battle experience one needs to produce a regulation of field command. Define rights and responsibilities of all echelons in war.
The same should be made for peacetime regarding all chiefs of arms and services.
https://www.aroundspb.ru/finnish/docs/dir0_voronov.php

Army general Meretskov, chief of the General Staff in December 1940:
Experience of recent wars, training exercises and staff rides demonstrated lack of operational preparedness and military culture among higher commander, staffs of formations, army, front and especially aviation staffs. This problem wasn’t paid attention to previously. The main handicap is that during many years instructions on employment of large modern formations, on joint actions of aviation and tanks were absent. There was no clarity on how large aviation and mechanized formations should be employed, where the main efforts of aviation should lie – on support of ground troops or independent operations, or both should be sought as far as it needed.

Experience of war on the Karelian-Finnish theatre demonstrated that our manuals providing basic principles on employment of military forces don’t correspond to requirements of modern war. They contain many erroneous statements, which mislead commanders. In war we didn’t follow the principle theses of out manuals because they didn’t correspond to requirements of war.
http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/sov-new-1940/02.html

General Pokrovsky (chief of staff of the West, 3rd Belorussian Front), in a post-war interview:
…The events of war that followed demonstrated that we were not prepared for organization of the field command. Regulation on field command of the army in wartime conditions was not developed prior to the war. There were drafts, but such a regulations on field command of the army, on Stavka and in general on transition of the army to wartime state in respect of command – the regulation that existed before the First World War (*) – such a well-developed and approved Regulation didn’t exist. That is why during the war it took time for things to settle down. Stavka was organized with a number of changed and amendments. And field command of directions, which were created soon after the war start, they were also organized in improvised fashion and in haste.
* meaning the Russian “Regulation of field command in wartime” issued in July 1914.
http://rkka.ru/memory/pokrovskiy/main.htm


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Re: Pre-war manuals and doctrinal gap

#3

Post by Art » 24 Dec 2022, 09:50

Art wrote:
18 Dec 2022, 19:23
Along with presence of many manuals and instructions absent are: ...instruction on attack and defense of fortified regions...
M.V. Zakharov (assistant chief of the General Staff) in 1939-40 recollected an example of deliberate destruction of military manuals devloped by "enemies". During the Soviet-Finnish War in December 1939 komkor Zakharov was sent with an inspection mission to the Karelian Isthmus. Upon studying the situation he recommended to organize a breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line using an existing instruction on attack on fortified position. It turned out that this instruction was absent in higher staffs because it was considered harmful (apparently being written by "enemies of people") and destroyed. Zakharov put some strain to locate a surviving copy, finding it in a library in Moscow, which was used a basis for instructions disseminated to military units.

By all probabilty it was not a single example. One of suspects is the "Battle manual of mechanized forces (pt. 3) of 1937" which was officially put in force by a Voroshilov's order in 1937, which was also covered in military press. Later on this manual simply disappeared without a trace. Given a time period it is quite likely that it was also removed from staffs and destroyed.

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Re: Pre-war manuals and doctrinal gap

#4

Post by Art » 11 Feb 2023, 11:20

It is worth to note that the Provisional Field Manual of 1936 contained only half a page covering attack on "fortified regions" (permanent fortifications). And the main point of this short piece was that the method of attack is described in detail in a separate instruction. Which was apparently the same instruction copies of which were confiscated and destroyed according to Zakharov's account. The project of the Field Manual of 1939 contained a more detailed combined chapter of 9 paragraphs entitled "attack on strongly fortified positions" which covered both attack on field and permanent fortifications. But again this chapter said that "attack on fortified region is carried out based on a separate instruction", and this instruction was absent.
Unsurprisingly the Red Army found itself ill-prepared for attack on the Mannerheim Line in 1939.

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