Siege of Ioania

[Nikolay]

re the Second War: I never knew the Greek army went that far up into Bulgarian territory . It would be great if our fellow Bulgarian members furnished us with further information.

Does anyone know if any of the other participants of the war set up their own monuments?

Nick

Indeed the Greek army went far north and east into the Bulgarian-held territory. On 18/31 July 1913 when the ceasefire entered into force Greeks were holding the line: south of Pehchevo- just south of Gorna Dzumaja-north of Nevrokop- Xanthi-Gjumurdzina(Komotini). However it must be noted that right up to the end of the war the concentrated Greek army had a overhelming superiority over the Second Bulgarian army that was facing it. In the beginning between the valleys of Vardar and Struma 72 Greek battalions were up against only 34 Bulgarian battalions (of which 8 battalions were local militia and further three were marschbattalions of untrained new recruits) plus crushing superiority in artillery. When Bulgarian High command were preparing for the Second war, they greatly underestimated the quality of the Greek army. They left Second army weak and poorly equiped with artillerry. And they paid dearly for that...
However in the very end of the war, on 15/28 July the reinforced Bulgarian Second army was able to launch a surprise counteratack on the Greek left flank and overrun the position of the Greek 3rd Infantry division on the peaks Beyaztepe and Zanoga. At the same time on the right flank Bulgarians regained the towns of Bansko and Razlog and set foot on the strategically crucial Predela pass between the Rila and Pirin mountains. These unexpected events put the Greek army, which was concetrated in the narrow Kresna gorge on the river Struma, in a very difficult position. By that time Serbian army's advance was already checked at Kalimantzi and some of the Bulgarian commanders even insisited that army should continue the war. But Romanian army was already 40 km from Sofia and there was not a single unit available for defence from the north. At the same time events of 15-17 July changed the attutide of the Greek prime minister Elefterios Venizelos towards the eventual ceasefire. When arriving in Bucharest for negotiations on 12/25 July he instisted that Bulgaria should surrender unconditionally and that the peace should be signed on the battlefield. He also categorically rejected Bulgarian claim to an outlet to the Aegean sea. When however on 17 July he received the latest news from the battlefield (a telegram by King Konstantinos), he immediately accepted Bulgarian proposal for a ceasefire, no uncontional surrender or preliminary peace was forced upon Bulgaria, and at the end Bulgaria did receive an outlet to the Aegean sea. So, this late counteroffencive played quite an important part.
This is my view on the events, from what I have read. I have read a very old Greek book on the war of 1913 by col. V. Dusmanis (translated in its entirity in Bulgarian and published in the Bulgarian military history journal -1928-29) and two very good Serbian books on the same war - by M. Lazarevic (ed. 1955) and by S. Skoko (1972 - I was able to find only the first volume of the book). Plus, of course, a score of books in Bulgarian. I will surely check the new book you mentioned (thanks for the link BTW ).
Actually from the beginning this war was a no-win situation for the Bulgaria, both politically and miltary. And one must admitt, had it not been for the fiercest resistance Bulgarian army put on the battlefield against all the odds, disaster upon Bulgaria would have been much, much heavier.

[Nikolay]

Bulgaria is then defeated in the second round in 1913.The Turks retake Adrianople.

The map is not very accurate. Bulgarian troops didn't reach Nish or Skopie, and the army facing Romanians on the Balkan range never actually existed

[Mr Holmes]

Dear Nikolay,

Thank you very, very much for the detailed reply! So it was only for a very short period of time that the Greeks were able to stay that far north. It is obvious that the war consumed most of the resources that each nation could field as is evidenced by the fact that there were no Bulgarian defences to be arrayed against the Romanian incursion. From all that you written, I just have one question: What did Venizelos actually mean by unconditional surrender? Do you know what terms were requested by Venizelos under the auspices of an unconditional surrender?

And one must admitt, had it not been for the fiercest resistance Bulgarian army put on the battlefield against all the odds, disaster upon Bulgaria would have been much, much heavier.

It must have been a very hard fight for all sides. (Personally, I have respect for the efforts of the common soldier no matter which side they were on.) Bulgaria lost many people to disease; do you know which areas were significantly affected and why? ie. from occupation policies, lack of sanitation, or even just the side-effects of war? (These questions are also valid for the other nations, too)

With regards to the book that I gave the link to. It took a while for the WW2 volume to be delivered to my house, but it got here safe and sound. For the most part, it was a dry account of the various battles (I like that sort of thing: XX Div. moves to Athens and engages 1SS for example) with many maps. It came in a green leather bound cover and has smooth pages. My only qualms were with the spelling of some of the places (for those not very knowledgable with Greek names of towns etc. it may get confusing. A hypotheical example: Άγιος Δημήτριος (St. Demetrius) may be spelt as "Agios Dimitrios" instead of the more Latinised Hagios Demetrius, for example. I hope you understand what I mean.) And also there are some glaring, at times, spelling and syntactical mistakes. But they don't overall, take much away from the book.

Thanks again,

Nick

[Peter H]

Why did Romania join the conflict?

This link has this to say:

http://www.globusz.com/ebooks/Balkans/00000030.htm

The Romanian army had invaded northern Bulgaria, bent on maintaining the Balkan equilibrium and on securing compensation for having observed neutrality during the war of 1912-13...

[Mr Holmes]

Mr H,

Oh dear, for having remained neutral...

I'm sorry if this link has been posted before, but it has some nice pictures of differing scenes from the War:

http://knigite.abv.bg/bugarash/vest/index.html

One more thing, on the issue of national reasoning for entering the conflict. I found this site earlier today and in it the author states thus:

On the 19th May 1912, when the Cretan deputies attempted to force an entrance into the Parliament, Venizelos averted a premature war with Turkey by suspending the session of Parliament until 1st October.

The Cretan Question had reached a dead end and Venizelos sought for a solution that could be found before October. In the meantime, however, the Balkan horizon had darkened. In June the Albanian uprising assumed explosive dimensions and spread to the adminstrative vilayets of Ioannina, Kossovo and Monastiri and threatened even Thessalonika. Faced with the threat of Albanian territorial claims and with the governmental crisis which had erupted in Constantinople, the Balkan states reacted. Bulgaria had completed her network of alliances with a military pact with Serbia and an understanding with Montenegro. On the 13th August Bulgaria decided, in consultation with the other Balkan states, on military intervention. It was agreed that the provocation to Turkey would be the entrance of the Cretan deputies into the Greek Parliament. In spite of the Greek reservations, events unfolded swiftly: On the 18th September general mobilisation was proclaimed. On the 22nd September the Greek-Bulgarian Military Pact was signed in Sofia. On the 25th September Montenegro declared war on the Porte. On the 1st October the suspended session of the Greek Parliament was resumed and the Cretan deputies were accepted. On the 4th October Turkey declared war on the Balkan states (with the exception of Greece) and on the 5th October Greece entered the war.

Source: http://www.venizelos-foundation.gr/endocs/bio10-14.jsp (bold emphasis, mine)

How is it that Venizelos made a complete about turn in terms of peace and war with Turkey within a few months? Granted, circumstances did change, but Turkey had not declared war on Greece. Alas, the article does not go into it. What justifications were used to explain to the major powers as to why Greece came to war with Turkey? It's pact with Bulgaria?

Thanks,

Nick



(I did not know whether I should have opened a new thread or not with regards to this Venizelos issue. Apologies to the Moderator if this causes any inconvenience.)

[Victor]

Why did Romania join the conflict?

After the 1st Balkan War, Bulgaria was forced by the Great Powers through the St. Petersburg Protocol (9 May 1913) to cede the fortress of Silistra to Romania. The protocol was not respected, although it had been signed. The idea was to keep the balance of forces in the Balkan Peninsula. The Romanian intervention in the 2nd Balkan War came after intense pressure from the Kaiser, who feared that the Bulgarian hegemony might be installed in the Balkans if they defeated their former allies Serbia and Greece and annexed more land. The intervention quickened end to a war, which could have generated an earlier WWI and which had brought a lot of horrors and atrocities to the area.

[Peter H]

Thanks Victor

Romanian casualties in 1913 are given as 1500 men.

A discussion on your website:

http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=2794



Regards
Peter

[Nikolay]

Why did Romania join the conflict?

After the 1st Balkan War, Bulgaria was forced by the Great Powers through the St. Petersburg Protocol (9 May 1913) to cede the fortress of Silistra to Romania. The protocol was not respected, although it had been signed.

The mixed Bulgaro-Romanian commision did meet three or four times to discuss the exact border line around Silistra. However after Interallied war broke out, Romania put forth claims on the whole of Southern Dobrudga. Silistra was already forgotten, Romanian party cancelled the meetings scheduled from 21 June onwards and Romania ordered a general mobilisation. So it was not Bulgaria that didn't respect the Petersburg protocol.

[Nikolay]

Why did Romania join the conflict?

The Romanian intervention in the 2nd Balkan War came after intense pressure from the Kaiser, who feared that the Bulgarian hegemony might be installed in the Balkans if they defeated their former allies Serbia and Greece and annexed more land.

It is first time I hear something like that. Could you provide some sources?

[Nikolay]

The intervention quickened end to a war, which could have generated an earlier WWI and which had brought a lot of horrors and atrocities to the area.

This war could have never triggered any sort of world war, because at that point (end of June 1913), Bulgaria was in total isolation. Even Russia did encourage Romania to attack in order to help its ally Serbia, considered at that point far more important that Bulgaria. I don't see how because simply of the beauty of Bulgaria, world war could have started.
I believe that the real reason for Romania's entry into war was pure raison d'etat: to acquire Southern Dobrudga (on which by the way Romania had no ethnic, nor historical justification of its claims) and to prevent any sort of Bulgarian hegemony south of Danube. And it was normal practice in international politics at that time. Romania was pursuing its own international strategy.
I don't think anyone at the time nor later bought seriously "honest peacemaker"'s justification put forth by the Romanian government.
This intervention also made inevitable Bulgaria's declaration of war on Romania in 1916 that brought further horrors and atrocities on both nations etc.

[Victor]

Nikolay, please try to respond using just one post.

The mixed Bulgaro-Romanian commision did meet three or four times to discuss the exact border line around Silistra. However after Interallied war broke out, Romania put forth claims on the whole of Southern Dobrudga. Silistra was already forgotten, Romanian party cancelled the meetings scheduled from 21 June onwards and Romania ordered a general mobilisation. So it was not Bulgaria that didn't respect the Petersburg protocol.

The Protocol called for the surrender of Silistra to Romania. This did not happen before Bulgaria opened hostilities with Serbia and Montenegro and Greece, which changed completely the situation in the Balkans and threatened to change the balance agreed at St. Petersburg.

It is first time I hear something like that. Could you provide some sources?

Mihai Macuc, Pe frontul celui de-al doilea razboi balcanic (1913), Dosarele Istoriei issue no. 5/2002

This war could have never triggered any sort of world war, because at that point (end of June 1913), Bulgaria was in total isolation. Even Russia did encourage Romania to attack in order to help its ally Serbia, considered at that point far more important that Bulgaria. I don't see how because simply of the beauty of Bulgaria, world war could have started.

Personally I think that if the crisis continued, one of the Great Powers might have chosen to intervene. Austria-Hungary was looking for an opportunity to attack Serbia and if this would have happened, it could have triggered the alliances between the Great Powers, like it happened one year later.

I believe that the real reason for Romania's entry into war was pure raison d'etat: to acquire Southern Dobrudga (on which by the way Romania had no ethnic, nor historical justification of its claims) and to prevent any sort of Bulgarian hegemony south of Danube. And it was normal practice in international politics at that time. Romania was pursuing its own international strategy.
I don't think anyone at the time nor later bought seriously "honest peacemaker"'s justification put forth by the Romanian government.

I am not familiar with the "honest peacemaker" justification, nor have I encountered it so far. From what I read, the main reason was simple: prevent Bulgaria from acquiring too much territory and becoming too powerful. The quickening of the end of hostilities was a result, not the main purpose of the intervention.

This intervention also made inevitable Bulgaria's declaration of war on Romania in 1916 that brought further horrors and atrocities on both nations etc.

Let's be serious. Bulgaria's declaration of war in 1916 was inevitable under any circumstance.

[Nikolay]

Nikolay, please try to respond using just one post.

The mixed Bulgaro-Romanian commision did meet three or four times to discuss the exact border line around Silistra. However after Interallied war broke out, Romania put forth claims on the whole of Southern Dobrudga. Silistra was already forgotten, Romanian party cancelled the meetings scheduled from 21 June onwards and Romania ordered a general mobilisation. So it was not Bulgaria that didn't respect the Petersburg protocol.

The Protocol called for the surrender of Silistra to Romania. This did not happen before Bulgaria opened hostilities with Serbia and Montenegro and Greece, which changed completely the situation in the Balkans and threatened to change the balance agreed at St. Petersburg.

There was no such thing as "the balance agreed at St. Petersburg". The only thing agreed there was the surrender of the town of Silistra with an adjacent 3-km strip around it to Romania. In order toe stablish the exact border of this zone a mixed commision of Bulgarian and Romanian representatives was convened. On 21 June (6 July) Bulgarian government was notified by the Romanian one that Romanian representatives will no longer participate in the work of the commision and that the Protocol was already invalid(?!) as it was "not adequate to the new situation". Several days later Romanian army crossed the Bulgarian border.
So, who didn't respect the protocol after all?

It is first time I hear something like that. Could you provide some sources?

Mihai Macuc, Pe frontul celui de-al doilea razboi balcanic (1913), Dosarele Istoriei issue no. 5/2002

OK. But are there any original documents like telegrams, or letters, mentioned in this article, supporting the thesis that the Kaiser "forced" Romania to invade Bulgaria?

This war could have never triggered any sort of world war, because at that point (end of June 1913), Bulgaria was in total isolation. Even Russia did encourage Romania to attack in order to help its ally Serbia, considered at that point far more important that Bulgaria. I don't see how because simply of the beauty of Bulgaria, world war could have started.

Personally I think that if the crisis continued, one of the Great Powers might have chosen to intervene. Austria-Hungary was looking for an opportunity to attack Serbia and if this would have happened, it could have triggered the alliances between the Great Powers, like it happened one year later.

Which Power and to intervene for what? Austro-Hungary was quite happy that its biggest nightmare - the Balkan alliance was dead and buried and Germany, France and Russia all supported Serbia, greece and Rumania during the war. Germany and France had particularly anti-Bulgarian positions. Russia encouraged Romania to help Serbia and to invade Bulgaria. And later at the Bucharest peace conference Bulgaria was in a total isolation. Only Austria promised some feeble support that never went beyond encouragements and nice words.
Who would risk a world war then?

I believe that the real reason for Romania's entry into war was pure raison d'etat: to acquire Southern Dobrudga (on which by the way Romania had no ethnic, nor historical justification of its claims) and to prevent any sort of Bulgarian hegemony south of Danube. And it was normal practice in international politics at that time. Romania was pursuing its own international strategy.
I don't think anyone at the time nor later bought seriously "honest peacemaker"'s justification put forth by the Romanian government.

I am not familiar with the "honest peacemaker" justification, nor have I encountered it so far. From what I read, the main reason was simple: prevent Bulgaria from acquiring too much territory and becoming too powerful. The quickening of the end of hostilities was a result, not the main purpose of the intervention.

And of course the Southern Dobrudga (1/10 of Bulgarian pre-war territory) was at stake here.

This intervention also made inevitable Bulgaria's declaration of war on Romania in 1916 that brought further horrors and atrocities on both nations etc.

Let's be serious. Bulgaria's declaration of war in 1916 was inevitable under any circumstance.

I am, it wasn't. Under the terms of thetreaty of alliance between Bulgaria and the Central powers, Bulgaria had no legal obligation to enter war with any adversary of the said powers except Serbia. Actually Bulgaria declared war on Romania on 1st September, 4 days after the hostilites between Austria and Romania had begun. This delay brought great deal of fear in both Berlin and Vienna, that Bulgaria might stay neutral. And Bulgaria might have stayed (as it stayed later neutral in the war between the Central Powers and the US) , had it not been for the Southern Dobrudga issue...

[Mr Holmes]

I have been trying to find the settlement to the conflict (the Bucharest Treaty of 1913) on-line but I am not having much luck. All I seem to be getting are politically biased commentaries on the treaty, but cannot find the actual text of the Treaty itself. Could some kind soul please supply me with a link if they have one handy?

Thanks,

Nick

[Peter H]

In French,the diplomatic language that was used:

http://www.ypex.gov.gr/NR/rdonlyres/672 ... treaty.doc

A translation via Babel Fish:

DRAFT OF PEACE Their Majesties the King of Romania, the King of Hellènes, the King of Montenegro and the King of Serbia, on the one hand, and Its Majesty the King of Bulgarian, on the other hand, animated desire to put an end to the currently existing state of war between Their respective countries, wanting, in a thought of order, to establish peace between Their people tested so a long time, solved to conclude a final Treaty from peace. Their known as Majestés, consequently, named for Their Plenipotentiary, knowledge: Its Majesty the King of Romania: Its Excellence Mr Titus Maïoresco, His President of the Council of Ministers, Foreign Minister; Its Excellence Mr Alexandre Marghiloman, His Minister for Finance; Its Excellence Mr Take Ionesco, His Minister of Interior Department; Its Excellence Mr Constantin G Dissesco, His State education and Minister of religion; The Major general aide-de-camp C Coanda, general Inspector of artillery, and Colonel C Christesco, Assistant manager of the large staff of His army. Its Majesty the King of Hellènes: Its Excellence Mr Eleftéris Veniselos, His President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for the War; Its Excellence Mr Démètre Breaded, Ambassador plenipotentiary; Mr Nicolas Politis, Professor of international law to the University of Paris; The Captain Ath. Exadactylos, and the Captain C Pali. Its Majesty the King of Montenegro: Its Excellence the General Serdar Yanko Voukotitch, His President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for the War, and Mr Jean Matanovitch, Old Chargé d' affaires from Montenegro in Constantinople. Its Majesty the King of Serbia: Its Excellence Mr Nicolas P. Pachitch, His President of the Council of Ministers, Foreign Minister; Its Excellence Mr Mihaïlo G Ristitch, His Extraordinary Envoy and Ambassador plenipotentiary in Bucharest; Its Excellence Mister Doctor Miroslaw Spalaïkovitch, Extraordinary Envoy and Ambassador plenipotentiary; Colonel K Smilianitch, and Lieutenant Colonel D. Kalafatovitch. Its Majesty the King of the Bulgarian ones: Its Excellence Mr Dimitri Tontcheff, His Minister for Finance; The Major general Ivan Fitcheff, Chief of the staff of His army; Mr Sawa Ivantchoff, doctor in right, former Vice-president of Sobranié; Mr Siméon Radeff, and the Lieutenant Colonel of staff Constantin Stancioff. Which, according to the proposal of Royal Governement of Romania, are rénuis in Conference in Bucharest, provided with full powerss, which were found in due form. The agreement being fortunately established between them, they are agreed following stipulations:

ARTICLE FIRST. There will be, from the day of the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, peace and friendship between Its Majesty the King of Romania, His Majesty the King of Hellènes, Its Majesty the King of Montenegro, His Majesty the King of Serbia and His Majesty the King of Bulgarian, like between Their heirs and successors, Their respective States and subjects.

ARTICLE II. Between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Romania, the old border between the Danube and the Black Sea are, in accordance with the official report stopped by the military Delegates respective and annexed to the Protocol No 5 of July 22 (August 4) 1913 of the Conference of Bucharest, rectified in the following way: The new border will leave the Danube, upstream Turtukaïa, to lead to the Black Sea in the South of Ekrene. Between these two extreme points, the line border will follow the layout indicated on charts 1/100.000 and 1/200.000 Rumanian staffs, and according to description annexed to the present article. It is formally understood that Bulgaria will démantélera, at the latest within two year, the existing works of fortifications and will not build of them others in Roustchouk, Schoumla, in the intermediate country, and a zône of twenty kilometers around Baltchik. A Joint Committee, made up representatives of the two High contracting parties, in an equal number on the two sides, will be instructed, in the fifteen days which will follow the signature of this Treaty, to carry out on the ground the layout of the new border, in accordance with the preceding stipulations. This commission will chair the division of the real estates and capital which could belong up to now jointly at districts, communes, or communities of inhabitants separated by the new border. In the event of dissension to the layout and the measures of execution, the two High contracting parties begin to be addressed to a friendly third Government to request it to designate a referee whose decision on the points in litigation will be regarded as final.

ARTICLE III. Between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia, the border will follow, in accordance with the official report stopped by the respective military Delegates and annexed with the Protocol No 9 of July 25 (August 7) 1913 of the Conference of Bucharest, the following layout: The line border will leave the old border of the Patarica top, will follow the old turco-Bulgarian border and the watershed between Vardar and Strouma with the exception that the high valley of Stroumitza will remain on Serb territory; it will lead to the Belasica mountain, where it will be connected to the bulgaro-Greek border. A detailed description of this border and its layout on the chart 1/200.000 Austrian staffs, are annexed to the present article. A Joint Committee, made up representatives of the two High contracting parties, in an equal number on the two sides will be instructed, in the fifteen days which will follow the signature of this Treaty, to carry out on the ground the layout of the new border, in accordance with the preceding stipulations. This commission will chair the division of the real estates and capital which could belong up to now jointly at districts, communes, or communities of inhabitants separated by the new border. In the event of dissension to the layout and the measures of execution, the two High contracting parties begin to be addressed to a friendly third Government to request it to designate a referee whose decision on the points in litigation will be regarded as final.

ARTICLE IV. The questions relative to the old serbo-Bulgarian border will be settled according to the agreement occurred between the two High contracting parties, noted in the Protocol annexed to the present article.

ARTICLE V. Between the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Bulgaria, the border will follow, in accordance with the official report stopped by the respective military Delegates and annexed with the Protocol No 9 of July 25 (August 7) 1913 of the Conference of Bucharest, the following layout: The line border will leave the new bulgaro-Serb border on the peak of Belasica planina, to lead to the mouth of Mesta to the Aegean Sea. Between these two extreme points, the line border will follow the layout indicated on the chart 1/200.000 Austrian staffs and according to description annexed to the present article. A Joint Committee, made up representatives of the two High contracting parties, in an equal number on the two sides, will be instructed, in the fifteen days which will follow the signature of this Treaty, to carry out on the ground the layout of the border in accordance with the preceding stipulations. This commission will chair the division of the real estates and capital which could belong up to now jointly at districts, communes, or communities of inhabitants separated by the new border. In the event of dissension to the layout and the measures of execution, the two High contracting parties begin to be addressed to friendly third Gouvernment to request it to designate a referee whose decision on the points in litigation will be regarded as final. It is formally understood that Bulgaria desists, as of now, of any claim on the island of Crete.

ARTICLE VI. The Headquarters of the respective armies will be informed at once of the signature of this Treaty. The Bulgarian Government is committed bringing back its army, as of the following day of this significance, on the foot of peace. It will direct the troops on their garrisons where one will proceed, as soon as possible, with the reference of the various reserves in their hearths. The troops whose garrison is located in the zône of occupation of the army of the one of the High contracting parties, will be directed on another point of the old Bulgarian territory and will be able to gain their usual garrisons only after evacuation of the zône of occupation referred to above.

ARTICLE VII. The evacuation of the Bulgarian territory, as well old as new, will start at once after the demobilization of the Bulgarian army, and will be completed at the latest in the fortnight. During this time, for the Rumanian occupying army, the zône of demarcation will be indicated by the Sistov-Lovcea-Turski-Izvor-Glozene-Zlatitza-Mirkovo-Araba-Konak-Orchania-Mezdra-Vratza-Berkovitza-Lom-Danube line.

ARTICLE VIII. During the occupation of the Bulgarian territories the various armies will preserve the right of requisition, realising payment in cash. They will have there the free use of the railway lines for transport of troops and the provisioning of any nature, without it being necessary with allowance with the profit of the local authority. The patients and the casualties will be there under the safeguard of the known as armies.

ARTICLE IX. As soon as possible after the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, all the prisoners of war will be reciprocally returned. The Governments of the High contracting parties will indicate each special Police chief charged to receive the prisoners. All the prisoners with the hands of one of the Governments will be delivered to the Government commissioner to which they belong or to his duly authorized representative, at the place which will be fixed by the interested parts. The Governments of the High contracting parties will respectively present one at the other, and as soon as possible after the handing-over of all the prisoners, a statement of direct expenditures supported by him for the care and the maintenance of the prisoners, since the date of the capture or rendering until that of died or the handing-over. Compensation will be made between the sums which had by Bulgaria with l` one of the other High contracting parties and those which had, and the difference will be paid with the creditor Government as soon as possible after the exchange of the states of expenditure referred to above.

ARTICLE X. This Treaty will be ratified and the ratifications will be exchanged by it in Bucharest within fifteen day or earlier if to make may be. In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiary respective ones signed it and there their seals affixed. Fact in Bucharest the twenty eighth day of July (tenth day of August) of the year millet nine hundred and thirteen. Signed: For Romania: For Bulgaria: (L.S.) T Maïoresco (L.S.) D. Tontcheff Al General Marghiloman Fitcheff Take Ionesco Dr. S. Ivantchoff C.G. Dissesco S. General Radeff aide-de-camp Coanda Lt Colonel Stancioff Colonel C Christesco For Greece: (L.S.) E.K. Veniselos D. Panas N Politis Capitaine A. Exadactylos Capitaine C Pali For Montenegro: For Serbia: (L.S.) General Serdar I Voukotitch (L.S.) Nik. P. Pachitch Y. Matanovitch Mr. G Ristitch Mr. Spalaïkovitch Colonel K Smilianitch Lt Colonel D. Kalafatovitch

The Ottomans and Bulgarians also were parties to the Treaty of Constantinople,September 29th 1913.

[Mr Holmes]

Great! Thanks!

I have two questions stemming from the terms of the Treaty and one other:

a) Within ARTICLE V, we see written:

"It is formally understood that Bulgaria desists, as of now, of any claim on the island of Crete."

What was all that about (contextually I mean, I know what the passage reads )?

b) What was the actual reception of the terms of the Treaty within Bulgarian society? Both politically and socially. What of the later Treaty of Constantinople?

c) Why was Turkey not present at this signing? (I'm sure this will be outlined in Mango's book which I am reading, but just in case it isn't)

As always, any light thrown on these questions will leave me most grateful.

Oh, and a couple of pictures:



Caption: Eleftherios Venizelos on the day of the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest 1913




Caption: Working session at the Conference of Bucharest (July-August 1913)

Source for both pictures: http://www.venizelos-foundation.gr/endo ... Photos.jsp


Cheers

Nick