Did Hitler "beleive in his own rectitude?" (Trevo

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David Thompson
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Post by David Thompson » 22 Mar 2007 23:35

Boby:
The speeches (The Schmundt memorandum of 23 May are very, very dubious) represent Hitler's reinterpretation of the whole situation after the alliance England-Poland of end March 1939 and the subsequently enter to war of Britain and France. Until that date, the aim was to reincorporate Danzig, and sign an alliance with Poland.
Truthseeker:
I mainatin that Hitler had no fundamental hostility towards the West, and his objectives were directed eastwards.
Hitler (22 Aug 1939):
It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one's eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be executed, since essential points have changed. It became clear to me, that Poland would attack us in case of a conflict with the West. (emphasis added)
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 344#573344

Boby
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Post by Boby » 23 Mar 2007 12:01

David

There are other version of the Speech (the Böhm version), and this words not appear. Months ago, I posted info about this Speech (regarding the quote about the armenians), and I posted the title of the article of Dr. Winfried Baumgart in the Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. He have a dispute with Admiral Böhm:

- Dr. Winfried Baumgart "Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939. Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung", VfZ Vol. 16 (1968) pp. 120-149

[Reply]

- Hermann Böhm "Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939 (Erwiderung), VfZ Vol. 19 (1971), pp. 294-300

[Reply]

- Dr. Winfried Baumgart "Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939 (Erwiderung), VfZ Vol. 19 (1971), pp. 301-304

Baumgart said (I find this in Kershaw biography of Hitler), that the best version of the Speech is from Canaris (the one you post), and that the others are based on this notes (Canaris take notes during the speech (this was forbidden by Hitler), the others take notes in the evening (Halder, Böhm, Greiner version for the KTB OKW, etc)

Weinberg and Baumgart rejected this version because, they argue, Böhm was a great admirer of Hitler. An called his version "abbreviated and inaccurate" (but was far more long that Canaris notes!), See: http://www.ns-archiv.de/krieg/1939/22-08-1939-boehm.php [Böhm] and http://www.ns-archiv.de/krieg/1939/22-08-1939.php [Canaris]

If any have this articles, they can post the arguments of both parts (perhaps michael mills have access in the National Library?)

Regards

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Post by Penn44 » 23 Mar 2007 13:40

kiwi123 wrote:I would not call it a "blame game," and I don't find it tedious to debate the issues of responsbility. There are lessons to be learnt in this process.
What "lessons" are you referring to?

Penn44

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Post by Boby » 23 Mar 2007 19:33

David

In fact, this was the first time that Hitler mention a Westward move by Germany. Why he mentioned only when the Franco-British Alliance with Poland was established?

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Post by David Thompson » 23 Mar 2007 21:10

Boby -- You asked:
In fact, this was the first time that Hitler mention a Westward move by Germany. Why he mentioned only when the Franco-British Alliance with Poland was established?
To answer your question, I think that the Anglo-French situation and behavior during the re-militarization of the Rhineland, renunciation of the Treaty of Versailles, the annexation of Austria, the Munich agreement, and the creation of the Reich protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia convinced Hitler that his enemies in the west were weaker than those in the east. The David Low cartoon at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 047#664047 aptly sums up the situation.

Like most gamblers, I don't think that Hitler was very forthright about his plans until he had already settled on them. As others have remarked, luck is the ability to recognize an opportunity and take advantage of it. Until the opportunity arises, the only thing one can do is be prepared, hence Hitler's emphasis on rearmament.

Hitler (on 22 Aug 1939):

(a)
On the other side a negative picture as far as decisive personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England or France.

For us it is easy to make decision. We have nothing to lose; we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act. Our opponents risk much and can gain only a little. England's stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities. No masters, no men of action.

Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, France, and England, in the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.

The English empire did not emerge from the last war strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved. Conflict between England and Ireland. The South African Union became more independent. Concessions had to be made to India. England is in great danger. Unhealthy industries. A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.

France's position has also deteriorated particularly in the Mediterranean.
(b)
All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2 to 3 years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better now.
(c)
My propositions to Poland (Danzig corridor) were disturbed by England's intervention. Poland changed her tone toward us. The initiative cannot be allowed to pass to the others. This moment is more favorable than in 2 to 3 years. An attempt on my life or Mussolini's could change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.
(d)
Only a week before, I got a warning through France. I have always accepted a great risk in the conviction that it may succeed.

Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.

The following special reasons strengthen my idea. England and France are obligated, neither is in a position for it. There is no actual rearmament in England, just propaganda. It has done much damage that many reluctant Germans said and wrote to Englishmen after the solution of the Czech question: The Fuehrer carried his point because you lost your nerve, because you capitulated too soon. This explains the present propaganda war. The English speak of a war of nerves. It is one element of this war of nerves to present the increase of armament. But how is British rearmament in actual fact ? The construction program of the Navy for 1938 has not yet been filled. Only mobilization of the reserve fleet. Purchase of fishing steamers. Considerable strengthening of the Navy, not before 1941 or 1942.

Little has been done on land. England will be able to send a maximum of 3 divisions to the continent. A little has been done for the air force, but it is only a beginning. AA defense is in its beginning stages. At the moment England has only 150 AA guns. The new AA gun has been ordered. It will take a long time until enough have been produced. Fire directors are lacking. England is still vulnerable from the air. This can change in 2 to 3 years. At the moment the English air force has only 130000 men, France 72000 men, Poland 15000 men. England does not want the conflict to break out for two or three years.

The following is characteristic for England. Poland wanted a loan from England for rearmament. England, however, only gave credit in order to make sure that Poland buys in England, although England cannot deliver. This means that England does not really want to support Poland. She does not risk 8 millions pounds in Poland, although she put half a billion into China. England's position in the world is very precarious. She will not accept any risks.

France lacks men (decline of the birth rate). Little has been done for rearmament. The artillery is antiquated. France did not want to enter on this adventure. The West has only two possibilities to fight against us:

1. Blockade: It will not be effective because of our autarchy and because we have sources of aid in the east.

2. Attack from the west from the Maginot line: I consider this impossible.

Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well as Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of those countries. Actually England cannot help Poland. There remains an attack on Italy. A military attack is out of the question. No one is counting on a longer war. If Mr. von Brauchitsch had told me that I would need 4 years to conquer Poland I would have replied: then it cannot be done. It is nonsense to say that England wants to wage a long war.

(e) The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not count on my great power of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them in Munich.

I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the England offer. Russia has no interest in maintaining Poland and Stalin knows that it is the end of his regime no matter whether his soldiers come out of a war victoriously or beaten. Litvinow's replacement was decisive. I brought about the change toward Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got into political conversation. Proposal of a non-aggression pact. Then came a general proposal from Russia. Four days ago I took a special step, which brought it about that Russia answered yesterday that she is ready to sign. The personal contract with Stalin is established. The day after tomorrow von Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her.

We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute some
Schweinhund [literally, swineherd's dog; figuratively, filthy person] will make a proposal for mediation.

The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony. The way is open for the soldier, after I have made the political preparations.

Today's publication of the non-aggression pact with Russia hit like a shell. The consequences cannot be overlooked. Stalin also said that this course will be of benefit to both countries. The effect on Poland will be tremendous.
http://forum.axishistory.com/v.....344#573344 (emphasis added)

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Post by Boby » 24 Mar 2007 00:02

Thanks David.

About Schmundt memorandum of 23 May, I have doubts. First, there are not verbatim records, but "sinngemäß wiedergegeben", i.e, the general meaning of what Hitler said. No one is perfect, and this version is inaccurate, of course.

See

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airc ... wiler.html

for a critique of Hans-Günther Seraphim of this memorandum, and see:

David Irving "The Rise and fall of the Luftwaffe" (London, Fpp 2002), pp. 81-82 for Milch diary and trial testimony. Göring WAS NOT PRESENT. Also, Warlimont denied that was in this conference.

Also, see Raeder testimony:

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/05-16-46.htm

Regards

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Post by David Thompson » 24 Mar 2007 02:21

Thanks, Boby, for jogging my memory on the 23 May 1939 Fuehrer Conference document (IMT Exhibit L-79). Now that you mention it, Norman Rich, in his book Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion, W.W. Norton & Co., London/New York: 1973, p. 292, has this footnote on the subject:
9. A document introduced in evidence at Nuremberg purporting to be a record of a Hitler conference of May 23, 1939 (IMT, 79-L, 37:546-56) makes it appear as though Hitler had definitely decided on war by this time—against Poland, if he could be sure Britain and France would remain neutral; otherwise in the first instance against the West. The authenticity of this document is suspect, however, in particular its date, which was written on a covering note listing the names of the participants at the conference, some of whom, as was proved later, were not present. The document is typewritten and unsigned; it is not entered in the government document record, as was customary; and Hitler's statements recorded therein are at variance with other expressions of his opinions at this time found in documents of proven authenticity. See Hans-Günther Seraphim, "Nachkriegsprozesse und zeitgeschichtliche Forschung," in Mensch und Staat in Recht und Geschichte. Festschrift fur Herbert Kraus (Kitzingen am Main, 1954), pp. 448-50. Admiral Raeder, General Mulch, Captain von Below (Hitler's adjutant), who admitted being present at this May 23 conference, all testified after the war that the existing record of the conference was spurious. Their testimony does not mean much in itself, but it helps substantiate suspicions raised by the nature of the document. IMT 14:38-39, 134; NOKW 3518.
I'll add your comments and this note to the document in the linked thread at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 869#620869

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Post by Bankers » 26 Mar 2007 22:30

It is hard to defend Hitler from any perspective, however, one must remember that Goebbels and Goring reminded Hitler that they were holding thousands of prisoners from the west. Knowing that they (the Germans) were being caught in a vice they (Goring and Goebbels) suggested that for each km that the western armies advanced that 1,000 prisoners be put to death. Hitler rejected the idea out of hand. Not much else of a good nature can be said of him. Source: Interview with Artur Axmann, BBC, early 1970's. Martin

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