The Normandy campaign.

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RichTO90
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#76

Post by RichTO90 » 11 Feb 2010, 21:07

Lightbob wrote:Sorry Rich but comparing fighting Elite Panzer Divisions supported by Nebel werfer Brigades to Fighting throat, nose and ear and stomach, White bread Divisions is certainly simplifying things a bit is certainly simplifying things.
Sorry in turn, but you do realize that the "throat, nose and ear and stomach, White bread Divisions [sic]" was actually a specific formation that was nowhere near Normandy? And that since I never mentioned anything of the sort - simply stating that it was the "bulk of the infantry opposition" - your remark is rather an obvious strawman?
You may ba able to tell me that the US 4th Armoured division in one of its operations in Normandy unloaded its A/P rounds and replaced them with .50 Cal MG ammunition, because it would be more usefull in the forthcoming action.
And you might be able to tell me where you sourced such a claim from? Since you are the one making it?
Rich according to most Histories the 17 SS Panzer Division was the weakest and most poorly trained in France.
Bob
Which "most histories" would those be? The ones that indicate that it was incompletely trained? In terms of time, which is not the same as being poorly trained? That was a problem endemic to Ob. West, not to 17. SS.

It was seriously short in terms of officers and NCOs, but that was a common problem by that time. It's mobility was poor, but that was consequential only in terms of operational mobility, and in terms of weaponry it was quite strong.

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LWD
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#77

Post by LWD » 11 Feb 2010, 21:25

Lightbob wrote: ...The 15 Scottish Division warned by Ultra of a counter attack by the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions went on to the defensive....
I find the above rather strange as the British were willing to take pretty signficant losses at some points rather than risk revealing the secret of Ultra. Furthermore my impression was that it revealed a lot more strategically useful info than tactical such as this. Can you provide any documentation in regards to this?


Aber
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#78

Post by Aber » 11 Feb 2010, 21:50

RichTO90 wrote:
I see. So then that means that the 3 Division operations order, the I Corps operations order, the NEPTUNE operations order, and Monty's stated intentions were all part of a grand deception? :D
IIRC it was - Caen to be captured or effectively masked on D-Day - not quite so black and white.

Montgomery's notes to the April Overlord briefing give the location of 21st Panzer as Caen, so realistically it was a challenging objective.

Aber
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#79

Post by Aber » 11 Feb 2010, 21:59

RichTO90 wrote:
Aber wrote:In the long run everything evens out, but there should have been an argument about which territorial objectives were critical in the short run after crossing the Seine and focusing on those as priority.
That hits it on the head again, except...that is exactly what did happen. And of course territorial objectives are a means to an end, they aren't the end. When the rather short-sided and inadequate "plan" (ewhich was never an operational plan, it was a logistical schedule based on wishful thinking about what should happen) collapsed in the wake of the Chambois-Falaise battle Eisenhower made a decision, Montgomery kicked in his own idea, and argument ensued. :lol:
My issue is not with Eisenhower's 'broad-front strategy' in principle in August/early September 1944, as there are some arguments in its favour, but that calling it a strategy is an overstatement. It should have been obvious at the time, even disregarding possible German resistance, that the objectives were logistically unfeasible and that some priorites should have been established eg Channel ports, Paris, V1 sites, Belgian airfields, piercing the WestWall at Aachen, and other operations dropped down the priority list.

RichTO90
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#80

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Feb 2010, 04:55

Aber wrote:IIRC it was - Caen to be captured or effectively masked on D-Day - not quite so black and white.
No, I'm afraid it was extremely black and white.

"Own Troops
5. 1 Corps Plan
1 Corps on LEFT pf Second Army is assaulting the beaches between GRAYE SUR MER 9584 and OUISTREHAM 1179 with RIGHT 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and LEFT 3rd British Infantry Division to secure, on D-Day, a covering position on the general line PUTOT EN BESSIN 9072 - CAEN 0060 - thence R ORNE to the sea, preparatory to a further advance in accordance with the Second Army plan.
...
Intention
12. The 3rd British Infantry Division will land on QUEEN RED and WHITE beaches and capture CAEN, and a bridgehead SOUTH of the R ORNE at that place.
...
15, The Intermediate Brigade (185 Infantry Brigade Group)
(a) 185 Infantry Brigade Group with Staffs Yeo in support will land at approximately H+2 1/2 hours and will capture CAEN and a bridgehead SOUTH of the R ORNE at CAEN."
(3 British Infantry Division Operation Order No. 1, 14 May 44, WO 171/409)

So, corps, acting on army instructions, ordering the capture of Caen. No "masking".
Montgomery's notes to the April Overlord briefing give the location of 21st Panzer as Caen, so realistically it was a challenging objective.
That would be difficult, since in April 21. Panzer was at Rennes. It began moving to the area Falaise-Caen in May. Allied intelligence placed it at Rennes as late as 6 May and then on 13 May speculated that it had begin to move to the area south of Caen. On 20 May that speculation was repeated. The intelligence assessment issued prior to 6 June merely remarked that 21. Panzer was in the vicinity of Falaise and that it could be expected to develop a counterattack in the afternoon of 6 June. No changes or special provisions were made to defeat such an attack though, since it was anticipated that 185 Brigade and the Staffs would be in control of Caen and the crossings by that time.
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

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Kingfish
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#81

Post by Kingfish » 12 Feb 2010, 12:51

LWD wrote:
Lightbob wrote: ...The 15 Scottish Division warned by Ultra of a counter attack by the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions went on to the defensive....
I find the above rather strange as the British were willing to take pretty signficant losses at some points rather than risk revealing the secret of Ultra. Furthermore my impression was that it revealed a lot more strategically useful info than tactical such as this. Can you provide any documentation in regards to this?
Wasn't 11th armored pulled back from the Odon bridgehead as a result of the Ultra intercept?

RichTO90
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#82

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Feb 2010, 15:40

Aber wrote:My issue is not with Eisenhower's 'broad-front strategy' in principle in August/early September 1944, as there are some arguments in its favour, but that calling it a strategy is an overstatement.
Then don't call it a strategy, since it was not, nor was Eisenhower, even as SCAEF, responsible for strategy.
It should have been obvious at the time, even disregarding possible German resistance, that the objectives were logistically unfeasible and that some priorites should have been established eg Channel ports, Paris, V1 sites, Belgian airfields, piercing the WestWall at Aachen, and other operations dropped down the priority list.
If it isn't obvious today, with the benefit of hindsight, why should it have been obvious at the time? And "some" objectives were prioritized...Channel ports, Paris, V1 sites, Belgian airfields, piercing the West Wall at Aachen, and, of course, Antwerp. So you are saying that MARKET GARDEN and the "pencil like thrust" into Holland and North Germany should have been dropped? :D

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Attrition
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#83

Post by Attrition » 12 Feb 2010, 15:42

RichTO90 wrote:
Aber wrote:IIRC it was - Caen to be captured or effectively masked on D-Day - not quite so black and white.
No, I'm afraid it was extremely black and white.

"Own Troops
5. 1 Corps Plan
1 Corps on LEFT pf Second Army is assaulting the beaches between GRAYE SUR MER 9584 and OUISTREHAM 1179 with RIGHT 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and LEFT 3rd British Infantry Division to secure, on D-Day, a covering position on the general line PUTOT EN BESSIN 9072 - CAEN 0060 - thence R ORNE to the sea, preparatory to a further advance in accordance with the Second Army plan.
...
Intention
12. The 3rd British Infantry Division will land on QUEEN RED and WHITE beaches and capture CAEN, and a bridgehead SOUTH of the R ORNE at that place.
...
15, The Intermediate Brigade (185 Infantry Brigade Group)
(a) 185 Infantry Brigade Group with Staffs Yeo in support will land at approximately H+2 1/2 hours and will capture CAEN and a bridgehead SOUTH of the R ORNE at CAEN."
(3 British Infantry Division Operation Order No. 1, 14 May 44, WO 171/409)

So, corps, acting on army instructions, ordering the capture of Caen. No "masking".
Montgomery's notes to the April Overlord briefing give the location of 21st Panzer as Caen, so realistically it was a challenging objective.
That would be difficult, since in April 21. Panzer was at Rennes. It began moving to the area Falaise-Caen in May. Allied intelligence placed it at Rennes as late as 6 May and then on 13 May speculated that it had begin to move to the area south of Caen. On 20 May that speculation was repeated. The intelligence assessment issued prior to 6 June merely remarked that 21. Panzer was in the vicinity of Falaise and that it could be expected to develop a counterattack in the afternoon of 6 June. No changes or special provisions were made to defeat such an attack though, since it was anticipated that 185 Brigade and the Staffs would be in control of Caen and the crossings by that time.

Were any other towns intended to be captured on D-Day? Carentan, St Lo and Bayeux perhaps?

RichTO90
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#84

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Feb 2010, 15:46

Kingfish wrote:Wasn't 11th armored pulled back from the Odon bridgehead as a result of the Ultra intercept?
Elements were pulled back from Hill 112...but then were sent back as the German attack was slow to jump off, so were hit anyway. As the weight of the attack developed and casualties mounted it was decided to pull then back and abandon the position. So ULTRA gave a warning that was acted upon, but not in the sense that I think you meant exactly?
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

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Attrition
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#85

Post by Attrition » 12 Feb 2010, 15:52

Has anyone wondered if the German scuttle from Normandy was the most effective defensive method they could muster?

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#86

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 Feb 2010, 17:54

Attrition wrote:Has anyone wondered if the German scuttle from Normandy was the most effective defensive method they could muster?
It usually works better on the game board. Not that those prove much. For a Hitlerian 'Hold at all Cost' strategy to work the German play has to be proactive and make frequent counter attacks, and hang onto vulnerable positions. Otherwise the Allied player can lever the German pieces out of Normandy fairly quickly. In the games I've observed a hold on strategy leads to a catstrophic attrition rate of the German pieces. A measured withdrawl across France cuts the loss rate. Sucessfull counter attacks needed to be limited to critical positions and Allied pieces vulnerable to severe losses or destruction. Each time the Allied logistics train catches up and severe losses threaten the German player a drop back to the next favorable terrain is in order. Some defense lines might only be held a week, others might be held for a month.

Hanging on to the ports at all cost does pay. Which was probablly the case in the real world.

In a few games the German player opted for a large scale mobile battle in central France with massive counter attacks. Over the long haul the result was the same as historically, with the Allied pieces closing up to the Siegfried Line and Rhine late in 1944, & the German player playing a crippled skeleton of a army.

RichTO90
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#87

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Feb 2010, 19:55

Attrition wrote:Were any other towns intended to be captured on D-Day? Carentan, St Lo and Bayeux perhaps?
Carentan and St Lo were not D-Day objectives. Bayeux was not a D-Day objective for 50 Division, but reaching the N13 between Bayeux and Caen was.
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

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Attrition
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#88

Post by Attrition » 12 Feb 2010, 21:39

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
Attrition wrote:Has anyone wondered if the German scuttle from Normandy was the most effective defensive method they could muster?
It usually works better on the game board. Not that those prove much. For a Hitlerian 'Hold at all Cost' strategy to work the German play has to be proactive and make frequent counter attacks, and hang onto vulnerable positions. Otherwise the Allied player can lever the German pieces out of Normandy fairly quickly. In the games I've observed a hold on strategy leads to a catstrophic attrition rate of the German pieces. A measured withdrawl across France cuts the loss rate. Sucessfull counter attacks needed to be limited to critical positions and Allied pieces vulnerable to severe losses or destruction. Each time the Allied logistics train catches up and severe losses threaten the German player a drop back to the next favorable terrain is in order. Some defense lines might only be held a week, others might be held for a month.

Hanging on to the ports at all cost does pay. Which was probablly the case in the real world.

In a few games the German player opted for a large scale mobile battle in central France with massive counter attacks. Over the long haul the result was the same as historically, with the Allied pieces closing up to the Siegfried Line and Rhine late in 1944, & the German player playing a crippled skeleton of a army.
I was thinking more of fighting the battle of Normandy on the banks of the Rhine.

Aber
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#89

Post by Aber » 12 Feb 2010, 22:04

RichTO90 wrote:
Aber wrote:IIRC it was - Caen to be captured or effectively masked on D-Day - not quite so black and white.
No, I'm afraid it was extremely black and white.

"Own Troops
5. 1 Corps Plan
1 Corps on LEFT pf Second Army is assaulting the beaches between GRAYE SUR MER 9584 and OUISTREHAM 1179 with RIGHT 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and LEFT 3rd British Infantry Division to secure, on D-Day, a covering position on the general line PUTOT EN BESSIN 9072 - CAEN 0060 - thence R ORNE to the sea, preparatory to a further advance in accordance with the Second Army plan.
...
Intention
12. The 3rd British Infantry Division will land on QUEEN RED and WHITE beaches and capture CAEN, and a bridgehead SOUTH of the R ORNE at that place.
...
15, The Intermediate Brigade (185 Infantry Brigade Group)
(a) 185 Infantry Brigade Group with Staffs Yeo in support will land at approximately H+2 1/2 hours and will capture CAEN and a bridgehead SOUTH of the R ORNE at CAEN."
(3 British Infantry Division Operation Order No. 1, 14 May 44, WO 171/409)

So, corps, acting on army instructions, ordering the capture of Caen. No "masking".
.

I have quotes from the I Corps order:

'3 Brit Inf Div should, by the evening of D-Day have captured or effectively masked Caen, and be disposed in depth with brigade locations.....'

'Should the enemy forestall us at Caen and the defences prove to be strongly organised, thus causing us to fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event, 3 Brit Inf Div will contain the enemyin Caen and retain the bulk of its forces disposed for mobile operations outside the covering positions.'

RichTO90
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Re: The Normandy campaign.

#90

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Feb 2010, 22:18

Aber wrote:I have quotes from the I Corps order:

'3 Brit Inf Div should, by the evening of D-Day have captured or effectively masked Caen, and be disposed in depth with brigade locations.....'

'Should the enemy forestall us at Caen and the defences prove to be strongly organised, thus causing us to fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event, 3 Brit Inf Div will contain the enemyin Caen and retain the bulk of its forces disposed for mobile operations outside the covering positions.'
"20. 3 British Division

a) The task of 3 British Division is to capture CAEN and secure a bridgehead over the R ORNE at that place.

b ) The enemy may develop his counter-attack--

i) Through CAEN
ii) Across R ORNE at RANVILLE - BENOUVILLE having established himself in the area East of R ORNE from which he can dominate the beaches West of OUISTREHAM and the Northern approaches to CAEN.
iii) West of Caen, between R MUE and the CAEN Canal
iv) Any combination of the above

In cases (ii) and (iii) using CAEN as a pivot, if he suceeds in forestalling us there.

c) To counter these enemy measure 3 British Division should, before dark on D-Day, have captured or effectively masked CAEN and be disposed in depth with brigade localities firmly established.

i) North-West of BENOUVILLE, in support of 6 Airborne Division operating East of R ORNE (having relieved the airborne troops West of the canal and taken over the defence of the BENOUVILLE-RANVILLE crossings.
ii) North-West of CAEN, tied up with the LEFT forward brigade locality of 3 Canadian Division.

Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defences prove to be strongly organised thus causing us the fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of its forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit its usefulness and to make its retention a costly business."
(I Corps Operations Order No. 1, WO 171/258)

Selectively quoting to change the intent of the original so as to better fit your argument isn't very nice I'm afraid. You are quoting the contingency order, paragraph 20. (c), as if it is the actual order, which is paragraph 20.(a). Note paragraph 20. (a) is identical of course to that I already gave from the 3 Division operational order.
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

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