Poland and checoslovakia together in alliance

[Pavel Novak]

I doubt that Romania and Yugoslavia would go to war against Germany even in such scenario. Little Entente was aimed only against Hungary and Romania made clear in 1938 that they would fulfil its treaty obligations in case of hungarian attack against Czechoslovakia but no more. I don't know however details of Romanian - Polish alliance.

Btw. If France declared war to Germany due to its war declaration to Czechoslovakia also the Soviet Union is obliged to declare war to Germany because of complicated alliance France - the Soviet Union - Czechoslovakia. Soviet foreign minister had speech in 1938 that they fulfil this treaty if activated (which did not happened historically due to Munich and despite communist propaganda after war Soviets refused to go to war over Czechoslovakia in 1938 alone).

Regards

[Halibutt]

I doubt that Romania and Yugoslavia would go to war against Germany even in such scenario. Little Entente was aimed only against Hungary and Romania made clear in 1938 that they would fulfil its treaty obligations in case of hungarian attack against Czechoslovakia but no more. I don't know however details of Romanian - Polish alliance.

+1 here. As to Pol-Rom alliance, it was clearly and specifically anti-Soviet. That is both parties promised to help the other in case of Soviet aggression, no mention of other states in the treaty.
Cheers

[KevWad]

This is actually one of my favorite What If senerios, one book I have "What If?" talks about it, from reading this and that believe that...
First the German army attacking Czechoslovakia would be very limited, as Hitler didn't trust Poland and stations many of his troops in Eastern Germany and Prussia. The would likely be fighting going on in Eastern Prussia (If wither Poland or German attacks first) and the Poles would for sure have more time to mobilize, and start their own offensive. As not many know the Poles did raid a German town (Which I believe was about 3-5 km in German territory) in Sept 2nd, and is was a success (now we can take something like that, only magnify it!). Another thing nobody brought up was that the Germans were planning an airborne drop on Czechoslovakia. When they practiced it on the day is was originally scheduled for (For the German attack on the Czechs) it turned out a disaster, weather being the biggest factor, and in combat conditions it won't be likely the Germans would have that much success.

Only thing is that would the USSR take advantage of the situation and start another Polish-Soviet war?

I doubt that Romania and Yugoslavia would go to war against Germany even in such scenario. Little Entente was aimed only against Hungary and Romania made clear in 1938 that they would fulfil its treaty obligations in case of hungarian attack against Czechoslovakia but no more. I don't know however details of Romanian - Polish alliance.
Regards

Well Romania and Hungry were both close friends with Poland, even if they won't actually go to war, they will give aid, to the Czechs and Poles. Yugoslavia would probably only join if Hungry and Romania joins, but the chances of that happening isn't too dim.

[Pavel Novak]

I have been little thinking about what need to be different for Czechoslovak-Polish alliance to work. Basically there are two sets of problems - 1) czechoslovak-polish relations and 2) their relations to other states.

1) To have better relations both states had to recognize need of each other immediatelly at the end of ww1 thus Czechoslovakia did not made that stupid invasion in 1919 and both states needed to be able to reach compromise over borders.

2) This point is no less complicated than the previous one because Poland and Czechoslovakia need to have joint approach to other countries. That means mainly the Soviet Union, Germany and Hungary.

2.A) Hungary
There is no hope for good Czechoslovak-Hungarian relationship if even small part of Upper Hungary is controlled by Prague. Historically Hungary did not left Slovakia in 1918 but there was regular war for whole Upper Hungary. For working alliance between Poland and Czechoslovakia, Poland needs to abandon good relations with Hungary. On the good side such polish move would strengthen their relations with Romania.

2.B) Germany
This is problematic too. Czechoslovakia had surprisingly good relations with Weimar Germany and btw. occupation of Bohemian borderland by Prague in 1918 was done with content of German state. During 1920s Czechoslovakia did not considered Germany as hostille state and most of Czechoslovak army was oriented against Hungary. Czechoslovak-German relations deteriorated only after 1933. On the other hand Polish relations with Germany were pretty hostille in 1920s and were better for some time after Nazis came to power. For Czechoslovak-Polish alliance both states had to recognize Germany as potential military threat and sustain such view.

3.C) the Soviet Union
In this case Czechoslovakia needs to see the USSR as threat to central Europe and not as counter-balance force against Germany. Such move would strengthen ties also with Romania.

Finally even if all of this happened security of Poland and Czechoslovakia is still seriously endangered. At best it could led to Polish membership in the Little Entente and functioning of this alliance as defense pact against all possible agressors. Such a pact with at least political support from France could be strong enough deterrent against German threat thus prevent German adventure in the East. But if the USSR are left outside there would be geopolitical pressure to form German-USSR pact. Once such pact exists the expanded Little Entente is doomed.

So basically I think that as long as there were power hungry great powers in west and east Czechoslovakia and Poland could not prevent their occupation without very strong commitment from France and the United Kingdom and even such help doesn't need to be enough.

[Tim Smith]

The question is how Germany should wage war against Poland and Czechoslovakia. Where to attack?

Regards

It's a difficult decision for the Germans. If they go on the defensive against Poland while concentrating against Czechoslovakia, the Polish Army will push forward into Germany at least as far as the Oder, and overrun nearly all of East Prussia (Koenigsburg enclave might hold out as it did in 1944, supplied by sea, as the Kriegsmarine will quickly overwhelm the small Polish Navy.)

If the Germans do it the other way round, attacking Poland first with the aim of pushing the Poles back to the Narew-Vistula line, the Czech Army will likely smash its way into Austria, reaching at least as far as the Danube, and possibly taking Vienna itself.

[Pavel Novak]

If Germany fights just Poland and Czechoslovakia, it can always win throug war of attrition but longer war can lead to another participants. Question is if and how can Germany win quickly.

Germans possibilities at the start:
1. attack Czechoslovakia

- A) from western direction with rest of borders only covered against counterattack
--- German concentration would be enough to slowly push czechoslovak forces over all of length of Czechoslovakia – classical war of attrition, heavy losses and long war.

- B) trying to cut Czechoslovakia from North and South with aim to cut off czechoslovak forces in Bohemia
--- Theoretically gives chances for shorter war but it is questionable if it is possible even if Germany fights only with Czechoslovakia. Possible Polish attacks against rear of german northern concentration in Silesia would reduce power of such attack even more. Probably heavy german losses and initial defeat than once again long war of attrition.

- C) attack Czechoslovakia just from south
--- once again war of attrition – as Germans attacks in one direction Czechoslovakia and Poland could concentrate its reserves against it

2. attack Poland

- A) from Silesia and eastern Prussia towards Warsaw
--- Czechoslovak counter attack against rear of forces in Silesia can very complicate such action. Czechoslovak and Polish general staffs actually planned common attack against Silesia in early 30s so CS army wouldn’t be completely unprepared for such action. If Poland can stop attack from north than once again war of attrition.

B) attack against Polish corridor than against Warsaw
--- Such attack can be initially successful as I do not think that Polish forces can keep corridor. However it is questionable if Germany would be able to continue quickly against Warsaw.

There is also possibility of joint Polish-Czechoslovak preemptive strike against Germany however I do not think that such attack would be successful because of strong german air force and mechanized forces with which German army could outmaneuver attacking forces.

[glenn239]

Question is if and how can Germany win quickly.

No, that is not the question. Events unfolded as they did because between Germany and the Soviet Union there was a shared common will to overthrow the status quo, and these Powers had the ability to redraw Eastern Europe to their collective fancy. No coalition of Powers on Earth could stop them.

So the question is what difference does a Polish-Czech alliance make against this reality? At most, the Nazi-Soviet Pact has to be adjusted to an all-out Red Army assault on Poland simultaneous to the German DOW.

[Pavel Novak]

That my question was about original scenario in this "what if" where only Germany is the invader and the USSR stays neutral. Naturally alliance of Germany and the Soviet Union would quickly end any effective resistence between them.

[Halibutt]

Historically the two countries had only one thing in common: France. Other than that I believe the political rift between Poland and Czechoslovakia was too deep and it developed over time. First there was the 1919 invasion of Silesia, which most Poles regarded as a stab in the back and a proof that the Czechs are pretty much the same as the WWI Huns. Then there was the silent alliance of Czechoslovakia and Germany during the Polish-Bolshevist War. While Czechoslovakia did not join the fights against Poland, it did all it could to prevent any arms transports to reach the besieged country. This in turn led to the refurbishing of the centuries-old Polish-Hungarian friendship. This went on and on, to the point where in late 1930s Polish intelligence and the army were training Slovak and Hungarian saboteurs.

All in all, I believe such an alliance would have to be formed around the time the Polish-French and Polish-Romanian alliances were, that is shortly after WWI. After that there was really no sympathy in Poland towards Czechoslovakia.

[Pavel Novak]

I do not think that was possible to create alliance between Czechoslovakia and Poland around French-Polish and Polish-Romanian alliances. There was no incentive to create such Czechoslovak-Polish alliance. The only common enemy at that time were Soviets but in a different way. Poland fought for its own country Czechoslovakia just wanted to get Legion out of Siberia and Czechoslovak war with Soviet Hungary was not recognized in Poland as a threat to Poland despite Hungarian-Soviet cooperation.

The only possible time for alliance between Czechoslovakia and Poland was in 1933-1934 after Hitler came to power which enormously alarmed Czechoslovak leadership and nearly overnight cordial German-Czechoslovak relations were destroyed. Unfortunately Czechoslovak leadership totally failed to positively address Polish proposals for cooperation and once Poland signed its non-aggression pact in Germany it lost its interest in agreement with Czechoslovakia.

[Halibutt]

The only possible time for alliance between Czechoslovakia and Poland was in 1933-1934 after Hitler came to power which enormously alarmed Czechoslovak leadership and nearly overnight cordial German-Czechoslovak relations were destroyed. Unfortunately Czechoslovak leadership totally failed to positively address Polish proposals for cooperation and once Poland signed its non-aggression pact in Germany it lost its interest in agreement with Czechoslovakia.

The problem was that the two countries external relations were pretty much incompatible. Weimar Germany was extremely hostile towards Poland from the start, and Hitler's rise to power, while noticed in Polish diplomatic circles, was initially viewed as a step in a relatively good direction. After all he did sign the non-aggression treaty with Poland and normalised the strained relations between Poland and Germany, something the Poles were trying to achieve since 1918... And while normalising relationships with Czechoslovakia would be a good thing as well, Czechoslovakia was not the largest possible threat to Poland. Good relations with Germany were way more important, even at the cost of keeping the southern flank the way it was.

Also, by 1933 it was already too late as the cards have already been dealt.

[Pavel Novak]

There was a small window of opportunity in the second half of 1933 after signature of four power pact which alarmed Poland in such way that they approached Czechoslovakia with offer for cooperation but Czechoslovak leadership failed to address it positively.

[wm]

There were another in 1921, the so called Skirmunt-Plitz rapprochement with Czechoslovakia:

Erazm Piltz, Dmowski’s right-hand man in the National Committee and at the Peace Conference, and a prominent figure in the Ministry of Foreign Afiairs after the war, was the leading Polish Czechophile, liked and respected by Benes." He seemed the ideal man to carry out in Prague the revolutionary mission of reversing the trend of Czechoslovak-Polish relations. He was assisted “with tremendous energy” by the Czechoslovak minister in Warsaw, Prokop Maxa."

Piltz outlined his views on foreign policy in general and Czechoslovak-Polish rapprochement in particular in a memorandum to Skirmunt on September 5, 1921. This document completed and elaborated Skirmunt’s circular note, and its importance can be gauged from the fact that copies of it were sent to all principal Polish missions abroad.

Piltz’s memorandum scrutinized first the dificult position of Poland and drew attention to the fact that practically all her borders were the object of revisionist ambitions of her neighbors.
In this situation, Piltz wrote, Poland had the choice between two policies: either continue to rely on a large army “basing peace and security of the state on its bayonets” or begin a policy of reconciliation. Analyzing the internal weakness of Poland resulting frominflation, social tensions, poverty, and absence of strong government andeficient administration, Piltz concluded that a policy of reconciliation and concession was far more realistic than maintenance of the present armed peace.

Turning to Czechoslovakia, the Polish diplomat developed his ideas on cooperation with that country, stating that such cooperation would be based not on sentiment but on mutual interests and therefore would have “vitality and chances of permanence.”Piltz painted the successes of Czechoslovak diplomacy in glowing colors. He spoke of Prague's advantageous position in the League of Nations and at the Conference of Ambassadors, of her excellent relations with both England and France, and of the realization of all claims by the Czechoslovak state at the Peace Conference and after.

Why should Prague wish to cooperate with Warsaw? Piltz answered by pointing to the problems of a multinational state, a dangerous geographical configuration, and a powerful Socialist pressure. To solve her internal problems Czechoslovakia needed a high standard of living, which could be secured only by economic expansion. She was likely to face dangerous German economic competition in the Balkan area, and she needed Polish cooperation and transit facilities to reach the vast Russian market.

A Czechoslovak-Polish entente could, according to Piltz, open the way for political and economic organization of East Central Europe. While critical of the narrowly conceived Little Entente, the Polish diplomat favored creation of a big bloc including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, with possible additions later. Such a bloc would be “the only logical completion of our alliance with France,” and if politically and economically united it would represent a counterweight to Germany. Piltz had in mind an organization assuring protection against both Germany and Russia, radically difierent from the Little Entente, whose solidarity extended only to the Hungarian question.
He was aware of the dificulties, and in the last part of his memorandum retumed to the more concrete question of rapprochement with Prague. Its immediate advantage would be a détente along the entire Czechoslovak-Polish border and regularization of the status of the Poles in the Teschen area. Piltz stressed that Polish complaints from Teschen led to constant friction and made Czech-Polish cooperation dificult. They complicated in-directly the relations with Paris. Similarly, Czech intrigues in Eastern Galicia were a source of misunderstanding and uneasiness.

Piltz warned Skirmunt that numerous groups in Poland including the people from Teschen would dislike the policy he advocated. He recalled that the Polish emotional and nationalist approach had been responsible for many diplomatic defeats in the past, and even when crowned with success had often led to antagonism and tension. Reviewing the Polish-Czech controversy from 1918 onward, Piltz emphasized that the Polish side had been guilty of mistakes and miscalculations. He ended his memorandum with a powerful appeal for a new attitude toward foreign policy, and declared that “The only way out of this vicious circle of isolation and struggle is at present an understanding with Czechoslovakia.”"

France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno
by Piotr Stefan Wandycz

[wm]

The Skirmunt-Piltz team undertook what was to be the most serious and sincere eflort in the interwar period to arrive at a rapprochement with Czechoslovakia. The new foreign minister gave an indication of his intention on his way from Rome to Warsaw. In an interview with the Neue Freie Presse Skirmunt declared that the “Principal object of Polish diplomacy is to create a parallelism of interests between Poland and the Czech people” and “to take a clear position with regard to what is called the Little Entente.” On assuming ofice Skirmunt sent a friendly telegram to Benes, and he may also have been responsible for a pro-Czechoslovak statement on June 16 by Prime Minister Witos.“

How did Prague react to these Polish overtures? Benes early in July 1921 explained his point of view to the counselor of the Polish legation in Prague. He declared that although Germany would not be a major military threat for the next fifteen years, she would become a dangerous economic rival much earlier. Hence Czechoslovak-Polish economic cooperation would be highly desirable.

Speaking of Russia, Benes expressed the opinion that Moscow would not play an important role for a decade or so and that consequently this period ought to be used for a consolidation of East Central Europe. Regarding Polish-Czechoslovak relations, the thing to do was to find a “form of coexistence and cooperation.”

Benes assured the Polish diplomat that neither he nor Masaryk favored an eastern (pro-Russian) orientation but that there were many Slavophiles in the country. The counselor in reporting this conversation to Warsaw remarked that Benes’s views were of great importance insofar as he was “the disciple, the exponent of the thoughts, and the executor of Masaryk.”
Nevertheless he was not “a complete master” of the situation and had to move cautiously between the pacifist Left and the highly nationalist Right."

The Czechoslovak foreign minister spoke at roughly the same time to the American charge in Prague, confirming his intention of working for an economic agreement with Poland to be followed by political understanding. The main objective of these agreements was to show that Polish-Czechoslovak difliculties were definitely over, and that friendly relations would prevail from then on. The American diplomat wrote that Benes “emphasized that he would allow nothing in the treaty which would in any way involve Czecho-Slovakia by reason of further trouble between Poland and Russia,” thus defining the limits of the proposed collaboration.

France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925

[wm]

While the Czechoslovak-Polish talks approached their end, government changes occurred in both countries which proved of some importance. In Prague, Benes headed a new ministry based on a coalition of the five big parties (pétka), and though he retained the portfolio of foreign affairs he became necessarily involved in internal politics. The premiership in a coalition government dictated prudence and moderation in foreign policy, and Benes in his first speech before the Chamber stressed that he was not directing the negotiations with Poland against anyone.
The forthcoming agreements, he said, would mark the end of the first stage in Czechoslovak foreign policy which aimed at the creation of a secure and tranquil political system in Central Europe.

The new Polish cabinet in which Skirmunt remained foreign minister was a non party government which came to power after a protracted internal crisis. Presided over by Antoni Ponikowski, it was hardly a strong ministry and was not expected to last long. Its uncertain future endangered the continuity of Polish foreign policy, even though the new premier emphasized in his opening address the value of the French alliance and the need for a settlement with Czechoslovakia.

But, if the inherent weaknesses of the Czechoslovak coalition cabinet and of the Polish nonparty ministry boded ill for the future, the road lay open for final agreements between Warsaw and Prague. The commercial treaty was signed in Warsaw on October 20, 1921, by the Polish undersecretary of state, Henryk Strasburger, the Czechoslovak minister in Warsaw, Prokop Maxa, and the chief of the economic section of the Prague ministry, Jan Dvoracek. It completed and partly superseded the more limited accords of the past (of August 21, 1919, and of March 12, September 24 and 26, 1920).
Both countries obtained the most-favored nation clause and transit facilities that were especially important from the Czechoslovak point of view.
Two weeks after signing the commercial treaty, Skirmunt came to Prague, and there together with Benes concluded on November 6 the final political agreement.

France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925