Planning and Implementation of the Lublin-Brest Operation

[Vasilyev]

For me the continuing reliance of the General Staff historians on the idea of strategic directions as shown in their 1961 work stresses their importance even this late into the war and as I argue in my next paper, we should look at the war through this prism from the Soviet side.

And all of this planning happens in just under a calendar month!

I'm looking forward to reading it! Your articles are always a good time.

The creation of the 4 strategic directions (NW, N, W/Main, and S) in Spring 1944 gets mentioned frequently and, as you said, comes directly from the General Staff's writings on the war.

By 1944 there were "directions" (departments) under the GenStaff Operations Directorate corresponding to each Front. They monitored implementation of orders and communicated the daily situation of each Front up the chain to the Ops Chief & Deputies, CoS, SVGK, and Stalin. They also drafted orders for their assigned area. Each one would have 3-7 people. You also had a central apparatus of ~20-30 people (not 100% sure off the exact number).

You also had the Group/Corps of General Staff officers under Ops, about ~80-100 staff officers by the late war. They helped supervise the planning of operations as well as their organization and implementation. Their powers and responsibilities took a while to clearly formulate, and they didn't truly mature as an institution until mid-late '43. For "Bagration", each Front had a group of 6-8 of these officers assigned; 5-10 was the norm from Summer '43 on. During that operation they worked with Corps.

Finally, you had the Representatives of the SVGK. They were senior officials with substantial political (Voroshilov, Timoshenko) or institutional (Zhukov, Vasilevsky) authority. Their powers and responsibilities were, as far as I'm aware, not formally defined. As Stalin's plenipotentiaries, it was difficult to turn them down and impossible to ignore them.

For the Summer 1944 operation, Zhukov was the representative with 1st Ukrainian, 1st Belorussian, and 2nd Belorussian Fronts. Vasilevsky supervised 3rd Belorussian, 1st Baltic, and 2nd Baltic (from 7/9). Timoshenko supervised 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts. From fall 1944, Govorov of the Leningrad Front would supervise the Leningrad, 2nd Baltic, and 3rd Baltic Fronts, alternating with Vasilevsky at different times until 1945.

In Fall 1944, Stalin asked the General Staff whether the institution could be abolished altogether. They opposed it, because of the length of the Front and complex situation in each theater. Stalin retained Govorov/Vasilevsky in the Baltic and Timoshenko in the Balkans while Zhukov became commander of 1st Belorussian Front in November. The 4 fronts on the Western/Main direction - 3rd Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian, 1st Belorussian, and 1st Ukrainian - would be directly managed by the Stavka. Vasilevsky returned to Moscow after he was injured in a car accident, and was sent to coordinate the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts in East Prussia in February '45.

How were strategic directions in '44 managed in practice at Ops? I didn't spot anything concrete, but it seems like they were a concept for planning and thinking about the war but not management. After all, by 7/9 SVGK rep Vasilevsky was now managing Fronts across 2 directions (NW and West/Main). This doesn't reduce the strategic directions' importance - far from it - but it does separate them from the '41 institutions which had their own staffs.

(Will respond to the rest of your post separately!)

[Vasilyev]

My take from this, with which you may or may not agree, is that the broad outline of a general offensive was planned early in outline with Bagration and Lvov-Sandomir as linked operations. The original strike by the left flank of 1BF was to be northwards towards Minsk. However as the situation evolved this was changed into a linking operation with the Lvov-Sandomir to the south with a strike towards Lublin.

1st BelF's July war diary puts 6/23 as when the "final" Kovel plan against Siedlce-Brest was sent to the General Staff (contemporaneous with Konev's plan), but its revised version wasn't approved until 7/7. The preparatory stage would run until 7/15, to give the Front time to regroup its artillery and build up the supplies needed for the operation. So the original start date of the operation was shortly after Konev's.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=211326083

Zhukov was still coordinating the Front's actions around Baranovichi until 7/8. According to Shtemenko:

In this plan, which was carefully and comprehensively considered by the General Staff, the task of reaching the Warsaw region [via Demblin-Pulawy] of part of the forces of the left-flank armies of the front was successfully combined with the intention of a deeper encirclement of the enemy in the Brest region. We reported this to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. On the same day, July 7, Antonov sent a telegram to G.K. Zhukov about the approval of the plan by the Stavka.

The main factor at this point was flexibility, as German dispositions after their retreat from Kovel were uncertain. This also led to a more flexible artillery fire and assault plan on the first day of the offensive, with a short 30-minute preparation followed by attacks by battalions.

As Vasilevsky and Zhukov note, 7/9 was when the final decisions are made concerning the start of the "general offensive", including Kovel-Siedlce/Brest and Lviv–Sandomierz. The Kovel plan was approved, apparently without changes.

After Zhukov visited Rokossovsky to discuss the final Kovel plan the Kovel Operation's directives were sent to the armies of 1st BelF's left wing on 7/12. They would report on their readiness on 7/16.

The directives sent to its subordinates did not discuss any alternative objectives as discussed in Shtemenko. While an alternative to delivering the main blow in the direction of Siedlce evidently existed both at the General Staff and the Front's operations department, it did not make its way down to the actual combat orders issued.

So, the operations were initially timed to start together (before the German withdrawal from Kovel) and Zhukov was, in theory, coordinating them. While there was a plan on file to advance on Lublin that the Front and General Staff were familiar with, this was unrelated to the 1st Ukrainian Front's operation. Up to 7/21 nothing concrete on delivering the main blow against Lublin-Demblin-Pulawy appears.

I think the switch to a strike against Lublin resulted mainly from political factors rather than military:

Not later than July 26-27, capture the city of Lublin, for which, primarily, use the 2nd Tank Army of Bogdanov and the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps of Konstantinov.

This is urgently demanded by the political situation and the interests of an independent democratic Poland.

The exact structure of "people's Poland" took a while for Stalin and the Polish communists to hammer out. This was probably a tactical choice on Stalin's part, to keep his options open until the last possible moment. Gomulka wasn't called to Moscow with a large PPR delegation until 7/17.

8th Guards Army and 47th Army forced the Bug by the end of 7/20. 69th Army (whose objective was Chelm-Lublin) and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps created bridgeheads but failed to force the river. 342nd ID and 1st Ski Jaeger Div were able to withdraw across the Bug without being as badly mauled and put up stiff resistance. 69th Army was able to force the Germans back by the end of 7/21, but it lagged well behind the other two armies. 2 TA was ordered to swing to Lublin at 20:30 on 7/21.

The final big meeting between all the factions (ZPP, PPR, etc.) and Stalin where the PKWN Manifesto was put together from earlier draft documents was later in the night on 7/21, from 23:05 to 00:50 the next day. Chelm was fully cleared early in the morning on 7/22 and was where the PKWN Manifesto was first announced. Gomulka, among others, convinced Stalin that creating the appearance of a "spontaneous" communist uprising from within Poland would be more advantageous. The actual delegation didn't arrive until several days later.

1st BelF ordered 2nd TA and 7th GCC to cross the Wieprz on 7/22 and capture Lublin city and the region by 7/23, according to its July war diary. As I mentioned before, according to Norbert Bacyk NA Bulganin also showed up to 2nd TA's HQ to push them to seize the city ASAP. The new political significance of the city led the Front to act rashly and rush to capture the city faster than what was reasonable, resulting in unnecessarily heavy losses given the weakness of the German defenses.

[Vasilyev]

So while this revises my original idea that the Lublin-Brest operation was not part of Operation Bagration but rather part of the Lvov-Sandomir, none the less this new format shows a very interesting feature in that it is the first time that Stavka is planning and achieving a broad front advance, with a cascade of linked operations managed by the Stavka Representatives. So under this dynamic planning regime, Bagration - Lublin/Brest - Lvov/Sandomir becomes one giant operation across all three strategic directions.

To your broader points (final response by me!), I think I agree. By mid-late April the concept of a "general offensive" was firmly in place within the General Staff and after some arguing Stalin was convinced to call a halt to most operations to prepare for the new offensive. Kovel-Brest and Lviv were linked together in time, by geography, and in the General Staff's planning under the same "strategic direction". By May-June the decision had also been made to have Zhukov coordinate these operations as SVGK rep.

[Der Alte Fritz]

The volume 16 (5-4) (Stavka, 1944-45) is online
http://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/ ... 44-1945-gg

Regarding the volume 23 (12-4) (General Staff, 1944-45) - I don't remember seeing it online or scanned anywhere. Probably someone else does.

I have not seen this online but I do have a copy of it scanned but not yet made up into a pdf.

[FORBIN Yves]

In this site http://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/1-glavnaya possible to have infos strentgh for unis or situationnals maps as in this one https://pamyat-naroda.ru/ ?

[Der Alte Fritz]

THe historyrussia,org site is simply a library of electronic books and so does not have strengths or situational maps as in Pamyat Naroda.

[FORBIN Yves]

I see thank you to tell me but 70th Army seems little only 4 IDs and and a Bde with a total of 30000 mens really or have reinforcements later ?

[Art]

What period are you talking about? In July 1944 the Army comprised only 4 rifle divisions.

[FORBIN Yves]

For end july and confirmation thank you and i have a nice map in French i find but i can't upload what are the requirements ?

[FORBIN Yves]

Please exist a Soviet map where appear 1st Polish Army end july i think she follow 69A and she is in Lublin - Pulawy area ?