Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

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michael mills
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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#601

Post by michael mills » 26 Jul 2012, 15:41

Reference to a present-day phenomenon, with which readers are familiar, can explain a similar phenomenon in the past, with which readers are not familiar.

The familiar activity of political pressure groups influencing the actions of governments in the present provides a guide to how similar political pressure groups influenced the actions of other governments in 1939. They demonstrate that the mere fact that a particular political pressure group in, say, Poland in 1939 was not part of the government does not mean that it was unable to influence government actions.

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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#602

Post by Sid Guttridge » 26 Jul 2012, 16:21

Hi Michael,

If not absolutely vital to Polish trade, Danzig remained important and currently irreplaceable. Furthermore, if it were in Reich hands it would make it potentially even easier for Germany to constrict Polish access to the Baltic through the Corridor and Gdynia (which was within heavy artillery range of Danzig territory).

If I remember correctly, Germany never made a claim for the return of Danzig alone in 1938-39. The Danzig issue was always coupled with other matters, such as the proposed extraterritorial road/rail highway across the Corridor.

Thus, from the Polish perspective, making a concession over Danzig looked like the thin end of the wedge.

The example of Czechoslovakia was also fresh in Polish minds. There, concessions in Sudetenland in late 1938 had rendered the rump of the country indefensible in March 1939. The Poles were understandabbly not inclined to repeat such an error.

The Poles therefore decided on a policy of no concessions regarding the status quo whatsoever.

Events proved them justified in taking this hard line. At the very fist opportunity, Germany began the systematic dismantling of any vestige of an independent Polish state. Uniquely in its conquered territories, Germany made no attempt to recognize any Polish national entity, even of a collaborationist bent.

Cheers,

Sid.


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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#603

Post by wm » 26 Jul 2012, 22:55

michael mills wrote:The examples of Polish propaganda about "recovering" "lost" Polish lands that were now German territory, to which I referred and of which wm has posted actual pictorial examples, indicates a Polish motive for endendering such a conflict, namely to seize territory from a defeated Germany.
No, it doesn't. It indicates the alarm and anger of people living near the Polish-German border and facing every day signs of Germany hostile attitude and the Polish Government total inactivity.
Especially the "we have not been here since only yesterday" was a response to the Germans allegations that Poland was a temporary entity and its days were numbered anyway.
It was a local grass root campaign, it had its beginning on February 18, 1939. As far as I know the posters were unknown outside Silesia.
michael mills wrote:In the same way, anti-German nationalist organisations in Poland had a decisive influence on Polish foreign policy in 1939, due to the fact that certain factions in the ruling Sanacja Government, namely those of Smigly-Rydz and President Moscicki, wanted to gain the support of those organisations in their struggle for power with Beck.
Smigły-Rydz could have got rid of Beck simply by wiggling his nose at any time. He was a very popular politician, had support of the army and ruling party. Beck was an official nominated to his post and was hated by everyone so this theory rests on very shaky ground.
The Beck's speech on 5 May actually gave him a measure of popularity he hadn't enjoyed previously.
michael mills wrote: Beck was angry because he had been coerced into doing something he did not want to do, and which he may well have thought would result in disaster for Poland and for himself.
It is known that Beck didn't have accurate information about the state of the Polish Army and assumed that it was much stronger than in reality, and was counting on the allies prompt attack on the West. He did not anticipate any disaster.
And as to the "himself" part, during the war as an artillery observer he called artillery barrage on himself to stop an enemy advance overrunning his position. He knew war well and wasn't afraid of it.

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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#604

Post by DrG » 31 Jul 2012, 02:29

This is the first of several posts in which I will quote, translated into English, documents and excerpts of books about the origins of WW2. I hope that at least some of the readers of this forum will find them useful.
Then, after my last message, I will ask moderators to suspend my account to the Axis History Forum, because posting documented and pondered messages requires too much time (as readers may notice from my two-weeks-long absence), expecially if compared to the few seconds that are required to write the too many worthless posts that overload this forum.

Now I will translate a passage from the memoirs of Giuseppe Bastianini ("Volevo fermare Mussolini", BUR, 2005), the Italian ambassador in Varsaw between 1932 and the beginning of 1939. This excerpt shows that Polish opposition to the idea of a highway between Prussia and Pomerania hadn't any link with fears of Germany or of Nazism, but instead it was either merely irrational either aimed at isolating Prussia and damage German economy. This passage, that I guess is still unknown outside Italy, traces the real origins of the project of the highway to Prussia.
pages 340-342 wrote:One morning [of 1936], completely unexpected in the embassy, Piero Puricelli [Italian engineer, senator and businessman, designer of the first highway of the world, the Milano-Laghi, in 1922] was announced to me and I saw him appear in front of me impeccable, perfumed and smiling as usual, to explain ex abrupto a grandiose project of highway that he wished to offer to the Polish govern to get its direct interest. [...] His truly gigantic plan appeared clearly on a geographic chart that he took out of his poket with an elegant gesture and on which I saw, drawn in red, some straight lines, one of which started from Rome and, through Switzerland, Germany, Poland, Russia and China reached the Yellow Sea. It was an highway that in a first time should have stopped in Moscow, but that he promised himself to push through, counting to receive the necessary support by Chiang Kai-shek. He had submitted this plan two days before to Hitler who, after having given his approval, had authorized him to go to Varsaw to get the interest of the Polish govern for the execution of the stretch that would have passed through the "corridor". The curiosity of seeing the Polish reactions with my own eyes overcame every other consideration. I went along with Puricelli to Beck, without, by the way, hidding to my surprising friend a sharply negative foresight about the kind of welcome that he would have to expect. In fact, just at the first hint it became evident that, in the mind of the Polish minister of Foreign Affairs, that gigantic plan of intercontinental highway assumed the likeness of an obscure and not welcome at all thing. Puricelli highlited the benefits, but Beck, intent in other considerations, remained icy, and not shaken at all by the enthusiastic approval given by Berlin. He muttered that Poland had few money to spend also in works much more important than that. The face of Puricelli, at this moment, brightened up fully when he announced that the Führer offered two combinations: either a paritetic German-Polish company for the financing and the exercise of the stretch through the corridor, either the construction of it, without any compensation, totally paid by Germany. I saw a ferocious flash passing on the look of Beck and his reply was that Poland did not accept gifts. In vain Puricelli offered him one out of his own pocket, in other words a connection highway between Varsaw and Torun; Beck declared that that project was so massive that it required much time for a deep study by Polish technicians and repeated that Poland did not accept gifts nor shared interests on parts of its soil.
Given that, luckly, Puricelli was not ignored in Poland (his company was rebuilding the Varsaw-Cracow road in those times), I wished to highlight that it was his own plan and how the step made by him prescinded from higher considerations that it wasn't his duty to evaluate, then, in order to bring the talks back to another tone, I started praising the ideal of great designers who wished to leave to the posterity works of such a relevance as to exalt the skills of man. I wished to underline the example that Poland was providing by building Gdynia and its maginificent port in a zone where there was an empty swamp and a neglected shore, and so, once appeased Beck, I brought Puricelli to the embassy for lunch. And that was the umpteenth proof that it was forbidden to talk about the so-called corridor in Varsaw for no reason at all. It would have been impossible to modify such state of mind either by offering combinations either by offering compensations.

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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#605

Post by DrG » 31 Jul 2012, 02:30

In 1946 prof. Keith Feiling published "The Life of Neville Chamberlain", based upon the personal papers of the late British statesman. I quote the letter, one of the thousands Chamberlain wrote daily to his sisters, that explains how UK reached war and, partially, why. It is a very important document, because it proofs that the aim of UK was that of war against Germany and thus that any negotiation about Danzig, and any peace offer, even though Hitler was believed to be sincere, was seen as a problem for this objective. Hopes in an internal German rebellion, similar to that of Nov. 1918, were the core of British strategy.
Omitted passages are absent also in Feiling's book, highlights in bold and notes in square brackets[] are mine.
Neville Chamberlain, quoted in Feiling, pages 416-418 wrote: 10 September 1939

the final long-drawn-out agonies that preceded the actual declaration of war were as nearly unendurable as could be. We were anxious to bring things to a head, but there were three complications, - the secret communications that were going on with Göring and Hitler through a neutral intermediary [the Swede Dahlerus], the conference proposal of Mussolini, and the French anxiety to postpone the actual declaration as long as possible, until they could evacuate their women and children, and mobilise their armies. There was very little of this that we could say in public, and meantime the House of Commons was out of hand, torn with suspicions, and ready (some of them...) to believe the government guilty of any cowardice and treachery...

The communications with Hitler and Göring looked rather promising at one time, but came to nothing in the end, as Hitler apparently got carried away by the prospect of a short war in Poland, and then a settlement... They gave the impression, probably with intention, that it was possible to persuade Hitler to accept a peaceful and reasonable solution of the Polish question, in order to get to an Anglo-German agreement, which he continually declared to be his greatest ambition.

What happened to destroy this chance? Was Hitler merely talking through his hat, and deliberately deceiving us while he matured his schemes? I don’t think so. There is good evidence that orders for the invasion on the 25th August were actually given and then cancelled at the last minute because H. wavered. With such an extraordinary creature one can only speculate. But I believe he did seriously contemplate an agreement with us, and that he worked seriously at proposals (subsequently broadcast) which to his one-track mind seemed almost fabulously generous. But at the last moment some brainstorm took possession of him – maybe Ribbentrop stirred it up – and once he had set his machine in motion, he couldn’t stop it.

...Mussolini’s proposals were, I think, a perfectly genuine attempt to stop war, not for any altruistic reasons, but because Italy was not in a state to go to war and exceedingly likely to get into trouble if other people did. [this interpretation is partially wrong, as I will show in a following post by quoting the testimony Clara Petacci's recently published diaries] But it was doomed to failure, because Hitler by that time was not prepared to hold his hand, unless he could get what he wanted without war. And we weren’t prepared to give it to him...

So the war began, after a short and troubled night, and only the fact that one’s mind works at three times its ordinary pace on such occasions enabled me to get through my broadcast, the formation of the War Cabinet, the meeting of the House of Commons, and the preliminary orders on that awful Sunday, which the calendar tells me was this day a week ago...

For some time past it has been more and more evident that the German plan was to make a peace offer as soon as they had finished their Eastern campaign, and that they would do nothing to jeopardise its success meanwhile. Now I see Göring has come out with the idea, accompanied as usual by insults, boasts, and threats. Our first reply is the announcement of our preparations for a 3 years war. Next I shall go and see Daladier... One thing comforts me. While war was still averted, I felt I was indispensable, for no one else could carry out my policy. To-day the position has changed. Half a dozen people could take my place while war is in progress, and I do not see that I could have any particular part to play until it comes to discussing peace terms, and that may be a long way off.

It may be, but I have a feeling that it won’t be so very long. There is such a widespread desire to avoid war, and it is so deeply rooted, that it surely must find expression somehow. Of course the difficulty is with Hitler himself. Until he disappears and his system collapses, there can be no peace. But what I hope for is not a military victory – I very much doubt the feasibility of that – but a collapse of the German home front. For that it is necessary to convince the Germans that they cannot win. And USA might at the right moment help there. On this theory one must weigh every action in the light of its probable effect on German mentality. I hope myself we shall not start to bomb their munition centres and objectives in towns, unless they begin it...

You, in your letter, hoped I shouldn’t think my efforts had been unavailing. Indeed I don’t think so, and have never said so. It was of course a grievous disappointment that peace could not be saved, but I know that my persistent efforts have convinced the world that no part of the blame can lie here. That consciousness of moral right, which it is impossible for the Germans to feel, must be a tremendous force on our side. [finally, after the admission of having avoided to do anything to reach a compromise in August and to make peace after the end of the Polish campaign, Chamberlain's hypocrisy surfaces again]

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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#606

Post by DrG » 31 Jul 2012, 02:31

As I wrote previuously, Chamberlain doubted of Mussolini's altruism in his mediation on the Danzig crisis. While it is true that Italian military unpreparedness played a role in Italy's pro-peace stance, there were also genuine psychological reasons for Mussolini's mediation.
Here I will report some excerpts from Clara Petacci's diary, given that Mussolini's own diaries have disappeared at the end of WW2. Ms. Petacci was Mussolini's last mistress and met him almost daily. Given her unlimited admiration for the Duce, she wrote word by word everything he told her, mostly romantic or trivial things, or quarrels because of jealousy, but, sometimes, also interesting sentences, like the ones I am going to quote. The diaries were hidden, buried in a garden, by Clara Petacci shortly before her departure from the Garda Lake to Milan at the end of April 1945. They were recovered shortly after the war and then have been kept in the Archivio Centrale dello Stato. Given the presence of strictly personal details, they have been classified for 70 years, instead of the usual 50 years. The diaries of the years 1939-1940 have been published by Rizzoli in 2011 with the title "Verso il disastro".
4 May 1939 wrote:He walks away, takes some telegrams: "That's bad! That's bad! Things are getting complicated. This Poland exagerates, I don't know where does it want to go! A third of the population is mixed and they can't think to resist Germany. Before the arrival of the assistance, they [the Germans] have already taken it all. It is foolish to go against Germany, for a small Country, it's foolish. Also us, I don't think... I don't see it clearly, anyway it is really a critical and dangerous moment, things don't go well at all: I don't see clearly. I am a bit troubled (he sits on the stool). You don't know what war is. You can't remember: you were very young, you weren't two. The whole life changes, everything turns upside down: it's appalling. Men were born to destroy each other, it's true, but it is so bad..."
27 August 1939 wrote:At 6 pm I watch the change of the guard: the crowd acclaims him, calls him to the window, wants him at the balcony. Finally he looks out. People feel the need of watching him in these days, of listening to him. Then he opens the door and comes to me: "My dear, have you seen? They needed to see me and then I have heartened them with a smile... and I have made a gesture as to say that things are going in a better way. These people don't want war and entrust themselves to me with their silence and calm. From everywhere in the world they write to me so as I act as a mediator. I have received many letters of French mothers who implore me to intervene. What can I do... I intervene, but we shall see. I don't know what to do. [...] I believe that people have been glad of my smile. I have no hope, but until the the gun doesn't thunder there is still hope. Skirmishes always happen at the borders. Until customs guards fire some shots of rifle to each other etc. it has no importance. When that tube of steel that has a range of 40 km thunders, the situation becomes serious... [...] [talks about the Bertha gun in WW1] Until they shot with rifles... But, you know, I am afraid that with this delay they only want to temporize. War is not a joke, no. You were too little to remember. It is really a painful thing.
Nobody wants war: everybody entrust themselves, I receive messages from all over the world. I have replied to Canada telling that I will work, as I have done till now, to gain a lasting peace, but with justice. Yes, the usual dots on the i's. We shall hope: while there's life, there's hope. [...] Ciano phones him: he listens, replies, closes and says: "The fact that they have not rejected it is already a good thing... Hitler has been very good making these proposals. And thus he has laid a bridge... and when people start talking it can be a good beginning." [...] if tomorrow there were war my life would change completely: I would make the life of an ascetic, I wouldn't even wish to hear talking about women. I wouldn't live in any other way than in torment, in the tension of this tragedy that is war; I would have the responsability of eight million men [the theoretical maximum number of mobilizable Italian men in case of war], of the life of my people... Also my life would be in danger, despite the fact that it doesn't matter, but what would matter would be that of my people. I couldn't even think to do anything else. You don't know what war is: you don't remember it. Renunciations and sacrifices, hunger, rationing, shelters, diseases... Ah, may God beware of it, and everything would be on my shoulders with all its enormous weight of endless responsibilities. [...] You don't know what war is... you were a child... and today it's something even worse and more serious... A defeat is the end of a people and causes to mourn for twenty years. Ah, it's terrible! [...] I hope I will be able to save my people from war.
28 August 1939 wrote:When I talk about a conference rather than weapons, he says: "It is right and it would be the best solution. But when two masses are thrown in this way, there is nothing else except the gun that talks... England should have told Poland that she wouldn't have fired a shot for Danzig and the corridor, but they would have intervened if a square meter of [Polish] territory had been touched. For two hundred Polish customs guards - two hundred! I say - the lives of millions of young men are in danger. It's monstrous. Even more given that Danzig is German, thus its incorporation was a logic thing. Yes, you are right: also him [Hitler] could have avoided to move all this machine; but, anyway, since 28 April he had talked about this right claim, and large peoples must be able to live too...[...] I phone him: "I believe, my dear, that if the gun will not fire tomorrow it will be a miracle. Yes, after all they have been shooting each other for several days. No, England should have taken advantage of the hand that Hitler has hold to them and not to tergiversate. These are matters that must be solved immediately. I think that they have also asked a pause of six months to try to find an agreement. Yes, of course you are right. Hitler would think this: they would prepare themselves even more, and the more the time passes the more tragic becomes the situation... It must be decided quickly. I have done everything that was humanly possibile, I have played all my cards, by now... But no, don't tell this: it isn't the fatalism of great men. I have done what was in my power to avoid war: now it's destiny..." A destiny wanted and searched, I say. He shrugs in his shoulders, he is a bit strange this evening: "It seems that war is a fatality of life".
30 August 1939 wrote:He returns inside and tells: "Ciano must tell me something urgent. Yes, my love, wait here, my dear". He enshroudes me with a look of infinite tenderness and sweetness, such that my heart trembles. When he returns after a long time he is a bit pale: "Do you see, my dear? This is the card of destiny! The Poles have made the general mobilization. This is the reply to the Führer who has hold out his hand to the Poles... He had told that he wanted to negotiate directly, that they may send a man and instead they mobilize. The Germans will be furious. This is one of the many wrong moves. Poor Poles, poor Poles, what an end they will go! It is useless: the Germans always find stupids or viles in front of them... Now they have some fanatics, and this will be the ruin for those poor Poles. They don't understand that they will be mangled. How can they delude themselves of an help from the French and the English... These gentlemen don't know the geographic chart, and so the English and French have never seen a geografic chart, for they have signed a blank cheque to the Poles. How, where and in which way can they help them? Through the Siegfried Line? Delusion, foolishness. They would massacre millions of French, just to arrive - if ever they would arrive - to meet fresh German troops beyond the line... it is more than 50 km deep, with such fortifications that thinking of passing through it is foolish. Hitler had this defensive line built to demonstrate that he wanted nothing from France: neither friendship neither war, and thus has placed an insurmountable barrier on their border. After the Saar etc. Hitler declared that he would have never asked anything else from the French: and in fact he has not dealed with them anymore. On the other hand, the French have created the Maginot Line, as much formidable and insuperable... thus from that part there is nothing to do. Hitler told me in Venice in 1934: "When, to take a territory, I must send two million youngsters to death, victory would never repay me for this loss of lives". You see that he was reasoning also then! Hitler has always aimed at making his conquests without bloodshed. By the way, he has never asked anything that didn't belong to them [the Germans], but only right claims. By now, if there has been a fault, what they should have deducted, they have deducted; it's now time to make an agreement before making a war, rather than after... it's better a peace before, than a peace of blood then: it is this that they don't want to understand. [The British] Believe that it is easy to beat the Germans: delusion. [...] The Poles mobilize step by step, with no way out: they want their own end. It would have been enough that the English had told them to accept Hitler's proposal and to send a Pole to negotiate... They want or believe to stop the march of Germany and don't understand that so they help it [Germany], because the Poles will be beaten and will die. Human incomprehension and wickedness are sorry things... The Poles will be the victims of the false English prestige and of the vile French fear." He thinks: "What do you want? By now, in front of fool Poles without chance of remedy all negotiations fall. My dear, you have fear when I tell you the horrors of war... Children - and it's sure, poor babies - are left to themselves. Women have to take the jobs of the men. Everything - tramways, buses, factories. In the other war, you don't remember, you were too much a child, newborn, I have seen women work in mills at the castings of lead. Certainly children are left to the elders and to themselves, they grow up ignorant and with so many lacks, that they have forced us to send them to several institutes. They are called "the sons of the war": rascals, ill, nervous, poor creatures. Every woman worked, and will do it again today. Every woman will be assigned to a duty according to... I have no hope anymore and the precautions that I have taken [against war] show you my pessimism: every measure tells you. I have not to despair of any of my efforts. When the dossier of what I have done for peace will be read, they will be amazed, dazed of what a man had been able to do. [this, like many other dossiers that Mussolini was carrying in his column of trucks from Milan to Como at the end of the war, has been lost] They will see, then, what is the political fight against a people...

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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#607

Post by DrG » 31 Jul 2012, 02:31

While the Polish govern refused to negotiate with Germany, members of the Polish opposition tried to find a reasonable solution to the Danzig crisis. About this topic I am going to post an interesting passage from Valerio Perna, "Galeazzo Ciano, operazione Polonia", Luni Editrice, 1999.
This shows that there were Polish politicians who understood that Polish interests were not necessary in contrast with the German ones.
page 170 wrote:The evidence collected by Arone [Italian ambassador in Varsaw] were enough to give credit to the worst hypotheses [about the dangers of a coming war]. Nevertheless, diplomatic cirlces in Varsaw hoped that Italian inventiveness would have reached a solution in extremo. The German ambassador von Moltke and even more the French one Noël talked about it. This vague expectation seemed to concretize when a request of a secret meeting was delivered to the Italian embassy by the leader of parlamentary opposition, senator Wladislaw Gizbert-Studnicki, author of a project of mediation on which Italian diplomacy could have worked. The "Studnicki project" contemplated the substantial acceptance of German requests. The Reich would have got Danzig and the canals on the Vistula, a large extraterritorial highway through the Corridor, and guarantees for the minorities of German language. To Poland, as a moral satisfaction, would have remained the delta of Vistula. Studnicki's proposal was so well structured that Arone and the secretaries of the embassy believed that they were in front of a project arranged not much by the opposition, but by government circles. On 11 August [1939] the project was transmitted to Rome so that Ciano could read it before going to Salzburg to meet Ribbentrop. Meanwhile in Varsaw talks were started in order to verify the origin of the project. Counsellor [of the Italian embassy] Soro tells about a secret meeting between Arone and Arciszewski [Polish undersecretary of Foreign Affairs] in the French embassy by initiative of Noël, but it is not mentioned in official reports. Sure was, instead, the meeting, promoted by the Apostolic nuncio [Vatican ambassador] monsignor Cortesi, between deputy undersecretary Arciszewski and ambassador Arone. Witnessing the meeting between the two men, the nuncio got the impression that Studnicki's project was unknown by the minister.
When it was understood that the project was a mere idea of the opposition and was not endorsed by the Polish govern the discussion about it ended, and with it ended any hope of a peaceful solution of the Danzig crisis.

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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#608

Post by DrG » 31 Jul 2012, 02:34

I am going to post my translation of several passages taken from chapter VII "Perché la guerra (1938-1939)" ("Why the war (1938-1939)") of "Roma tra Londra e Berlino", Vol. II by the late prof. Rosaria Quartararo, printed by Jouvence, Pubblicazioni del Dipartimento di Studi Politici dell'Università di Roma "La Sapienza", 2001.
The full chapter is 106 pages long, plus 34 pages of notes, and deserves to be read line by line, but I would be unable to translate it fully. It is completely based upon primary sources from the Italia, British, French and German archives, plus memoirs, diaries, ecc. written by the people involved in the diplomatic relations of the time.
The parts in italics are present in the original, instead the notes in square brackets [] are mine.

The first passage is the opening of the chapter, which gives a general framework for the beginning of the Danzig crisis and the origins of WW2.
593-594 wrote:Till now, it has been reputed that the trustful abandon in the certainty of peace [after the Munich agreement] disappeared suddenly after the break of Nazi troops into Prague, which marked the irreversible end of appeasement. Actually, the Conference of Munich itself cancelled appeasement. In fact, once the euphoria of the moment had passed, the Anglo-French realized that the Munich agreement, besides having fatally compromised the role of the League of Nations and the system of French alliances, sanctioned also the failure of the British tradition against the strengthening of a great power on the continent. The central core of the "philosophy of that crisis", to use the words of Georges Bonnet [French foreign minister], was the certitude, by the part of London and Paris, that the Munich agreement had been the unavoidable outcome of their military weakness in comparison with Berlin; without that agreement, defeat would have been sure. That evaluation operated as a violent trauma, and it is in this fact that the origins of the end of appeasement must be retraced. The coup of Prague did nothing else than confirm the radical transformation happened in British policy. Since Munich, rage and worry characterized London's foreign policy towards Berlin and Rome; as usual, the French were towed into this policy by the British. The resounding resignations of Duff Cooper and the severe warnings by Churchill, shortly after Munich, were not isolated examples but were, on the contrary, the most evident expression of a general state of mind of revolt that became, between October and November 1938, even more widespread and general. In fact, British public opinion approved compactly, within a few months, a series of measures that not only were aimed at accelerating the rearm to a maximum, but also to put the Kingdom and the Empire in a virtual state of war. British and French were already firmly believing that a frontal conflict with imperialist Nazifascism was unavoidable. Thus, at the beginning of November, the "armed bloc of democracies" was born in Paris; it was the beginning of the encirclement policy that was concretized, in the first half of 1939, by a series of political offensives aimed, at the same time, against Berlin and against Rome. This line, started, directed and supported by Chamberlain, and approved unanimously by the official circles and by the majority of public opinion, constitued the "legitimate defence" of a senescent empire, that tried to guarantee its preservation against the menace of the continental expansion of Germany and of the Mediterranean expansion of Italy; because it is sure that, along with the defence of the Kingdom, it was added, on the British part, also the firm will of preserving the Empire, even though this implied the recourse to war.

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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#609

Post by DrG » 31 Jul 2012, 02:35

Several pages of Quartararo's chapter are devoted to British rearmament, also in the Mediterranean in spite of the Easter Agreements with Italy of April 1938, and to the failed negotiations between France and Italy, with the former at first making a proposal to the latter through Daladier's secret envoy Baudouin, a proposal fully accepted by Mussolini, and then refusing to sign this verbal agreement and to negotiate.

Now, about the occupation of Prague and the guarantee to Poland:
pages 624-626 wrote:The facts of Prague did nothing else than confirm the Anglo-French orientation [...] The complete partition of Czechoslovachia, a fact expected since a long time and that nobody tried to prevent, reinforced in Chamberlain, in the Cabinet and among British people, the belief that Prague did not represent much "the end of an old adventure, but the beginning of a new one... It's this, shorlty, the step towards the attempt to dominate world with force". The liberty of the Kingdom and of the Empire must be put before European peace. [...] In truth, Prague, and then Memel, offered to London the necessary moral support to continue openly the policy of encirclement of Germany and to mobilize the public opinion in the implementation of that policy. Moreover, it is documented that neither Prague neither Memel determined any change, nor reversal in the Anglo-French policy. Rather, the comparative examination of the directives pursued by Great Britain before and after the facts of Prague reveal that there was not the slightest qualitative change. There was only the official communication, but already known, of the need of further allocations of money for rearm. [...] The only true ripercussion that the facts of Prague had in London involved public opinion alone. Prague accelerated and accomplished, within a few hours, that process of national mobilization that had started shortly after Munich.[...]
The unconditional guarantee that London and Paris granted to Poland on 31 March, that up to today has looked like an untimely action, born ex abrupto from the facts of Prague, with which Great Britain and France binded themselves to enter war along with Poland without, nevertheless, being able to do anything to help her, becomes fully understandable only if inserted in the framework of the deep alteration happened in British policy after Munich: from appeasement to political and military encirclement of Germany and also of Italy. Only in this framework that absolutely unconditional, and also senseless, guarantee has a meaning, because, as noted by Taylor, the British were, by this time, unable both to push the Poles to negotiate with the Germans both to collaborate with the Russians.
Quartararo notes, moreover, that the first open action of reapproach between UK and USSR had happened before the occupation of Prague, when Chamberlain was the first British PM who took part to the Soviet Embassy party at the beginning of March 1939, a presence that foreign diplomats did not miss to understand in its deeper meanings.

Commenting the negative reaction of Italy in front of the occupation of Prague, Quartararo notes:
In reality, Mussolini would not have been able to leave the Axis simply because London and Paris did not offer to him any alternative solution. The British and French governments lost, on 15 March 1939, an excellent chance of driving Italy away from Germany, but they didn't care apparently.
Then, about the British duplicity in the occupation of Albania (which I mention also because it's an example of the similar behaivour kept with Germany during the occupation of Bohemia-Moravia; in fact, Chamberlain declared at the Commons that the German occupation was not binding UK to the pact of Munich because Czechoslovakia dissolved itself from within and thus the pact was void, but then the occupation of Prague became the excuse for the British guarantee to Poland):
pages 636-638 wrote:Between 8 and 9 April [the days of the Italian invasion], Crolla [Italian diplomat in London] visited the Foreign Office five times, following the instructions of Palazzo Chigi [Italian Ministry of Foreign affairs] in order to minimize the scope of the action in Albania and reaffirm the intangibility of Anglo-Italian friendship.
[...] During all those meetings, Halifax did not show any change in the line of full acquiescence that his govern had kept in front of the Italian action; on the contrary, he reaffirmed the validity of the Easter Agreements, he was complacent of the return home of the Italian legionaries in Spain, and assured Crolla that the Anglo-Italian crisis could be regarded as successfully avoided; he added that London would have done everything to consolidate the good relations with Rome and finally he expressed the gratitude of the Prime Minister for the assurances that Mussolini had given to Greece. About the episodic "intemperances" of the British press, Halifax declared that the Fascist govern had not to pay attention to them, because they did not mirror the attitude of the Cabinet. [...] Until 10 April, Halifax affirmed that Chamberlain was still attaching importance to the agreement of 16 April [1938, i.e. the Easter Agreements] and that he would have defended it to the hilt in the House of Commons. Up to that date, at the Commons, Chamberlain had provided a version of the facts of Albania accordant to the thesis of the Fascist govern; he had also declared solemnly that no[/] British interestes existed in Albania.
Then, suddenly, on 13 April, Chamberlain gave a guarantee to Greece and Romania in the House of Commons, immediately followed by Daladier. [text of Chamberlain's speech] Followed, shortly after, the formal decision to impose compulsory conscription and, finally, the pact with Turkey, already announced to the Commons on 13 April. So the encirclement of Italy was complete, from the Mediterranean to the Balkans. [...] More precisely, the conquest of Albania allowed the encirclement policy, already in place, to emerge completely to the surface and, at the same time, it provided its moral justification

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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#610

Post by DrG » 31 Jul 2012, 02:35

Among the several topics touched by Quartararo in the following pages, there is the aim of Italy in the signing of the Pact of Steel. That aim was fully understood by Sir Percy Loraine, British ambassador in Rome.
page 654 wrote:That Mussolini still desired, after the Pact of Steel, to stipulate an agreement with the French is confirmed by several sources, included the interpretation that London gave of the [Mussolini's] speech of Turin; a speech, this, that was a true and proper appeal to France on the eve of the signing of the Pact of Steel. Also Loraine, when he communicated to the Foreign Office this aspect of the speech of Turin, noticed that the Pact of Steel could have served as an instrument of peace, given the repeated declarations of the Duce and his will of mediating a pacific solution of the German-Polish dispute. Loraine, thus, assumed that the obligation of mutual consultation, provided for by the Pact, and Mussolini's desire to keep peace in Europe, safeguarded Polish independence better than the British guarantee.
The months of 1939 passed, with worsening diplomatic relations in Europe and a strenghtening of Anglo-French military cohoperation.
At the end of June 1939...
pages 660-662 wrote:Mussolini hoped that it was possible to solve the crisis of Danzig with a plebiscite that sanctioned the German character of the city. Such a plebiscite should have been organized and controlled by a committee of powers, formed by representatives of Germany, Poland, UK, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands and France. [...; this proposal was ignored by the other countries] Despite the fact that Chamberlain showed to be more than convinced that Germany wanted to occupy whole Poland and start a European war, at the same time he declared to be inclined to accept a peaceful solution of the crisis, if the "Germans had come to their senses". But he did not explain how an eventual peaceful solution would have concretized. From the instructions of Halifax to Loraine it is possible to deduce that Chamberlain hoped that Mussolini, without any formal request by the Anglo-French part, induced Hitler to give up Danzig. In reality, from Chamberlain's diary, we understand that the Premier was expecting the outbreak of war at any moment and did not want to accept a new Munich at all.
In this context, the joint efforts of Palazzo Venezia [the seat of Mussolini's govern] and the Vatican to persuade the British to promote direct negotiations between Berlin and Varsaw were usuccessfull. Indeed, on 7 July, Phipps [British ambassador to France] communicated to Bonnet a verbal message from the Prime Minister to Daladier, proposing the need of opening negotiations with Rome because "Mussolini's intervention has saved us all from war last year". Phipps told that also the French obstination was "deplorable", expecially after that the Duce had declared, at least a dozen of times, that he was ready to negotiate... Then, revelaing the very spirit of the message that almost all the Foreing Office had written to Daladier in name of Chamberlain - a letter that, by the way, had not been delivered yet - Phipps underlined that, even if the negotiations between Paris and Rome had aborted, they would have been useful to give more time to Great Britain and France to complete their "formidable preparation" and to show to the whole world that Western democracies were sincere in their will of peace. [the French refused to negotiate anyway]
At the end of July 1939...
pages 665-666 wrote:Mussolini, meanwhile, continued, by his own initiative, to make pressures on Hitler to induce him to accept an international conference; moreover, the announcement of that conference was the only aim of the meeting with Hitler at the Brenner, scheduled for 4 August, to which the Duce intended to confer "an effective content of the highest international extent". [...] The vast emotion that such an initiative would have caused in the international public opinion, and in the British in particular - that in the past had shown to be very inclined to accept a de iure solution to the Danzig problem - would have forced the Anglo-French to accept the Italo-German offer [of a conference]. Conversely, in the event that London and Paris would refuse, they would have borne the responsability of the following occurrences.
Ribbentrop and Hitler rejected Mussolini's project because, in the so called "war of nerves", it was necessary to go all the way, without "yieldings" or "weaknesses". Hitler was believing, then, that Poland would have ended up ceding Danzig; yet he seemed to agree with Mussolini about the need of avoiding a general conflagration and reserved to express his opinion at the conference. [due to this reply, Mussolini cancelled the meeting at the Brenner] On August the 1st, Attolico [Italian ambassador in Berlin] reported that Hitler, despite the fact that he was preparing war on Poland, was still keeping a political perspective "open both to war and to peace". Two factors, in particular, influenced Hitler's mind: the uncertainty about the chance of "isolating" Poland and the outcome of the Anglo-Franco-Russian negotiations. Although Ribbentrop talked to everybody, with the utmost indifference, of a 10-years-long war, in truth Hitler had not taken any decision yet.

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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#611

Post by DrG » 31 Jul 2012, 02:36

According to Quartararo, the behaivour of Ribbentrop, who didn't inform Ciano with the deails that were required by the Pact of Steel and spoke about war with Poland at Salzburg on 11-12 Aug., and the will of Italy to avoid war, alienated Germany from the eyes of Mussolini. Quartararo comments (page 668)
it is a reality that Mussolini and Ciano, after Salzburg, tried in every way to save Europe from the war, relying on the British collaboration; a collaboration that was denied. Although the impact of the conference of Salzburg on Fascist policy was certainly deep, it seems that Ribbentrop proposed deliberately the breaking of Poland, in other words "the maximum program", with the twofold aim of probing the attitude of Rome and of promoting Mussolini's mediation with London in order to achieve the "minimum program", in other words Danzig and the corridor. That the full conquest of Poland was the "maximum program" of Hitler is maybe true. It is not certain, instead that he aimed exclusively at pursuing this object, neither that Poland was the keystone of the unconditional expansion of the Reich to the East and the West. The examination of the diplomatic exchanges between Rome, London, Berlin and Paris reveals, in fact, on the one hand that the Germans were willing, till the end, to negotiate with the Poles; on the other hand that Mussolini, while he exercized incessant pressures on Hitler to induce him to keep himself open to negotiations with Varsaw, was able to distance himself from Germany so that, at the beginning of the war, the "decoupling" had already happened de facto.
After Salzburg, Mussolini compiled a "project of communiqué to the German govern" in which he repeated with the maximum clarity that Italy would not have entered war for Danzig and that, on the contrary, the German-Polish controversy could have been solved very well by a negotiation. At the same time, Attolico paid visit to the British ambassador [in Berlin] Henderson to solicit a close Anglo-Italian collaboration with the aim of guaranteeing European peace.
Mussolini wanted to curb the Germans, but London had to collaborate, inducing the Poles to negotiate with the Reich. Attolico asked Henderson whether Chamberlain was willing to make a mediation along with Mussolini; Henderson replied in an evasive way, because now more than before Lodon was fully projected towards war. [In UK] The only critiques that opposition made to the govern were about alleged deficiencies in defensive preparations and in the organization of the provisioning. Object of critique was also the formulation of negotiations with USSR, that proceeded too slowly; the Labourists wanted that Chamberlain and Halifax dealed personally with Molotov and Stalin, to guarantee the certainty of the collaboration "of the huge Russian army and air force". [...] Britain had to enter war; moreover, it had, from now, to guarantee to Czechoslovakia that its independence would have been restored after the victory on Germany.
During the first half of August 1939...
pages 670-671 wrote:The govern of London continued to ignore the tension between Berlin and Varsaw and, at the same time, choose a line of full closure towards Rome; and this despite the fact that the High Commissioners of Australia and South Africa underlined the need and urgence of an Anglo-Italian collaboration to solve the Danzig crisis. [...] On 15 August Attolico made a démarche to Henderson to urge a British mediation with Varsaw, underlining that Hitler would have entered war only if he would have not been able to solve peacefully the issue of Danzig and the corridor. Henderson replied that there was no chance of a compromise and that his govern intened to keep the commitments taken with Poland. Weizsäcker, who met Coulondre [French ambassador in Berlin] that same day and had with him a conversation of very similar content, had no more success than Attolico. The reply of the French ambassador clarifies that also Paris, even though grudgingly, had firmly oriented itself towards preemptive war, understood as a supreme need. "Besides the obligations of juridical nature, France was forced to support Poland for the defence of her interests that required the equilibrium in East Europe in order to guarantee French security." [source: letter by Henderson to the Foreign Office]

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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#612

Post by DrG » 31 Jul 2012, 02:37

Here are some examples, still from Quartararo, of how Italy tried to preserve peace, and UK replied menacing war not only on Germany, but on Italy too:
pages 672-674 wrote:Also Grandi [former ambassador in London and now Minister of Justice, but still the most importat Italian diplomat], who met Dingli [Chamberlain's personal contact with Mussolini] in Rome on 19 August, asserted that the destiny of Europe depended on Anglo-Italian collaboration. This policy was, by now, much more easy to be achieved because, after Salzburg, the pro-German faction had lost much ground. Now it was possible to untie Italy from Germany. Why did not Chamberlain himself propose and international conference? Mussolini would have accepted gladly such a proposal and would have used his influence on Hitler to push him to take part. Grandi underlined to Dingli that he had to communicate this to Chamberlain with the utmost urgency; nevertheless, Grandi had understood how deeply the British policy had changed since Munich. Now there was a strange calm, a great quiet in London: "By now the British have gotten the idea that war cannot be avoided and wait for it with the quiet and fatalism of a terrible and necessary thing." The same day, the Foreign Office gave instructions to Loraine to bring to Mussolini a message in which it was reaffirmed the thesis that, if anybody tried to impose to Poland the acceptance of the German diktat, France and Great Britain would have entered war, even if this would have caused an Anglo-Italian conflict. In vain Henderson, from Berlin, told Halifax that "if something hadn't been done now" to push the Poles on the way of negotiation, war would have been unavoidable. The Germans asked for direct contacts with Varsaw. Given that it seemed impossible to establish these contacts, as an alternative, Weizsäcker proposed the visit to Berlin of an "English personality linked to the Cabinet", who spoke German and confered directly with Hitler.
Also Loraine asked instructions in vain. What to do, after the avances of Attolico to Henderson aimed at a Mussolini-Chamberlain joint action? Should he talk to Ciano? Halifax replied that he had to avoid any initiative; it was necessary to proceed with the maximum "caution" to avoid to ingenerate "misunderstandings". To Crolla, who he met "by chance" (because he had not thought it appropriate to convene him), Halifax told that his govern, in order to accept the beginning of German-Polish negotiations, wanted that previously it were devised "a way to give Poland the absolute certainty that the eventual agreement between Berlin and Varsaw would be then scrupulously respected".
He did not explain, however, in what way it would have been possible. Moreover, London knew perfectly that Mussolini was going on to curb the Germans, envisaging the chance of a negotiation with Varsaw; and London knew that Fascist Italy did not want to start a war against France and Great Britain for the issue of Danzig. Towards the Germans, Rome kept a behaivour of absolute firmness. Ciano told Mackensen that the present crisis derived from the fact that the Führer had rejected the idea of a conference in July; nevertheless, Italy was still willing to collaborate to the cause of peace and hoped that Berlin would have taken concrete initiatives in that direction. With Loraine, instead, Ciano was more explicit: he proposed a multilateral guarantee, Italian, British, French and German, to safeguard Poland, adding that, if Hitler had broken the pacts, this would have concurrently marked the end of the Axis and of the Pact of Steel. Loraine, always in lack of instructions, limited himself to say that, if Germany had attacked Poland, then Great Britain would have marched against the invaders. He underlined also that the British public opinion was, by now, galvanized to such an extent that no govern would have been able to try a different solution without being overthrown within a few hours. Indeed, Halifax and the Cabinet, fully oriented towards preemptive war against Germany, hoped in Italian mediation only verbally and did not want to collaborate with Mussolini at all.
In the following days the situation continued to be more or less as already described, and the announcement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact did not alter the British attitude, while it increased the estrangement of Mussolini from Germany and made the French colder about the war.
pages 679-683 wrote:Completely ignoring the appeals from Rome and Paris, and those by Henderson from Berlin, on 25 August Great Britain signed the alliance with Poland, making irreversible the intransigent and bellicose attitude of the Poles. Thus Hitler took the initiative, in the hope of overcoming the impasse. On 25 August - the same day in which, supposedly, he should have attacked Poland - after having received another communication from Attolico (in which it was repeated, as usual, that Italy would have not entered war), Hitler gave to Henderson a message for Chamberlain, underlining that his initiative should be interpreted in London as his formal request to solve the problem of Danzig with a negotiation. [...] The meaining of Hitler's avance was evident. War against Poland was still the ultima ratio, and it was mostly a strong stimulus to push London to exert its influence on Varsaw. Hitler wanted a negotiated solution. His offer of a "permanent agreement" and of a guarantee to the British Empire did not aim only to refutate the "ludicrous" declaration by Halifax to the Commons that "Germany aimed at governing the world", but derived more probably from the fact that Hitler, much more than Mussolini, had understood the deep reasons of the British policy and of her "front of peace".
Not even Lipski [Polish ambassador in Berlin] was able to understand the strange behaivour of the British govern. Why didn't London communicate with Varsaw? And why didn't he get instructions from Varsaw? It was clear that Varsaw was waiting for advices and suggestions from London and Paris that did not come... Meanwhile, Beck was becoming even more bellicose; he reached the point of telling to the British ambassador, Kennard, that, given the climate of of high tension existing at the border with the Germans, ha "may be forced to take isolated initiatives". Meanwhile, after his last talk with Hitler, Henderson returned immediately to London to try to convince Halifax to accept a compromise solution to the current crisis. The following day, the chargé d'affairs in Berlin Sir Oglivie Forbes gave to Weizsäcker a Memorandum with dilatory aims: the British Cabinet intended to examinate "calmly the proposal of the Führer". Nazi Germany decided to wait: Hitler continued to keep himself equally disposed towards peace and war. [Meanwhile Italy gave to Germany the so-called "molibdenium list", a list of rough materials needed to enter war that had been deliberately exagerated in order to justify the future Italian neutrality]
Unmoved, London continued to sabotage the action of Rome. Despite the fact that the Cabinet was still "studying" Hitler's proposal, the Admiralty had already ordered all the units of the Royal Navy to leave the Mediterranean, preannouncing also "precautionary measures". Also the French had taken similar measures in Europe and the Mediterranean, with the result of displaying to the Germans that the Allied powers regarded Italy as an enemy. Without doubt, this did not serve to strengthen the mediation of Mussolini, instead it got the opposite effect.
[...] The British asked Mussolini to use his influence in Berlin to launch a German-Polish agreement limited only to the issue of Danzing and the corridor. This communication is even more contradictory if we take into account that the essential pre-requisite for any German-Polish agreement was to establish finally direct contacts between the two parts involved. Mussolini has been pushing on Berlin for a long time; the last British proposal, then, should have assumed an analogous action, by the British govern, on Varsaw. Instead, during his meeting with Raczynski, happened in London on 26 August, Halifax did not make the slightest pressure to move the Poles to negotiate. He envisaged, indeed, the chance of a negotiated solution, but hinted at Hitler's proposal with so vague and ambigous terms that he consolidated even more the deep distrust that the Poles felt towards the Germans. In fact, when Raczynski [Polish ambassador in London]explained the point of view of his govern - i.e. that it was absolutely not the case of trusting Hitler - Halifax fully agreed with that "diagnosis". [...] The French, on the contrary, started to feel painfully the weight of the "front of peace". Bonnet informed Guariglia [Italian ambassador in Paris] that Paris was making - separatedly - pressures on Varsaw to force it to negotiate; he added that he was confident in a similar action on Berlin by Rome. Even the irreducible Daladier had replied in a conciliatory way to the letter that Hitler had sent to him on 25 August - the same day of the Führer's démarche with London - declaring that France was ready to collaborate so that the negotiations between Berlin and Varsaw reached a success. François-Poncet [French ambassador in Rome] continued to press on Loraine to force the British to avoid war, underlining that now the French Cabinet was willing to go "very far" to repay with dignity the mediation of Fascist Italy; drily, Loraine replied that Mussolini had to take his decisions alone: if he wished, he could go on curbing Hitler, or, if he preferred to enter war along with him, he was absolutely free of doing it... London, that was the true and only arbiter of the crisis of 1939, continued to refuse any mediation that could avoid war. Still with the intent of shaking Great Britain, the Germans, who did not talk about "victories of the Axis" anymore, tried at least to underline its solidity. Indeed, given that Italy did not do anything else than trying to convince London and Berlin to collaborate to solve peacefully the issue of Danzig, if the Germans had aimed exclusively to the breaking of Poland and the conquer of the world, they should have reacted very negatively in front of Mussolini's attempts. On the contrary, it emerges with the maximum clarity that those who reacted negatively, or, better, did not react at all, were the British.

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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#613

Post by DrG » 31 Jul 2012, 02:38

On 27 and 28 August Ciano continued to make pressures on Halifax, who announced that he had sent a reply to Hitler's offers. Thus Mussolini wrote to Hitler suggesting to give the maximum importance to the British reply.
page 683 wrote:The Duce persevered again in his attempt to promote a "dialogue" at least between London and Berlin because the situation was objectively absurd: no contacts between London and Berlin; even less contacts between Berlin and Varsaw. Not only, but there weren't even consultations between London and Paris aimed at the promotion of a negotiated solution...
page 684-686 wrote:Finally, on 29 August, Henderson handed the reply of his govern to Hitler. From the tone of the British message, and from the speech that Chamberlain made at the Commons, it seemed that the international crisis was going to reach a peaceful solution; the British, in fact, guaranteed that Poland was ready to enter negotiations with Berlin about the issue of Danzig and of the corridor. Hitler, although "skeptical" about the good will of the Poles, handed to Henderson a Memorandum for the Cabinet in which he repeated that Germany asked only Danzig and the corridor, plus some guarantees for the ethnic German groups in Polish territory. To Henderson he told, moreover, that he had already prepared the proposals to be submitted to the Poles, proposals that would have been object of negotiation. Thus he asked that a Polish plenipotentiary would come to him by the evening of 30 August.
Why did Hitler leave a lapse of time so short? Had he reached, maybe, the decision of invading and conquer whole Poland? Maybe; but instead it is more probable that the term fixed on 30 August had been decided with the aim of gaining now what, till that day, Mussolini had not managed to get: a prompt British mediation with Varsaw; this would have been logic and consequent, all the more given that the British had guaranteed in writing that the Poles were ready to negotiate. That Hitler was still undecided whether to resort to weapons or not is confirmed by a circular of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, containing detailed requests to Poland - Danzig and a plebiscite for the Corridor - communicated to the British by the Swede Dahlerus, and by Halder's handnotes, from which the same requests can be gathered. Both the documents have the date "30 August". We can then conclude that Hitler, even though he was personally convinced that neither the British neither the Poles wanted to yield, still hoped that finally the British negotiation in Varsaw would take place; otherwise, if the British had refused again to collaborate, he would have invaded Poland and, from a position of force, he would have forced the Poles, British and French to negotiate again with Germany. In fact, Ribbentrop told Attolico that Hitler had decided to solve the issue with Poland "in one way or another"... Also in the opinion of Attolico Hitler had not yet reached a final choice and pursued, at the same time, the objective of peace and war.
What is sure is that, if the Polish plenipotentiary did not appear and the days of 30 and 31 August elapsed without that it was possible to establish a contact between Berlin and Varsaw it depended on a precise choice by Great Britain, that had been preparing a preemptive war for months, aimed at the political and militar annihilation of Germany. This interpretation is confirmed by the evolution of the British policy, between 30 August and 2 September 1939, towards Italy and Germany. Rome, indeed, besides going on with its action of mediation between London and Berlin, made ouvertures of a different kind to the British; she reached the point of proposing the denounciation of the Axis and the Pact of Steel.
Mussolini then proposed an Italian guarantee to the agreement reached by the hoped international conference, a guarantee that Italy would have broken the Axis and the Pact of Steel if Germany hadn't followed duly the new international pact. Moreover, if France had accepted the Italian requests, which were the same things that had already been offered by the French through Baudouin six months before and then not implemented, Mussolini was willing to sign a non-aggression pact with UK and France.
page 686 wrote:That pact, besides insuring Italian neutrality, would have been, in the view of Mussolini of foreign affairs, a formidable tool of pressure to force Hitler to give up any project of war.
Given that Italy would have remained neutral anyway, London ignored the Italian proposal.
When the French ambassador in Rome François-Poncet asked his British omologue Loraine about Mussolini's mediation, the British openly lied, pretending that Mussolini might not be willing to negotiate (while he had continued to repeat it for months):
pages 687-688 wrote:The true sentiments of Great Britain towards Fascist Italy emerged clearly from the talk that Loraine had, that same day [29 August 1939], with François-Poncet. Given that the French embassy pressed, again, Loraine to ask officially to the Duce to make, also in name of London, the mediation with Berlin, the British ambassardor was forced "...to wear his best skates to slip on ice...", he replied that the situation was so much "enigmatic" and "delicate" that he could not risk a "refusal from Mussolini". If the Duce cosidered appropriate to intervene on Berlin, he could do it alone, without the British intervention; while, if he wanted to join Germany and enter the war, he was free to do it. From his stance, however, it was clear that he would have stayed neutral. Therefore, until that hypothesis hadn't become a certitude, neither London neither Paris had to ask his mediation... This certifies that the British govern had already chosen, on 29 August, the road to war. Indeed, when Magistrati [an Italian diplomat in Berlin] went to the British embassy to know from Ogilvie Forbes a summary of the meeting between Henderson and Hitler, he discovered that the British had already packed their luggages... In full contrast with that atmosphere of general demobilization, Ogilvie Forbes reassured Magistrati that London was guaranteeing the Polish will of opening negotiations with the Germans...

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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#614

Post by DrG » 31 Jul 2012, 02:38

Now, let's see what were the British actions to move the Poles to negotiate on 29 Aug. 1939, as analyzed by prof. Quartararo:
pages 688-690 wrote:With the Poles, instead, London had not taken any initiative yet. Despite the pressures of Henderson on Halifax, in Varsaw Kennard and Beck continued quietly to congratulate each other for their firmness. In this context it can be understood that the message that Chamberlain sent to Hitler, on 30 August, was nothing more than a masterpiece of hypocrisy:
We are examining the German note with the utmost urgency. We are explaining to Varsaw how it is of vital importance that they give instructions aimed at avoiding border incidents.
That same day, i.e. 30 August, the Polish govern decided mobilization starting from the following day. Still on 30 August, when Henderson brought to Hitler the message from Chamberlain, he incidentally informed Weiszäcker that the Cabinet was trying to understand whether the preceding note by Hitler was an ultimatum or not. Until that crucial aspect hadn't been clarified, the British govern informed the German one that it was not sure of being able to persuade the Poles to send to Germany a plenipotentiary... On 30 August in Varsaw happened what follows: Kennard, on the one hand, affirmed that it was absolutely useless to make pressures on the Poles, who, by now, preferred to die rather than humiliate themselves in front of the Germans; on the other hand, he trifled, purely at theoretical level, with the idea of a conference to be held, in an unspecified future, in a netural country, or maybe in Italy. Meanwhile Halifax communicated to Bonnet and Henderson that London had already informed Varsaw that she was not able to bear the responsability of giving advices to her. The Poles had to decide alone whether to negotiate or not with the Germans.
It was in that moment that Henderson, who returned to the British embassy at 2 am in the night between 30 and 31 August, decided to "play the card of peace to the very end"; by his own initiative he went to meet Lipski to ask him to organize, at the last moment, the meeting between two of the "highest personalities", one Polish and the other German, with the aim of making Poland at least examine those 16 points that Hitler had made them read to him as a preview in the morning of 29 August. It is necessary to underline that, till that moment, Lipski, left without instructions, had been cut off from the contacts, by the way rather scant and sui generis, between London and Berlin, so that he had reputed to avoid the halls of the Wilhelmstrasse... Between Berlin and Varsaw there had not been any communication. However, that night, after the request by Henderson, Lipski seemed to be inclined to ask Varsaw the authorization to meet Ribbentrop. Henderson, anyway, "in order to ease in, invocked the help of Attolico, who he knew was in good relations with Lipski". So, at the early hours of 31 August, Attolico went to Lipski to persuade him too. The Italian ambassador ran to Ribbentrop and, not without effort he almost forced him to have Weiszäcker summon Lipski. [in other words, despite Henderson and Attolico's efforts, it was not Lipski who went to Ribbentrop by his own initiative, he went only because he had been invited] In the afternoon, Ribbentrop informed Attolico that Lipski had gone to the Wilhelmstrasse, but as a simple ambassador, and not as a plenipotentiary. Not only he had no power to negotiate about the German-Polish issues, but hadn't even wanted to give a glimpse to the 16-points German Memorandum. This was then confirmed by Hitler, who asked to meet Attolico in the evening of 31 August. Hitler told him that, after the British "guarantee" about the Polish immediate disposability he had waited in vain, for two days, that Varsaw sent a plenipotentiary to him. In order to please Italy, finally he had summoned Lipski. But Lipski hadn't even wanted to read the text containing the proposals of Berlin. As a consequence, Hitler regarded as "failed" the British mediation.
An official communiqué from Great Britain arrived in Berlin that same day, after 11 pm; it pointed out that it was impossibile to send a Polish plenipotentiary and it suggested to the Reich to communicate with Poland through "normal" diplomacy - something that had already happened after the intervention of Attolic, who had pushed Ribbentrop to call Lipski. Insofar as it can look incredible, after that 36 hours had elapsed since the German request to start negotiations with a plenipotentiary of the govern of Varsaw, and when, by then, the German and Polish armies were at rifle shoots range, London "suggested" Berlin to try normal diplomatic ways... In retrospect, Attolico, analyzing the behaivour of Great Britain during the crisis, reached the conclusion that London, consciously, had aimed at preemptive war against Germany to safeguard the Kingdom and the Empire, using cynically the Polish pawn.

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DrG
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Re: Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

#615

Post by DrG » 31 Jul 2012, 02:39

On 31 August 1939 Mussolini, along with the Holy See, tried again to propose an international conference, to be held on 5 September, and which should have been attended by Germany, Poland, UK, France, Italy, Spain and USSR. Given that war was very near, Mussolini believed that the only way to make Hitler agree to a conference was that Poland would accept, in line of principle, that the conference would grant the German annexion of Danzing. In order to reach this, he firstly informed UK and France, then, if they had agreed, he would inform Hitler, putting him in the position of bearing all the responsability for war if he had refused such a good compromise.
UK and France had very different reactions:
pages 692-695 wrote:By telephone, Ciano "begged" Halifax to give him an answer with the utmost urgency. There was not a minute left, the German-Polish hostilities could start at any moment.
Halifax talked with Chamberlain about the content of his two talks with Ciano. Then they called Corbin [French ambassador in London], who "knew nothing" of Mussolini's proposal and thus had to phone to Paris to be informed by Bonnet. The latter told that, according to Coulondre's reports the situations appeared to be "not much serious"; anyway, Bonnet had to consult Daladier, who, in turn, wished to summon the whole Cabinet. Anyway, Bonnet promised to Corbin and the British that he would have sent a reply by the French govern within a few hours. Chamberlain, instead, without even summoning the Cabinet, had already decided to reject Mussolini's proposal. To Halifax he said that it was impossible to endorse "a peace conference under the threat of armies". At least, it should have been indispensable a prior "demobilization". Moreover, Rome hadn't specified which powers should have possibly taken part to the conference. This last statement looks very ambiguous, if we consider that Ciano had explicitly talked about the attendance of Poland, Russia and Spain, as is attested by British documents [...] Later, Halifax phoned Ciano. Completely ignoring Mussolini's proposal, he limited himself to reaffirm the well known British thesis that Poland could not give up her rights on Danzig before the beginning of negotiations. Given Hitler's brutal methods, the Poles wanted "precise guaratees". Again, Halifax did not explain how it was possible to give those "precise guarantees" to the Poles. Thus he repeated that, in order to communicate with Varsaw, Berlin had to apply the "normal procedure"; in other words, Ribbentrop had to communicate the proposals of the Reich to Lipski. Then Ciano replied that Attolico had already made a démarche to Berlin with that content; at the moment, he was waiting for a reply.
Not less significant was French attitude. At the beginning of the afternoon of 31 August, Daladier phoned Chamberlain to communicate that, rather than accepting "a second Munich", he was ready to resign immediately. Then the French capitulated all along; after the meeting of the Cabinet, Bonnet phoned Halifax: France has accepted Mussolini's proposal now and had already prepared a draft of the official document to be sent to Rome. Meanwhile, the day had elapsed without that the British had communicated their reply to Ciano. [...] Given that London was delaying the communication of her reply about the conference, Ciano was forced to inform Berlin of the content of Mussolini's proposal without knowing what would have been the attitude of the Anglo-French. As a consequence, as it can be expected, the talk that Attolico had with Hitler, at 7 pm of 31 August, hand't a very encouraging outcome; [Attolico] noted that, of course, Hitler wished to know London's reply before committing himself. The Führer underlined that, if that reply hadn't arrived by the end of that day, the offensive against Poland would have started inexorably. Maybe, only after having dropped a few German bombs on Polish soil, London would have decided to make its work of persuasion on Varsaw. These words did not imply, however, that Hitler had decided to invade Poland. Fatalistically, the Führer told Attolico that "It was necessary to wait for the course of events". He did not want to "go on being slapped on his face by the Poles", neither he wanted to put Mussolini in an embarassing position. He believed, after the so-called British "guarantee", that the Poles would have not paid the least attention to Mussolini's proposal. When Attolico asked if "things have reached an end", Hitler answered in the affirmative. With this, Hitler meant that he wished to clarify that, if London had not given a positive reply also on behalf of Varsaw, a conference would have been possible only after that German bombers would have shaken strongly the nerves of the Poles and of Western democracies. After all, Lipski's behaivour, that evening, confirmed that the govern of Varsaw was keeping a stance of absolute refusal.
On September 1st, at dawn, started the attack of German bombers on Poland. A few hours later, Loraine handed to Ciano a "verbal note" of ambiguous content; on the one hand, the British govern communicated that the Cabinet was still studying Mussolini's proposal; on the other hand, it "seemed", from the news received, that the military action underook by the Germans made it "difficult" to go on the way of mediation. The French, instead, had sent to Rome their unconditional adhesion. Indeed, the [French] Minister of Air Force told Guariglia, on behalf of Daladier, that France was "absolutely determined" to reactivate the Italo-French friendship, "with all the consequences that ensue". In front of the spectre of war, the "Jamais" [the strong "No" shouted by Daladier during a speech, brandishing a Corsican dagger, in response to Italian vociferous claims in the Autumn of 1938] of Daladier had dissolved as fog in the sun, also because, unlike British public opinion, the French did not want war. Corbin told Halifax, in fact, that the future conference should not have solved only the "partial and immediate problems", but also reorganize the whole European structure in a way to guarantee peace. Moreover, unbeknown to the British, Bonnet had continued to push Beck to induce him to accept the Italian proposal of an international conference.
[...] [Hitler official reply to Mussolini] This means that Hitler intended to stop the invasion after the first skirmishes beyond the border, do induce Poles, British and French to come to terms.
This interpretation is substantiated by several documents, and expecially by the directives that the Wilhelmstrasse sent that day to the diplomatic representations:
In defence against Polish attacks, German troops have moved against Poland today on the dawn. This action, for the time being, cannot be defined war, but only skirmishes that have been caused by Polish provocations...
In fact, on 2 September, Hitler approved, on line of principle, the proposal of an international conference.

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