Market Garden Plus

[bronk7]

even if they got Arnhem, would they have had the necessary logistics to continue??

[ljadw]

I don't think thay you are approaching the problem from the right direction:MG could only succeed if the Germans collapsed/were collapsing,if this happened,the logistical problem for advancing through Germany would not exist : a few batallions always could be supplied,and a few batallions only would be needed .

[bronk7]

Ij, do you mean if Germany surrendered? without Antwerp[ Scheldt estuary], supplies were very hard to get to the troops.....even if Monty had supplies, the other armies could not go far .., ...Germany attacked with 3 armies in December, so they had enough defensive power to stop a single thrust.....ty for your reply

[ljadw]

In august,the assumption was : the Hun is on the run,a little push,he will plunge down and no more get up .

A little push was the only thing that could be done in september,a big push (a big offensive) would only be possible in 1945.Thus,a little push was attempted,in the hope that it would be sufficient :if the Hun was shouting :Kamerad,and doing Hände hoch,there would be no logistical problems :no more than one division would be enough to round up the German defense and to go to Berlin . If the Germans were fighting, there was no chance that MG could succeed : there were no supplies for 6 divisions to go to Berlin .

All depended on what the Germans could/would do .

If Antwerp had priority,there would be no time for MG :the weather would be to bad and the Germans would have the time to recover .

[bronk7]

I've read many books on MG, and have 4 now....most of them state, Monty would isolate/surround/cut-off/etc the Ruhr, thus shortening the war...also, the country was good armor country up there, as opposed to the southern area...there was the feeling the Germans were just about ''finished''....are you saying they thought the Germans would surrender[ like dominoes ], because 1 division is going through?? or they would surrender after Monty got past Arnhem??

[ljadw]

I am saying that only limited forces were available for MG,and that the success of MG depended on the collaps of the German moral .

I am also saying that even less forces would be available for MG Plus /Post MG,and that a further advance /encirclment of the Ruhr also would depend on the collaps of the German moral .

I am also doubting that with the less forces that were available for MG Plus,an encirclment of the Ruhr would be possible,while I think that with these limited forces an advance to Berlin would be possible : one can go to Berlin with one division,one cannot encircle the Ruhr with one division .

For both cases(Ruhr/Berlin) if the German moral would be maintained,the result would be an allied failure .

I think that the allied planners were misjudging the logistical difficulties if they thought that the divisions who advanced from Hasselt to Arnhem could also encircle the Ruhr .


Some crow distance figures :

Paris-Brussels 310 km

Paris Hasselt :389

Hasselt-Arnhem : 155

Arnhem-Dortmund : 140

Hasselt-Dortmund via Arnhem : 299,not via Arnhem : 199

Area of the Ruhr : 4335 square km

[steverodgers801]

The whole premise of the strong thrust was flawed because it would simply allow Germany to concentrate all their strength against the Thrust. The farther Monty would have gotten east the weaker his attack would have become due to the need to guard the flanks. Finally would Monty really have spent 100k commonwealth soldiers to take Berlin, considering the lack of replacements, or would he have wasted American lives and then allowed his soldiers to take the credit. Finally I don't know why Monty would think that the American public would tolerate the inactivity of most of the US army so that Monty could satisfy his ego. What do you think would have happened to Ike if he had dare go to Marshall and propose such a scheme, and that is considering that Marshall had already made it clear that such a plan was completely unacceptable. If Monty did not want to use American troops there was plenty of action in the Pacific for them.

[bronk7]

Ij, ty for the answer--''not enough to isolate Ruhr"'<> I guess getting the bridge over Arnhem is a big factor, first...but I just read in 2 books, one last night, Monty was complaining he would have to postpone MG till the 23 because he STILL was not getting enough supplies--this, after some divisions' motor transport was used just to supply Monty, and those divisions would be totally static! ...I don't think enough is said about logistics

[bronk7]

ty steve, yes, the Germans weren't that ''stupid''/inefficient , as Sosabowski tried to tell them! and Monty even said himself, the Brits were low on men/etc after so many years of war....very good point on that subject--just read that last night

[Aber]

Ij, ty for the answer--''not enough to isolate Ruhr"'<> I guess getting the bridge over Arnhem is a big factor, first...but I just read in 2 books, one last night, Monty was complaining he would have to postpone MG till the 23 because he STILL was not getting enough supplies--this, after some divisions' motor transport was used just to supply Monty, and those divisions would be totally static! ...I don't think enough is said about logistics

Reread them and pay careful attention to the sequence of events. The Red Lion express to Brussels which used some of the transport from those divisions did not start delivering until AFTER Market Garden started, and half of those supplies were for the U.S. airborne forces. The divisions had just arrived in Normandy and there was not enough transport to move them to the front let alone supply them there.

[Aber]

The whole premise of the strong thrust was flawed because it would simply allow Germany to concentrate all their strength against the Thrust. The farther Monty would have gotten east the weaker his attack would have become due to the need to guard the flanks. Finally would Monty really have spent 100k commonwealth soldiers to take Berlin, considering the lack of replacements, or would he have wasted American lives and then allowed his soldiers to take the credit. Finally I don't know why Monty would think that the American public would tolerate the inactivity of most of the US army so that Monty could satisfy his ego. What do you think would have happened to Ike if he had dare go to Marshall and propose such a scheme, and that is considering that Marshall had already made it clear that such a plan was completely unacceptable. If Monty did not want to use American troops there was plenty of action in the Pacific for them.

How many misconceptions in a single post.

Market Garden =/= 'strong thrust'
Market Garden =/= drive to Berlin
Taking Berlin =/= 100,000 casualties
Market Garden =/= Montgomery's ego
Ike does not need Marshall's approval
Montgomery had no problem using good troops from any nation

[bronk7]

Ij, ty for the answer--''not enough to isolate Ruhr"'<> I guess getting the bridge over Arnhem is a big factor, first...but I just read in 2 books, one last night, Monty was complaining he would have to postpone MG till the 23 because he STILL was not getting enough supplies--this, after some divisions' motor transport was used just to supply Monty, and those divisions would be totally static! ...I don't think enough is said about logistics

Reread them and pay careful attention to the sequence of events. The Red Lion express to Brussels which used some of the transport from those divisions did not start delivering until AFTER Market Garden started, and half of those supplies were for the U.S. airborne forces. The divisions had just arrived in Normandy and there was not enough transport to move them to the front let alone supply them there.

isn't that what I just said? ty for your reply

[Aber]

Well it didn't read that way...

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi,

Yet another Market Garden thread which ignores the fact that the operation was only one part of Eisenhower's overall theatre strategy at this time.

The implicit criticism of Market Garden often seems to be that not only did it fail but that because it was launched it caused other operations to fail. I have, however, never seen an attempt to quantify exactly how this is meant to have occurred. What is clear is that several German units were diverted from the Aachen front because of the threat that MG produced. Montgomery didn't want all the resources for himself (and yes, like all Generals, he had a bit of an ego!), he wanted all the resources to be concentrated north of the Ardennes - a completely different thing.

Will someone go along to the US archives and produce some documentary evidence that shows the logistic position of 12th Army Group during the first three weeks in September 1944? Then we can discuss whether any of the US operations during the period were sensible!

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Bronk7,

Did those books of yours (titles would be useful) say that those US divisions were in Normandy, that they had been brought forward onto the continent ahead of logistics units, in which the Allies were already short, or, in fact, how they could have been supplied anywhere else in NW Europe? Not forgetting that "grounding" formations that couldn't be supplied further forward was an established practice in the British army and that two British divisions were "grounded" near Le Havre and their transport used for supply runs up to Brussels?

By the way, welcome to the forum!

Regards

Tom