General Staff of the Red Army

[Vasilyev]

Splitting off from the Lublin-Brest discussion.

In the Soviet economy, the country's central economic planning and management bodies - Sovnarkom, the CC apparatus, the Politburo, and Gosplan - spent much of their time dealing with petitions and disputes regarding resource distribution. The same held true for the leadership of the industrial commissariats. Labor and material resources were scarce, so it's no surprise that they were fiercely fought over.

The General Staff and the Stavka, among other bodies, sometimes played a similar role in the Red Army:

Differences usually arose not over the concept of the operation or the order in which it was carried out, but over the composition of the troops and their support. It is clear that each commander sought to get more reserves from the Stavka, to have enough tanks, artillery, and ammunition. We never told any of them what exactly the Stavka had at its disposal, but the commanders, bypassing us, found out about it in their own ways. At the General Staff they demanded, at the Stavka they petitioned.

It must be said frankly that the fronts at which the representatives of the Headquarters were located were usually better supplied. Firstly, because the Stavka sent its representatives to the most important areas. And secondly, because each representative of the Headquarters himself had authority, especially Marshal G.K. Zhukov. In some cases, he put the General Staff in a very difficult position: you can’t allow it, see if you can refuse the Deputy Supreme Commander ...

http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/shtemenko/07.html

Fronts petitioned, lobbied, and harangued the Center for more resources. They had their own information channels and were proactive in their efforts.

Conflict over information in the 1930s Soviet economy was also a problem. Industrial commissariats could and did withhold information from the Center if they thought it would give them an edge. Even the Great Terror and the destruction of much of the leadership of industry didn't resolve this issue. Greater control over information was one of the few advantages subordinate bodies had.

In the extreme case of the Western Front from October '43 - April '44, it's clear that massive problems were either ignored or unnoticed for months on end by the Center, with a GKO commission (including General Staff officers like Shtemenko) sent to check the work of the Front. Some especially egregious issues:

The front headquarters was removed from the planning of operations and recorded only the course of events developing according to army plans. The front headquarters does not have any planning operational documents on the operations carried out. All operations carried out were planned only in the armies and were verbally approved by the front commander. As a result, the front headquarters did not submit its proposals to the command for planning and conducting operations and did not exercise proper control over the implementation of the decisions of the command.

and:

The front command did not submit reports to the Stavka on the shortcomings and reasons for the failure of operations, and thus did not truthfully reveal either for itself or for the Stavka the reasons for the failure of the front to fulfill the tasks set by the Stavka. The suppression of the real reasons for the failure of operations was in this case nothing more than a form of deception of the Stavka.

Though these issues were eventually caught and this case is certainly on the extreme end of things, that they persisted for more than 6 months underscores that the Center could be critically ignorant about the inner workings of Front commands.

Further, many of those responsible at the Front command got off without serious consequences. Front Commander Sokolovsky was made CoS of the 1st Ukrainian Front that same month and by 1952 was appointed Chief of the General Staff. CoS Pokrovsky remained at the Front until the end of the war.

In a less extreme case, in some discussions on doctrine, it's evident that there was leeway in how much armies could violate formal doctrine. In the case of rifle divisions, for example, the 1942 regulations prohibiting echeloning them were consistently ignored. This comes up in the GKO report on the Western Front, but appears in other instances throughout the war until the '42 regulation was formally repealed in October 1944.

[Vasilyev]

The Stavka didn’t have its own staff and instead worked off the General Staff’s Operations Department. SVGK directives usually (not always) originated from the “directions” of Ops, which by the late war corresponded to each Front. This would then go up the chain for higher approval (and, presumably, edits if needed) before reaching the Stavka.

The State Defense Committee (GKO) also didn’t have its own staff and worked off of the apparatus of the Central Committee. The staff of the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom, SNK) also played an important direct and indirect role in managing the GKO’s paperwork and drafting resolutions.

SVGK representatives, I believe, were supported by the Corps of General Staff officers in the field. I’m not sure if they had their own retinue which traveled with them, larger than an adjunct or two. GKO representatives (plenipotentiaries) presumably also traveled with staff support from the CC (responsible instructors of the Orgburo?), but I can’t recall their size or composition.

[Art]

The Stavka didn’t have its own staff and instead worked off the General Staff’s Operations Department.

It was assumed more or less explicitly that in the war the People's Commissar of Defense would act as a commander in chief of all forces on the front or in the rear. The Commissariat's apparatus, including the (General) Staff, would be employed as his working body without creating a separate command structure. The problem here is that the Soviet Navy became an independent branch of military in 1938 and there was simply no body for a united command of the Red Army and Navy. Another thing was a Soviet reliance on collegial command: in all large units the military council consisting of several memebers was formally the supreme command organ. Important directives and orders were normally signed by three men: commander, chief of staff and a military council's member. Accordingly the Stavka was established during the Soviet-Finnish war as a sort of military council of the High Command and consisted of Voroshilov (commander in chief), Shaposhnikov (chief of staff), Stalin (political member) and Kuznetsov (chief of Navy). The 1941's incarnation included more members and also a number of abvisors, whose rights and ditues were never formally defined. Yet for all practical purposes it was still a top level military council.

[Vasilyev]

The Stavka didn’t have its own staff and instead worked off the General Staff’s Operations Department.

It was assumed more or less explicitly that in the war the People's Commissar of Defense would act as a commander in chief of all forces on the front or in the rear. The Commissariat's apparatus, including the (General) Staff, would be employed as his working body without creating a separate command structure. The problem here is that the Soviet Navy became an independent branch of military in 1938 and there was simply no body for a united command of the Red Army and Navy. Another thing was a Soviet reliance on collegial command: in all large units the military council consisting of several memebers was formally the supreme command organ. Important directives and orders were normally signed by three men: commander, chief of staff and a military council's member. Accordingly the Stavka was established during the Soviet-Finnish war as a sort of military council of the High Command and consisted of Voroshilov (commander in chief), Shaposhnikov (chief of staff), Stalin (political member) and Kuznetsov (chief of Navy). The 1941's incarnation included more members and also a number of abvisors, whose rights and ditues were never formally defined. Yet for all practical purposes it was still a top level military council.

The Front Military Council also seems like it was a convenient way for Stalin to "parachute" his representatives to the command structure of the Front without creating an entirely new position for them. NA Bulganin keeps popping up in this role. The Corps of General Staff Officers, SVGK Reps, and "political" Members of Military Councils all acted as parallel channels to monitor Fronts (and Armies) along with official reports and requests.

Compare and contrast the already robust system which existed in '41 to check on the fulfillment and implementation of directives in industry in parallel to the formal hierarchy. I wonder why efforts to create "living links" in the military were so anemic up to '41. While organizational failures like in the case of the initial organization and work of the General Staff make sense, it seems strange that before the war Stalin neglected to apply techniques he was very familiar with in the Party and economy to the military.

[Art]

Military councils and political members of military councils date back to the early years of the Soviet Army, and first political comissars in military appeared in 1917 even before the Bolshevist Revolution. The Stavka of the Soviet-Finnish War 1939-40 was a classical military council as it issued directives by three signatures: Voroshilov, Shaposhnikov and Stalin. It is worth to note that prior to 22 June 1941 there was another collegial organ in the Soviet Military - the Main Military Council of the RKKA consisting of key military personnel and several political representatives. In April 1941 the Council was given the right to issue orders and directives on matters of military operations with three signatures: People's Commissar, Chief of the General Staff, and a political Council member (Zhdanov and Malenkov). So it was a proto-Stavka of some sort. Even more on 22.6.41 before the Stavka was formally established at least two directives were issued with exactly these signatures: Timoshenko (People's Commissar), Zhukov (CoGS) and Malenkov (political member).
The practice of the Stavka of 1941 quickly became rather chaotic: there were orders and directives issued by Stalin alone, or by chief of GS alone, or signed both by Stalin and CoGS.

[Vasilyev]

Military councils and political members of military councils date back to the early years of the Soviet Army, and first political comissars in military appeared in 1917 even before the Bolshevist Revolution. The Stavka of the Soviet-Finnish War 1939-40 was a classical military council as it issued directives by three signatures: Voroshilov, Shaposhnikov and Stalin. It is worth to note that prior to 22 June 1941 there was another collegial organ in the Soviet Military - the Main Military Council of the RKKA consisting of key military personnel and several political representatives. In April 1941 the Council was given the right to issue orders and directives on matters of military operations with three signatures: People's Commissar, Chief of the General Staff, and a political Council member (Zhdanov and Malenkov). So it was a proto-Stavka of some sort. Even more on 22.6.41 before the Stavka was formally established at least two directives were issued with exactly these signatures: Timoshenko (People's Commissar), Zhukov (CoGS) and Malenkov (political member).
The practice of the Stavka of 1941 quickly became rather chaotic: there were orders and directives issued by Stalin alone, or by chief of GS alone, or signed both by Stalin and CoGS.

The proliferation of "signing authority" could be even worse in industry, with complaints from Ordzhonikidze in the mid-30s that in some Glavks 40 people had the right to sign. During the war the proliferation of plenipotentiary and quasi-plenipotentiary authority - who is going to tell Zaltsman "no" without a high-ranking supporter - was a double-edged sword. More local initiative and freedom to let the "market" sort things out paired with arbitrariness, confusion, and turf wars.

Back to the General Staff, have you spotted the wartime regulations for the work of the General Staff and the Corps of General Staff officers online? Those would be helpful for establishing their formal duties and powers.

[Art]

Back to the General Staff, have you spotted the wartime regulations for the work of the General Staff and the Corps of General Staff officers online? Those would be helpful for establishing their formal duties and powers.

A short regulation on the Red Army's General Staff was issued on 10 August 1941:

«Утверждаю» Народный комиссар обороны СССР

И. Сталин 10 августа 1941 г.

Положение о Генеральном штабе Красной Армии

Генеральный штаб Красной Армии является центральным органом управления Народного комиссара обороны Союза ССР по подготовке и использованию Вооруженных Сил Союза ССР для обороны страны.

Начальник Генерального штаба, в соответствии с указаниями и решениями Народного комиссара обороны, объединяет деятельность всех управлений Народного комиссариата обороны, дает им задания и указания.

Ведению Генерального штаба Красной Армии подлежит:

1. Разработка директив и приказов Ставки Верховного Командования по оперативному использованию Вооруженных Сил Союза ССР и планов войны на новых возможных театрах военных действий.

2. Организация и руководство разведывательной деятельностью всех видов разведки, обработка разведывательных данных и информация нижестоящих штабов и войск.

3. Разработка вопросов противовоздушной обороны.

4. Разработка и руководство по строительству укрепленных районов.

5. Руководство военно-топографической службой Красной Армии и снабжение Красной Армии топографическими картами.

6. Руководство оперативной подготовкой всех родов войск, штабов, служб и органов тыла.

7. Организация и устройство оперативного тыла действующей армии.

8. Разработка положений о вождении армейских соединений, наставлений и руководств по штабной службе, издание описаний театров военных действий. [390]

9. Сбор и обработка материалов по изучению опыта войны и разработка приказов, директив и указаний по использованию опыта войны; руководство историческими разработками по изучению боевого опыта мировой и гражданской войн.

10. Организация и руководство шифровальной службой Красной Армии и обеспечение скрытого управления войсками.

В состав Генерального штаба Красной Армии входят:

а) Оперативное управление;
б) Разведывательное управление;
в) Управление устройства оперативного тыла;
г) Управление строительства укрепленных районов;
д) Военно-топографическое управление;
е) Шифровальное управление;
ж) военно-исторический отдел;
з) общий отдел;
и) отдел кадров;
к) группа офицеров Генерального штаба на правах отдела Генерального штаба.

Начальник Генерального штаба Красной Армии Маршал Советского Союза Б. Шапошников
Военный комиссар Генерального штаба Красной Армии дивизионный комиссар Боков

№ 34984с.

ф. 4, оп. 11, д. 65, л. 500-502. Подлинник

cited in a collection of the People's Commissariat for Defense orders:
http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/nko_1941-1942/app.html

The Russian official history briefly described regulations and instructions for General Staff's officers, that's quite an instructive chapter actually:
https://энциклопедия.минобороны.рф/file ... _shtab.pdf

Also an NKO order on reorganization of the group of General Staff officers, 22 June 1943:
https://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/onli ... Tt5xmaRqV7

[Vasilyev]

An important development is the July 29th Stavka directive assigning representatives Zhukov and Vasilevsky leadership of the operations of 3 Fronts each. 1st Ukrainian, 1st Belorussian, and 3rd Belorussian for Zhukov, 3rd Belorussian, 1st Baltic, and 2nd Baltic for Vasilevsky.

The Stavka of the Supreme High Command orders that the Chief of the General Staff and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal Vasilevsky, be entrusted with not only coordination, but also leadership of operations carried out by the troops of the 3rd Belorussian, 2nd and 1st Baltic Fronts.

and

The Stavka of the Supreme High Command orders that the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, be entrusted with not only coordination, but also leadership of operations carried out by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian, 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts.

This created something akin to the Directions of 1941-42, but without the staff necessary to create a truly new HQ-link for managing multiple Fronts. Zhukov and Vasilevsky had General Staff officers supporting them, but not a large group. So the actual outcome seems less like one of improved management than putting pressure on the SVGK reps by giving them more direct responsibility for the outcomes of these operations.

[Art]

Zhukov and Vasilevsky had General Staff officers supporting them, but not a large group.

I don't know precise numbers, but it appears they could be as large as dozens. From the memoir of general V.I. Kazakov:

By mid-December [1942] the commander of the Soviet Army's artillery colonel general N.N. Voronov arrived to us with a large group of general and officers constituting his operational staff.
Among those arriving were acquaintances of mine - generals A.K. Sivkov and I.D. Vekilov, colonels K.P. Kazakov, M.V. Rostovtsev, and Ya.Ye. Sivakov, lieutenant colonel D.R. Yermakov, major V.P. Obodovskiy...
It so happened that in Zavarykino, where we [HQ of the Don Front] relocated already on 30 November, three staffs were gathered: staff of the front, the Vasilevsky's staff and the Voronov's staff. Due to such large influx of people the village became congested.

http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/kazakov_vi/04.html

[Vasilyev]

Zhukov and Vasilevsky had General Staff officers supporting them, but not a large group.

I don't know precise numbers, but it appears they could be as large as dozens. From the memoir of general V.I. Kazakov:

By mid-December [1942] the commander of the Soviet Army's artillery colonel general N.N. Voronov arrived to us with a large group of general and officers constituting his operational staff.
Among those arriving were acquaintances of mine - generals A.K. Sivkov and I.D. Vekilov, colonels K.P. Kazakov, M.V. Rostovtsev, and Ya.Ye. Sivakov, lieutenant colonel D.R. Yermakov, major V.P. Obodovskiy...
It so happened that in Zavarykino, where we [HQ of the Don Front] relocated already on 30 November, three staffs were gathered: staff of the front, the Vasilevsky's staff and the Voronov's staff. Due to such large influx of people the village became congested.

http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/kazakov_vi/04.html

I think several dozen might hold true for 1944, if I remember right. Certainly if you include the 5-10 General Staff officers assigned to each Front. In comparison, Directions in ‘41-42 had a couple hundred officers. Though the large staff sizes in ‘41-42 weren’t as necessary later on as the General Staff increased in professionalism and cut loose officers without the necessary education and skill.