On page 145, Eduard Benes, the former Czech President, begins to deal with Soviet preparations to enter the war. First he describes the Soviet attempts to maintain its position of neutrality vis-a-vis Germany, by such actions as recognising the independent pro-German Slovak government on 16 Septemebr 1939, and subsequently expelling the Czech enoy Fierlinger from Moscow in December of that year.
Benes continues:
Benes then goes on to describe two initiatives he undertook at the end of 1940 to determine the future course of Soviet policy. One was to send an unofficial representative to Moscow; this envoy, Colonel Pika, was sent first to Istanbul where he maintained contact with the Soviet intelligence service, and finally was admitted to the Soviet Union.In addition, I gave much attention to the way in which the Soviet Government emphasized the 'insignificance of these various formalities,' - the description envoy Fierlinger told me had been applied to the recognition of Slovakia, the abolition of our Legation, etc. when he left Moscow. It was clear that the Soviet Union was bribing Germany to prolong the period of neutrality [my emphasis]. Consequently, in spite of all these events, which for our people at that time were very depressing events, I again said in my broadcast address to the homeland when France fell that I was convinced that the fall of France did not mean the end of the war and that I was still counting on the intervention in the war of the 'great eastern factor' - the Soviet Union [my emphasis]. I always retained this conviction.
The breaking out of the Soviet-Finnish war on November 30th, 1939, seemed to me a very significant event which fitted exactly into my interpretation of the future course of world events. I interpreted it as showing that the Soviet Union, regardless of the German-Finnish alliance and Germany's general policy, was consistently and undeviatingly pursuing its aim of wishing to protect itself against German both territorially and strategically. At the same time, it was ready to bear all the consequences of its actions: expulsion from the League of Nations and the attempts of Daladier to draw France and Great Britain into some form or other into action against the Soviet Union. The object of this manoeuvre was in line with Daladier's earlier plan. France was to disengage itself from the war against Germany and Germany's activities were to be diverted towards an attack against the Soviet Union, at the same time agreeing to make peace with the Western Powers.
The other was to find out what had happened to the unit of Czech troops under Lt Col Ludvik Svoboda which had crossed into the Soviet Union after the fall of Poland. It was ascertained that they were being held in a temporary camp in Ukraine and relatively well treated. Benes asked the Soviet authorities to allow those soldiers to be sent to the West to join Czech troops there; the Soviets agreed, and after a few weeks two detachments were transferred to the Near East, where they were taken over by the British and sent to join Czech units in Great Britain.
Benes continues (page 147):
Page 149:These two developments left me in no doubt as to the situation. But it was becessary to proceed, on our side, with the utmost discretion and not by our negligence to cause the Soviet Union any difficulties in respect of its neutral position towards Germany. We succeeded. And so from the beginning of 1941, my political calculations became an absolute conviction - after I had checked them with the probable Soviet plans. I was sure that the participation of the Soviet Union was in reality only a question of time. It was simply a question whether it would take place according to Communist suppositions, that is to say, not before the end of the war and in the form of a revolution and with the help also of German Communists (which I never ceased to doubt) or whether it would happen in accordance with my own expectations and opinion, in the near future and not simply on the revolutionary plane. The reports I received from Germany, soon brought me to the conclusion that in the end the deciding factor would be the Germans themselves, that is to say, Hitler, and not Stalin.
It is obvious, therefore, that Benes, who manifestly was no friend of Hitler of Germany, considered that Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union was essentially pre-emptive, to "nip in the bud" Stalin's preparations to enter the war against Germany at a time of his own choosing.Not long afterwards reports which reached me from Prague fully confirmed my expectations. The Soviet Union was still trying to postpone its participation in the war as long as possible. But when Hitler in the Battle of Britain in the autumn of 1940 failed to break British resistance and force it to sue for peace, he was obliged to resolve a dilemma which for Germany was really desperate: what was he to do if Britain should continue its resistance, strengthened more and more by the help of the United States and if the preparations of the Soviet Union either to enter the war or to evoke a great social revolution should increase to a maximum intensity? [my emphases]
For Germany these were catastrophic prospects and Hitler, actuated by his character and his lack of education, immediately made his fatal and amateurish decision, expecting in his political narrow-mindedness that he would get out of this situation somehow in the end. The United States not being in the war, he decided that the time was opportune for an attack on the Soviet Union to break its strength before this could be sufficiently developed, thus nipping in the bud its war preparations and its plan to enter the war and stage a revolution later on [my emphasis]. At the same time he hoped that it would be possible to convince the Western Powers that the Soviet Union was planning a European and world revolution and induce them to make peace with Germany and give him a free hand in the East. Petain's France was without doubt ready to do so.
It is noteworthy that Benes does not see a German desire to seize "Lebensraum" or achieve an ideological goal as the motivation for Hitler's decision; he sees it as purely strategic.
