Intended FJ role in Sealion

[phylo_roadking]

"I don't know where you see him go lose again in the late Summer of 1940, but in those days Putzier still ran the show. In September 1940 he was moved to the Hansa clinic in Berlin"

But as I said, get yourself some proper sources.

Well, as of this point in time none of your many sources are effectively contradicting his vist to Karinhall on the 2nd of September when he raised his opposition to how the Sealion planners intended to use the FJ....NOR his visit to Göring's hunting lodge at the end of the month where he also raised the issue of the invasion. So I'll make do with Student's own account of his movements until you can prove he wasn't where he said he was at the beginning and end of September, and didn't raise the issue of Sealion planning for the FJ with Göring as he said he did.

P.S. for someone who was apparently on sick leave and as you say fully out of the loop with Putzier in charge of everything...don't you regard it as indicative of Student being kept in the loop on planning of the FJ's role in Sealion that he WAS able to raise the issue of how the FJ were to be used at Folkestone with Göring? :roll:

[Knouterer]

One thing we can probably all agree on is that the available information about the role of the FJ in Sea Lion is vague, incomplete and contradictory. Golla devotes just one single page to it, I see, apart from his map which brings up more questions than it answers. Note for instance that FJR 1 is apparently expected to advance in three different directions at once.
Of course, this directly reflects the fact that the LW showed only very moderate interest in the whole undertaking.
From the notes taken on discussions (Lagebesprechungen) in the OKW (as published by Karl Klee in 1958) (my translation):

4 Sept.: "No proposal from the Luftwaffe concerning the the use of Fallschirmtruppen"

24 Sept.: "Preparations of the Luftwaffe for operation Sea Lion still far from complete" (sehr im Rückstand).

Interestingly, it seems that for a while in September Göring even considered converting about 100 Ju 52s to bombers, to add some weight to the night attacks on London, which means they wouldn't have been available for dropping FJ (can't find my source for that at the moment but will report back when I do).

In any case, it seems clear enough that no role was foreseen for the 22. LL Division, at least not in the critical first few days.

[Knouterer]

Concerning numbers: in my private calculations about a possible Sea Lion scenario I assumed until now about 7000 FJ in two drops, but in view of the above information from various contributors I conclude that this is too high a number. In view of the difficult terrain (steep hills, woods, marshy ground, etc.) and the fact that various obstacles had been placed on just about every bit of level ground, it would also seem that glider borne troops would have suffered heavy losses through crashes.
In any case, however many they were, the FJ would have been involved in heavy fighting from (almost) the minute they landed and would consequently have had some trouble getting organized.

The coastal area in question was defended, at the end of September, by 45 and 56 (London) Division with the NZ division (2 brigades + Milforce with 8th RTR) behind them in the Ashford-Maidstone-Canterbury area.

Looking at the picture at battalion level, and disregarding all units on the coastline in the invasion area, we have in or right next to the dropping zones:
From 45 Division:

- 8th Queen's Westminsters in Lympne (airfield & village), with D coy in Sellindge (where there were also 2x12" railroad howitzers), with RAF and HG troops and light AA guns.

From 56 Division:

- 1st QW defending north side of Folkestone/Sandgate (Shorncliffe) , with some field arty (25 pdr & 75 mm)
- 1st Bat London Rifle Brigade in Hawkinge-Paddlesworth-Lyminge, with RAF troops, 4x25 pdr, 4x18 pdr, various AA guns, 9 Beaverettes
- 1st London Scottish in Alkham with similar amount of arty
- 8th Royal Fusiliers in Barham a bit to the north with 4x75 mm, 2x4.5", 2x25 pdr, AA guns

The main threat to the FJ would be the NZ division, which very probably would have been on the move before the second wave even arrived, but other troops would presumably also enter the fray, such as the 500 men of No 5 Commando stationed north of Dover and part of the strong Royal Marine garrison in Deal, once it became clear that that part of the coast was not going to be attacked.

So the FJ would have been confronted, within a very short time, with superior numbers of enemy troops with tanks, and also increasingly heavy artillery fire from all sides. For instance, at Canterbury there was, besides two 9.2" railroad guns, the 56th Medium Regiment with 16x6" howitzers, which I imagine would receive orders to move a few miles south to a position from where they could bring the beach and the FJ under fire.

However well they fought, it is clear that the FJ under those circumstances would begin to run out of ammo pretty soon. As pointed out in a previous post, it is not realistic to assume that Lympne could be taken, held and made operational on the first day.
Dropping supplies by parachute would be difficult, in the general confusion with fighting raging all over the place (and a lot of AA fire) most of it would end up in enemy hands (think Arnhem and Dien Bien Phu in the final stages).

An attack on Dover by the FJ alone was totally out of the question, apart from everything else it was strongly garrisoned by parts of 2nd London Brigade, Royal Marines, Irish Guards, MG units, etc., with AT ditches, minefields, wire barriers and pillboxes on the landward side.

Therefore, it is clear that their only hope of survival was linking up with the 17. ID, and fast.

Mais ceci est une autre histoire, as the French say.

[phylo_roadking]

Of course, this directly reflects the fact that the LW showed only very moderate interest in the whole undertaking.
From the notes taken on discussions (Lagebesprechungen) in the OKW (as published by Karl Klee in 1958) (my translation):

4 Sept.: "No proposal from the Luftwaffe concerning the the use of Fallschirmtruppen"

Knouterer - this is very interesting, for as we know, the Lympne/Hawkinge plan had definitely been formulated BEFORE that...it was that plan, the one illustrated by the map, that Student took exception to on the 2nd of September when he visted Karinhall.

So do we read that as -

1/ no plan originating from the Luftwaffe concerning the use of the FJ had appeared - Student refers to the Folkstone idea as being "Hitler's"...

2/ no better/alternative plan had yet originated from the Luftwaffe? Remember how blase about the whole Sealion operation Göring was on the 2nd...

[phylo_roadking]

The coastal area in question was defended, at the end of September, by 45 and 56 (London) Division with the NZ division (2 brigades + Milforce with 8th RTR) behind them in the Ashford-Maidstone-Canterbury area.

Looking at the picture at battalion level, and disregarding all units on the coastline in the invasion area, we have in or right next to the dropping zones:
From 45 Division:

- 8th Queen's Westminsters in Lympne (airfield & village), with D coy in Sellindge (where there were also 2x12" railroad howitzers), with RAF and HG troops and light AA guns.

From 56 Division:

- 1st QW defending north side of Folkestone/Sandgate (Shorncliffe) , with some field arty (25 pdr & 75 mm)
- 1st Bat London Rifle Brigade in Hawkinge-Paddlesworth-Lyminge, with RAF troops, 4x25 pdr, 4x18 pdr, various AA guns, 9 Beaverettes
- 1st London Scottish in Alkham with similar amount of arty
- 8th Royal Fusiliers in Barham a bit to the north with 4x75 mm, 2x4.5", 2x25 pdr, AA guns

The main threat to the FJ would be the NZ division, which very probably would have been on the move before the second wave even arrived, but other troops would presumably also enter the fray, such as the 500 men of No 5 Commando stationed north of Dover and part of the strong Royal Marine garrison in Deal, once it became clear that that part of the coast was not going to be attacked.

So the FJ would have been confronted, within a very short time, with superior numbers of enemy troops with tanks, and also increasingly heavy artillery fire from all sides. For instance, at Canterbury there was, besides two 9.2" railroad guns, the 56th Medium Regiment with 16x6" howitzers, which I imagine would receive orders to move a few miles south to a position from where they could bring the beach and the FJ under fire.

It's a nice list indeed...but I wonder how many of those would have been diverted to deal with the FJ? Arguably - many of them would have been more concerned with what was coming at them through the surf! I wonder what the various instructions of the Marines at Deal were, in particular? It's a nice large chunk of highly trained troops. But that's going off topic...as forces that far away from the FJ dropzones would have nearly three times as much distance to cover to reach contact with the FJ as MILFORCE and the more local defenders would have!

After that sentence of Kuhn's/Kurowski's and looking again at the NZEF/MILFORCE's orders...it does indeed look as if the British had some degree of advanced warning of that element of the Sealion operation at least There are just too many conicidences regarding the placement of start lines for their crosscountry sweeps. Which of course means -

The main threat to the FJ would be the NZ division, which very probably would have been on the move before the second wave even arrived

....or perhaps even before the first wave arrived? IF they did know what was planned...? I spent a lot of time some time ago trying to work out how long it would take the NZEF to advance forward to and rendezvous with MILFORCE, then move forward to their start lines...and how far across the terrain towards Lympne the FJ could have got in the meantime - but what if the NZEF/MILFORCE were on the move ahead of the FJ's schedule???

[Knouterer]

It's a nice list indeed...but I wonder how many of those would have been diverted to deal with the FJ? Arguably - many of them would have been more concerned with what was coming at them through the surf!

Well, there were enough other units manning the coastline, I only mentioned those that could have given the FJ their undivided attention, in my estimation ... I noted "some arty" for the 1st QW as it seems some of the guns supporting them were pointing seawards (2x75 mm guns on the golf links overlooking Hythe, 2 more near the beach).

On the shoreline, starting from Dungeness going north, we have about half of No. 6 Commando (some 250 men) in Littlestone, then 7th and 6th Somerset Light Infantry (about one company per km/0.6 mile), then 3rd Independent Company (a commando-type unit of some 280 men) plus coastal and AA gunners in (and around ?) Dymchurch Redoubt, then 3 companies composed of staff and pupils of the Small Arms School in Hythe (firearms instructors and future instructors, snipers in training - their fire would have been pretty deadly) then a whole variety of units of 2nd London Brigade in and around Hythe. Add a sprinkling of Home Guard, coast artillery batteries, detachments from machine gun battalions, some 50 pieces of field artillery (only those directly supporting the above units), AT guns, and what have you.

The 12 German infantry battalions (4 Regts) of the "first wave of the first wave" would have a 2:1 superiority at best, and that's supposing they did not suffer too many losses on the way over and from the coast artillery (some 18 6" and 5.5" guns in this sector by my count), which IMHO is pretty marginal for an amphibious assault, especially in the absence of any shore bombardment worth mentioning. But of course you could hardly call it an "assault" anyway, considering how slow and laborious the process of unloading the barges would have been.

Regarding the submersible and floating tanks, I wouldn't put too much hopes in them, even those that actually made it ashore would have come right up against the Dymchurch seawall (if Schenk's diagrams are anything to go by) which stretched for several miles with only a few exit ramps, which would of course have been mined and covered by 75 mm guns and 2-pdr AT guns. And let's not forget the dense barbed wire barriers (Dannert wire was one item that was not in short supply in the summer of 1940) plus the naval pattern beach mines which with 20 lbs/9 kg of explosive each would also make spectacular bangs.

In short, since I started studying the subject a bit a few months ago, I have become more and more convinced that the whole plan had no hope of success (as many Germans including Hitler seemed to realize well enough). The British vastly overestimated the German capabilities (excusable in view of the stunning events of the preceding months), and the Germans seriously underestimated the British defences.

[phylo_roadking]

On the shoreline, starting from Dungeness going north, we have about half of No. 6 Commando (some 250 men) in Littlestone, then 7th and 6th Somerset Light Infantry (about one company per km/0.6 mile), then 3rd Independent Company (a commando-type unit of some 280 men) plus coastal and AA gunners in (and around ?) Dymchurch Redoubt, then 3 companies composed of staff and pupils of the Small Arms School in Hythe (firearms instructors and future instructors, snipers in training - their fire would have been pretty deadly) then a whole variety of units of 2nd London Brigade in and around Hythe. Add a sprinkling of Home Guard, coast artillery batteries, detachments from machine gun battalions, some 50 pieces of field artillery (only those directly supporting the above units), AT guns, and what have you.

The 12 German infantry battalions (4 Regts) of the "first wave of the first wave" would have a 2:1 superiority at best, and that's supposing they did not suffer too many losses on the way over and from the coast artillery (some 18 6" and 5.5" guns in this sector by my count), which IMHO is pretty marginal for an amphibious assault, especially in the absence of any shore bombardment worth mentioning. But of course you could hardly call it an "assault" anyway, considering how slow and laborious the process of unloading the barges would have been.

Regarding the submersible and floating tanks, I wouldn't put too much hopes in them, even those that actually made it ashore would have come right up against the Dymchurch seawall (if Schenk's diagrams are anything to go by) which stretched for several miles with only a few exit ramps, which would of course have been mined and covered by 75 mm guns and 2-pdr AT guns. And let's not forget the dense barbed wire barriers (Dannert wire was one item that was not in short supply in the summer of 1940) plus the naval pattern beach mines which with 20 lbs/9 kg of explosive each would also make spectacular bangs.

In short, since I started studying the subject a bit a few months ago, I have become more and more convinced that the whole plan had no hope of success (as many Germans including Hitler seemed to realize well enough). The British vastly overestimated the German capabilities (excusable in view of the stunning events of the preceding months), and the Germans seriously underestimated the British defences.

It's an interesting stretch of coast - the histories and war diaries don't do the defences any real justice The Small Arms School at Hythe for instance...I passed it on a busy (loud!) day in the summer of 1988, and the one thing I DID notice was a gurt big WWII-era concrete sea wall complete with firing points/embrasures in a man-high parapet running down the shore side of the site, overlooking the beach beyond - in effect the School and its environs was a very strong redoubt itself.

I certainly don't underestimate the defences thrown up in 1940 along THAT stretch of coastline; by all accounts there were places along the whole coast where the defences were "marginal" at best (See Brian Lavery's description of some of the problem areas and period accounts of them in his We Shall Fight On The Beaches), having been thrown up in that first 6-8 week panic spurt of building (and sometimes very shoddy work) from just before Dunkirk until Brookie took over...but that section of the Kent coast seems to have had a LOT more attention paid to it than the normal accounts of the summer of 1940 would hint at Possibly, yes, a lot more work was done over the winter in preparation for the spring of 1941...just as elsewhere work on various Stop Lines that Brooke had halted in mid-July was started again to finish them off...but it was ALSO blessed with more than its fair share of military establishments and installations anyway

[Zuylen]

@Phylo

Indeed no need to get bothered about the few issues that are not disputed around Student's whereabouts in the second half of 1940. I have no countering sources anyway. Although I still believe that Student was far from fit and ready come September 1940.

To my modest opinion it is impossible to have 7,000 airbornes ready by late Summer 1940. If they had 4,000 well trained airbornes ready, it would already have been quite an achievement. That took around 400 planes to get them in, come with their equipment and so.

I have never truly gotten into the Sealion operation, so I should leave it at that. Personally I am convinced that any airborne ops in the UK would have turned out disasterous. The operation in Holland had failed in the northern theatre and had been a mediocre success in the south. Nonetheless, the mediocre success was mainly caused by the ground forces getting to the aid of the cornered airbornes on the third day of the invasion. Those ground forces came in force, with a tank division and under complete air superiority. Ingredients that the English scenario would not have included. A self sustaining operations of some duration would have costed the Luftwaffe far more airplanes and dedication than it would have contributed to a large-scale tactical or strategic picture. Only airborne drops very nearby the envisaged (amphibious) landing zones would have been able to make some difference. Let me repeat that the Sealion ops, obviously a nice study topic, has not been studied by me at all.

[Knouterer]

It's an interesting stretch of coast - the histories and war diaries don't do the defences any real justice

I've never been there ... but this looks like an excellent spot to set up a Vickers:

http://www.francisfrith.com/greatstone/ ... 55_g214003

[phylo_roadking]

Only airborne drops very nearby the envisaged (amphibious) landing zones would have been able to make some difference.

Interestingly - according to his account, this is the idea Student had apparently settled on by the time he met Göring at Karinhall on the 2nd of September, as opposed to the "Hitler" plan for the airfields. Obviously time had moved the whole plot away from his original idea of "bouncing" the Channel immediately after Dunkirk and attempting to take Dover by coup de main when the British potential for defence was still in disarray.

[Zuylen]

Phylo. One should take it one step further back. It was Student's own fault - entirely - that Hitler believed in miracles regarding the Fallschirmjäger and their abilities. Student had excelled himself to get the FJR into a position where their operational use would be of prominent weight. It was Student designing the operations in Holland. Also those were in fact far to risky, with exception to perhaps the Moerdijk operation which probably all Heer generals could have embraced would it have been presented as such. But Student got Hitler to believe that he could gain much more. He did, in fact, gain much more. But basically thru shear fortune and an extremely poor defender. When Student's tricks came nicely together in May 1940, and the BEF had made a poor impression too, Hitler started believing in true miracles. Student, on the other hand, had grown some modesty and realized that the Holland operation succeeded for other reasons than the ability of the airborens. In fact, three out of four airfield operations had failed. Looking beyond the Netherlands, two out of six had succeeded. Student realized that he wouldn't repeat that trick in the UK, where lines of communications were much stretched and the Luftwaffe umbilical would be long and thin. Student didn't fancy a suicide raid.

A few months later Student showed he still overrated his Fallschirmjäger weapon. Not the airbornes themselves. They were a fine bunch. The weapon in itself had much limitations though, as the Allies would have to experience too. The stubborness of Ike and Monty grew even beyond Hitler's. Hitler was quite healed from the airborne hoax after Crete, although Crete was not even a lost battle to the Germans. The Allies continued overrating airbornes as a tactical means until a month prior to the German surrender. They managed to launch at least four large scale operations involving airbornes that all failed or were no more than very moderate local successes. Only the fifth, Varsity, was some sort of success, but lacked an opponent ...

[phylo_roadking]

Phylo. One should take it one step further back. It was Student's own fault - entirely - that Hitler believed in miracles regarding the Fallschirmjäger and their abilities. Student had excelled himself to get the FJR into a position where their operational use would be of prominent weight. It was Student designing the operations in Holland. Also those were in fact far to risky, with exception to perhaps the Moerdijk operation which probably all Heer generals could have embraced would it have been presented as such. But Student got Hitler to believe that he could gain much more. He did, in fact, gain much more. But basically thru shear fortune and an extremely poor defender. When Student's tricks came nicely together in May 1940, and the BEF had made a poor impression too, Hitler started believing in true miracles. Student, on the other hand, had grown some modesty and realized that the Holland operation succeeded for other reasons than the ability of the airborens.

Oh, I certainly agree with all that...with the proviso that just maybe - Student also saw that the FJ were more versatile than they had been allowed to be to date I.E. the true value of paratroopers and airlanded forces was not in "gimmick"-type operations such as they had been used for at that point, but as blocking forces in the way the U.S. and British used them in Normandy to shield the invasion beaches...and the FJ itself had successfully done in the small operation at Dombås. He certainly seems to have appreciated that role by the end of the summer of 1940...but yes - Student, in his drive to build some sort of a reputation for his new force and capability had pushed hard for headlining, high-profile operations that saddled it with the wrong reputation...

...hence by the time of Crete, the rapid growth of Student's force had doomed it to ever bigger gimmicks Operations of a size justifying the investment over the previous winter.

[Zuylen]

Well, the gimmick was lost after Eben-Emael and Rotterdam anyway. In fact, the true 'gimmickish nature' of the airbornes was much more limited than the Allies anticipated. The blocking operation or the limited tactical role were both excellent parts in which we can still see airbornes, such as the airborne ops in Northern Iraq during the 2003 invasion. Student had a greater ambition and I truly believe that Student was convinced that a full scale airbornedivision had much more operational value than it actually had. The logistical value - to my opinion - was negative. In other words. The efforts that had to be invested logistically costed more than they gained. The operational value of these large scale airborne units, also the later Allied airborne divisions, was very limited whereas their logistic leverage during an operation was extreme. That was also an aspect that was overseen by the Germans during the massive landing in Holland in May 1940. That was a logistic disaster, also beyond the total loss of some 250 transporters. To even airlift the basic divisional size of troops and equipment the Luftwaffe extended its logistic capacity far beyond its genuine capacity, which in the end parasited on other logistical duties too in order to get supplies to the spreaded airbornes as well. The military economics of these kinds of operations showed negative pay-outs, all along. That was a conclusion the Germans drew much earlier than the Allies.

[phylo_roadking]

The logistical value - to my opinion - was negative. In other words. The efforts that had to be invested logistically costed more than they gained. The operational value of these large scale airborne units, also the later Allied airborne divisions, was very limited whereas their logistic leverage during an operation was extreme. That was also an aspect that was overseen by the Germans during the massive landing in Holland in May 1940. That was a logistic disaster, also beyond the total loss of some 250 transporters. To even airlift the basic divisional size of troops and equipment the Luftwaffe extended its logistic capacity far beyond its genuine capacity, which in the end parasited on other logistical duties too in order to get supplies to the spreaded airbornes as well.

I wonder if there are any studies of this aspect? I'm wondering...because there are comments in Hooton that Richthofen's sortie rate for his divebombers in Poland plummeted as their assigned Ju52s were transferred away temporarily to supplying frontline troops - leaving them short of ordnance and POL for some three days at least.

I assume the Wehrmacht planned for the assignment of by far the greater number of Ju52s to the FJ operation in Holland? I mean - are there any extant comments to this effect in any of the GELB planning material?

[Zuylen]

The initial operation in Holland contained the element of having 3,500 airbornes (and airlifted division units) as well as around 10,500 airlanding troops of 22.ID airlifted into Holland on three airfields and an airstrip (Ockenburg, near the Hague). That operation would demand the assignment of two entire Geschwader of Ju-52, both comprising four Gruppes of 55 Ju-52 each. That were roughly 450 Ju-52. This force was calculated to require three waves to get the entire initial landingforce into Holland c/w their equipment. Losses were calculated in, moderately, but would have to be compensated by the Norway squadrons and the squadron that had come free from Eben-Emael operation. It means that about 1,500 sorties were required to get the 14,000 men in. The planning had been so precise that every flight and every bit of equipment had been drawn up on a loading scheme. I have large chunks of that partially burnt scheme, the april 1940 version.

In the end around 600 Ju-52 were occupied by the Dutch theatre alone. That included Lufthansa planes and also the flight school had been pulled empty to get enough qualified flying personnel. If one noticed a Ju-52 flying south of the Dutch-Belgian border during the first week of the offensive, one must have been a lucky SOB. Because there were hardly any left, besides a few sea-plane and ambulance versions. Only on the third day of the invasion some Ju-52 were released for other duties.

That both the occupation of the entire transport fleet during the Holland and Crete ops and the extravagant losses weighted heavily on the corporate balance of the entire army, goes without saying. That is simply a matter of basic (military) economics. Speidel mentions it in his extended aft-war analyses of the Luftwaffe. I don't think that the Ju-52 losses were that dramatic against the Fall Gelb/Rot 1940 scheme. The lines of communications during the May/June 1940 campaign were quite easily mastered, particularly with the pause in the fighting between Gelb and Rot and the pacification of large angles of the battlefield (Holland, Belgium, BEF). In May 1941 losses did matter a lot though. At that time the lines of communication were much stretched and would be multifold that within another year. The Ju-52 losses in Holland had been compensated by spring 1941, but then again been lost during the operations in Greece and Crete. After that, the losses had not been fully compensated any more, leaving an inapt German transport fleet at the point of war where the Ju-52 loading space was most needed.

The army economics suffer the most if the operation sustains high losses that are not made up by the result. Both the Dutch and the Crete operation showed that the giant loss of airtransport room costed much more than the tactical gains. When the losses are so severe and lasting as was the case with the Ju-52 fleet, the economics rapidly worsen. The 1941 operation Barbarossa was soon suffering from a logistical backlog disaster. A few hundred Ju-52 added to the small transport fleet would have added a daily transport capacity of say 200 tonnes. That's quite significant, although it would not have deleted the German challenges, obviously.