#2
Post
by Bill Woerlee » 30 May 2007, 12:28
Peter
G'day mate
I have thought long and hard over this very issue and tried to come to an answer as to whether it was possible or if they mastered the technique. The only theatre I have looked at is the Palestinian campaign.
In the Sinai, there was no ability to mass the artillery for a creeping barrage for two reasons.
1. The asymetrical nature of the forces opposing each other meant that the Turkish artillery was always on the defensive rather than the offensive. When they tried concentrated offensive fire, urgency of fire support on the flanks force a collapse in the schema.
2. Supply problems ensured that artillery was always short of shells and the batteries were limited in the number of guns they could service. Every shell had to be transported slowly by camels from supply railheads either from Gaza or Auja. Which ever route was used, supply was a long, difficult and arduous affair with the ever present problem of airborne interdiction. The activity of Ben-my-Chree along the coast presented an ever present threat to supply lines.
By the time the fight was taken to Palestine after the fall of Gaza, the Turks were constantly on the backfoot. They had lost nearly all their first line troops and artillery in the disasters against Russia and at Baghdad. There was nothing left in the pantry so artillery support was only for defensive purposes. The last assault of the Turks in Palestine was more by way of a last hurrah at Abu Tellul on 14 July 1918. This was a German attack and a consequent disaster as the Turks pulled out of the attack and left the Germans hanging out to dry. Poor artillery preperation.
So was it a case of no mystery or no opportunity to apply the principles? Probably part of Column A and parly Column B.
Cheers
Bill