Was the Russian Army the largest in history?

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EternaL
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#46

Post by EternaL » 20 Mar 2002, 22:24

oleg wrote:
EternaL wrote:This discussion seems to miss an important point : the massive bombing of german industry and support lines, starting in 1943.
It has hardly anything to do with discussion -we are dicussing LL.
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You mean you discuss about the truth you do not want to accept, am i right ?

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#47

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 20 Mar 2002, 22:51

EternaL wrote:
oleg wrote:
EternaL wrote:This discussion seems to miss an important point : the massive bombing of german industry and support lines, starting in 1943.
It has hardly anything to do with discussion -we are dicussing LL.
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You mean you discuss about the truth you do not want to accept, am i right ?
What truth did not I want to accept?


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#48

Post by EternaL » 20 Mar 2002, 23:09

What truth did not I want to accept?
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The truth that the german army would have kicked your beloved mother russians ass without allies help. You know what i mean.

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#49

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 20 Mar 2002, 23:14

EternaL wrote:
What truth did not I want to accept?
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The truth that the german army would have kicked your beloved mother russians ass without allies help. You know what i mean.
So how much allied help was there around Moscow in winter of 1941 or Around Stalingrad 1942?

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#50

Post by EternaL » 20 Mar 2002, 23:20

So how much allied help was there around Moscow in winter of 1941 or Around Stalingrad 1942?
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Stalingrad was an idiotic mistake of Hitler, which should never been happened. Before this event, the Red Army was overcomed again and again. If Hitler had started the invasion a bit earlier and with better winter equipment the Red Army would have been history. Once again the Red Army had more luck then skill. The bad treatment of the inhabitants of the occupied areas by the Wehrmacht has also been a great mistake.

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#51

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 20 Mar 2002, 23:28

EternaL wrote:
So how much allied help was there around Moscow in winter of 1941 or Around Stalingrad 1942?
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Stalingrad was an idiotic mistake of Hitler, which should never been happened. Before this event, the Red Army was overcomed again and again. If Hitler had started the invasion a bit earlier and with better winter equipment the Red Army would have been history. One again the Red Army had more luck then skill. The bad treatment of the inhabitants of the occupied areas by the Wehrmacht has also been a great mistake.
If, if if, blame on Hitler - are you one of them German generals? Btw Barbarossa failed because it was bound to fail due to idiotic planning. I mean if the German army was so great how come Barbarossa failed?

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#52

Post by EternaL » 20 Mar 2002, 23:38

The main reasons which have lead to the irrefutable downfall of the Wehrmacht.
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1.) The massive bombing destroyed both industry and support lines

2.) Catastrophical decisions like Stalingrad from an incompetent leader

3.) Massive lend lease and allies support for mother russia

4.) Fighting at 3 fronts at the same time was fatal, even for the german army

5.) The worse and untactical treatment of inhabitants in occupied areas


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Once again the whole world and its power had been needed, to overcome the german army (one of the best this world has ever seen).
Last edited by EternaL on 20 Mar 2002, 23:49, edited 2 times in total.

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#53

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 20 Mar 2002, 23:46

EternaL wrote:
oleg wrote:
EternaL wrote:
So how much allied help was there around Moscow in winter of 1941 or Around Stalingrad 1942?
_____________________________________________________________

If, if if, blame on Hitler - are you one of them German generals? Btw Barbarossa failed because it was bound to fail due to idiotic planning. I mean if the German army was so great how come Barbarossa failed?

The german army was without any doubt the best in WW2, but fighting on more then 2 fronts leaded to it's downfall (a privilege of questionable value, mother russia never had). I'm sure that no other army on this planet would have fought it out so bravely at various fronts (France, Italy, Africa, Russia etc.) then the Wehrmacht and i'm very proud about it. Again the whole world has been needed to overcome the Germans.
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The Wehrmacht and the Reich lost the war because :


1.) the massive bombing destroyed both industry and support lines

2.) catastrophical decisions like Stalingrad from an incompetent leader

3.) massive lend lease and allies support for mother russia

4.) fighting at 3 fronts at the same time was fatal, even for the german army

5.) the bad and unstrategical treatment of inhabitants in occupied areas
Nobody forced Germans to fight USSR - they did on their own nad they failed in 1941 alredy - manly to due to undreestiating the enemy and consequnet failure to plan reasobale cmapagin. That is pretty much illustates German startegic failure.
Shortcomings of the German Operational Battle Plans.
No one can dismiss the capabilities of the individual German soldier at the tactical level. The German squad was based on the machine gun that normally gave them superior firepower in combat. Coupled with good training and superior NCO leadership, a German infantry squad was an outstanding force in tactical-level combat, especially against poorly trained enemy squads that lacked machine guns during the first half of World War II. As the Allies added more firepower to their lower-level units, the Germans continued to maintain at least parity at the tactical level due to superior defensive tactics and experienced leadership. However, at the higher levels of command, there were many problems inherent in the German system. These problems were overshadowed early in the war by this tactical squad superiority and the overwhelming use of tanks and aircraft at the point of attack. Unfortunately for the Germans, there soon came a day when superior tactics and clever manoeuvring schemes would not always carry the day. Their overweening pride would compound the weaknesses inherent in their operational concepts.

The Germans excelled at manoeuvre. However, the operational art of war consists of more than the ability to merely manoeuvre forces on the battlefield. To be truly effective, an army must also figure out what the enemy is going to do, disguise their own intentions, and keep their own formations freshly manned and supplied. This is where the Germans consistently failed. German operational intelligence was a joke. They constantly misjudged the Allies' capabilities and intentions, especially the Soviets. In addition, the Germans could not balance the ends with the means available in logistics and manning. They fixated on the manoeuvre plan and consistently showed an unwillingness to integrate support functions into the planning process. Certainly, the generals share a large portion of the blame for the loss of numerous campaigns. One of the main reasons was not so much Hitler's interference, but rather in the German structure and method for conducting operational warfare. One must look at pre-World War I thinking at the German Staff levels to further describe the German mind set at the operational level.

Problems within the General Staff.
The rise in importance of the German Chief of General Staff is outside the scope of this article. Suffice to say that after the Seven Weeks War, the German Chief of General Staff (von Moltke) became the supreme head of the army in wartime by royal decree, eliminating the influence of the Minister of War in matters of command. After Otto von Bismarck's role as Chancellor of Germany had ended, the position of Chief of General Staff also usurped the role of the politician in the creation of war planning. This was in direct violation of Clausewitz's chief axiom - the use of military force is the continuation of policy by other means. Because of the increased role of the General Staff in the planning of policy, and given Germany's geographical position, the search for a battle of quick annihilation became the policy of future Chief's of General Staff. Alfred Count von Schlieffen became the prophet of annihilation, always preaching the idea of the modern Cannae. To understand the role of German politics in military planning, one only needs to look at the Schlieffen Plan. If war ever came to Germany, Schlieffen intended initially to attack and destroy France by a wide sweep through Belgium, before turning upon Russia. What is ironic and indicative of the General Staff attitudes is that Germany, at that time, was a protector of Belgium! Military planning precluded a political solution, turning Clausewitz upside-down. During Bismarck's time, Germany was able to politically avoid a two-front war. However, the General Staff's fixation on annihilation now prevented a political solution. A lack of another suitable plan prohibited the politicians from undertaking a different approach that might have placated major rivals, e.g. England.

Problems, Continued.
This battle of annihilation permeated the German General Staff and officer class up to and into World War II. The introduction of Nazi racial policies of character over intelligence pushed this attitude further into the minds of new young German officers, especially those in the General Staff. As a result, the Operations officer became the de facto second-in-command of the unit (be it division, corps, or army). Senior staff officers were assigned to these coveted positions, whereas the more junior-level officers or reservists filled the intelligence and the quartermaster posts. While most armies had staff officers at equal levels within the chain of command, this was not the case in the German army. As a result, differences of opinion between the logistics officer and the operations officer were usually ignored and never seriously considered by the overall unit commander. Halder, the German Chief of the General Staff of the Army during the first half of World War II, was quoted as saying "...our quartermaster service may never hamper the operational concept" . The battle of annihilation precluded the need for supply and intelligence. A quick operation made these support functions less important, in their eyes. The Nazi policy of the superiority of the will to solve problems simply exacerbated the fact that the Germans didn't seriously consider anything other than the operational plan. Logistics, personnel management, and intelligence all took back seats in the German Army.

German Operational Intelligence
The main problems with German operational intelligence were not structural, but attitudinal. High command had problems evaluating and using the information received in conjunction with the operational plan. There was an overwhelming tendency to accept preconceived notions in place of cold, hard facts. This attitude permeated all levels of staff and unit commanders. When information was found which that did not support the manoeuvre plan laid out by operations, it was suppressed - so as to not interfere with the plan. Because of this bias, it was difficult to find quality intelligence officers of quality lasting very long, as these staff officers were not allowed to offer contradictory facts that would disrupt the plan. When they did, generally they were ignored.

One example illustrates the German's willingness to bend everything to the operational concept. Early in 1941, Hitler had ordered a study of the Pripyat Marshes and how it would effect the planned invasion of Russia. Foreign Armies East (General Staff Intelligence) provided conclusions that had unsettled Halder. As he did not want to provide Hitler with any excuse to meddle with the plan, he ordered a revision that toned down the dangers the area might generate. Hitler was unmoved, but Halder considered Hitler's concerns exaggerated. However, Hitler was correct, as the Germans never did manage to clear the Pripyat Marshes. Clearly, Halder was not interested in information that did not match the plan and preconceptions. Note at this point, Hitler had yet to interfere with operational level planning.

Coupled with the focus on the operational plan, the Germans displayed an arrogant disregard for their enemies' abilities. Racial bias helped to mold the German staff's preconceived ideas of the abilities of the Soviets on the battlefield. For example, the Germans pointed to the early Soviet military failures against Finland and Poland, rather then Soviet successes later in Finland and against Japan. This racial bias, despite subsequent German apologists, extended down to the lowest level of society, including the Army. Only countless defeats on the battlefield changed this outlook towards the Slavic and Anglo-Saxon hordes. It is almost inconceivable that the Germans were not aware of the KV-1 or T-34 tank before Operation Barbarossa, given the fact that the Germans had numerous military attaches and advisers in the Soviet Union prior to June 22, 1941. This is an obvious example of a failure of German intelligence. Briefly, German intelligence information was rarely analysed by an unbiased superior to make subsequent changes in the upcoming operational execution.

German Supply at an Operational Level.
The Germans had two main logistic problems (besides the obvious strategic ones of fighting both Russia and the U.S.!). The first was structural. Lines of responsibility and authority were unclear or illogical. The individual services retained too much independence, which merely grew as the war continued. For example, the General Quartermaster Office was responsible for maintaining the flow of supplies; however, the Navy, SS, and Luftwaffe had their own supply offices. Not only did this cause redundancy, but it also created a lack of control by a centralised logistical service. Matters were not helped when individual units also hoarded transport for their own uses.

The German logistical department also had attitudinal problems, a far more serious problem, for much the same reasons that prevailed in the intelligence section. Hierarchy in supply mirrored the problems in the intelligence department. Junior officers had no ability to persuade the operations officer that the plan would not work based on supply available. When Colonel Otto Eckstein, then chief supply officer for Army Group Center, pointed out the precariousness of the situation in Russia during October 1941, Halder replied, "…you are certainly right to be anxious, based on your calculations; but we don't want to hold Bock up…" . Bock was, of course, the commander of Army Group Center.

Poor logistics and intelligence resulted in a series of debacles for the German army when faced with an opponent of legitimate staying power in many campaigns, from the North African campaign to Operation Barbarossa and Typhoon, to Operation Blue and Citadel, and finally, to the beaches of Normandy. Moreover, this list could easily be expanded to include most of the German defeats from 1941 to 1944. Bad logistical and intelligence support played a large role in the failure of German endeavours during this time frame.

In summary, operational warfare does not solely revolve around manoeuvre of armed elements, but also in the supply of these elements, accurate enemy intelligence and thoughtful personnel management of replacements and officers. In short, the German officer corps' inability to consider support functions in planning were just as much to blame for the German's losing the war, as Hitler's meddling in operational planning.

Inside Hitler's High Command (Modern War Studies)
by Geoffrey P. Megargee, Williamson Murray - only 13 $ at amazon - give it a shot.

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#54

Post by EternaL » 20 Mar 2002, 23:49

So we agree upon the fact, that Germany would have beaten the Red Army without the mentioned failures ?

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Oleg Grigoryev
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#55

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 21 Mar 2002, 00:02

EternaL wrote:So we agree upon the fact, that Germany would have beaten the Red Army without the mentioned failures ?
no why? they were inherent in Geram army -why should I ignore hem? Besides the whole Blitzkreig thing was ill-suited for the USSR in the firts palce (not to sya the idea of advancing along 3 divergent axis of advance.
Operational art should never be confused with the German practice of blitzkrieg, with which it is often mistakenly coupled. While both concepts have a number of battlefield elements in common, blitzkrieg is, at heart, a strategy for waging war, while operational art is subordinated to strategy. As practiced, blitzkrieg was a military-economic means for achieving German hegemony in western and central Europe. Blitzkrieg is, fundamentally, war on the cheap, a perfect tool for subduing such small and medium-sized countries as Poland, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and even France. As long as Germany's smaller continental opponents could be individually dispatched in a single lightning campaign, the system worked perfectly. However, once such continental or transcontinental powers as the Soviet Union and the United States entered the contest, Germany, with its smaller industrial and population base, was doomed. This was precisely the situation Hitler found himself in from the end of 1941 onward.
Operational art, on the other hand, was closely tied to a series of strategic assumptions arrived at by the Soviets in the 1920s, that the next war would be a protracted struggle demanding every last ounce of the nation's strength. If the Soviets were ultimately mistaken that a world capitalist coalition would be directed against them, they were certainly correct in predicting the war's fundamental nature and shaped their operational art accordingly. Thus the beginning of the war found them, for all their manifold defects, politically, militarily, and economically better prepared than the Germans for waging a prolonged war. The Soviets could thus afford to lose millions of men and hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of territory, while the Germans had to win every time, or not at all. Operational art, with its emphasis on a continuing series of partial and consecutive victories, leading to an ultimate strategic result, was thus well suited to meet the rigors of the coming war.



The Russian way of War -Operational Art 1904-1940 by Richard Harrison

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#56

Post by Takao » 21 Mar 2002, 02:00

The "Battle of the Atlantic", I would think had avery big effect on the Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union. As most, if not all, convoys that went to the Soviet Union were staged out of Britain. So whatever supplies made it to the Soviet Union, first had to make it across the Atlantic and through the wolfpacks stationed there. Don't ask me for the reasons for this and why the convoys didn't come directly from the USA (because I haven't found any yet). You must also remember that while what supplies were recieved by the Soviet Union during 1941; some 750 tanks, 800 fighters, 1,400 vehicles, and 100,000 tons of stores(if my sources are correct) was not much to the Soviet Union, It was a great sacrifice on Britain's part. Also, IIRC, the average loss rate for the Atlantic convoys was 17% compared to an average loss rate of 4% for those convoys going to the Soviet Union.

As for "Operation Torch", some 1/3 of the ships used during this operation(the American force) sailed directly from the United States to the shores of Morocco. The other 2/3 came from Britain to Gibralter and then headed for their respective beaches. The US and GB were very concerned that word of the mission would get out and the invasion forces would be met by as many U-boats as could be gotten in the area. Even though the invasion forces were heavily guarded, an attack by 40-50 U-boats would be very devastating. Their fears were justified, for the preceding month of October 101 ships (637,833 ton) were lost. However, as the early British invasion convoys sailed, the wolfpacks were busy attacking to other supply convoys, and these early invasion forces met little resistance. The Americans took a somewhat southernly route and avoided the wolfpack hunting grounds altogether. During the year of 1941 4.1 million tons of shipping was sunk. During the year of 1942, it was much worse with 7.6 million tons lost. Finally dropping to 3 million tons sunk for the year 1943.(these figures have been taken from a graph giving the monthly losses in terms of tons, for the years 1941, 1942, 1943. The number of U-boats sunk did not see a dramatic rise until 1943 either. It was not until late 1943, once the convoy route to Britain was relatively clear, that forces could finally be built up for a cross-channel invasion.

From what I have gathered from further reading, the Americans wanted to hit the Axis somewhere, anywhere, and if the could not get British cooperation, then they would turn to the Pacific theater. President Roosevelt nixed the idea of fighting in the Pacific, but the British would not commit to a cross-channel invasion of France. It was finally decided to move against the Germany forces in North Africa.

I wasn't complaining about Soviet actions in the Pacific, but I have always wondered why the Soviets did not strike there sooner then they did. I know she was committed to defeating Germany and the Soviet Union had signed a non-aggression pact(?) with Japan. However, with all the forces the Soviet Union had mustered, I am still amazed that nothing happened along the border except for skirmishes.

Could you please tell me more about the use of Vladivastok Most of the books here in the US hardly mention that port.

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#57

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 21 Mar 2002, 02:44

Firts -thank you very much for tha data provided.
Iwasn't complaining about Soviet actions in the Pacific, but I have always wondered why the Soviets did not strike there sooner then they did. I know she was committed to defeating Germany and the Soviet Union had signed a non-aggression pact(?) with Japan. However, with all the forces the Soviet Union had mustered, I am still amazed that nothing happened along the border except for skirmishes.

Could you please tell me more about the use of Vladivastok Most of the books here in the US hardly mention that port.

Inside the world Greatest Tanks
In regards to Valdivostok . I only have data on general tonnage pushed through :

Northern Russia: 3964000
Persian Gulf : 4 160 000
Black Sea : 681 000
Soviet Far East: 8244000
Soviet Arctic : 452000

As you cans see Far East and Iran were the main roots for LL. I also know that all sipping through Vladivstaok were done without Convoys. In regards to Japan: Soviet Union always had plans to fight Japan - most of them were for rather aggressive counterstrokes type operation (I have the documents dealing with the plan for 1942). But they all were based on the premises that Japan strikes first. The main reason of not launching anything sooner were probably due to logistical difficulties. It would be a min burden for already overstrained Soviet Railroads to support two theaters so far apart

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1941

#58

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 21 Mar 2002, 23:00

otal strength of Wehrmacht in 1941 - 7.3 million, Red Army - 5.4 million.

For Barbarossa, Axis allocated 4,306,800 men in 166 divisions. The Red Army possessed 3,289,851 men in Western MDs, including even NKVD forces, in 190 divisions.

Axis deployed 153 divisions in the first echelon, while the Red Army (with incomplete strategic deployment) had 108 divisions. Calculating the divisional slice for Axis as 25.9 thousand, and for the Red Army as 17.3 thousand, we can estimated that enemy forces that initially attacked the Red Army in the border area outnumbered the Soviet forces by 2.1 to 1, and obviously quite a bit more in the breakthrough sectors. Considering that Soviet divisions on the border were stretched out on a 50km front on average, they didn't have a prayer.

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#59

Post by LeoAU » 22 Mar 2002, 03:04

Stalingrad was an idiotic mistake of Hitler, which should never been happened. Before this event, the Red Army was overcomed again and again. If Hitler had started the invasion a bit earlier and with better winter equipment the Red Army would have been history. Once again the Red Army had more luck then skill. The bad treatment of the inhabitants of the occupied areas by the Wehrmacht has also been a great mistake.
The whole Barbarossa was an idiotic mistake.
Before Stalingrad Germans were beaten several times (in Russia) - Moscow counter offensive, Rostov, Elnya etc... In 41 Germans launched 3 main thrusts, after great 'victories' and great purformance all they could do in 42 - launched offensive with only ONE army group - the other ones were stripped and whatever reinforcements they had were sent to army group South. That's how victorious Whermaht really was. They couldn't keep up with such offensives. Not to mention HOW they strted the war. No declaration of war. Like cowards?

Interesting enough - you say if Germans started the invasion earlier and WITH winter equipment. According to you if they started earlier they would've beaten Red Army before the winter comes - but then why would they need all the winter equipment? :lol: And if they needed winter equipment because obviously Red Army wouldn't be beaten by winter - then how crucial was when they started? :lol: Germans would've lost with or without winter.summer/spring etc equipment despite when they invade.[/b]

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#60

Post by Takao » 22 Mar 2002, 03:34

Thanks Oleg,

I was surprised to see how much went through the Persian Gulf. I would guess that most of that came during 1943-44, once the Med had been secured, but then again it could have come round the "Horn" and up through the Suez Canal. I have heard of single ships going in and out of Vladivastok and some allusions to air routes for supplies, but nothing concrete.

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