oleg wrote:EternaL wrote:So how much allied help was there around Moscow in winter of 1941 or Around Stalingrad 1942?
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If, if if, blame on Hitler - are you one of them German generals? Btw Barbarossa failed because it was bound to fail due to idiotic planning. I mean if the German army was so great how come Barbarossa failed?
The german army was without any doubt
the best in WW2, but fighting on more then 2 fronts leaded to it's downfall (a privilege of questionable value, mother russia never had). I'm sure that no other army on this planet would have fought it out so bravely at various fronts (France, Italy, Africa, Russia etc.) then the Wehrmacht and i'm very proud about it. Again the
whole world has been needed to overcome the Germans.
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The Wehrmacht and the Reich lost the war
because :
1.) the massive bombing destroyed both industry and support lines
2.) catastrophical decisions like Stalingrad from an incompetent leader
3.) massive lend lease and allies support for mother russia
4.) fighting at 3 fronts at the same time was
fatal, even for the german army
5.) the bad and unstrategical treatment of inhabitants in occupied areas
Nobody forced Germans to fight USSR - they did on their own nad they failed in 1941 alredy - manly to due to undreestiating the enemy and consequnet failure to plan reasobale cmapagin. That is pretty much illustates German startegic failure.
Shortcomings of the German Operational Battle Plans.
No one can dismiss the capabilities of the individual German soldier at the tactical level. The German squad was based on the machine gun that normally gave them superior firepower in combat. Coupled with good training and superior NCO leadership, a German infantry squad was an outstanding force in tactical-level combat, especially against poorly trained enemy squads that lacked machine guns during the first half of World War II. As the Allies added more firepower to their lower-level units, the Germans continued to maintain at least parity at the tactical level due to superior defensive tactics and experienced leadership. However, at the higher levels of command, there were many problems inherent in the German system. These problems were overshadowed early in the war by this tactical squad superiority and the overwhelming use of tanks and aircraft at the point of attack. Unfortunately for the Germans, there soon came a day when superior tactics and clever manoeuvring schemes would not always carry the day. Their overweening pride would compound the weaknesses inherent in their operational concepts.
The Germans excelled at manoeuvre. However, the operational art of war consists of more than the ability to merely manoeuvre forces on the battlefield. To be truly effective, an army must also figure out what the enemy is going to do, disguise their own intentions, and keep their own formations freshly manned and supplied. This is where the Germans consistently failed. German operational intelligence was a joke. They constantly misjudged the Allies' capabilities and intentions, especially the Soviets. In addition, the Germans could not balance the ends with the means available in logistics and manning. They fixated on the manoeuvre plan and consistently showed an unwillingness to integrate support functions into the planning process. Certainly, the generals share a large portion of the blame for the loss of numerous campaigns. One of the main reasons was not so much Hitler's interference, but rather in the German structure and method for conducting operational warfare. One must look at pre-World War I thinking at the German Staff levels to further describe the German mind set at the operational level.
Problems within the General Staff.
The rise in importance of the German Chief of General Staff is outside the scope of this article. Suffice to say that after the Seven Weeks War, the German Chief of General Staff (von Moltke) became the supreme head of the army in wartime by royal decree, eliminating the influence of the Minister of War in matters of command. After Otto von Bismarck's role as Chancellor of Germany had ended, the position of Chief of General Staff also usurped the role of the politician in the creation of war planning. This was in direct violation of Clausewitz's chief axiom - the use of military force is the continuation of policy by other means. Because of the increased role of the General Staff in the planning of policy, and given Germany's geographical position, the search for a battle of quick annihilation became the policy of future Chief's of General Staff. Alfred Count von Schlieffen became the prophet of annihilation, always preaching the idea of the modern Cannae. To understand the role of German politics in military planning, one only needs to look at the Schlieffen Plan. If war ever came to Germany, Schlieffen intended initially to attack and destroy France by a wide sweep through Belgium, before turning upon Russia. What is ironic and indicative of the General Staff attitudes is that Germany, at that time, was a protector of Belgium! Military planning precluded a political solution, turning Clausewitz upside-down. During Bismarck's time, Germany was able to politically avoid a two-front war. However, the General Staff's fixation on annihilation now prevented a political solution. A lack of another suitable plan prohibited the politicians from undertaking a different approach that might have placated major rivals, e.g. England.
Problems, Continued.
This battle of annihilation permeated the German General Staff and officer class up to and into World War II. The introduction of Nazi racial policies of character over intelligence pushed this attitude further into the minds of new young German officers, especially those in the General Staff. As a result, the Operations officer became the de facto second-in-command of the unit (be it division, corps, or army). Senior staff officers were assigned to these coveted positions, whereas the more junior-level officers or reservists filled the intelligence and the quartermaster posts. While most armies had staff officers at equal levels within the chain of command, this was not the case in the German army. As a result, differences of opinion between the logistics officer and the operations officer were usually ignored and never seriously considered by the overall unit commander. Halder, the German Chief of the General Staff of the Army during the first half of World War II, was quoted as saying "...our quartermaster service may never hamper the operational concept" . The battle of annihilation precluded the need for supply and intelligence. A quick operation made these support functions less important, in their eyes. The Nazi policy of the superiority of the will to solve problems simply exacerbated the fact that the Germans didn't seriously consider anything other than the operational plan. Logistics, personnel management, and intelligence all took back seats in the German Army.
German Operational Intelligence
The main problems with German operational intelligence were not structural, but attitudinal. High command had problems evaluating and using the information received in conjunction with the operational plan. There was an overwhelming tendency to accept preconceived notions in place of cold, hard facts. This attitude permeated all levels of staff and unit commanders. When information was found which that did not support the manoeuvre plan laid out by operations, it was suppressed - so as to not interfere with the plan. Because of this bias, it was difficult to find quality intelligence officers of quality lasting very long, as these staff officers were not allowed to offer contradictory facts that would disrupt the plan. When they did, generally they were ignored.
One example illustrates the German's willingness to bend everything to the operational concept. Early in 1941, Hitler had ordered a study of the Pripyat Marshes and how it would effect the planned invasion of Russia. Foreign Armies East (General Staff Intelligence) provided conclusions that had unsettled Halder. As he did not want to provide Hitler with any excuse to meddle with the plan, he ordered a revision that toned down the dangers the area might generate. Hitler was unmoved, but Halder considered Hitler's concerns exaggerated. However, Hitler was correct, as the Germans never did manage to clear the Pripyat Marshes. Clearly, Halder was not interested in information that did not match the plan and preconceptions. Note at this point, Hitler had yet to interfere with operational level planning.
Coupled with the focus on the operational plan, the Germans displayed an arrogant disregard for their enemies' abilities. Racial bias helped to mold the German staff's preconceived ideas of the abilities of the Soviets on the battlefield. For example, the Germans pointed to the early Soviet military failures against Finland and Poland, rather then Soviet successes later in Finland and against Japan. This racial bias, despite subsequent German apologists, extended down to the lowest level of society, including the Army. Only countless defeats on the battlefield changed this outlook towards the Slavic and Anglo-Saxon hordes. It is almost inconceivable that the Germans were not aware of the KV-1 or T-34 tank before Operation Barbarossa, given the fact that the Germans had numerous military attaches and advisers in the Soviet Union prior to June 22, 1941. This is an obvious example of a failure of German intelligence. Briefly, German intelligence information was rarely analysed by an unbiased superior to make subsequent changes in the upcoming operational execution.
German Supply at an Operational Level.
The Germans had two main logistic problems (besides the obvious strategic ones of fighting both Russia and the U.S.!). The first was structural. Lines of responsibility and authority were unclear or illogical. The individual services retained too much independence, which merely grew as the war continued. For example, the General Quartermaster Office was responsible for maintaining the flow of supplies; however, the Navy, SS, and Luftwaffe had their own supply offices. Not only did this cause redundancy, but it also created a lack of control by a centralised logistical service. Matters were not helped when individual units also hoarded transport for their own uses.
The German logistical department also had attitudinal problems, a far more serious problem, for much the same reasons that prevailed in the intelligence section. Hierarchy in supply mirrored the problems in the intelligence department. Junior officers had no ability to persuade the operations officer that the plan would not work based on supply available. When Colonel Otto Eckstein, then chief supply officer for Army Group Center, pointed out the precariousness of the situation in Russia during October 1941, Halder replied, "…you are certainly right to be anxious, based on your calculations; but we don't want to hold Bock up…" . Bock was, of course, the commander of Army Group Center.
Poor logistics and intelligence resulted in a series of debacles for the German army when faced with an opponent of legitimate staying power in many campaigns, from the North African campaign to Operation Barbarossa and Typhoon, to Operation Blue and Citadel, and finally, to the beaches of Normandy. Moreover, this list could easily be expanded to include most of the German defeats from 1941 to 1944. Bad logistical and intelligence support played a large role in the failure of German endeavours during this time frame.
In summary, operational warfare does not solely revolve around manoeuvre of armed elements, but also in the supply of these elements, accurate enemy intelligence and thoughtful personnel management of replacements and officers. In short, the German officer corps' inability to consider support functions in planning were just as much to blame for the German's losing the war, as Hitler's meddling in operational planning.