#2
Post
by infantry » 23 Feb 2007, 23:24
Dear Peter,
Excerpt from one of my presentations
The Çanakkale area was a fortress command from very early times. Many fortresses and other fortifications were built, enlarged and rebuilt during the reign of several Ottoman sultans. But until the activation and assignment of Fifth Army on 24 March 1915, the main responsibility of the defenses remained under the command of the artillery corps. So nearly every artillery officers - especially heavy artillery branch - served at least one term in Çanakkale fortified zone before 1914. They knew the area thoroughly. And during Balkan Wars the entire Gelibolu (Gallipoli) peninsula was prepared for possible amphibious operations. Although defense system was immature it gave an opportunity for staff and artillery officers to analyze and practice the idea of defense against amphibious operations. The outcome of these experiences was the victory of 18 March and the successful performance of Turkish artillery officers under the command of Brig. Gen. Cevat (Çobanlı) Paşa.
Liman von Sanders and his small staff arrived and took the command of Çanakkale fortified zone on 26 March. After a brief inspection, Liman Paşa disregarded the experience and advice of the Fortified Area Command and disbanded the old defense system. According to the old plan, all units placed their main body near the possible landing sites and kept small reserves in the interior. The Fortified Area Command expected the main attacks to come at the southern tip of the peninsula (Cape Helles) and Kabate regions, because only these two areas created an immediate danger to the straits defenses. Unfortunately, the fortifications were unfinished except for those at Seddülbahir-Teke Koyu. This was mainly due to the shortage of materials and manpower. Liman Paşa categorically rejected the Ottoman plan and its assumptions as unsuitable for defense against modern amphibious warfare. According to his own ideas and plan, units would place an observation and screening force overwatching the beaches and maintain main bodies as mobile reserves. Moreover, he identified the Bolayır (Bulair) region and Beşige bays as the probable main landing sites.
It is now well known that Liman Paşa’s concept of defense failed completely. Allied units did land southern tip and one mile north of Kabatepe – the original planned site was Kabatepe - and not at Liman Paşa’s probable landing sites. Moreover, he stubbornly kept the 7th Division at Bulair for an entire day and did not pay attention to the situation reports coming from subordinate units.
The small screening forces were not able to oppose the landings effectively except at the fortifications built by Fortified Area Command in the Seddülbahir-Teke Koyu area. Additionally, the large reserves suffered great difficulty in reaching the landing sites due to the poor roads, shortage of transportation, and the effects of the allied naval bombardment. His counter-attacks to destroy the landing parties were unsuccessful and ended with heavy Ottoman casualties.
Had all the Turkish unit commanders followed Liman Paşa's orders exactly, the Anzac landing at Arıburnu would have been successful and the 9th Division would have been unable to offer the kind of resistance that stopped the further enlargement of the beach head. The 19th Division commander, Mustafa Kemal Bey, openly disobeyed Liman's orders and committed his 57th Regiment to Arıburnu.
During the battle, Liman Paşa and his staff never communicated with the Fortified Area Command in order to make use of their expertise. This attitude also created a tension between both of the commands throughout the campaign.
Regards
