Comintern role in bringing about war

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michael mills
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Comintern role in bringing about war

Post by michael mills » 05 Oct 2002 13:13

The following quote is from the book (note: not a website) "On a Field of Red: The Communist International and the Coming of World War ", by Anthony Cave brown and Charles B. MacDonald, published 1981 by Academic Press Canada. It demonstrates how the Soviet Union manoeuvred to bring about a "Second Imperialist War" between Germany and the Western Allies so as to engender a World revolution.

The quote is from pages 507 and 508:

On August 31, 1939, [after the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany on 23 August] the secretary-general of the Comintern, Dimitrov, hastened to the microphones of Radio Moscow to make a declaration intended to provide guidance. It had been essential for Russia to sign the pact with Germany, he declared, because the British prime minister, Chamberlain, had been trying to trick Germany and Russia into a war from which the western democracies might emerge triumphant. Russia had signed the pact, he said, to demonstrate that "all ideas of making the Soviet union into a catspaw to take British chestnuts out of the fire would have to be abandoned".

To party leaders over the world went instructions in question-and-answer form for dissemination to the faithful:

Have the basic aims of the Comintern changed? No, as heretofore the purpose of the Comintern is to bring about a world revolution of the proletariat.
Is a world revolution possible now? No, all efforts to kindle a revolution have so far been unsuccessful.
Cannot the beginning of a revolution be hastened by agitation? No, as this is dependent upon the conditions in the different countries.
What are the natural prerequisites to a revolution? A prolonged war, as expounded in the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin.
Is a war in Europe in the interests of the Comintern? Yes, since it must bring nearer the moment when the temper of the masses explodes.
Would a pact between the USSR and England and France hasten the outbreak of war? No, because a union between those countries would cause Germany to refrain from a military venture.
Would a pact between the USSR and Germany hasten the outbreak of war? Yes, with the USSR as a neutral power, Germany would be able to carry through with her plans.
What, therefore, must be the attitude of the USSR be to hasten a world revolution? To assist Germany in a sufficient degree so that she will begin a war and to take measures to insure that this war will drag on.

The two principals themselves had no illusions about the pact. As Stalin guardedly remarked to the Latvian foreign minister, Wilhelm Munters: "Now an unexpected turn took place; that happens often in the course of history. But one cannot rely upon it…..Perhaps German pretensions can awaken again". Much more blatantly, Hitler told a foreign visitor to the Berghof: "Everything I am doing is directed against Russia; if the West is too stupid and too blind to grasp this, I shall be forced to....strike at the West, and then after its defeat turn against the Soviet Union my assembled forces".


The source for the Comintern directives is given as "Report on Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact by US military attache, Riga, Latvia, MID [US Military Intelligence Division] Rpt No. 10501, 19 Sep 39, OMR [Old Military Records], NA [National Archives]".

Note that the Comintern directives are couched in the "anti-Fascist" rhetoric of the Comintern, which never changed, despite the Hitler-Stalin Pact. They show that the Soviet Union, through its "independent subsidiary" the Comintern, intended to bring about war between Germany and the Western Allies, in the expectation that it would be able to pick up the pieces at the end, or in the Comintern jargon, to bring about "the outbreak of the world proletarian revolution".

The Comintern directives certainly give the lie to the contention, often made by certain contributors to this forum, that the Soviet Union was the innocent victim of unprovoked aggression by the "fascist warmonger", Nazi Germany, which state bears sole responsibility for all the atrocities engendered by the German-Soviet war. In truth, the Soviet Union was burnt by a fire which it had itself lit.

An earlier passage in this book, on page 427, demonstrates Soviet planning for a future conflict in 1936, at the time of the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.

When the [Spanish] Socialist leader, Largo Caballero appealed to Russia for help for the Republicans, Stalin moved with caution. Far from being a product of Comintern intrigue, the civil war in Spain was for Stalin in some ways an embarrassment. The lines between left and right were so clearly drawn in Spain as to be difficult for Stalin to ignore, and when both Hitler and Mussolini appeared to be ready to aid Franco, the embarrassment increased. Yet Stalin was a firm believer in Lenin's dictum: "Accept all the obligations that are demanded of us, but when the hour of decision sounds, do not forget that the honor of a communist consists in not fulfilling them except in the measures in which they answer to the interests of the proletariat"; For Stalin, the proletariat had come to mean the Soviet state, so that when on July 26, 1936 - the day after Franco's messengers reached Hitler at Bayreuth - the Comintern's Executive Committee convened secretly in Prague with Soviet military and diplomatic officials, the decisions that would emerge would reflect less the agony of the Spanish proletariat than the realpolitik of the Kremlin:

Since the Red Army was not yet strong enough to protect Russia against Germany, the Comintern would do nothing in Spain that might provoke a German attack on Russia.
At the same time, Franco could not be allowed to win, for that would confront France with Fascist enemies on three sides, which might encourage Germany to attack Russia without fear of French attack from the rear.
So, too, victory by the Spanish Communists was, for the moment, not to be countenanced, for that might prompt Britain and France to make common cause with Germany and Italy against Russia.
On the other hand, Russia had to provide enough help to keep the Spanish Communists from losing, so that the war would continue until such time as Russia might turn it to advantage, perhaps in time to provoke a general European war that would leave the Western European nations exhausted and impotent and Russia the dominant power on the Continent.


The Comintern decisions reveal the real reason why the Soviet Union wished to avoid an attack by either Germany or the Western Powers. It was not because the Soviet Union was peace-loving and wished to avoid any war. Rather, it wished to delay war until the Red Army was strong enough; then it wished to bring about a general war, ie the "Fascist" powers versus the Western Powers, from which the Soviet Union would emerge the sole victor.

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Brannik
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Post by Brannik » 05 Oct 2002 17:35

Not to start another "Suvorov War",but there's another bit of info that supports some of his claims.
Regards

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Steve
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Post by Steve » 05 Oct 2002 19:48

Stalin probably would have liked France and the U.K. to get embroiled in a long war with Germany and then pick up the pieces it seems a completly rational point of view from his perspective. But the facts remain that their was no need for a European war unless Hitler pushed for one and the occupation of Bohemia/Moravia in 1939 showed that this would not be a war over German minorities but a war to establish German domination in Europe. Their is no getting away from the fact that no matter what Stalin was wishing for the Soviet Union was completly unprepared for a war in 1941 and was not the aggressor, as to whether it would have been the aggressor in the future only a crystal ball would reveal that.

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Post by michael mills » 06 Oct 2002 04:28

Steve wrote:
Their [sic! "There" is meant] is no getting away from the fact that no matter what Stalin was wishing for the Soviet Union was completly unprepared for a war in 1941 and was not the aggressor, as to whether it would have been the aggressor in the future only a crystal ball would reveal that.


No, not a crystal ball, but Comintern records, which I have quoted. The statements of intent are quite clear; the Soviet Union intended to instigate a war between Germany and the West, but to remain aloof from it until both parties had exhausted themselves, and then move in to establish its domination. Those statements of intent are not derived from someone looking into a crystal ball, but from documented Comontern decisions.

Furthermore, it is quite untrue to say that the Soviet Union was completely unprepared for war in 1941. If it had been, it could never have absorbed the Axis assault to the extent it did, and would have been defeated.

In fact, Soviet forces in June 1941 were greatly superior to those of Germany and its Axis allies. However, they were wrongly disposed. The Soviet Government believed that the axis of the German attack would be in the South, to seize Ukraine and the Caucasus region in order to control the vital raw materials of those regions. For that reason, the Soviet forces were concentrated in the South, guarding Ukraine, and in that area were greatly superior to the Axis forces facing them.

However, the main German thrust came in the North and Centre, which enabled them to quickly break through the Soviet forces drawn up on the frontier. The Axis advance in the South (Army Group C plus Romanian forces) did not begin until the breakthrough in the North and Centre had succeeded, and the Soviet forces massed in Ukraine could be attacked from the West and the North.

Remember the basic principle of military strategy:

"Twice armed is he that hath his quarrel just,
But thrice armed he that gets his blow in fust".

In this case, Germany got its blow in first, well before it was exhausted from a long war against Britain, and well before the Soviet Union was ready to make the move revealed in the Comintern decisions I quoted. Even so, Germany was not strong enough to deliver the knockout blow, and thus eventually exhausted itself and was defeated.

Steve, you have obviously not read the book I quoted. I suggest that you do so, and open your mind to alternative interpretations of the historical record, rather than clinging doggedly to positions that are based on ignorance of all the facts.

I do not claim that the book "On a Field of Red" represents the whole truth, anymore than any single book does. However, it provides a lot of information that demonstrates the falsehood of the interpretation that in 1941 the Soviet Union was the victim of a totally unprovoked attack.

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Post by Reigo » 06 Oct 2002 15:05

In fact, Soviet forces in June 1941 were greatly superior to those of Germany and its Axis allies. However, they were wrongly disposed. The Soviet Government believed that the axis of the German attack would be in the South, to seize Ukraine and the Caucasus region in order to control the vital raw materials of those regions. For that reason, the Soviet forces were concentrated in the South, guarding Ukraine, and in that area were greatly superior to the Axis forces facing them.


With the existing information one can say that the Soviet government didn't believe in Axis attack before 21st June. It's true that the Soviet intelligence thought that the main German force concentration is builded in the South. And it is equally true that the main Soviet force concentration was meant to built to the South (mainly the Lvov area). What is very important: the Soviet force concentration was in the middle on 22nd June. They weren't ready for anything (not for defence, not for attack). What was the aim of the Soviet concentrations in summer 1941, it is not completely clear. One can believe what one wants. :wink:

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Post by Michael Kenny » 06 Oct 2002 15:40

Oh I see, Germany's real intention was to hold up this planned Soviet attack untill it could declare war on America. Thus making sure it could destroy Germany,occupy it and thus stop any Soviet expansion into those parts of Europe not taken before 1945. Brilliant plan, this should help us understand why Germany invaded and occupied France,Holland,Belgium,Norway,Denmark,Greece,Yugoslavia,Crete,North Africa,Poland,Czechoslovakia and Austria. It was to save them!. I would also like to know why when anyone has a view other than that of a contributer he is 'ignorant'. Forgive my skepticism but is this another attempt to rehabilitate the Third Reich as the West's unsung saviour?. It may be that books do exist that put forward such a scenario but there are thousands more books that give other simpler and more widely held view -that Hitler was an expansionist war-monger who needed no excuse to invade any country. If it walks like a duck and quacks it is a duck. Can we also use the fact that the principle opponent for US Navy wargames after WWI was the UK to deduce that the USA was planning an attack on Britain? Hmm... I'm now thinking did the USA bring about the conflict so they could replace the British Empire-or was it just another part of the cunning Soviet Plan you discovered?.(Baldrick eat your heart out)

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Post by Reigo » 06 Oct 2002 15:45

As a sidenote: Comintern started to constantly degenerate after the Communist mutinies failed in Europe 1923 - 1924 (last one in Estonia on 1st December 1924). It turned into propaganda organization. Stalin didn't care about it much. There is evidene that in 1941 (before the German attack) Stalin considered to disband it as useless organization.

In December 1924 Stalin said that Socialism in one country is possible. So most historians have concluded that Stalin didn't plan anymore World Revolution. But one can argue with this conclusion. When Communists seized power in Russia they believed that socialism in one country isn't possible and that the sole socialist country will not survive. They tried to organize/support revolutions in elsewhere. But everywhere failed. Now Stalin said that Socialism can develop also in one country. But the idea of World Revolution and the destruction of Capitalism didn't disappear. Stalin never said that the World Revolution is impossible. In my opinion Stalin picked another way for World Revolution. It was a Communist dogma that there will be another World War between capitalists. There is evidence that Stalin said that they will wait until the Capitalists weaken themselves and then Soviet Union will decide the fate of the War.

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Duck Talk...

Post by Scott Smith » 06 Oct 2002 17:05

Michael Kenny wrote:this should help us understand why Germany invaded and occupied France, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Greece, Yugoslavia, Crete, North Africa, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria.

The Versailles powers had no more right to keep Austria from becoming German as Texas from becoming American.

Germany had legitimate issues with Czecho-Slovakia and Poland over German minorities and Danzig. Saying that she did not is window dressing for the real objective of keeping Germany contained ad infinitum with a hostile ring of alliances.

The other invasions are easily explained. The Versailles powers declared war on Germany. The rest is jockeying for strategic advantage and access to resources.
:wink:

Michael Kenny wrote:Forgive my skepticism but is this another attempt to rehabilitate the Third Reich as the West's unsung saviour?

Has Mr. Mills advanced such a thesis? His explanations are perfectly reasonable.

The purpose of Socialism-In-One-Country, btw, was for the Soviet Union to industrialize and buildup the Urals to fight an "Imperialist War." Of course Soviet Russia was a burgeoing threat to Germany, especially with the stalemate from Great Britain inexplicably still in the war, but not an acute threat until 1942. And despite taking the initiative in 1941, Germany still had insufficient strength to force a decision--and lost, as Mr. Mills notes.
:)

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Post by Michael Kenny » 06 Oct 2002 17:32

So Scott are you saying Germany had legitimate reasons for invading Poland?. And yes the Allies declared war on Germany but that was because Germany had already STARTED the war(it just didn't bother to declare it). The Allied Powers had every right to impose conditions on Germany after WWI, they did win after all and might is right.I see another way of excusing this agression by Germany taking hold here. It seems any straw is being clutched to try and put this naked expansionism in a better light. The fig-leaf of a pre-emptive strike to save the West from the Eastern hordes rides again.

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Post by Scott Smith » 06 Oct 2002 19:33

Michael Kenny wrote:So Scott are you saying Germany had legitimate reasons for invading Poland?. And yes the Allies declared war on Germany but that was because Germany had already STARTED the war(it just didn't bother to declare it). The Allied Powers had every right to impose conditions on Germany after WWI, they did win after all and might is right.I see another way of excusing this agression by Germany taking hold here. It seems any straw is being clutched to try and put this naked expansionism in a better light. The fig-leaf of a pre-emptive strike to save the West from the Eastern hordes rides again.

Yes, Germany had a legitimate reason for invading Poland because Poland refused to seriously negotiate over Danzig, and Poland could do this because of the Allied guarantee, which was a blank-check aimed against Germany.

Sure, the victorious Allies had every right to impose whatever conditions they wanted on Germany in 1919, but it would be a bit hypocritical to then call it a Just peace. A lasting-peace is forged through mutual respect and dialog, not by trying to contain an economic and military rival with entangling and hostile alliances and a lot of sanctimonious rhetoric. Germany did not want to fight either the British or French again, but she did want hegemony over her spheres of interest, just as the Allies would want the same with their own nations and empires. Certainly the issue of German minorities was a good one and so was Danzig.

I never said anything about saving the West from Eastern hordes. But from the German point-of-view, the Soviets were a threat who had overplayed their hand in the partnership and simply could not be trusted. I don't think the Soviets were ever considered a mortal danger to the West, or at least not in the British mentality; they had always been contained with the Royal Navy before and the limiting of Russian access to warm-water ports. But Germany is different because she was a continental power with access to the West. And so was the Red Army a continental power. The likely scenario is obvious.

As far as Hitler's expansionism, this is overplayed, IMHO. Hitler was a German nationalist who wanted to bring all ethnic Germans, by whatever stretch of the imagination, into one contiguous Reich--and to gain access to sufficient resources that Germany could never again be blockaded economically by hostile powers, and therefore brought to her knees as had happened in the Great War--which Germany should have won by her superior force of arms, at least in the Nazi view.

Hitler became impatient as his brusque diplomatic measures had lost their shock-value and then resorted to military force, not believing that the British would actually declare war, because there is no way the Allies could militarily guarantee Polish borders without the Soviet help. And when the Allies made an alliance with Poland on the eve of war they did not declare war against the Soviet Union when they dismembered the rest of Poland, thus ending any chance of a negotiation for the return of Polish sovereignty once Germany had won the campaign.

Yes, Germany had war-aims, but it was the Allies who refused to negotiate anything short of German encirclement, then Unconditional Surrender.
:)

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Post by michael mills » 07 Oct 2002 06:16

Michael Kenny wrote:
Oh I see, Germany's real intention was to hold up this planned Soviet attack untill it could declare war on America. Thus making sure it could destroy Germany,occupy it and thus stop any Soviet expansion into those parts of Europe not taken before 1945. Brilliant plan, this should help us understand why Germany invaded and occupied France,Holland,Belgium,Norway,Denmark,Greece,Yugoslavia,Crete,North Africa,Poland,Czechoslovakia and Austria. It was to save them!. I would also like to know why when anyone has a view other than that of a contributer he is 'ignorant'. Forgive my skepticism but is this another attempt to rehabilitate the Third Reich as the West's unsung saviour?. It may be that books do exist that put forward such a scenario but there are thousands more books that give other simpler and more widely held view -that Hitler was an expansionist war-monger who needed no excuse to invade any country. If it walks like a duck and quacks it is a duck. Can we also use the fact that the principle opponent for US Navy wargames after WWI was the UK to deduce that the USA was planning an attack on Britain? Hmm... I'm now thinking did the USA bring about the conflict so they could replace the British Empire-or was it just another part of the cunning Soviet Plan you discovered?.(Baldrick eat your heart out)


Instead of sarcasm, why not address the material that I posted. What is your interpretation of the Comintern decisions quoted in the book "On A Field of Red"?

Although I have stated that that book should not be regarded as the sole truth, I do not think you should dismiss it out of hand simply because it does not conform to your own view of history (or so you seem to think)> Have you even read it?

The view that Hitler "needed no excuse to invade any country" is not only simple, it is simplistic. There are many cases where Hitler would have preferred to enter into an alliance with a country, but resorted to invading it when it joined Germany's enemies; Poland and Yugoslavia are cases in point. Hitler also tried to bring Greece into the Tripartite Pact, but was thwarted by Mussolini's impetuous invasion, which Hitler did not want; since that invasion brought British RAF units into Greece, which then menaced Germany's source of oil in Romania, Hitler was obliged to invade Greece to remove that threat. All of those invasions represented a drain on German resources and a distraction from the ultimate purpose of National Socialism, which was to destroy Bolshevism.

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Post by Steve » 07 Oct 2002 16:26

Every country has a wish list or a set of circumstances they would like to bring about but they have to be judged on what they actualy do and in the case of the Soviets it is now known what they intended in 1941 onwards. If they were planing an invasion in 41 or later of course Hitler was right to strike first.
The text of Stalins famous speech to military academy graduates on May 5th 41 is now known and does not support the claims that he called for an agressive war with Germany. Instructions for a new mobilisation plan were issued on August 16th 1940 (MP-41) after revisions it was to be ready by May 1st 41 but this was deferred and for some parts the date of July 20th 41 was given. In the course of forming this plan the planners realised that 5 years were needed to carry out full Red Army modernisation. In June 41 no plan existed to bring ALL units to full readyness.
On May 5th Soviet intelligence reported 103-107 German divisions with more on the way concentrating in the east. On May 15th a document of which only one copy was produced called "Considerations on plans for the strategic deployment of Soviet armed forces in the event of war with Germany and its allies " was signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov. The plan envisaged a pre-emptive strike by 152 Soviet divisions but the Soviet leaders realised the Red Army was in no condition to carry out such a move the alternative was to order a general mobilisation. To cut a long story short Stalin decided on a policy of appeasment believing Hitler was bluffing hence his supposed refusal to believe warnings.
Whatever Stalins future intentions were an offensive war in the early 40s was not on the table. The Comintern may have wanted to bring about such a war but their instrument the Red army was not capable of it and only Stalin would make such a decision. In June 41 Colonel-General Halder dismissed the idea of a Soviet offensive as "nonsense" and I would humbly agree with him.

Mostly taken from an article by Professor John Erikson

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Post by Reigo » 07 Oct 2002 18:19

The text of Stalins famous speech to military academy graduates on May 5th 41 is now known and does not support the claims that he called for an agressive war with Germany.


Stalin main message was: it is time for offense instead of defense. Soviet writer Vishnevski (belonged to the Party elite), who also listened the speech wrote then in his diary that Soviet Union will start now "ideological and practical offensive." "USA from the West and USSR from the East are going to put pincers around Germany." "In front of us is our expedition to the West. In front of us are opportunities, about which we have dreamt long time."

Source:
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/2148/1941/Nevezhin.txt

It's true that Stalin directly didn't "call for an agressive war with Germany." But it seems that everybody got such message. After Stalin's speech the Soviet propaganda started increasingly to be anti-German and offensive-war oriented.

Instructions for a new mobilisation plan were issued on August 16th 1940 (MP-41) after revisions it was to be ready by May 1st 41 but this was deferred and for some parts the date of July 20th 41 was given. In the course of forming this plan the planners realised that 5 years were needed to carry out full Red Army modernisation. In June 41 no plan existed to bring ALL units to full readyness.


Interesting, according to Meltiukhov the developing of this plan started in April 1940 and it was accepted by the government on 12 February 1941.
(Source is given as: 1941 god - uroki i vyvody. Pp.69—69, 178—179; 1941 god. Dokumenty.Book.1. P.607—650.)
It's true that the Soviets didn't have for example so much tanks as were demanded in the plan, but no plan is a dogma. There was fex an order to have 1/3 of Mech Corps with cosiderably less tanks and to use them as training units.

On May 15th a document of which only one copy was produced called "Considerations on plans for the strategic deployment of Soviet armed forces in the event of war with Germany and its allies " was signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov. The plan envisaged a pre-emptive strike by 152 Soviet divisions but the Soviet leaders realised the Red Army was in no condition to carry out such a move the alternative was to order a general mobilisation.


At first just a sidenote: the plan can be called preemptive put surely not preventive. The plan considered that it is useful to attack the Germans before they finish the concentration of their troops (which the Soviets knew was going on). The German attack was considered only as a possible (Hitler also believed that somewhere in the future a Soviet attack can come - does it make Barbarossa preventive?)
Secondly: the version that this plan wasn't accepted at all is based only on some memoirs and fex Meltiukhov has shown how these memoirs are quite questionable.

The Soviets were concentrating for something. And the Soviet military doctrine was to strike first on unsuspected enemy. That refutes the feeble claims that Soviets maybe waited until the Germans attacked and then counter-attacked themselves. The version that Soviets concentrated their troops to scare the Germans not to attack, is refuted by the fact that all the Soviet concentrations were done in utmost secrecy or under the disguise of exercises.

To cut a long story short Stalin decided on a policy of appeasment believing Hitler was bluffing hence his supposed refusal to believe warnings.


As a sidenote: appeasement was showed for the outside world, there was no appeasement in Soviet inside propaganda. When talking about appeasement remember that Hitler was also before Barbarossa interested that the Soviets didn't suspect anything.
So appeasement is not a proof that SU wasn't planning to attack.

In June 41 Colonel-General Halder dismissed the idea of a Soviet offensive as "nonsense" and I would humbly agree with him.


Halder's opinion is irrevelant, because:
* German intelligence on SU was poor.
* If there was to be a Soviet offensive in 1941, it most surely wouldn't have happened on 23rd June fex. Like already said, preparations for something were on the middle and on 22nd June 1941 the Soviets weren't ready for nothing. Halder saw that the Red Army wasn't ready for nothing and concluded that they weren't also ready for attack.

I just wanted to show that the mainstream version can be argued.
Unfortunately I will be away for few days.

Regards,
Last edited by Reigo on 07 Oct 2002 18:52, edited 1 time in total.

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Post by Caldric » 07 Oct 2002 18:39

And what is the point of any of it. The Soviets did not invade Germany, having plans for such an attack does not mean you are going to use them, all nations military create such plans, that is nothing new. The work in the Comintern was geared to bring about the fall of Capitalism and its bastions around the world. Why would you find any of this surprising? Or more importantly news? This work of the Comintern has been known for decades, they were open in their ideals of destroying the Western Democracies. They had been preaching it since Marx took up the pen and started writing.

But none of this means the Soviets were going to invade the Germans anytime soon. It is very important to understand Soviet Doctrine on warfare, offense offense offense, is the only defense. Stalin and the Soviets knew the pact in 1939 was only reprieve from the eventual war with Germany, the Nazi Germans had been preaching for their destruction for 2 decades, and the same for Germany in Moscow. Once war started many of the leaders of the Comintern were shot or brought into line with the Western Nations. The work of the Comintern before the war is nothing to be surprised about, this Jargon was nothing more then propaganda for the most part.

At any rate nothing changes the fact that the Soviets were the victims of unprovoked invasion, and nothing can change the fact that Germany did this not for fear of Soviet invasion and as a victim, but to steal Soviet land for their own use.

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Post by Scott Smith » 07 Oct 2002 19:45

Caldric wrote:At any rate nothing changes the fact that the Soviets were the victims of unprovoked invasion, and nothing can change the fact that Germany did this not for fear of Soviet invasion and as a victim, but to steal Soviet land for their own use.

Russia would certainly switch sides at the opportunistic time and the Germans knew this. They needed to secure their flanks for a long siege either by getting the British out of the war or invading the Soviet Union. And the British weren't negotiating because they knew that they could not be invaded without ultimately drawing the Americans into the war.

So, in order to solve the encirclement before it became an acute problem that Germany could never escape from (1942 at the latest) Barbarossa was hatched. But Barbarossa had no chance of succeeding because German intelligence and logistics were so poor.

A better strategy was trying to contain Great Britain without provoking the USA until they were willing to negotiate a peace, and then using the mightly Wehrmacht to watch the Russians like a hawk (albeit a serious drain on the economy). But nobody believed that England could be contained without an invasion, which was impossible and which Hitler didn't want to do anyway. Neverthless, England couldn't fight a naval war-of-attrition forever, and the threat of resuming the Blitz was there as well.

Containment of England could have been accomplished by seizing Gibraltar and blockading or seizing Alexandria to seal-off the Mediterranean, and using the Kreigsmarine, especially U-boats, and the Luftwaffe against British merchant shipping. Would they say "Uncle" before the Red Army was ready to roll? Hard to say. Not with Churchill and FDR in power most likely. And Uncle Joe would have swept-up the spoils of Europe, or so he hoped--with FDR standing by like a poacher to collect the remains of the British Empire.
:)

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