The quote is from pages 507 and 508:
On August 31, 1939, [after the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany on 23 August] the secretary-general of the Comintern, Dimitrov, hastened to the microphones of Radio Moscow to make a declaration intended to provide guidance. It had been essential for Russia to sign the pact with Germany, he declared, because the British prime minister, Chamberlain, had been trying to trick Germany and Russia into a war from which the western democracies might emerge triumphant. Russia had signed the pact, he said, to demonstrate that "all ideas of making the Soviet union into a catspaw to take British chestnuts out of the fire would have to be abandoned".
To party leaders over the world went instructions in question-and-answer form for dissemination to the faithful:
Have the basic aims of the Comintern changed? No, as heretofore the purpose of the Comintern is to bring about a world revolution of the proletariat.
Is a world revolution possible now? No, all efforts to kindle a revolution have so far been unsuccessful.
Cannot the beginning of a revolution be hastened by agitation? No, as this is dependent upon the conditions in the different countries.
What are the natural prerequisites to a revolution? A prolonged war, as expounded in the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin.
Is a war in Europe in the interests of the Comintern? Yes, since it must bring nearer the moment when the temper of the masses explodes.
Would a pact between the USSR and England and France hasten the outbreak of war? No, because a union between those countries would cause Germany to refrain from a military venture.
Would a pact between the USSR and Germany hasten the outbreak of war? Yes, with the USSR as a neutral power, Germany would be able to carry through with her plans.
What, therefore, must be the attitude of the USSR be to hasten a world revolution? To assist Germany in a sufficient degree so that she will begin a war and to take measures to insure that this war will drag on.
The two principals themselves had no illusions about the pact. As Stalin guardedly remarked to the Latvian foreign minister, Wilhelm Munters: "Now an unexpected turn took place; that happens often in the course of history. But one cannot rely upon it…..Perhaps German pretensions can awaken again". Much more blatantly, Hitler told a foreign visitor to the Berghof: "Everything I am doing is directed against Russia; if the West is too stupid and too blind to grasp this, I shall be forced to....strike at the West, and then after its defeat turn against the Soviet Union my assembled forces".
The source for the Comintern directives is given as "Report on Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact by US military attache, Riga, Latvia, MID [US Military Intelligence Division] Rpt No. 10501, 19 Sep 39, OMR [Old Military Records], NA [National Archives]".
Note that the Comintern directives are couched in the "anti-Fascist" rhetoric of the Comintern, which never changed, despite the Hitler-Stalin Pact. They show that the Soviet Union, through its "independent subsidiary" the Comintern, intended to bring about war between Germany and the Western Allies, in the expectation that it would be able to pick up the pieces at the end, or in the Comintern jargon, to bring about "the outbreak of the world proletarian revolution".
The Comintern directives certainly give the lie to the contention, often made by certain contributors to this forum, that the Soviet Union was the innocent victim of unprovoked aggression by the "fascist warmonger", Nazi Germany, which state bears sole responsibility for all the atrocities engendered by the German-Soviet war. In truth, the Soviet Union was burnt by a fire which it had itself lit.
An earlier passage in this book, on page 427, demonstrates Soviet planning for a future conflict in 1936, at the time of the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.
When the [Spanish] Socialist leader, Largo Caballero appealed to Russia for help for the Republicans, Stalin moved with caution. Far from being a product of Comintern intrigue, the civil war in Spain was for Stalin in some ways an embarrassment. The lines between left and right were so clearly drawn in Spain as to be difficult for Stalin to ignore, and when both Hitler and Mussolini appeared to be ready to aid Franco, the embarrassment increased. Yet Stalin was a firm believer in Lenin's dictum: "Accept all the obligations that are demanded of us, but when the hour of decision sounds, do not forget that the honor of a communist consists in not fulfilling them except in the measures in which they answer to the interests of the proletariat"; For Stalin, the proletariat had come to mean the Soviet state, so that when on July 26, 1936 - the day after Franco's messengers reached Hitler at Bayreuth - the Comintern's Executive Committee convened secretly in Prague with Soviet military and diplomatic officials, the decisions that would emerge would reflect less the agony of the Spanish proletariat than the realpolitik of the Kremlin:
Since the Red Army was not yet strong enough to protect Russia against Germany, the Comintern would do nothing in Spain that might provoke a German attack on Russia.
At the same time, Franco could not be allowed to win, for that would confront France with Fascist enemies on three sides, which might encourage Germany to attack Russia without fear of French attack from the rear.
So, too, victory by the Spanish Communists was, for the moment, not to be countenanced, for that might prompt Britain and France to make common cause with Germany and Italy against Russia.
On the other hand, Russia had to provide enough help to keep the Spanish Communists from losing, so that the war would continue until such time as Russia might turn it to advantage, perhaps in time to provoke a general European war that would leave the Western European nations exhausted and impotent and Russia the dominant power on the Continent.
The Comintern decisions reveal the real reason why the Soviet Union wished to avoid an attack by either Germany or the Western Powers. It was not because the Soviet Union was peace-loving and wished to avoid any war. Rather, it wished to delay war until the Red Army was strong enough; then it wished to bring about a general war, ie the "Fascist" powers versus the Western Powers, from which the Soviet Union would emerge the sole victor.