Allied Intervention Force during the Russian Civil War

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Panzermahn
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Allied Intervention Force during the Russian Civil War

#1

Post by Panzermahn » 26 Feb 2004, 17:36

Hi,

I'm interested in knowing any info on the Allied Intervention Force that were sent to help the White Russian Armies against the Bolsheviks?

who won actually?

what countries contributed to this force?

what happened to the allid force eventually?

is there any source or references to this?

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Matt H.
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#2

Post by Matt H. » 26 Feb 2004, 18:26

Allied intervention in the Russian civil war took the form of participation by Great Britain, France and the USA. There was of course, the inevitable fear of Bolshevism and the shock of a sudden Russian withdrawal that motivated the Allies to intervene. Churchill, in a famous speech, referred to Lenin as a "baboon".

As for how much fighting they actually did, I'm not too sure, although it did not surpass that done by the likes of Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel. A small British force under General Miller fought the Reds in the north, quite near to their stronghold.

Most of the White activity was concentrated in the south, under Generals Denikin and Wrangel, where the Cossacks populace received them with support.


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Vadim
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Re: Allied Intervention Force during the Russian Civil War

#3

Post by Vadim » 26 Feb 2004, 18:30

panzermahn wrote:who won actually?
Just out of curiosity, who do you think won, considering that Soviet Russia lasted for about 75 years? :lol:

I could tell you a lot about this, but with all due respect, this is such a basic question that I suggest you enter "allied intervention in Russia" into Google and you will get all the information your heart desires. Read what's out there and if you have specific questions at that point, post them here and I will do my best to answer them.

Here is a good link to start http://dir.yahoo.com/Regional/Countries ... ervention/[/list][/list]
Last edited by Vadim on 26 Feb 2004, 19:19, edited 1 time in total.

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Matt H.
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#4

Post by Matt H. » 26 Feb 2004, 19:04

who won actually?
The Whites could have won very easily, if only they had co-ordinated their administrative and organisational structure. Rather than being united under a single Commander-in-Chief, with a single goal, the Whites were a myriad of different factions working for different ends. Denikin for example, was a staunch Russian nationalist ("One nation -- indivisible" he had said) who had to work with Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries (anti-Bolshevik socialists).

The Whites had many excellent commanders -- Petr Wrangel and Lavr Kornilov being the best in my view. Either of these two could have cut it as a Commander-in-Chief.

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Vadim
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#5

Post by Vadim » 26 Feb 2004, 19:12

I agree, the Whites could have won or at least put up a lot more of a fight. The country would have been a lot better off if they did win. Panzer's question though was "who won actually?" and we all know who won actually...

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Allen Milcic
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#6

Post by Allen Milcic » 26 Feb 2004, 19:23

Hello Vadim:

I am curious to know your opinion on the importance of Trotsky to the ultimate Red victory against the counter-revolution?

Best regards/
Allen

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Kunikov
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#7

Post by Kunikov » 27 Feb 2004, 00:52

You can try "When Hell Froze Over" about the American participation in and around Murmansk and Archangel. Also simply try books about the Russian civil war in general, like "Red Victory" by Lincoln.

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#8

Post by Kunikov » 27 Feb 2004, 00:54

Matt H. wrote:
who won actually?
The Whites could have won very easily, if only they had co-ordinated their administrative and organisational structure. Rather than being united under a single Commander-in-Chief, with a single goal, the Whites were a myriad of different factions working for different ends. Denikin for example, was a staunch Russian nationalist ("One nation -- indivisible" he had said) who had to work with Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries (anti-Bolshevik socialists).

The Whites had many excellent commanders -- Petr Wrangel and Lavr Kornilov being the best in my view. Either of these two could have cut it as a Commander-in-Chief.
This is really a worthless argument, one can also say there was no need for a civil war at all if only the Tsar treated the people correctly. If they did what you would have liked them to do they wouldn't have been the people they were.

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1812
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#9

Post by 1812 » 27 Feb 2004, 01:02

I think the allies shipped weapons to the white russians during the civil war. I know they used troops at some point, but I forgot when.

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#10

Post by Kunikov » 27 Feb 2004, 01:11

1812 wrote:I think the allies shipped weapons to the white russians during the civil war. I know they used troops at some point, but I forgot when.
Weapons were never enough for the whites and they participated mostly in 1917 when they were trying to protect their supplies in Murmansk and Archangel as well as some pacific ports. But, they were not the only ones fighting for the whites or just against the Bolsheviks in Russia.

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#11

Post by Caldric » 27 Feb 2004, 05:49

"it is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany."
Woodrow Wilson
Aide Memoire
Wilson agreed that intervention was admissible "only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance." He did not commit U.S. troops to stop the Bolsheviks. He assured the Russians that none of the governments involved "contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia" or "any intervention in her internal affairs."
American troops were only to guard the military stores, help the Russians in forming their own means of self-defense, and help the Czecho-Slovak forces to return home. President Wilson afforded the troops an escape clause in his Aide Memoire when he stated that if United States "shall feel obliged to withdraw these forces, in order to add them to the western front," it would. Major General William S. Graves, commander of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, used this Aide Memoire as the blue print for operations throughout the nineteen months of the American involvement in the Siberian intervention, and never once got involved in Russia’s internal affairs.
From: Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure
from http://secretwar.hhsweb.com/

The Aide Memoire July 17, 1918 :
The whole heart of the people of the United States is in the winning of this war. The controlling purpose of the Government of the United States is to do everything that is necessary and effective to win it. It wishes to cooperated in every practicable way with the allied governments, and to cooperated ungrudgingly; for it has no ends of its own to serve and believes that the war can be won only by common council and intimated concert of action. It has sought to study every proposed policy or action in which its cooperation has been asked in this spirit, and states the following conclusions in the confidence, that if it finds itself obliged to decline participation in any undertaking or course of action, it will bee understood that it does so only because it deems itself precluded from participating by imperative considerations of policy or fact.

In full agreement with the allied governments and upon the unanimous advice of the Supreme War Council, the Government of the United States adopted, upon its entrance into the war, a plan for taking part in the fighting on the western front into which all its resources of men and material were to be put, and put as rapidly as possible, and it has carried out this plan with energy and success, pressing its execution more and more rapidly forward and literally putting into it the entire energy and executive force of the nation. This was its response, its very willing and hearty response, to what was the unhesitating judgment alike of its own military advisers and of the advisers of the allied governments. It is now considering, at the suggestion of the Supreme War Council, the possibility of making very considerable additions even to this immense programme which, if they should prove feasible at all, will tax the industrial processes of the United States and the shipping facilities of the whole group of associated nations to the utmost. It has thus concentrated all its plans and all its resources upon this single and absolutely necessary object.

In such circumstances it feels it to be its duty to say that it cannot, so long as the military situation on the western front remains critical, consent to break or slacken the force of its present effort by diverting any part of its military force to other points or objectives. The United States is at a great distance from the field of action on the western front; it is at a much greater distance from any other field of action. The instrumentalities by which it is to handle its armies and its stores have at great cost and with great difficulty been created in France. They do not exist elsewhere. It is practicable for her to do a great deal in France; it is not practicable for her to do anything of importance on a large scale upon any other field. The American Government, therefore, very respectfully requested its Associates to accept its deliberate judgment that it should not dissipate its force by attempting important operations elsewhere.

It regards the Italian front as closely coordinated with the western front, however, and is willing to divert a portion of its military forces from France to Italy if it is the judgment and wish of the Supreme Command that it should do so. It wishes to defer to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief in this matter, as it would wish to defer in all others, particularly because it considers these two fronts so related as to be practically but separate parts of a single line and because it would be necessary that any American troops sent to Italy should be subtracted from the number used in France and be actually transported across French territory from the ports now used by armies of the United States.

It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany. It cannot, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would, in its judgment, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russian, not a method of serving her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profited by it at all, in time to save them from their present distresses, and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own. Military action is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States see the circumstances, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. For helping the Czecho-Slovaks there is immediate necessity and sufficient justification. Recent developments have made it evident that that is in the interest of what the Russian people themselves desire, and the Government of the United States is glad to contribute the small force at its disposal of the Supreme Command in the matter of establishing a small force at Murmansk, to guard the military stores at Kola and to make it safe for Russian forces to come together in organized bodies in the north. But it owes it to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than these modest and experimental plans. It is not in a position, and has no expectation of being in a position, to take part in organized intervention in adequate force form either Vladivostok or Murmansk and Archangel. It feels that it ought to add, also, that it will feel at liberty to use the few troops it can spare only for the purposed here stated and shall feel obliged to withdraw these forces, in order to add them to the forces at the western front, if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they should develop into others inconsistent with the policy to which the Government of the United States feels constrained to restrict itself.

At the same time the Government of the United States wishes to say with the utmost cordiality and good will that none of the conclusions here stated is meant to wear the least color of criticism of what the other governments associated against Germany may think it wise to undertake. It wishes in no way to embarrass their choices of policy. All that is intended here is a perfectly frank and definite statement of the policy which the United States feels obliged to adopt for herself and in the use of her own military forces. The Government of the United States does not wish it to be understood that in so restricting its own activities it is seeking, even by implication, to set limits to the action or to define the policies of its Associates.

It hopes to carry out the plans for safeguarding the rear of the Czecho-Slovaks operating from Vladivostok in a way that will place it and keep it in close cooperation with a small military force like its own from Japan, and if necessary from the other Allies, and that will assure it of the cordial accord of all the allied powers; and it proposes to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter, but that each of the associated powers has the single object of affording such aid as shall be acceptable, to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.

It is the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross Representatives, and agents of the Young Men’s Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest sort, in order in some systematic manner to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered in the rear of the westward moving forces of the Czecho-Slovaks.



Department of State, Washington, July 17, 1918

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col. klink
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allied intervention force

#12

Post by col. klink » 27 Feb 2004, 07:13

A great short book that deals mostly about the American troops in the Northern-Archangel force is The Ignorant Armies by E. M. Halliday though I think the book has long been out of print. The majority of the US troops were mostly from the area around Michigan and Wisconsin and consisted of the 339th Infantry Regiment of the 85th Division along with a battalion from the 310th Engineers,the 337th Field Hospital and the 337th Ambulance Company. There is a memorial in Detroit with the graves of the 86 bodies that returned to the US. According to the book which is from the early 1960s there were about 20 bodies that had not been recovered. The Americans contributed about 5,500 troops to the Northern Expedition out of about a total of 50,000. About 15 years ago I remember seeing but not reading, a book in the US titled The Day They Almost Bombed Moscow, I think the title of the book in the UK is The Day We Almost Bombed Moscow. It dealt with the allied intervention in the other theaters as well.

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#13

Post by robert knott » 27 Feb 2004, 09:59

You would be surprised (but then again, you might not) how few people in the U.S. know of this expedition into Russia. Of course, to the Russians it is common knowledge, and it has been a source of fear and resentment of the U.S. Wasn't it Nikita Kruschev who pointed out to a prominent American: "We have never invaded your country... but you have invaded ours."?

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#14

Post by Matt H. » 27 Feb 2004, 19:25

Kunikov wrote:
Matt H. wrote:
who won actually?
The Whites could have won very easily, if only they had co-ordinated their administrative and organisational structure. Rather than being united under a single Commander-in-Chief, with a single goal, the Whites were a myriad of different factions working for different ends. Denikin for example, was a staunch Russian nationalist ("One nation -- indivisible" he had said) who had to work with Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries (anti-Bolshevik socialists).

The Whites had many excellent commanders -- Petr Wrangel and Lavr Kornilov being the best in my view. Either of these two could have cut it as a Commander-in-Chief.
This is really a worthless argument, one can also say there was no need for a civil war at all if only the Tsar treated the people correctly. If they did what you would have liked them to do they wouldn't have been the people they were.
It's true that the Whites were not organised and administered in an efficient manner. It's also true that this was a substantial factor in their final defeat. Don't get in a strop just because you don't like a certain argument which doesn't fit your view.

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#15

Post by Kunikov » 27 Feb 2004, 20:31

Matt H. wrote:
Kunikov wrote:
Matt H. wrote:
who won actually?
The Whites could have won very easily, if only they had co-ordinated their administrative and organisational structure. Rather than being united under a single Commander-in-Chief, with a single goal, the Whites were a myriad of different factions working for different ends. Denikin for example, was a staunch Russian nationalist ("One nation -- indivisible" he had said) who had to work with Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries (anti-Bolshevik socialists).

The Whites had many excellent commanders -- Petr Wrangel and Lavr Kornilov being the best in my view. Either of these two could have cut it as a Commander-in-Chief.
This is really a worthless argument, one can also say there was no need for a civil war at all if only the Tsar treated the people correctly. If they did what you would have liked them to do they wouldn't have been the people they were.
It's true that the Whites were not organised and administered in an efficient manner. It's also true that this was a substantial factor in their final defeat. Don't get in a strop just because you don't like a certain argument which doesn't fit your view.
My view is not what matters here, history is. I can, as I have already said, give many examples of situations for both sides which would make each win on their own terms. But that isn't what happened nor does it need discussing. Their policies were well enough decided upon as were their actions.

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