US Artillery Ammunition Shortage ETO

[Yoozername]

I have read many people retreading the same lame 'knowledge' in regards to the actual issues with the fairly well known artillery ammunition shortage in the Fall of 1944 in the ETO.

The 'story' is that Congressional parties visited the battlefields in North Africa and tsk-tsk-tsk such waste, ammunition everywhere wasted.

About the only thing that can be somewhat relevant is the ammunition ratios...HE/AP/WP/etc. were based on the rates consumed during the battles. The worst being the low allowance for WP it seems.

The real issues and information can be read in this report. I hope you find it as interesting as I did.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/eto/eto-058.pdf

[Richard Anderson]

I have read many people retreading the same lame 'knowledge' in regards to the actual issues with the fairly well known artillery ammunition shortage in the Fall of 1944 in the ETO.

The 'story' is that Congressional parties visited the battlefields in North Africa and tsk-tsk-tsk such waste, ammunition everywhere wasted.

About the only thing that can be somewhat relevant is the ammunition ratios...HE/AP/WP/etc. were based on the rates consumed during the battles. The worst being the low allowance for WP it seems.

The real issues and information can be read in this report. I hope you find it as interesting as I did.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/eto/eto-058.pdf

That report deals with the consequences and not the causes. See Thomson and Mayo, The Ordnance Department, Procurement and Supply, pp. 140-150 for a brief explanation of the cause, suitably weasel worded. I'll also dig back for some of the other less veiled references to the shenanigans that went on.

[Yoozername]

Well, it actually touches on both.

In any reaction, such as a chemical reaction, there is the concept of a 'limiting reactant'. An analogy can be drawn to this ammunition 'reaction'.

Clearly, the US and Allies were doing something that hadn't been done before as far as prosecuting an invasion of the size of Overlord and supplying of attacking armies in the ETO. Some of it was learning on the fly and reacting to events and plans just go out the window. In addition to this, the US was also involved with invasions in the East. So, its easy to blame failure but the failures need to be understood.

The stockpiles were basically 'there' in the ETO. Unfortunately, they were 'afloat' and the unloading and delivery methods became the immediate choke-point. That is, delivery was the immediate cause for the ammunition 'shortage'. The ships were lined up and could not 'dump' the ammunition. Ammunition in England would have to be loaded and then unloaded off ships. Ammunition direct from the USA and Canada would get backed up. Along with other shipping. I would be very interested in knowing the actual stocks that were in England pre-D-Day.

There are many other issues here. The ratios of caliber types, the ratio of ammunition types for each caliber, fuzes and much more. Ammunition like WP became a 'hot' item as it was a very good solution to the problem of hedgerow fighting. 81mm WP and 4.2 in mortar WP as well as 105mm WP were needed. The hedgerow fighting meant close proximity to the enemy and that means artillery, with its greater dispersion, was not preferred in some cases. In the mad scramble of the early invasion, 'shortages' in some cases were just due to the stockpiling of the dumps were haphazard, and it took time to get it sorted out. Sometimes lots were mixed around and that had its own issues.

But it seems that a choke point had been created, and the success across France generated another 'lag' as far as driving everything to where it was needed.

[Sheldrake]

Well, it actually touches on both.

In any reaction, such as a chemical reaction, there is the concept of a 'limiting reactant'. An analogy can be drawn to this ammunition 'reaction'.

Clearly, the US and Allies were doing something that hadn't been done before as far as prosecuting an invasion of the size of Overlord and supplying of attacking armies in the ETO. Some of it was learning on the fly and reacting to events and plans just go out the window. In addition to this, the US was also involved with invasions in the East. So, its easy to blame failure but the failures need to be understood.

The stockpiles were basically 'there' in the ETO. Unfortunately, they were 'afloat' and the unloading and delivery methods became the immediate choke-point. That is, delivery was the immediate cause for the ammunition 'shortage'. The ships were lined up and could not 'dump' the ammunition. Ammunition in England would have to be loaded and then unloaded off ships. Ammunition direct from the USA and Canada would get backed up. Along with other shipping. I would be very interested in knowing the actual stocks that were in England pre-D-Day.

There are many other issues here. The ratios of caliber types, the ratio of ammunition types for each caliber, fuzes and much more. Ammunition like WP became a 'hot' item as it was a very good solution to the problem of hedgerow fighting. 81mm WP and 4.2 in mortar WP as well as 105mm WP were needed. The hedgerow fighting meant close proximity to the enemy and that means artillery, with its greater dispersion, was not preferred in some cases. In the mad scramble of the early invasion, 'shortages' in some cases were just due to the stockpiling of the dumps were haphazard, and it took time to get it sorted out. Sometimes lots were mixed around and that had its own issues.

But it seems that a choke point had been created, and the success across France generated another 'lag' as far as driving everything to where it was needed.

Logistic planning for Op Overlord was ultimately based on judgement. Someone had to look in crystal ball. Neither the American nor British armies anticipated the intensity of the combat on land, in particular the level of infantry casualties and artillery ammunition. The two were related because the allies used artillery firepower to minimise infantry casualties. They also over estimated expenditure of anti tank and AA ammunition.

The allied planners did not anticipate the collapse of the Germans in France in the summer of 1944. In the last quarter of 1944 the allies were far short of the 100 division land force they anticipated necessary to defeat the German army on land - or the ammunition to support it.

Even though the allies had Cherborg, Le Havre, Rouen and Marseilles; and were clearing Antwerp and Brest, they lacked the rail system and inland transport to move supplies to the front. The Red Ball express was an improvisation that could not compensate for a fully operational railway network.

[Yoozername]

Logistic planning for Op Overlord was ultimately based on judgement. Someone had to look in crystal ball. Neither the American nor British armies anticipated the intensity of the combat on land, in particular the level of infantry casualties and artillery ammunition. The two were related because the allies used artillery firepower to minimise infantry casualties. They also over estimated expenditure of anti tank and AA ammunition.

The allied planners did not anticipate the collapse of the Germans in France in the summer of 1944. In the last quarter of 1944 the allies were far short of the 100 division land force they anticipated necessary to defeat the German army on land - or the ammunition to support it.

Even though the allies had Cherborg, Le Havre, Rouen and Marseilles; and were clearing Antwerp and Brest, they lacked the rail system and inland transport to move supplies to the front. The Red Ball express was an improvisation that could not compensate for a fully operational railway network.

I agree that the planning was based on previous experience against the Germans. Logically, one would have to have done that. Also, having some sea borne invasions under their belts, they knew the basics of coming ashore, under the umbrella of Navy weapons, and also the need for Air supremacy. It can probably be said that stopping a landing was nearly impossible unless one knew the exact beaches being invaded. The attacker's advantage of naval forces allows them to concentrate overwhelming large caliber explosives against defenses. Combined with offensive Airpower, the defender has few options.

I think you may not have read the report, and that's OK, Some of your points could be taken into question. They certainly are different than the report. But you bring up some good points.

The naval presence, and the range of its weapons, gave the invaders 'free' artillery support as far as their supply levels were concerned. At least initially. The actual terrain limited many weapons, particularly the larger caliber artillery , from getting targets like they may have in North Africa/Sicily/Italy. They were too dangerous to use for close support due to the proximity of the enemy to the friendlies, and artillery fire plans seemed to be the order of the day. Targeting crossroads and built up areas, possible enemy artillery and HQs, etc. Some of the 155mm Howitzer guys wanted to be used as close support, they felt they had greater accuracy than the 105mm, but as far as I know, mortars were the predominate weapons in the hedgerows, 105mm was used carefully, and direct fire was needed. Sherman tanks, M10 being used predominately to assist infantry.

It seems that some rationing, or maybe something best described as judicious control was implemented from the start. There was no real communications with ammo in transit, and just like the Germans, they could not really know what was coming up the road as far as resupply. And nothing is as useless as a gun without ammo. So, some claim, that lives were spent in some cases instead of ammunition. Certainly, the total KIA rate for the US really took off after D-Day, and that brings in its own issues. The least of which is replacements. The morale effect as the men knew the numbers all to well, made being a infantryman, tanker, armored infantry and TD man just a matter of time before getting it. It would then be a natural tactic to wait and build up a known supply of everything before kicking off an offensive or even any attack.

A 105mm howitzer might shoot off 75 rounds in a day. That one gun would probably require one deuce/half truck to supply that. As you point out, it all came on trucks and they use gasoline. And that takes time also. There are other needs for the artillery and it all adds up. It all has to come off a ship as it can't be pumped through a pipe like fuel. It all has to be inspected and loaded and driven to the front lines. Obviously, the planners never planned for a breakout. Or using the rail lines. The concept DOS, I believe, came out of WWII. In Korea, it was worse.

You wrote that AA and ATG ammunition was certainly over estimated. Units usually had a basic load of ammo they maintained and kept in their 'trains' (trucks). If a ATG was expected to do one of its secondary functions, like indirect fire, they would get that ammunition from a higher up supply function. People might claim that firing a 3 inch HE round was as good as a 105mm (Seek, Strike and Destroy actually says this), but the truth is that it would be better to fire a true artillery weapon and the 105mm HE is considerably deadlier. I am not that sure that given the state of affairs in Fall 1944 that higher ups either 'ordered' the 3 inch ammo (full charge and reduced charge), or that the means to drive it there were available.

There was even varying levels between Armies and it was ordered that they be 'evened out'. Offensive units, like tank divisions, need 10x the tonnage of all supply the an infantry unit does. They are somewhat useless without fuel, and they expend ammo at much higher rates.

Again, most people claim the ammo shortage of Fall 44 was from a shooting spree, and that may have some weight to it, but in terms of supply, the ammunition was there. Again, it was on boats, it was in England, it was on trucks and it was in dumps.

I would be interested in seeing other data or reports.

An interesting data point is the sherman 75mm HE round. I have read that the US produced 25 million of these. Something like 18 million in 43 and 7 million in 44. Of course, they were not all fired, and since the 75mm was declared obsolete, the remaining ammo was salvaged into metals and powder. Tons and Tons of it. Crazy planning. I wonder how many shiploads this would have been to float them across the ocean.

[Michael Kenny]

Commonwealth Ammunition figures from Hastings 'Overlord' book.

[Yoozername]

Very nice data. Did the British and CW forces ever have a 'ammunition crisis'?

[Yoozername]

Interesting information...extracted from The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany
CHAPTER XVI

Developing Beaches and Reconstructing Ports

Railway Rehabilitation

By mid-August, Liberties at deepwater quays in Cherbourg were unloading onto barges because a shortage of trucks and rail cars had crowded the quays and the marginal wharves at Terre Plein with supplies and equipment awaiting transportation inland. Only about 3,000 tons of cargo a day were moving out by rail at the end of August, and a backlog of nearly 72,000 tons awaited clearance in the port area.24

Efforts to expedite rail service had started before the fall of Cherbourg, when the 1056th Engineer Port Construction and Repair Group began to repair demolished railway bridges over the Vire, Taute, Madeleine, and Jourdan Rivers. By 7 July the two main line tracks from Paris to Cherbourg were open. One company of the 347th Engineer General Service Regiment had cleared a demolished tunnel just south of Cherbourg, and three other companies had repaired blown frogs and switches on the tracks into the city's railway station, the Gare de l'Etat. Fortunately damage was light on a mile-long spur from the Gare de l'Etat to the Digue du Homet, and less than five of the fifteen miles of track within the city needed extensive repairs. Most of the damage had resulted from Allied bombs and artillery fire.

Railway rehabilitation, carried on under the supervision of the Transportation Corps' 2d Military Railway Service, accelerated considerably after the late July decision to increase Cherbourg's tonnage target to 20,000 tons by mid-September, with the railroads carrying the main burden of transportation inland. New spurs were needed as well as new storage and marshaling yards to ensure that a constant supply of railway cars could be fed to the docks. Primarily a passenger port, Cherbourg had storage yards for only

[356]

350 cars and marshaling yards for only 400. The plan to move 20,000 tons daily through Cherbourg required 2,000 railway cars a day, and since a two-day supply of empty cars had to be on hand at all times, storage for 4,000 cars as well as marshaling yard capacity for the daily 2,000 was mandatory.

The first major railway reconstruction took place in the Terre Plein area, where an existing yard consisted of three tracks with a capacity of only 165 cars and a spur running into the Amiot Aircraft Plant. The 347th Engineer General Service Regiment repaired the tracks, which Allied bombing and shellfire had badly damaged, cleared away dragon's teeth and pillboxes from the area behind the Terre Plein, and laid 61 miles of new track to provide a marshaling yard for 714 cars. Unfortunately, the unit was inexperienced in railroad work and laid the track without ballast on filled-in land. As the track sank into the soft ground the rails spread, causing a number of derailments before the engineers stabilized the area by placing crushed rock ballast under the tracks.25

The same problem occurred in the construction of new yards at Couville and Sottevast, which together constituted one of the most ambitious construction projects undertaken on the Cotentin. Work at Couville began on 2 August, but heavy rains turned the area into a sea of mud. The engineers had to open a rock quarry and haul hundreds of carloads of rock to ballast the tracks. The first yard at Couville opened on 18 September, and expansion continued until 3 November, when the yard had sixteen miles of track with a capacity of 1,740 cars. Construction of the Sottevast yard, begun on 15 August, also was plagued by heavy rains that at one time had portions of the area under eighteen inches of water. Nevertheless, some of the facilities were ready by mid-October, and when construction stopped in mid-December the yard had eighteen miles of track with a capacity of 2,280 cars.

[Yoozername]

Also...

For all their accomplishments in port reconstruction in Europe following D-day, the engineers were never really able to keep up with the demands of harbor improvement until well into the spring of 1945. Statistics on discharges of ships showed continual increase, but the shortages of berthing capacity for vessels on the Continent and the inadequate depot system for bulk supply in the theater contributed heavily to the supply crises during the latter part of the year. Basing estimates on combat requirements instead of on port capacities, General Lee's COMZ headquarters consistently overstated the number of ships the logistical structure in the ports could handle in a single month. The excess shipments created a bottleneck at that point in the supply chain. Without unloading capacity, the ships piled up offshore, remaining idle as floating warehouses instead of returning to more efficient use in the shipping pool on the high seas. Only with the capture and the eventual development of Antwerp and Ghent did the backlog clear up and the port capacity grow to a size large enough to support the last drive into Germany.

[Sheldrake]

I have not had a chance yet to read the report you linked., but I have downloaded it to read later.

The rough planning figure for supplies was around 600 tons per day per division. The balance of the supply needs changed with the intensity of combat. With heavy fighting for every blade of grass, much more ammunition was needed than fuel. In a mobile phase more fuel was needed than ammunition , which was pace of operations.

The D Day planners of COSSAC whose work laid most of the logistic plans did not make any operational (G3) plans. There was no commander until the appointment of Eisenhower in December 1943. However they had to make some assumptions about progress and as a result created the phase lines that appear on many maps. One of the key assumptions was that it would take more than the 35 Divisions landed in 90 days to defeat the German army in the West. The D+90 line roughly along the Seine and Loire was the lodgement that the 35 division advance guard of the Overlord Force might achieve. After this time it was assumed that the remainder of the force would be shipped directly from the US into deep water ports of Brest and Cherbourg. This was much faster than land them in Liverpool or Glasgow and transferring them to France in assault shipping.

Any consideration of a Fall ammunition crisis has to accept that 1) the allies advanced much further than they expected and 2) until August 1944 few thought it possible to win the war in '44 The root cause of the "ammunition crisis" was because in Fall 1944 the Allies were trying to do too much with too little.

Very nice data. Did the British and CW forces ever have a 'ammunition crisis'?

The short answer is yes, on several occasions in the C20th. The most famous was the "Shell Crisis" in the First World War when the expansion of the munitions industry could not keep up with the intensity of fighting on the western front. This was one reason for the fall of the PM Asquith at the end of 1916.

It was not uncommon for 25 pdr guns to fire hundreds of rounds per gun per day in Normandy. IIRC One Canadian battery fired 500 rounds per gun in 24 hours. Ammunition was rationed after the great storm in June so that stiocks could be built up for the Op Epsom offensive SW of Caen.

The favoured british artillery technique was a multi battery concentration, that could bring 72 rounds on a 200 x 200 yd patch of ground in a fifteen second period. (and repeat this a few times) These might be employed on targets than might really only metit the use of a single battery of eight or even a troop of four guns. one company sized infantry patrol was supported by a fire plan supported by five regiments - 120 field and medium guns.

There was a tendency to use overkill - driven by the very reasonable desire to expend ammunition rather than lives.

[Richard Anderson]

Clearly, the US and Allies were doing something that hadn't been done before as far as prosecuting an invasion of the size of Overlord and supplying of attacking armies in the ETO. Some of it was learning on the fly and reacting to events and plans just go out the window. In addition to this, the US was also involved with invasions in the East. So, its easy to blame failure but the failures need to be understood.

Indeed. And the blame was done by finger pointing...curiously never at themselves. For example, ASF blamed Ordnance, the Transportation Corps, and the Theater staffs.

Some instances of ammunition shortages in Europe in 1944 were traced primarily to two factors. One was the failure to identify fully ammunition by calibers when it was shipped overseas in quantities by the Ordnance Department and the Transportation Corps. The other was the inadequate estimates of needs by overseas theaters. Moreover, the Ordnance Department felt that ammunition was being wasted, and in consequence had no strong incentive to raise production levels. This led General Lutes' office to put pressure on the production officials to increase output, on overseas theaters to increase their requisitions, and on the shipping personnel to manifest cargo more fully." John D. Millet, Organization and Role of Army Service Forces, p. 347.

The stockpiles were basically 'there' in the ETO. Unfortunately, they were 'afloat' and the unloading and delivery methods became the immediate choke-point. That is, delivery was the immediate cause for the ammunition 'shortage'. The ships were lined up and could not 'dump' the ammunition. Ammunition in England would have to be loaded and then unloaded off ships. Ammunition direct from the USA and Canada would get backed up. Along with other shipping. I would be very interested in knowing the actual stocks that were in England pre-D-Day.

Yes, one choke-point was shipping...failure to properly manifest items was problematic, especially in a day without computers. On top of that, shipping labels were often lost or defaced, and then unloading and port clearance played a part as well. However, a couple of points. There was relatively little ammunition stockpiled in England, since it was anticipated transshipment would make that problematic, so just like units, most supplies post-NEPTUNE were direct shipments from CONUS. For example, for "Shell, HE 105mm Howitzer M2 w/PDF M2 &TSQF M54 there were 1,541,343 rounds in the ETOUSA as of 31 May 1944...versus an authorized level of 2,673,003 (that, BTW, is a "shortage"). 257,215 rounds were expended in June and there were 1,296,836 rounds as of 30 June. Do the math...fewer than 13,000 rounds were delivered to the theater during the month. By the end of July there were 1,170,011 rounds in theater after 777,592 were expended in the month...better, about 651,000 were delivered, but theater authorized levels were now 4,018,680. The crisis was at the end of December, when 2,534,622 rounds were stocked versus 2,579,405 expended and an authorized level of 8,900,415. Meanwhile, US production during 1944 averaged only 2,429,583 rounds per month - for all theaters of war.

There are many other issues here. The ratios of caliber types, the ratio of ammunition types for each caliber, fuzes and much more. Ammunition like WP became a 'hot' item as it was a very good solution to the problem of hedgerow fighting. 81mm WP and 4.2 in mortar WP as well as 105mm WP were needed. The hedgerow fighting meant close proximity to the enemy and that means artillery, with its greater dispersion, was not preferred in some cases. In the mad scramble of the early invasion, 'shortages' in some cases were just due to the stockpiling of the dumps were haphazard, and it took time to get it sorted out. Sometimes lots were mixed around and that had its own issues.

A minor note; there was no 81mm WP, only light and heavy HE and CS. And expenditures of those rounds were much higher than expected as well for many of the reasons you give. Curiously, the supply of 4.2" HE, CS, and WP was very good compared to other ammunition...except in July, rounds on hand always exceeded authorized levels even though expenditures were high. Its a curious anomaly.

Anyway, port unloading, haphazard depot stockpiling, and transportation to the front problems just added to the general shortage to requirements.

But it seems that a choke point had been created, and the success across France generated another 'lag' as far as driving everything to where it was needed.

Those just exacerbated the general problem. Something similar occurred with regards to other Ordnance items, like tanks, which became a shortage in spite of the large numbers built.

[Yoozername]

The 81mm WP was based on the 81mm heavy round. Are you saying it wasn't a manufactured item? Perhaps you are confusing it with the 60mm? There was no WP for the 60mm.

81mm WP fire was a godsend. Go to 14 minute in the video

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WT3b6sY34uI

[Richard Anderson]

The 81mm WP was based on the 81mm heavy round. Are you saying it wasn't a manufactured item? Perhaps you are confusing it with the 60mm? There was no WP for the 60mm.

No, I'm saying there is no record of it being shipped to the ETOUSA (and yes I could have been clearer in that). It may be subsumed with the CS deliveries since it is lumped in with those in the production record (and the 76mm CS and WP are lumped together in the delivery records). There are some other interesting "missing" items from the ETOUSA as well, such as no 76mm HE (it may again have gotten included with the 3" HE).

81mm WP fire was a godsend. Go to 14 minute in the video

It is unclear if that is a wartime or postwar film since the YouTubers clipped that part away. Meanwhile, lots of 75mm and 3" WP were fired.

[Richard Anderson]

Never mind, should have checked. The round was the 81mm Shell, Chemical, M57 and could be employed with either a WP or CS filler.

[Yoozername]

Yes, I assure you, they were used. But as I mentioned before, the ratios needed were based on North Africa and Sicily and Italy. There are many Normandy infantry stories mentioning the effectiveness of 81mm WP. Using the large capacity HE shell bodies (which had thin walls), they could dump a large amount of WP and it would flush out anyone too close. Smaller weapons, like the bazooka or 60mm mortar would never have nearly this effect if given WP. It would best used as a marker. Maybe they had some for these weapons in Korea.

The Sherman 75mm WP is also an effective weapon. Used in direct fire, it had enough HE inside to break the shell into large fragments. This combined with a decent amount of WP made it a terror since the ranges were short in Normandy.

I am not aware of 76mm or 3 inch WP. I recall the Sherman 76mm did not have one, just the AP and HE.

The 105mm WP was a terror. The 4.2 inch was also a terror with WP and HE mixed barrages. 4.2 inch usually fired small barrages since it was an accurate (rifled) weapon and the effects of its HE/WP were very effective. I am sure they would have fired more if they had more.