Was the Russian Army the largest in history?

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LeoAU
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no doubts

Post by LeoAU » 02 Apr 2002 02:53

Rommel wrote:yes or no answer...was it or was it not the largest ,strongest and largest army in a conflict?


It definitely was the largest army at the end of the war and the whole course of the war proves it was the strongest.

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Post by Hawok » 02 Apr 2002 12:09

THE RED ARMY IN 1941 [german language]
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Was die sowjetischen Militärs, Historiker, Politiker und Publizisten gewöhnlich meinten, wenn sie die von ihnen stereotyp kolportierte Version verbreiteten, daß die Rote Armee im Juni 1941 noch nicht "voll auf den Krieg vorbereitet" gewesen sei, brachte die sowjetische Zeitschrift "Die sowjetischen Streitkräfte" 1978 auf die Formel : "Vorbereitung von Ausgangsstellungen für einen Angriff. Anlage von Kolonnenmarschbewegen...Maßnahmen zur Räumung von Sperren... Organisation des Zusammenwirkens von Infanterie und Panzern in den Sturmgruppen, Vorkehrungen für gewaltsame Flußüberquerungen." Der deutsche Angriff stieß in die sowjetischen Vorbereitungen hinein, die spätestens Mitte Juli 1941 abgeschlossen sein sollten. Er vereitelte nicht nur die Vollendung, sondern zwang der UdSSR zugleich auch das Dilemma auf, zu der Zeit über eine Armee zu verfügen, die auf die Verteidigung nahezu gar nicht und auf die Offensive noch nicht ausreichend vorbereitet war.

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W.Maser, Der Wortbruch - Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg

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Roberto
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Post by Roberto » 02 Apr 2002 15:30

Hawok wrote:THE RED ARMY IN 1941 [german language]
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Was die sowjetischen Militärs, Historiker, Politiker und Publizisten gewöhnlich meinten, wenn sie die von ihnen stereotyp kolportierte Version verbreiteten, daß die Rote Armee im Juni 1941 noch nicht "voll auf den Krieg vorbereitet" gewesen sei, brachte die sowjetische Zeitschrift "Die sowjetischen Streitkräfte" 1978 auf die Formel : "Vorbereitung von Ausgangsstellungen für einen Angriff. Anlage von Kolonnenmarschbewegen...Maßnahmen zur Räumung von Sperren... Organisation des Zusammenwirkens von Infanterie und Panzern in den Sturmgruppen, Vorkehrungen für gewaltsame Flußüberquerungen." Der deutsche Angriff stieß in die sowjetischen Vorbereitungen hinein, die spätestens Mitte Juli 1941 abgeschlossen sein sollten. Er vereitelte nicht nur die Vollendung, sondern zwang der UdSSR zugleich auch das Dilemma auf, zu der Zeit über eine Armee zu verfügen, die auf die Verteidigung nahezu gar nicht und auf die Offensive noch nicht ausreichend vorbereitet war.

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W.Maser, Der Wortbruch - Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg


Sounds like the the good old Nazi apology that the aggression against the Soviet Union had been a "preemptive attack", a propaganda lie refuted long ago that some writers are warming up again these days.

Stalin was an evil fellow without any doubt, and there is also no doubt that he had plans for expansion of the Soviet empire in mind. The question is whether he was the man to risk an all-out military offensive against an enemy known to be well prepared and experienced, and, if so, whether he considered 1941 to be the right moment for that.

Most historians tell us that there is no evidence to there having been such an attack plan in 1941, that on the contrary all evidence points to Stalin having done everything to avoid or at least postpone the outbreak of war and to having even, stubbornly and against all reason, failed to heed warnings that a German attack was imminent. These historians include Alan Bullock, David M. Glantz, Richard Overy, Harrison E. Salisbury, Alexander Werth, Gerd Überschär and, according to the latter, even Russian historians Dimitrij Volkogonov, Vladimir Karpov and Valerij Danilov. The late Volkogonov, son of a man who perished in Stalin's purges, was the most unlikely apologist of Stalin that I can think of.

On the other hand, there is a guy who calls himself Viktor Suvorov and what seems to be an imitator of his, by the name of Meltiukov, both of whom have theories in the direction that Stalin was actually planning an all-out attack on Germany in 1941, not as a reaction to the imminence of German aggression but in pursuit of his own plans of conquest. Neither of both apparently produces any evidence that Stalin was on the verge of staging such an all-out attack, or documentation revealing why Stalin planned such an attack, when the decision was taken, what Stalin’s goals were, what he is supposed to have had in mind with the enemy he allegedly intended to conquer, what his plans for German-occupied Europe were in the event of a victorious outcome of the supposed attack, or anything showing when Stalin gave the order to work out the military planning for so vast an undertaking, when and how he introduced his commanders to his intentions. All such details are known with regard to Hitler’s plan to attack the Soviet Union. Why do we know so much about the origins and organization of Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa but so little about Stalin’s allegedly intended thunderstorm, whatever it’s code name would have been?

It doesn’t seem as if Suvorov et al have anything palpable to show in the direction of an intended aggression by Stalin. From what I've learned about them in exchanges with their fans, they speculate on Stalin having intended an all-out attack in 1941 on the basis of the following considerations:

a) Stalin’s disbelief in the imminence of a German attack;
b) Deployment of Red Army forces near the frontier in a manner more suited for attack than for defense.

Rather meager indications to support a conclusion that Stalin was intending an all-out war of conquest, if you ask me.

As to a), it would be interesting to know what exactly these authors are referring to: Stalin’s apparent failure to heed warnings about the imminence of a German attack - even such that were not classified as unreliable by his intelligence services, which apparently did consider some as worth noticing -, or a lack of awareness that the Germans were preparing for war against the Soviet Union? Are they telling us that Stalin failed to notice the buildup of German forces on the German-Soviet frontier? That he believed German troops were being concentrated in Poland, Hungary and Romania to attack the British? That the numerous violations of Soviet airspace by German aircraft meant nothing to him at all? If so, one of the assumptions on which these authors base their conclusions seems to stand on shaky ground.

As to b), I think there’s nothing wrong in principle with speculations in the absence of conclusive evidence, but if a historian concludes on a certain intention from a certain behavior, as these authors obviously do, he must convincingly rule out other possible explanations for that behavior - something Suvorov et al obviously failed to do.

Have they convincingly ruled out the possibility that the concentration of Soviet troops at the borders with Germany and her allies was just a measure of preparation for the eventuality of war breaking out, pursuant to a strategy of forward defense followed by counter-attacks or to a military doctrine professing that in the event of war breaking out Soviet forces would immediately carry the fight onto enemy territory? The fact that military planning in the event of war breaking out was centered around attack rather than defense is no evidence that an all-out aggression was planned. It just shows that the Soviet military command believed its own propaganda BS that the Red Army was an offensive army and would rout the enemy on its own territory in the event of war breaking out instead of being constrained to defend itself against an enemy onslaught on Soviet territory.

Have they convincingly ruled out the possibility that Stalin may have feigned to ignore intelligence pointing to the imminence of a German attack that he actually took very seriously and to which he reacted by stepping up preparations for defense or attack, however late it was to do this?

Have they convincingly ruled out the possibility that Stalin’s concentration of troops at the border was but a show of force in order to deter Hitler from attacking or, as Stalin may have believed the intention of Hitler’s buildup to have been, persuade the other side to recommence negotiations?

Have they convincingly explained why an army supposedly on the verge of lounging at the enemy’s throat was not in a state of alert and thus caught with its pants down? Why Soviet troops didn’t know and asked for instructions about what to do when they realized they were being attacked?

There are other questions beside the above that Suvorov et al hopefully answered satisfactorily if their theories are to have any credibility. One is what advantage Stalin could have drawn from being the one to break a non-aggression pact that had been highly beneficial to him in the past, allowing him to swallow up Eastern Poland, the Baltic countries and a part of Romania, and continued to be so on account of the trade agreement that allowed him to acquire technology his army and his country badly needed and of the hope that the issues regarding German withdrawal from Finland, a free hand for the Soviet Union in Iran and the Persian Gulf and Soviet bases in Bulgaria and Turkey (the list of demands filed by Molotov with the German ambassador in Moscow on November 25, 1940) would be eventually resolved, despite the failure of Molotov’s visit to Berlin.
One of the sources Overy refers to is a 1995 publication by B. Pietrow-Ennker, Die Sowjetunion und der Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs 1939-1941. Ergebnisse einer internationalen Konferenz in Moskau. According to Overy:
This is an extensive report on a conference of historians in Moscow to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war. The Russian historians present confirmed that Stalin and Molotov were genuinely seeking a second pact.


Another is why Stalin, whose behavior so far didn’t exactly show him to be a military adventurer but rather a guy who liked to play it safe (he only attacked Finland because he incorrectly assumed it would be a walkover), would all of a sudden have turned into a gambler like Hitler, willing to take the risk of an all-out offensive against a force no one had stood up to so far. What would have brought about such a radical turnabout in Stalin’s attitudes and policies, causing him to abandon the principle of prodding with the bayonets but withdrawing them immediately as soon as they met steel? Did he have reasons to believe his own propaganda BS that “The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army”, as he said in a speech on May 5, 1941? Overy’s comment:
This, too, has been taken as evidence of malign intent. Yet it is entirely consistent with the Soviet view of fighting dating from the 1920s. Defense was regarded neither as an acceptable option for a revolutionary state, nor as militarily desirable. Stalin said nothing that had not been said a hundred times before.
Did he have reasons to believe that the Red Army was an army ready for large-scale offensive operations not only on propaganda posters, but in actual fact? Evidence points to exactly the contrary. There was the disastrous experience of the Winter War against Finland, in which entire Soviet divisions were annihilated by much smaller Finnish detachments and it took the deployment of an enormous numerical superiority in manpower and armament to eventually break the Mannerheim line, Soviet casualties being five times higher than those of the Finns. There was the rather unconvincing performance of his general staff at the war games held in January 1941, which is reported by Marshal Yeremenko to have driven Stalin into a fit of rage. What was there, beside numerical superiority, to make Stalin assume that his forces were capable of staging an all-out offensive against the Wehrmacht with a good chance of success? What numerical superiority did he reckon to be necessary in view of previous experiences, especially the Winter War, to overcome the German armed forces? Did he consider the Soviet Union able to achieve such numerical superiority? And if the answer to these three questions were “yes, because ...”, would the assumed advantage be enough to turn Stalin, the cautious and cunning manipulator, into Stalin, the Hitler-like military adventurer? Events showed that strong doubts as to the offensive capacities of the Soviet forces were all too justified. Effective as the Red Army eventually turned out to be in defensive fighting, it botched up almost all of its offensive operations prior to Stalingrad and wasn’t able to conduct successful offensives in summertime until after Kursk.

Yet another question is related to the fact that, if I’m not mistaken, the Red Army was undergoing a process of armament modernization that was not expected to be complete before 1942: Substitution of obsolete types of tanks by the new T34 medium and KV heavy tanks, introduction of new fighter and ground-attack planes and of other new artillery weapons like the “Katyusha” multiple rocket launcher. I’m no expert in military affairs, but wouldn’t it have been total nonsense from a military point of view to launch a large-scale offensive before this modernization was completed, while most tanks and planes were still of obsolete types?

I wonder what answers Suvorov et al have to all these questions.

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Post by Hawok » 02 Apr 2002 18:49

Why do we know so much about the origins and organization of Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa but so little about Stalin’s allegedly intended thunderstorm, whatever it’s code name would have been?

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No problem for Stalin and his generals, there has been enough time to annihilate all important documents (in opposite to Hitler).

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Post by Hawok » 02 Apr 2002 19:01

THE RED ARMY IN 1941 [german language]
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"Wie die Rote Armee auf den Angriff ausgerüstet war, ist kein Geheimnis mehr. Bereits 1939 verfügte die Sowjetunion über 200mal mehr Fallschirmjäger als alle anderen Länder zusammen. Grenztruppen des NKWD waren zur gleichen Zeit auf die gewaltsame Überquerung von Flüssen und anderen Gewässern vorbereitet. Keine der 63 sowjetischen Panzer-Divisionen verfügte über Pioniere zur Brückensprengung bei eventuellen Rückzügen....Wesentlich erscheint lediglich der Hinweis auf die Tatsache, daß die sowjetischen Panzer, die sämtlich auf einen Krieg auf fremdem Territorium konstruiert waren, sowohl über spezielle Panzer mit Flammenwerfern zu eigenen Durchbrüchen und zur Unterstützung der angereifenden Infanterie als auch über die Typen BT-2 bis BT-7M und die aus ihnen fortentwickelten A-20 (A:Awtostrada = Autobahn) verfügten, die so präparariert waren, daß sie beim Erreichen der deutschen Autobahnen in der Lage waren, ihre Ketten abzusprengen und mit den dafür vorgesehenen Rädern mit Gummibereifung ohne Ketten zu fahren und höhere Geschwindigkeiten zu erreichen..."

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W.Maser, Der Wortbruch - Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg

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Roberto
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Post by Roberto » 02 Apr 2002 19:10

Hawok wrote:
Why do we know so much about the origins and organization of Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa but so little about Stalin’s allegedly intended thunderstorm, whatever it’s code name would have been?

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That was not a big problem for him, he had enough time to annihilate all important documents (in opposite to Hitler).


Whoever has read a little about Stalin knows that annihilating documents, however ugly and incriminating, was not his style. The nasty things were locked tight in the archives of the secret services and have been coming to the surface since those archives were opened about ten years ago - stuff like the secret additional protocols to the Nazi-Soviet pact, death warrants signed by Stalin himself and the order for the execution of the Polish officers at Katyn. So it's not very likely that plans for an all-out attack on Europa should have been destroyed, if they had ever existed.

Here's something I just found about Mr. Maser's book, by the way:

Es ist auffallend, daß auch die neueren Publikationen von Fritz Becker und Werner Maser den Krieg Hitlers gegen die UdSSR gleichsam stellvertretend als Abwehrkampf gegen den Bolschewismus, dessen Diktator Stalin nach ihrer Ansicht eine gigantische Angriffsoperation unter dem Decknamen “Gewitter” für Mitte Juli 1941 vorsah, sehr stark in den Vordergrund stellen. Nach Masers Ansicht kam Hitlers “Unternehmen Barbarossa” dem von Stalin geplanten Angriff auf Deutschland nur um wenige Stunden zuvor. Exakte Belege für ihre Thesen können auch Becker und Maser nicht vorlegen; der Präventivplan Zhukovs und Timoshenkos ist für ihre Thesen kein Beweis, statt dessen ignorieren sie weitgehend Hitlers politische und ideologische Maxime, neuen “Lebensraum im Osten” erobern zu wollen. Es ist überraschend, wie beide Autoren die Ergebnisse der seriösen wissenschaftlichen Forschung mißachten und unberücksichtigt lassen.


Source of quote: Gerd R. Überschär, Das „Unternehmen Barbarossa“ gegen die Sowjetunion – ein Präventivkrieg?, in: Bailer-Galanda/Benz/Neugebauer (Hrg.), Die Auschwitzleugner, Berlin 1996

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Post by Hawok » 02 Apr 2002 19:18

Whoever has read a little about Stalin knows that annihilating documents, however ugly and incriminating, was not his style. The nasty things were locked tight in the archives of the secret services and have been coming to the surface since those archives were opened about ten years ago - stuff like the secret additional protocols to the Nazi-Soviet pact, death warrants signed by Stalin himself and the order for the execution of the Polish officers at Katyn. So it's not very likely that plans for an all-out attack on Europa should have been destroyed, if they had ever existed.

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However it is a well known fact that Stalin never signed very important documents (like his german counterpart). I guess (personal) it is naive to assume, that he did not annihilate all important documents after the successful war. Tell me one acceptable reason, why he shouldn't ? Nevertheless we have some good newer works which give us a possible and refreshing other view about the soviet plans. Take a closer look at Hoffmanns book "Stalins Vernichtungskrieg". Hoffmann has been a member of the well known Institut für Militärgeschichte (Freiburg). He and the often mentioned Ueberschär have written one of the best books about the eastern front (Schwarze Reihe).

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Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 02 Apr 2002 19:56

Hawok wrote:
Whoever has read a little about Stalin knows that annihilating documents, however ugly and incriminating, was not his style. The nasty things were locked tight in the archives of the secret services and have been coming to the surface since those archives were opened about ten years ago - stuff like the secret additional protocols to the Nazi-Soviet pact, death warrants signed by Stalin himself and the order for the execution of the Polish officers at Katyn. So it's not very likely that plans for an all-out attack on Europa should have been destroyed, if they had ever existed.

_____________________________________________________________

However it is a well known fact that Stalin never signed very important documents (like his german counterpart). I guess (personal) it is naive to assume, that he did not annihilate all important documents after the successful war. Tell me one acceptable reason, why he shouldn't ? Nevertheless we have some good newer works which give us a possible and refreshing other view about the soviet plans. Take a closer look at Hoffmanns book "Stalins Vernichtungskrieg". Hoffmann has been a member of the well known Institut für Militärgeschichte (Freiburg). He and the often mentioned Ueberschär have written one of the best books about the eastern front (Schwarze Reihe).


However it is well known that Stalin signed plenty of of very important documents starting with Katyn orders. As it for "it must be since it was not proven otherwise" -it is primitive logical fallacy. Which Suvrov and his followers used in all their books, however when his book came out in Russia and people began to show (with documents and such) that it is in fact otherwise , he somehow decided not address the critics. Anyway research done on the sate of RKKA, as of 22.6.41 clearly shows it was not in position to begin the offensive – it was not really in position to do much of anything.

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Post by Roberto » 02 Apr 2002 20:32

Hawok wrote:
Whoever has read a little about Stalin knows that annihilating documents, however ugly and incriminating, was not his style. The nasty things were locked tight in the archives of the secret services and have been coming to the surface since those archives were opened about ten years ago - stuff like the secret additional protocols to the Nazi-Soviet pact, death warrants signed by Stalin himself and the order for the execution of the Polish officers at Katyn. So it's not very likely that plans for an all-out attack on Europa should have been destroyed, if they had ever existed.

_____________________________________________________________

However it is a well known fact that Stalin never signed very important documents (like his german counterpart).


Well, he signed the Katyn order, didn't he?

I guess (personal) it is naive to assume, that he did not annihilate all important documents after the successful war. Tell me one acceptable reason, why he shouldn't ?


I think the question is: why should he? After all, he had won the war, and there was no risk that the documents might ever fall into enemy hands. In the archives of the secret police they were safe from eyes that they were not meant for, and they could always be useful at a later stage.

Nevertheless we have some good newer works which give us a possible and refreshing other view about the soviet plans. Take a closer look at Hoffmanns book "Stalins Vernichtungskrieg". Hoffmann has been a member of the well known Institut für Militärgeschichte (Freiburg).


I have a little problem with Hoffmann due to his unsubtantiated criticism of Christian Streit's Keine Kameraden, on which Streit commented as follows (pages 10 and following of the 1997 edition of Keine Kameraden. Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941 - 1945, Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., Bonn):

Wie nicht anders zu erwarten, löste die von mir berechnete Zahl der Todesopfer - etwa 3 300 000 - Widerspruch aus. Alfred Streim schätzt dagegen eine Zahl von “mindestens 2 530 000”. Seine Berechnung basiert in erster Linie auf einer Aufstellung von OKW/Kgf. vom 1.Mai 1944; er legt eine Gesamtzahl von etwa 5 200 000 Gefangenen zugrunde. Während Streim seinen Berechnungsmodus offenlegt, nennt Joachim Hoffmann bei einer Gesamtzahl von “genau 5 245 882” eine Opferzahl von “rund 2 Millionen”, ohne diese Zahl näher zu begründen; er führt lediglich “unbekannte Originalakten und sonstige Unterlagen” an, ohne sie nachzuweisen. [Fußnote] Weder Streim noch Hoffmann begründen, weshalb die von mir einer Aufstellung der Abt. Fremde Heere Ost im OKH entnommene Gesamtzahl von 5 754 528 (für Februar 1945) nicht zutreffen sollte. Diese Größenordnung ist aber in den Akten noch einmal belegt. Der Chef des Kriegsgefangenenwesens schätzte die Gesamtzahl der sowjetischen Gefangenen im Dezember 1944 auf 5,6 Millionen.”

[Fußnote, S. 304]

“Die Kriegsführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion” (1984), S. 730. - Roschmann, Gutachten, S. 17-25, rechnet die Zahl durch mehrfachen Abzug desselben Faktors auf 1 680 000 herunter. Er argumentiert, die Fronttruppen hätten in der Siegeseuphorie 1941 stark überhöhte Zahlen gemeldet. Deswegen vernachlässigt er eine Zahl von 280 810, die in der Aufstellung vom 1.5.44 als “Abgänge beim Transport, Zählfehler u. dergl.” erklärt ist, von vornherein (Streim, S. 225, rechnet sie mit gutem Grund “zu einem großen Teil zu den Todesfällen”). Sodann zieht R. von den 845 128 für den OKH-Bereich gemeldeten Todesfällen kurzerhand 300 000 als “Meldefehler” ab. Er nimmt nicht zur Kenntnis, daß der Generalquartiermeister des Heeres schon am 25.12.1941 die Kriegsgefangenenstatistik wegen “nunmehr festgestellter Fehlmeldungen [...] um rund 500 000” berichtigt hatte: KTB OKW, Bd. I, S. 1106.


My translation:

As was to be expected, the number of deaths I calculated - about 3 300 000 - led to protests. Alfred Streim estimates a number of “at least 2 530 000”. His calculation is mainly based on a listing by the OKW/Kgf. of 1 Mai 1944; and he considers a total number of about 5 200 000 prisoners. Whereas Streim openly shows his way of calculation, Joachim Hoffmann speaks of a total number of “exactly 5 245 882” and a number of victims of “around 2 million”, without providing a detailed justification of this number; he merely refers to “unknown original files and other documents” without providing evidence to their existence. [Footnote] Neither Streim nor explain why the total number that I took from a listing of the Abt. Fremde Heere Ost at the OKH, 5 754 528 (as of February 1945) should not be accurate. For this order of magnitude, however, there is further proof in the files. The Chief of Prisoner of War Matters estimated the total number of Soviet prisoners in December 1944 at 5.6 million.

[Footnote, page 304]

“Die Kriegsführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion” (1984), S. 730. - Roschmann, Gutachten, pages 17-25, reduces the number by repeated deduction of the same factor to 1 680 000. He argues that the front-line troops had reported strongly exaggerated numbers in the victory euphoria of 1941. Thus he dismisses a number of 280 810 that is explained in the listing of 1.5.44 as “Losses during transport, counting errors and similar” right away (Streim, S. 225, considers it, with good reason, as referring “to a large extent to deaths”). Hereafter R. takes the 845 128 deaths reported for the OKH area and simply deduces 300 000 as a “reporting error”. He does not take into consideration that the General Quarter of the Army had already on 25.12.1941 corrected the statistics of prisoners of war due to “reporting errors detected in the meantime [...] by around 500 000”: KTB OKW, Volume I, page 1106.


Hawok wrote:
He and the often mentioned Ueberschär have written one of the best books about the eastern front (Schwarze Reihe)


I've heard good things about that book. It's on my reading list, despite my reservations in regard to Hoffmann.

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Post by Hawok » 03 Apr 2002 16:28

Well, he signed the Katyn order, didn't he?

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Katyn was by far not of equal importance then a possible offensive war. Do we have the other missing documents showing his order to execute polish prisoners (more then 15000 died) ?

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Post by Hawok » 03 Apr 2002 16:31

I think the question is: why should he? After all, he had won the war, and there was no risk that the documents might ever fall into enemy hands. In the archives of the secret police they were safe from eyes that they were not meant for, and they could always be useful at a later stage.

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Why should he ? This question is ridiculous, sorry. Stalin was well known as one of the most disttrustful persons in history (see his biography). Now after his death or overcome what do you think could (!) have happended ? Who intelligent guy wouldn't have done that ?

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Post by Hawok » 03 Apr 2002 16:33

I have a little problem with Hoffmann due to his unsubtantiated criticism of Christian Streit's Keine Kameraden , on which Streit commented as follows (pages 10 and following of the 1997 edition of Keine Kameraden. Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941 - 1945 , Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., Bonn):

_____________________________________________________________

Let me tell you one personal thing : you seem to have problems with all authors, who question your view. Hoffmann has written an excellent book and i strongly suggest you should have a closer look at it. Free your mind and never exclude something, which seems impossible. That has little to do with nazi revisionism, but with intelligent and advanced thinking.

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Post by Hawok » 03 Apr 2002 16:37

Which Suvrov and his followers used in all their books, however when his book came out in Russia and people began to show (with documents and such) that it is in fact otherwise , he somehow decided not address the critics. Anyway research done on the sate of RKKA, as of 22.6.41 clearly shows it was not in position to begin the offensive – it was not really in position to do much of anything.


Suvrov and his fellowers ? Perhaps Suvrov - the bad guy- is more honest then most of his own historicans. Concerning June 1941 : correct, but Stalin would have attacked in late 1941 or spring 1942 without any doubt. The only possible result : it was a (not wanted) preemptive strike. If Hitler had not attacked, we would have fell under the soviet rule for many years.

Hitler was a great criminal (Holocaust), but without him (and that is his historical importance only a few have understood yet), europe would have fallen under Stalins reign (except the isolated and corrupt Churchill).

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Post by Roberto » 03 Apr 2002 18:11

Hawok wrote:
I have a little problem with Hoffmann due to his unsubtantiated criticism of Christian Streit's Keine Kameraden , on which Streit commented as follows (pages 10 and following of the 1997 edition of Keine Kameraden. Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941 - 1945 , Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., Bonn):

_____________________________________________________________

Let me tell you one personal thing : you seem to have problems with all authors, who question your view. Hoffmann has written an excellent book and i strongly suggest you should have a closer look at it. Free your mind and never exclude something, which seems impossible. That has little to do with nazi revisionism, but with intelligent and advanced thinking.


What is my "view" supposed to be, buddy? Better thread lightly. The problem I have with Mr. Hoffmann is that he challenged Streit's findings without providing the backup of that challenge, i.e. showing those "unknown original files and other documents" that allegedly prove Streit to be wrong. That is a highly unprofessional, not to say dishonest approach. I hope for Mr. Hoffmann that it was just an occasional slip and does not reflect his standard methodology.

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Post by Roberto » 03 Apr 2002 18:19

Hawok wrote:
I think the question is: why should he? After all, he had won the war, and there was no risk that the documents might ever fall into enemy hands. In the archives of the secret police they were safe from eyes that they were not meant for, and they could always be useful at a later stage.

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Why should he ? This question is ridiculous, sorry. Stalin was well known as one of the most disttrustful persons in history (see his biography). Now after his death or overcome what do you think could (!) have happended ? Who intelligent guy wouldn't have done that ?


"Who would have done that" or "why didn't they do it" are moot considerations when the evidence suggests otherwise. A vast array of documents highly incriminatory to the Soviet regime was not destroyed, but locked for decades in the archives of the KGB. Among them are the secret protocols attached to the Nazi-Soviet pact and documents related thereto, which Stalin biographer Volkogonov considered to constitute a final verdict on the wretchedness of Soviet diplomacy. So what indications do we have that plans for an all-out attack on Europe, if they ever existed, would have been destroyed, especially considering that they might be useful for future military planning? None at all, I would say. Hollow speculations of charlatans who need an explanation as to why they can provide no proof for the offensive operation that Stalin allegedly had in mind.

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