Red Army Order of Battle in 1941

[Avalancheon]

This thread will attempt to determine one of the most important questions regarding the Eastern Front campaign in 1941. Namely, how close were the Germans to achieving victory, and how close were the Soviets to being defeated? To be sure, this question can encompass many different dimensions, including the demographic, economic, military, and political. This thread will be focused strictly on the military aspect of the campaign in the East, and more specifically on the changing force ratios between the Germans and the Soviets.

Historians have long known the correlation of forces at the start of Operation Barbarossa, and the orders of battle for both sides during specific engagements like the battles of Minsk, Smolensk, Uman, Kiev, Vyazma, etc. But it was less clear what the overall force ratios between the Germans and the Soviets were across the entire Eastern Front on a month by month basis. For historians, the main source of confusion was the lack of detailed information concerning the Soviet mobilisation in 1941. In David Glantz's book, Stumbling Colossus, it was claimed that the Red Army fielded some 821 division equivalents during 1941. By subtracting the 304 pre-war divisions from this number, we are given the impression that the Soviets mobilised 517 division equivalents during 1941, a truly incredible number if true. However, these figures make no distinction between formations that were simply mobilised, or mobilised and deployed. Nor did they illustrate what the formations compositions were, or when they were mobilised.

Red Army5.png

Another source of confusion was the ambiguity concerning the number of Soviet divisions that were destroyed in 1941. The chaos of the German invasion threw the loss reporting system into dissaray; some divisions were not removed from the order of battle until months after they were destroyed. Moreover, due to the desperate nature of the war that the Soviets found themselves in, divisions were kept in action well past the point they would have been considered as destroyed in a Western Military. Without knowing how many divisions had been destroyed in a given month, it was impossible for historians to subtract them from the order of battle. There was simply no way to know how many divisions the Red Army was fielding in a given month.

But now, that situation has finally changed. The publication of Volume IIIB of Nigel Askeys series on Operation Barbarossa provides an exhaustive listing of the formations mobilised by the Soviets during 1941, and of the formations that were transferred from military districts to the frontlines. These are very important datapoints that fill in the gaps of our knowledge about the Soviet mobilisation in 1941. It tells us what forces became available for deployment against the Germans on each month that the campaign lasted. In order to create a truly accurate picture of the Red Armys changing order of battle during Operation Barbarossa, there are three questions we must ask:

1) What were the number of divisions mobilised and deployed?
2) What were the number of divisions transferred from military districts to the frontline?
3) What were the number of divisions destroyed in action (or disbanded)?

This thread will offer answers to all three of those questions. A definitive answer to the first two questions has already been provided through the research of Nigel Askey. A more tentative answer to the third question will be provided here on the AxisHistory website, as the result of an ongoing research project.

[Avalancheon]

Combat Formations Mobilised and Deployed

The information contained in this chart is sourced from Operation Barbarossa: The Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, Volume IIIB, by Nigel Askey. More specifically, from Section 2 (starting on Page 245): Soviet Mobilisation after 22nd June 1941.
The combat formations listed here are Division or Brigade sized only. This chart does not list Regiments or Battalions. It does not list artillery, engineer or logistical formations.
Moreover, this chart only lists combat formations that were Mobilised and Deployed (MD). It does not include formations that were built from pre-existing units (such as by redesignating a Rifle Division as a Guards Rifle Division), formations that remained in rear areas, or formations that were disbanded before seeing action.


Combat Formations raised by Month
-July: 18 Rifle Divisions, 17 Militia Divisions, 6 Tank Divisions, 7 Cavalry Divisions, 2 NKVD Motor Rifle Division, 2 Naval Infantry Brigades, 1 Rifle Brigade. / 50 Division equivalents.
-August: 52 Rifle Divisions, 12 Militia Divisions, 1 Tank Division, 2 Mechanised Divisions, 13 Cavalry Divisions, 1 Mountain Cavalry Division, 1 NKVD Rifle Division, 1 Rifle Brigade. / 75 Division equivalents.
-September: 26 Rifle Divisions, 8 Militia Divisions, 6 Cavalry Divisions, 1 NKVD Motor Rifle Division, 33 Tank Brigades, 6 Naval Infantry Brigades, 1 Rifle Brigade. / 57 Division equivalents.
-October: 29 Rifle Divisions, 1 Militia Division, 1 Mechanised Division, 10 Cavalry Divisions, 2 NKVD Rifle Divisions, 17 Tank Brigades, 3 Naval Infantry Brigades, 3 Rifle Brigades. / 50 Division equivalents.

Combat Formations raised by Type
-Rifle Divisions: 18 in July, 52 in August, 26 in September, 29 in October.
-Militia Divisions: 17 in July, 12 in August, 8 in September, 1 in October.
-Tank Divisions: 6 in July, 1 in August.
-Mechanised Divisions: 2 in August, 1 in October.
-Cavalry Divisions: 7 in July, 13 in August, 6 in September, 10 in October.
-Mountain Cavalry Division: 1 in August.
-NKVD Motor Rifle Divisions: 2 in July, 1 in September.
-NKVD Rifle Divisions: 1 in August, 2 in October.
-Tank Brigades: 33 in September, 17 in October.
-Naval Infantry Brigades: 2 in July, 6 in September, 3 in October.
-Rifle Brigades: 1 in July, 1 in August, 1 in September, 3 in October.


Combat Formations raised inside Military Districts
-Moscow Military District. // Rifle Divisions; 15 in July, 14 in August, 2 in September, 4 in October. Militia Divisions; 12 in July, 1 in August, 1 in October. Tank Brigades; 13 in September, 11 in October. Cavalry Divisions; 1 in July, 2 in August, 1 in September.
-Leningrad Military District. // Rifle Divisions; 1 in July, 1 in October. Militia Divisions; 5 in July, 3 in August, 2 in September. Tank Brigades; 2 in September, 1 in October. Cavalry Divisions; 1 in August. NKVD Motor Rifle Divisions; 1 in September. NKVD Rifle Division; 1 in August. Naval Infantry Brigades; 2 in July, 5 in September. Rifle Brigades: 1 in July, 1 in September, 2 in October.
-Orel Military District. // Rifle Divisions; 10 in August, 2 in September, 4 in October. Militia Divisions; 1 in September. Cavalry Divisions; 1 in August, 2 in September.
-Kharkov Military District. // Rifle Divisions; 10 in August, 2 in September, 1 in October. Militia Divisions; 2 in August. Cavalry Divisions; 3 in August. Tank Brigades; 4 in September, 1 in October.
-Odessa Military District. // Rifle Divisions; 10 in August. Militia Divisions; 2 in August, 3 in September. Cavalry Divisions; 1 in July, 3 in August.
-Transcaucasus Military District. // Rifle Divisions; 1 in July, 8 in September, 3 in October. Tank Brigades: 2 in October. Cavalry Division; 1 in August. Mountain Cavalry Division: 1 in August.
-North Caucasus Military District. // Rifle Divisions; 8 in October. Militia Divisions; 1 in August. Tank Brigades: 1 in September, 1 in October. Cavalry Division; 5 in July, 2 in August, 1 in September, 8 in October. Naval Infantry Brigades; 1 in October.
-Archangel Military District. // Rifle Divisions; 1 in September, 1 in October. Militia Divisions: 1 in August, 2 in September. Naval Rifle Brigade: 1 in September.
-Kiev Military District. // Militia Divisions; 1 in August. Rifle Brigades; 1 in August. NKVD Motor Rifle Division; 1 in July.
-Urals Military District. // Rifle Divisions; 1 in July, 2 in September. Tank Brigades; 1 in September.
-Volga Military District. // Rifle Divisions; 3 in October. Militia Divisions: 1 in September. Cavalry Divisions; 1 in September.
-Central Asian Military District. // Rifle Divisions: 3 in August, 2 in September. Tank Divisions; 1 in July. Cavalry Divisions; 1 in October.
-Siberian Military District. // Cavalry Divisions; 1 in September.
-Far Eastern Military District. // Rifle Divisions; 1 in October. Tank Divisions; 1 in July. Mechanised Divisions; 1 in August.
-Transbaikal Military District. // Mechanised Division; 1 in October.

[FORBIN Yves]

Very interesting !

[Art]

And what is the conclusion?

Moreover, this chart only lists combat formations that were Mobilised and Deployed (MD).

What does "deployed" mean - deployed on the front?

It does not include formations that were built from pre-existing units (such as by redesignating a Rifle Division as a Guards Rifle Division),

I can say that of 12 tank and motorized divisions mentioned above 10 (divisions No.101-110) were actually reformed pre-war divisions which were assigned new numbers. What makes things more confusing is that several other divisions were reformed and reorganized according to new TO/Es but remained with their old numbers. Only 111 and 112 Tank Divisions were definitely new formations but they used personnel and material released by pre-war divisions with transfer to new TO/Es. In a similar way many tank brigades were simply reformed old tank divisions are were built based on the personnel drawn from disbanded divisions. The same question (which formations were actually new) applies to to other divisions and brigades.

[Avalancheon]

Combat Formations Transferred from Military Districts to the Frontlines

The information contained in this chart is sourced from Operation Barbarossa: The Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, Volume IIIB, by Nigel Askey. More specifically, from Section 1 (starting on Page 5): The Actual Strength of All Soviet Land Combat Units in a Deployed (D) State on 22nd June 1941.
The combat formations listed here are Corps, Division or Brigade sized only. This chart does not list Regiments or Battalions. It does not list artillery, engineer or logistical formations.


Combat Formations Transferred
-Moscow Military District. // 118th and 235th Rifle Division; Transferred in July.
-Orel Military District. // 19th, 149th, 217th, 89th, 120th, 145th, and 222nd Rifle Division; Transferred in July. 48th and 51st Tank Division; Transferred in July. 220th Mechanised Division; Transferred in July.
-Kharkov Military District. // 214th Rifle Division; Transferred in July. 2nd Airborne Corps; Transferred in July.
-Odessa Military District. // 116th, 196th, 206th, 106th, 156th Rifle Divisions; Transferred in July. 32nd Cavalry Division; Transferred in July. 1st Airborne Corps; Transferred in July.
-Transcaucasus Military District. // 4th, 136th, 31st Rifle Divisions; Transferred in September. 47th and 76th Mountain Rifle Divisions; Transferred in September. 24th Cavalry and 17th Mountain Cavalry Divisions; Transferred in October.
-North Caucasus Military District. // 165th, 175th, 157th Rifle Divisions; 2 Transferred in July, 1 in September. 28th Mountain Rifle Division; Transferred in July.
-Archangel Military District. // 111th and 88th Rifle Divisions; 1 Transferred in July, 1 in August.
-Central Asian Military District. // 238th Rifle Division; Transferred in October. 194th Mountain Rifle Division; Transferred in July. 53rd Tank Division; Transferred in July. 221st Mechanised Division; Transferred in July.
-Far Eastern Military District. // 26th, 21st, 32nd, 78th, and 92nd Rifle Divisions; 2 Transferred in September, 3 in October. 58th and 60th Tank Divisions; Transferred in October.
-Transbaikal Military District. // 114th, 65th, and 93rd Rifle Divisions; 1 Transferred in September, 2 in October. 57th Tank Division; Transferred in July. 82nd Mechanised Division; Transferred in October.

[Avalancheon]

And what is the conclusion?

Hi Art. As I said in the OP, my research project on the Red Army order of battle in 1941 was completed back in late July. It encompassed many different categorys of study, including 1) the Red Army forces that existed pre-war, 2) the Red Army forces transferred after the war began, 3) the Red Army forces mobilised after the war began. And 4), the Red Army forces destroyed during the war in 1941.

My conclusion was that although the Germans inflicted staggering losses on the Soviets during this period of the war, the number of divisions they destroyed did not match the number of divisions the Red Army was mobilising. For this reason, the Soviets were able to not only maintain their numerical superiority over the Germans, but to actually increase it over this period of the war.

This conclusion does not differ substantially from David Glantz' position. However, my study uses the most accurate information available to finetune all the relevant datapoints, including the crucial figures on Soviet mobilisation (for which I am indebted to Nigel Askey). My work shows that the Red Armys strategic 'room for error' was smaller than what Glantz' figures would indicate. In other words, they escaped defeat by a narrower margin than what many historians would have believed.

If the Red Army had been hit harder by the Wehrmacht in the crucial summer months of 1941, then that could have set into motion a chain of events that would have potentially led to its collapse. Based on the number of divisions the Soviets were fielding on a month by month basis, the window of opportunity for the Wehrmacht to inflict a decisive defeat was from June to August. A Moscow attack in September (as advocated by the German Generals) could not have changed the force ratios by a very significant amount, assuming that such an attack was even logistically possible.


There is more to discuss here, but I will save that until after Part 3; the number of divisions destroyed in action (or disbanded). This was the research project that I spent 2 months on, expending a huge amount of effort. It is an exhaustive tabulation of all Soviet divisions destroyed from June to October 1941. This includes divisions in the 1st and 2nd echelons, divisions transferred, and newly mobilised divisions.

Even now, I do not consider it to be fully complete. There may be divisions that I missed, or that were destroyed earlier or later than I listed. Given the nature of the Soviet reporting system, there is a certain degree of interpretation in when we consider a division to be truly destroyed. I do not expect my tabulation to be 100% accurate. I only expect it to be accurate within a certain margin of error. I will be happy to receive corrections from others, as that will finetune my datapoints. This research was a one man solo effort, and I would like to turn it into a more collaborative effort here on the AxisHistory forum.

Moreover, this chart only lists combat formations that were Mobilised and Deployed (MD).

What does "deployed" mean - deployed on the front?

Nigel Askeys book divides combat formations into three categorys: Deployed, Mobilised and Deployed, Mobilised and Not Deployed.

Deployed (D): The unit is deployed with a TOE anywhere in the armed forces on the 1st day of the campaign.
Mobilised and Deployed (MD): The unit is mobilised with a TOE after the first day of the campaign, and allocated to an active front or army HQ.
Mobilised and Not Deployed (MND): The Unit is mobilised with a TOE after the first day of the campaign, and not allocated to an active front or army HQ.

It does not include formations that were built from pre-existing units (such as by redesignating a Rifle Division as a Guards Rifle Division),

I can say that of 12 tank and motorized divisions mentioned above 10 (divisions No.101-110) were actually reformed pre-war divisions which were assigned new numbers. What makes things more confusing is that several other divisions were reformed and reorganized according to new TO/Es but remained with their old numbers. Only 111 and 112 Tank Divisions were definitely new formations but they used personnel and material released by pre-war divisions with transfer to new TO/Es.

Nigel Askeys book provides relatively scant information on the newly mobilised tank divisions. The 104th tank division was formed through the fusion of the pre-war 9th and 53rd tank division.

In a similar way many tank brigades were simply reformed old tank divisions are were built based on the personnel drawn from disbanded divisions. The same question (which formations were actually new) applies to to other divisions and brigades.

Indeed. Many tank brigades were formed from the remnants of battered tank divisions. To be sure, there is a degree of interpretation in determining what constituted a newly mobilised formation.

[Art]

Nigel Askeys book provides relatively scant information on the newly mobilised tank divisions. The 104th tank division was formed through the fusion of the pre-war 9th and 53rd tank division.

101 Tank Division was formed in July 1941 by reorganization of 52 Tank Division
102 Tank Division - from 56 Tank Division
104 Tank Division - from 9 Tank Division
105 Tank Division - from 53 Tank Division
106 Motorized Division - from 221 Motorized Division
107 Tank Division - from 69 Motorized Division
108 Tank Division - from 59 Tank Division
110 Tank Division - from 51 Tank Division
1 Tank Division (II) was renamed from the 1 Motorized Divsion in August 1941 and later renamed 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division

These divisions were in fact old formations under new names, what was rationale for changing their names is unclear.
109, 111 and 112 Tank Divisions were new formations based on elements of pre-war divisions.

[Art]

My conclusion was that although the Germans inflicted staggering losses on the Soviets during this period of the war, the number of divisions they destroyed did not match the number of divisions the Red Army was mobilising. For this reason, the Soviets were able to not only maintain their numerical superiority over the Germans, but to actually increase it over this period of the war.

I think, the number of division is just a single parameter, which has its limitations. The complete mobilized strength of the Sov.Army in the summer of 1941 was supposed to be 9.3 million men. By the end of the year the actual number of personnel still didn't reach that level and the Soviet military was much worse off in terms of weapons and equipment. I don't think that there was a considerable Soviet superiority until the end of the year. Only the fact that Germany and allies were equally exhausted prevented them from taking use of this pathetic state of the Soviet army. The proliferation of formations was achieved by diminishing their personnel strength and even more by dwindling weapons and equipment numbers and also by reduction of non-divisional support elements. Such a policy enabled prolonging the war beyond first critical months but couldn't enable winning it.

[wwilson]

Avalancheon,

Great initiative. I am of the belief that order of battle analysis is an under-utilized tool that can be used to examine particular aspects of military history. I did some looking at the Soviet order of battle of 1945 to better understand a couple of questions I had at the time.

Art,

I agree "the number of division is just a single parameter, which has its limitations." One has to be careful regarding conclusions drawn from an order of battle analysis. For my part, I was interested in things like the divisions in Guards rifle corps, such as how often they were actually Guards rifle divisions vice "ordinary" rifle divisions. For that kind of data sorting, the order of battle look was very informative.

Cheers

[Avalancheon]

On a more personal note, I would now like to describe the background behind my research project, and what inspired me to do it. Back in August of 2022, I purchased a book that analysed the Eastern campaign from a fresh angle. The German Plan to Defeat Russia, How the German Army Failed Hitler, by Will Escutia. This book changed the way I looked at Operation Barbarossa. Previously, I had looked at the Eastern Front campaign from the strategic and operational perspective, focusing on the results of the various battles and how they shaped the course of that conflict. Escutia looks at it from a different perspective. In his view, Operation Barbarossa was a monumental battle of attrition between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army; in order to win, the Germans had to destroy divisions at a faster rate than the Soviets could mobilise them. If they could not succeed at this most fundamental task, then Germany would have no hope of defeating the USSR, no matter how many battles they won. Some may say that this is a simplistic way of looking at the Eastern front, since it ignores things like demographics, economics, armaments production, etc. That is true, but those factors only become really crucial in a long war. And before the Eastern campaign could turn into a long war, the Soviets had to survive the German onslaught in 1941.

During the planning of Operation Barbarossa in 1940, the OKH made the crucial mistake of assuming that the Red Army would be incapable of raising significant new forces by the spring of 1941. The FHO estimated their total strength at 202 divisions in August 1940; they re-estimated their total strength at 227 divisions in April 1941. But in fact, the true strength of the Red Army by the time war broke out was 304 divisions. The Germans invaded with a force of 151 divisions, confronting 220 divisions in Western Russia. Their cardinal error was in underestimating the size of the Red Army, and not mobilising an Army large enough to defeat it comprehensively. Thus, the Wehrmachts goal of winning a short war was already invalidated before the first shots were fired. On his website, Escutia provides an infograph on the number of divisions the Germans had to destroy in order to defeat the Soviet Union. Given that they destroyed 54 divisions in July, the Wehrmacht would then have to destroy 245 divisions in August, and another 245 divisions in September (!). This was clearly an impossible task, well beyond their capabilitys.

Red Army4.png

But Escutias information on the number of Soviet divisions mobilised come from David Glantzs books. As I stated before in this thread, there are alot of problems with these numbers. Glantz makes no distinction between formations that were mobilised and deployed (MD), or mobilised and not deployed (MND). Only the former matter for the purpose of this discussion; the latter can be ignored. Moreover, Glantzs figures for the Soviet mobilisation are from June to December; but the most crucial months of the campaign were from June to October. Any Soviet forces mobilised after October 1941 are basically irrelevant, because if the Germans had not landed a knockout blow by then, then their invasion had already failed. The weather would not permit them to attack any further, especially when compounded by their overstretched supply lines and strategic exhaustion. But now, to return to the subject at hand... David Glantzs book puts Soviet mobilisation at 517 division equivalents from June to December. Nigel Askeys book puts Soviet mobilisation at around 232 division equivalents from June to October. That fact by itself dramatically lowers the bar for German victory in 1941.


With this research project, my ultimate objective was to find out how many divisions the Red Army was fielding on a monthly basis. In order to create this order of battle, I needed to know 1) how many divisions were mobilised and deployed 2) how many divisions were transferred from East to West 3) how many divisions were destroyed in combat. While Nigel Askeys book enabled me to solve questions #1 and #2, an answer to question #3 remained elusive. [1] This was a serious problem for me, because I needed to know how many formations were being removed from the Red Armys order of battle each month. Since there was no single source that could answer this question, the only option was to do it myself.

And so it was that I embarked on a 2 months of research. I relied extensively on the Russian language Wikipedia to confirm which divisions were destroyed on which months during 1941. This was an incredibly difficult task, not only due to the large number of divisions which were fielded in the first and second echelons, but also the large number of divisions that were mobilised and deployed. To put this into perspective, I had to examine the records of roughly 500 division equivalents! Some of these formations could be confirmed as destroyed with a quick and simple check, but others required more research, because their fates were either not recorded, or they were virtually destroyed but not disbanded. [2] For those divisions whose fates were not recorded, I had to peruse secondary literature, or else to leave them unlisted on my data tables.


[1] In Nigels list of mobilised and deployed divisions, some have information on their fates, but others do not.

[2] This is something that pops up when researching the fates of Soviet divisions fielded during 1941. Many times, you will find a division which was virtually destroyed, with its strength dropping below 1000 men, but it was not removed from the order of battle. Instead, it was rebuilt from scratch with reservists.

[Avalancheon]

My conclusion was that although the Germans inflicted staggering losses on the Soviets during this period of the war, the number of divisions they destroyed did not match the number of divisions the Red Army was mobilising. For this reason, the Soviets were able to not only maintain their numerical superiority over the Germans, but to actually increase it over this period of the war.

I think, the number of division is just a single parameter, which has its limitations. The complete mobilized strength of the Sov.Army in the summer of 1941 was supposed to be 9.3 million men. By the end of the year the actual number of personnel still didn't reach that level and the Soviet military was much worse off in terms of weapons and equipment.

Knowing the number of divisions the Red Army fielded tells us alot about their overall strategic situation at a given point of time. But as you say, it doesn't tell us the full story. We would also need to look at things like the total manpower available b each front, the TOEs of the various formations, etc. That would give us a more complete picture of the situation.

The Soviet rifle divisions that were mobilised in June-July onward were significantly smaller and more poorly armed than a German infantry division. Many of them were also formed very quickly, with newly mobilised reservists thrown together and given little or no training. These newly raised divisions were disorganised, and lacking in cohesion. Many of them disintegrated rapidly in combat, and did not give a good account of themselves. But even so, a division is still a division. If it was mobilised, then it had to be destroyed.

I don't think that there was a considerable Soviet superiority until the end of the year. Only the fact that Germany and allies were equally exhausted prevented them from taking use of this pathetic state of the Soviet army. The proliferation of formations was achieved by diminishing their personnel strength and even more by dwindling weapons and equipment numbers and also by reduction of non-divisional support elements. Such a policy enabled prolonging the war beyond first critical months but couldn't enable winning it.

With regards to the number of divisions the Red Army fielded in 1941, their situation actually improved as the months went by. The Red Army began the war with 220 divisions in Western Russia, which actually increased to around 274 divisions by October. The problem was that these newly raised divisions were not as strong as the pre-war divisions, and so simply counting the number of divisions gives a misleading picture of the Soviets military situation. This partly explains why they suffered such a catastrophic defeat at Vyazma-Bryansk, where a large number of these new divisions simply disintegrated in combat.

Avalancheon,

Great initiative. I am of the belief that order of battle analysis is an under-utilized tool that can be used to examine particular aspects of military history. I did some looking at the Soviet order of battle of 1945 to better understand a couple of questions I had at the time.

Thank you for the kind words.

[Art]

On a more personal note, I would now like to describe the background behind my research project, and what inspired me to do it. Back in August of 2022, I purchased a book that analysed the Eastern campaign from a fresh angle. The German Plan to Defeat Russia, How the German Army Failed Hitler, by Will Escutia. This book changed the way I looked at Operation Barbarossa. Previously, I had looked at the Eastern Front campaign from the strategic and operational perspective, focusing on the results of the various battles and how they shaped the course of that conflict. Escutia looks at it from a different perspective. In his view, Operation Barbarossa was a monumental battle of attrition between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army; in order to win, the Germans had to destroy divisions at a faster rate than the Soviets could mobilise them. If they could not succeed at this most fundamental task, then Germany would have no hope of defeating the USSR, no matter how many battles they won.

Honestly speaking, I believe that causes and consequences are somehow swapped in this analysis. The SU could continue mobilization and field new formation and and new replacements because the war dragged on and tuned into a long campaign of attrition, which it wasn't supposed to be originally. It was because 1) the SU didn't collapse under the weight of initial military catastrophes (i.e. its economy, political system and leadership were more robust than the Germans hoped) 2) the Germans with allies couldn't fully occupy main population and industrial areas before they had run out of their offensive impetus. For example, if they had quickly reached the Volga line the Soviet Union wouldn't be capable of such scale of mobilization and its potential resources would be irrelevant. Or the other hand the Soviet military was much weaker by the end of 1941 then it was 6 months ago, despite ostensible increase of the number of formations. Weapons production was also at the low point due to a loss of important industrial centers and evacuation of the central industrial region. Still the Axis armies couldn't capitalize on this moment of weakness and couldn't even stage any large offensive operation because their own offensive capabilities had been exhausted for a number of reasons. Should they hadn't the results would be different. In other words, I think that a simple balance between the number of formation lost and the number raised ignores two other important factors: territorial gains and cumulative exhaustion of German offensive capability.

[Avalancheon]

Combat Formations Destroyed, 1st Echelon

The information contained in this chart is the result of an ongoing research project. It lists the Combat Formations of the 1st Strategic Echelon that were either destroyed in combat or disbanded.
This chart contains a list of 107 Divisions that were destroyed from June to October, 1941. The accuracy of this chart is expected to be within the margin of 5 Divisions, plus or minus (this includes Divisions not listed on the chart due to lack of clarity on their fate). Any falsification of the data contained within this chart will be used to improve its accuracy.


Combat Formations Destroyed, by Month

Northern Front
-August: 237th Rifle Division. 24th Tank Division.
-September: 115th Rifle Division. 1st Tank Division. 163rd Motorised Rifle Division.

NorthWestern Front
-July: 67th Rifle Division. 90th Rifle Division. 184th Rifle Division. 2nd Tank Division. 5th Tank Division.
-August: 16th Rifle Division. 48th Rifle Division. 125th Rifle Division. 23rd Tank Division. 84th Motorised Rifle Division.
-September: 33rd Rifle Division. 179th Rifle Division. 180th Rifle Division. 181st Rifle Division. 188th Rifle Division. 202nd Motorised Rifle Division.
-October: 126th Rifle Division.

Western Front
-July: 2nd Rifle Division. 8th Rifle Division. 13th Rifle Division. 17th Rifle Division. 27th Rifle Division. 37th Rifle Division. 56th Rifle Division. 85th Rifle Division. 86th Rifle Division. 113th Rifle Division. 6th and 36th Cavalry Division. 4th Tank Division. 7th Tank Division. 22nd Tank Division. 25th Tank Division. 26th Tank Division. 27th Tank Division. 29th Tank Division. 30th Tank Division. 31st Tank Division. 36th Tank Division. 38th Tank Division. 29th Motorised Rifle Division. 204th Motorised Rifle Division. 205th Motorised Rifle Division. 210th Motorised Rifle Division.
-August: 26th Tank Division. 33rd Tank Division. 209th Motorised Rifle Division.
-September: 24th Rifle Division. 42nd Rifle Division. 55th Rifle Division. 75th Rifle Division.

SouthWestern Front
-July: 135th Rifle Division. 8th Tank Division. 12th Tank Division. 15th Tank Division. 34th Tank Division. 37th Tank Division.
-August: 80th Rifle Division. 99th Rifle Division. 139th Rifle Division. 140th Rifle Division. 141st Rifle Division. 173rd Rifle Division. 189th Rifle Division. 190th Rifle Division. 197th Rifle Division. 44th Mountain Rifle Division. 58th Mountain Rifle Division. 60th Mountain Rifle Division. 72nd Mountain Rifle Division. 192nd Mountain Rifle Division. 12th Tank Division. 19th Tank Division. 32nd Tank Division. 34th Tank Division. 39th Tank Division. 40th Tank Division. 41st Tank Division. 43rd Tank Division. 213th Motorised Rifle Division. 216th Motorised Rifle Division. 240th Motorised Rifle Division.
-September: 41st Rifle Division. 62nd Rifle Division. 87th Rifle Division. 97th Rifle Division. 124th Rifle Division. 146th Rifle Division. 159th Rifle Division. 193rd Rifle Division. 195th Rifle Division. 200th Rifle Division. 228th Rifle Division. 10th Tank Division. 20th Tank Division. 35th Tank Division. 45th Tank Division. 49th Tank Division. 131st Motorised Rifle Division.
-October: 16th Rifle Division. 130th Rifle Division.

Southern Front
-August: 11th Tank Division. 16th Tank Division. 15th Motorised Rifle Division.
-September: 47th Tank Division.


Combat Formations Destroyed, by Army

Northern Front
-7th Army: 237th Rifle Division.
-14th Army: 1st Tank Division.
-23rd Army: 115th Rifle Division. 24th Tank Division.
Front Assets: 163rd Motorised Rifle Division.

NorthWestern Front
-8th Army: 48th Rifle Division. 90th Rifle Division. 125th Rifle Division. 23rd Tank Division. 202nd Motorised Rifle Division.
-11th Army: 33rd Rifle Division. 126th Rifle Division. 179th Rifle Division. 184th Rifle Division. 188th Rifle Division. 2nd Tank Division. 5th Tank Division. 84th Motorised Rifle Division.
-27th Army: 16th Rifle Division. 67th Rifle Division. 180th Rifle Division. 181st Rifle Division.

Western Front
-3rd Army: 27th Rifle Division. 56th Rifle Division. 85th Rifle Division. 29th Tank Division. 33rd Tank Division. 204th Motorised Rifle Division.
-4th Army: 42nd Rifle Division. 49th Rifle Division. 75th Rifle Division. 22nd Tank Division. 30th Tank Division. 205th Motorised Rifle Division.
-10th Army: 2nd Rifle Division. 8th Rifle Division. 86th Rifle Division. 113th Rifle Division. 6th and 36th Cavalry Division. 4th Tank Division. 7th Tank Division. 25th Tank Division. 31st Tank Division. 29th Motorised Rifle Division
-Front Assets: 17th Rifle Division. 24th Rifle Division. 37th Rifle Division. 55th Rifle Division. 26th Tank Division. 27th Tank Division. 36th Tank Division. 38th Tank Division. 209th Motorised Rifle Division. 210th Motorised Rifle Division

SouthWestern Front
-5th Army: 62nd Rifle Division. 87th Rifle Division. 124th Rifle Division. 135th Rifle Division. 19th Tank Division. 20th Tank Division. 35th Tank Division. 40th Tank Division. 41st Tank Division. 43rd Tank Division. 131st Motorised Rifle Division.
-6th Army: 41st Rifle Division. 80th Rifle Division. 97th Rifle Division. 139th Rifle Division. 141st Rifle Division. 159th Rifle Division. 8th Tank Division. 10th Tank Division. 12th Tank Division. 32nd Tank Division. 34th Tank Division. 37th Tank Division.
-12th Army: 164th Rifle Division. 44th Mountain Rifle Division. 58th Mountain Rifle Division. 60th Mountain Rifle Division. 192nd Mountain Rifle Division. 15th Tank Division. 39th Tank Division. 240th Motorised Rifle Division.
-26th Army: 99th Rifle Division. 173rd Rifle Division. 72nd Mountain Rifle Division.
-Front Assets: 130th Rifle Division. 140th Rifle Division. 146th Rifle Division. 189th Rifle Division. 190th Rifle Division. 193rd Rifle Division. 195th Rifle Division. 197th Rifle Division. 200th Rifle Division. 228th Rifle Division. 45th Tank Division. 49th Tank Division. 213th Motorised Rifle Division. 216th Motorised Rifle Division.

Southern Front
9th Army: 11th Tank Division. 16th Tank Division. 47th Tank Division. 15th Motorised Rifle Division.

[Art]

For information according to the official history until 1 December 1941 291 new divisions and 94 brigades were added to 170 division and 2 brigades present in the western military districts on 22.06.41.

That included:
- 57 rifle, 7 tank and 6 motorized division from internal districts and strategic reserve
- 9 rifle, 5 tank and 4 motorized divisions from the Far East
- 7 rifle, 1 cavalry and 1 motorized divisions from Caucasus and Central Asia
- newly formed 108 rifle, 35 militia, 42 cavalry and 9 tank divisions, 36 rifle, 56 tank and 2 motorized rifle brigades

(from "Strategicheskiy ocherk Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny 1941-1945", 1961)

Yet exact numbers can be argued over.

It is useful o post here a brief timeline of new formations in the second half of 1941:

1. 29.06.41 - NKVD and Stavka ordered formation of 15 new divisions using cadres of officers and NCOs from the NKVD troops. Total 15 new rifle divisions formed.

2. end of June - early July formation of people's militia in Leningrad and Moscow starts. Initially one "division" in each of the city district. Eventually 12 combat divisions raised in Moscow and 10 divisions in Leningrad, which were regularized as normal rifle divisions in September 1941.

3. 4 July - GKO orders formation of 13 new cavalry divisions

4. 6 July - GKO orders formation of 10 tank divisions (in fact almost all reorganized from existing tank and motorized divisions).

5. 6 and 8 July - GKO orders formation of 56 rifle and 16 cavalry divisions, mostly from personnel evacuated from western regions

6. 20 July - GKO orders formation of 7 cavalry divisions

7. 11 August - GKO orders formation of 85 rifle and 25 cavalry divisions until 15.12.41

8. 12 August NKO order on formation of 120 tank brigades until the end of 1941. In fact only 92 tank brigades had been formed, part of them - by reorganization of surviving tank divisions.

9. 14 August - Stavka orders formation of 2-3 additional divisions in Crimea. As a result 4 Crimean divisions formed from militia, NKVD troops etc.

10. 3 October - GKO orders formation of 6 rifle divisions in the Far East and Central Asia from personnel of service troops, one rifle division in the Kharkov MD based on replacement rifle brigade.

11. 14 October - GKO orders formation of 3 rifle divisions in the Transcaucasus from 3 replacement regiments

12. 14 October - GKO orders formation of 50 rifle brigades

13. 18 October - GKO orders formation of additional 25 rifle brigades

14. 13 November - GKO orders formation of 20 national cavalry divisions and 15 national rifle brigades in Central Asia and Caucasus

15. 22 November -GKO orders formation of 70 rifle divisions and 50 rifle brigades by February 1942.

That is not a full review, as additional brigades and divisions were formed by small batches.

[Avalancheon]

Honestly speaking, I believe that causes and consequences are somehow swapped in this analysis. The SU could continue mobilization and field new formation and and new replacements because the war dragged on and tuned into a long campaign of attrition, which it wasn't supposed to be originally. It was because

1) the SU didn't collapse under the weight of initial military catastrophes (i.e. its economy, political system and leadership were more robust than the Germans hoped)

Correct. When planning Operation Barbarossa, the Germans based many of their assumptions on the results of the Western campaign. They believed that if the Soviet Union was subjected to a powerful enough blow, that it would undergo a political collapse just as France and the Low Countrys did. Although Joseph Stalin was despondent at the beginning of the invasion, the Politburo convinced him to lead the nation. There was no one else who could do the job, after all. The Purges had deprived the USSR of its most capable leaders.

2) the Germans with allies couldn't fully occupy main population and industrial areas before they had run out of their offensive impetus.

Army Group South didn't reach the Dnieper river until late August because they were fighting outnumbered against Southern and SouthWestern Fronts, and were unable to form any pockets until the battle of Uman in early August. Army Group Center fought under more favorable circumstances and reached the Dnieper river by late July, but were forced to come to a halt because they had outrun their lines of supply. Logistical studys carried out in late 1940 by General Eduard Wagner correctly identified the Dnieper river as the culminating point, beyond which they could not be effectively supplied by the motor vehicle fleet (the Grosstransportraum). Army Group Center had to conduct an operational pause, to enable the railways to be regaged up to Smolensk, and allow for a supply stockpile to be built.

Another factor was the Red Army deploying the second strategic echelon along the Dnieper river. This enabled them to put up an unexpectedly tough fight at Smolensk, although the battle was ultimately a defeat. After Army Group Center came to a halt in August, the Red Army then launched repeated counter-attacks that wore them down. This gave enough time for the Soviets to hastily mobilise significant new forces and deploy them into battle. That is when the Eastern Front turned into a battle of attrition, on terms not favoring the Germans.

For example, if they had quickly reached the Volga line the Soviet Union wouldn't be capable of such scale of mobilization and its potential resources would be irrelevant. Or the other hand the Soviet military was much weaker by the end of 1941 then it was 6 months ago, despite ostensible increase of the number of formations. Weapons production was also at the low point due to a loss of important industrial centers and evacuation of the central industrial region. Still the Axis armies couldn't capitalize on this moment of weakness and couldn't even stage any large offensive operation because their own offensive capabilities had been exhausted for a number of reasons. Should they hadn't, the results would be different.

What the Germans really needed was a better assessment of the Red Armys size and mobilisation potential, especially during the planning stages of Operation Barbarossa in late 1940. This would convince them to mobilise a larger Army in preparation for an Eastern campaign. If the Germans had assigned these extra divisions to Army Group South, that would have enabled them to execute a large encirclement in the Ukraine in July. Among other things, this would have led to the Odessa military district being overrun, which would prevent the mobilisation of some 15 divisions in August. This puts the OstHeer in a stronger position overall, and sets them up to launch massive attacks in September against a weaker Red Army. But thats all strictly hypothetical.

In other words, I think that a simple balance between the number of formation lost and the number raised ignores two other important factors: territorial gains and cumulative exhaustion of German offensive capability.

Those are both important considerations when judging the Soviet Unions strategic circumstances in 1941. But a narrower focus on the Red Armys fluctuating strength during this period is also important. It would show how far or how close they were to defeat.