Soviet Fronts strengths: Overview

[Art]

As posted above (strength of the forces on the front):

1 June 1944:
Total - 6 750 240
incl. ground forces - 5 814 472
Army air forces - 369 490
PVO - 258 904
Navy - 307 374

The next question is what would you count as a division:
http://teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/BoevojSos ... -1944.html

I would take (numbers as of 1.6.44)
435 rifle divisions
10 airborne divisions
18 cavalry division
9 rifle and 4 ski brigades equivalent to 6.5 divisions
22 fortified regions equivalent to 11 divisions
16 tank corps equivalent to 18 divisions
6 mechanized corps equivalent to 6 divisions
Total 502.5

[Art]

Authorized and actual strength of Red Army's ground and air forces in 1929-1939 as of 1st January of each year:

Ground forces (authorized/actual strength)
1929 - 538,000/552,000 men
1930 - 540,000/568,000
1931 - 559,000/568,000
1932 - 656,000/675,000
1933 - 816,000/740,000
1934 - 751,000/760,000
1935 - 758,000/789,000
1936 - 917,000/864,000
1937 - 1,135,000/1,126,000
1938 - 1,263,000/1,233,000
1939 - 1,476,000/1,432,000

Air forces (authorized/actual strength)
1929 - 31,000/23,000
1930 - 42,000/27,000
1931 - 38,000/33,000
1932 - 63,000/55,000
1933 - 100,000/80,000
1934 - 83,000/76,000
1935 - 94,000/91,000
1936 - 116,000/111,000
1937 - 170,000/160,000
1938 - 195,000/192,000
1939 - 200,000/188,000

From appendix to "Mobilization planning and political decisions. End of 20s - mid 30s." by O. Ken (2002)
http://olegken.ru/work/hid/book/mobil/Appendix_4g.pdf

[curiousone]

Is there any source of data on Soviet tank strength at the front through the war? I would be especially pleased to see strength reports broken down by types of tanks.

[AriX]

Is there any source of data on Soviet tank strength at the front through the war? I would be especially pleased to see strength reports broken down by types of tanks.

There was such data on previous pages ofthis topic.

[KDF33]

I don't remember what it was exactly. That Krivosheev's thing, probably?
viewtopic.php?p=1378128#p1378128

Hi Art,

I was wondering if you could help me elucidate a certain ration category included in the 5/7/42 report. What is the meaning of the following:

5. Сохранить на июль установленный
пп. 4, 6 и 9 Постановления ГКО

№ 1704сс/ов и п. 5 Постановления ГКО
№ 1894сс/ов отпуск 664 148 продовольственных
пайков по НКО и 24635 пайков
по НКВМФ с распределением согласно
приложению.

Specifically, what does this mean: "отпуск 664 148 продовольственных пайков по НКО"?

And what is НКО?

Thank you!

[AMVAS]

Specifically, what does this mean: "отпуск 664 148 продовольственных пайков по НКО"?

And what is НКО?

"отпуск" - in this case means delivery or distribution
НКО = Народный Комиссариат Обороны (People Commissariat of Defense) or Ministry of Defense if you wish.
As soon as they were divided with Navy People commissariat (НКВМФ) figures for those two structures were given separately.

[KDF33]

"отпуск" - in this case means delivery or distribution
НКО = Народный Комиссариат Обороны (People Commissariat of Defense) or Ministry of Defense if you wish.
As soon as they were divided with Navy People commissariat (НКВМФ) figures for those two structures were given separately.

Thanks!

So this would mean something akin to "the delivery of 664,148 food rations to the People's Commissariat of Defense"?

[AMVAS]

"отпуск" - in this case means delivery or distribution
НКО = Народный Комиссариат Обороны (People Commissariat of Defense) or Ministry of Defense if you wish.
As soon as they were divided with Navy People commissariat (НКВМФ) figures for those two structures were given separately.

Thanks!

So this would mean something akin to "the delivery of 664,148 food rations to the People's Commissariat of Defense"?

Yep. Maybe only using "for" instead of "to" would be more exact. But is't tiny details

[KDF33]

Yep. Maybe only using "for" instead of "to" would be more exact. But is't tiny details

Thank you!

Now I'm wondering something else:

The aforementioned GKO decree 1986 puts Red Army rations for 5/7/42 at 9,205,000 for the active force (i.e., soldiers not hospitalized) plus another 482,317 rations for miscellaneous units not elsewhere classified (see appendix).

That gives us a total of 9,687,317 active RKKA personnel.

But another source gives a total active strength of 10,363,890 men for 1/7/42, a difference of 676,573 men.

That balance of 676,573 almost perfectly matches the aforementioned ration for the People's Commissariat of Defense (664,148), dated 5/7/42.

Does this mean that the personnel of the Commissariat was considered part of the Red Army?

[AMVAS]

Does this mean that the personnel of the Commissariat was considered part of the Red Army?

I'm not too good in such a details, but I expect yes, personnel of People's Commissariat of Defense was a part of Army.
however it could contain some number of volunteers.

[Art]

But another source gives a total active strength of 10,363,890 men for 1/7/42, a difference of 676,573 men.

That balance of 676,573 almost perfectly matches the aforementioned ration for the People's Commissariat of Defense (664,148), dated 5/7/42.

That's probably a coincidence. The number of rations wasn't equal to the number of men.
Rations were allocated:
1) in the operational army - to all personnel
2) in the rear areas, Caucasus, Central Asia and Far East - to privates and NCOs only. Officers were supposed to dinner at the garrison canteens paying with their own money (yet there were exceptions as described below).
In all cases the number of rations were smaller than the actual number of men.

Then this decree of 5 July 1942 said (paragraph 4) that the ration allocation is not based on the actual strength but is rather the limit to which the personnel strength should be cut.

Does this mean that the personnel of the Commissariat was considered part of the Red Army?

The allocations of additional rations was listed as follows:
1. Polish Army in the USSR - 44,000
2. Czechoslovak brigade - 1,250
3. Civil Air Fleet - 21,760
4. Raiload troops - 182,850
5. Railroad operation units of the People's Commissariat for Transport - 19,820
6. Intelligence Administration of the General Staff - 4,200
7. Officers and enlisted men servicing signal lines between Stavka and Front - 6,640
8. Officer of the newly formed divisions and brigades - 35,000
9. Officers of units quartered in distant areas who couldn't buy food - 176,000
10. Students and tutors of academies and courses, reserve of officers - 60,480
11. Personnel of military post units - 14,647
12. Civil personnel of bath and laundry detachments - 25,680
13. Civil personnel of VVS airfield service - 14,000
14. Aircraft repair teams - 2,500
15. Civil personnel of aircraft repair workshops - 2,850
16. Officers of the State Bank offices - 2,850
17. Personnel in the NKVD special camps - 10,000
18-19. Civil personnel of the ambulance ships - 5,540+1,000
20. Civil personnel of the Karelian Front's hospitals - 4,796
21. Civil personnel of military food procurement points - 980
22. Units of the NKVD GUShosDor transferred to the NKO - 25,750
23. Research Institute for Epidemiology - 155

6,8,9,10 - personnel of the Red Army who were not supposed to receive rations normally (officers outside the front) but were granted exeptions for some reasons.

1-2 were personnel of allied military

4-5 - Personnel of the NKPS (People's Commissariat for Transport) formations attached to the Red Army
3 - Formations of the Civil Air Fleet (transport, liaison, courier, ambulance aircraft) attached to the Red Army
11 - Personnel of the People's Commissariat for Signals' formations attached to the Red Army
16 - Personnel of the State Bank's formations attached to the Red Army
22 - Personnel of the NKVD's road construction units in the process of transfer to the Red Army, hence a separate line in allocation of rations

12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21 - civil personnel attached to the military who were given military rations to simplify supply

7 - Probably formations raised by the People's Commissariat for Signals (not sure)
17 - Unclear legal status, military personnel in the process of filtration after captivity etc.

[KDF33]

That's probably a coincidence. The number of rations wasn't equal to the number of men.
Rations were allocated:
1) in the operational army - to all personnel

Hi Art! Thanks for the detailed reply.

The part above intrigues me. According to the official Soviet History of the Second World War, the RKKA's active forces had the following numbers of personnel and equipment on 1 July 1942:



Yet, when one compares that book's manpower figures to ration figures contained in GKO decree 1986 issued on 5 July 1942, there's a discrepancy:



How can one account for the difference?

[Art]

I can only repeat that allocation of rations by GKO was for some reason below the actual number of men. This allocation became smaller every month:
May 42 - 9,950,000 rations for the Red Army (+950,000 hospital rations)
June 42 - 9,350,000 (+850,000 hospital)
July 42 - 9,205,000 (+772,450)

Nothing indicates that the Army actually became almost a million smaller in two months. This decreased allocation seems completely artificial, although the reasons were not commented anywhere.
Then when proposing the rations allocation on 6 June 1942 Mikoyan, Schadenko and Khrulyov wrote that the actual strength of the North Caucasus Front on 20.5.42 was 271,279 men whereas only 190,000 rations were allocated for the month of June. The reasons were not explained. The same allocation was retained in July.
On 31.7.42 when submitting the projected ration allocation for August M, S and K wrote that front and military districts requested 586,704 additional rations above those approved by the GKO in July. That again indicates that allocation was below the actual strength.