Tank Brigade 010/500

[Art]

Conclusions and proposals on organization of the tank brigade from the 1 GTBr after-action report, Vistula-Oder operation:

Command and control was executed from two points: command post (CoS with chiefs of services and brigade's staff and staffs of attached units) and observation post (brigade commanders, deputy commander, operations officer, reconnaissance officer, chief of engineers, two liaison officers, commanders of attached units, sapper squad and scout squad).
From experience of operation it is more profitable to position the brigade's staff with the brigade commanders. That enables concentration of communication means and facilitates command and information.
Large separation of the corps staff from the brigade hampered normal communication and information. Command points were located contrary to any provisions of regulations - the distance between corps and brigades staffs was sometimes as large as 100-110 km and never smaller than 18 km.
...
Experience demonstrated that the RSB radio provides a range of communications up to 50 km. Being the corps vanguard the brigade didn't have liaison vehicles attached from the crops, and the number of organic vehicles wasn't sufficient... Motorcycles as liaison vehicles in this operation proved ineffective.

Proposals:
- Lack of organic liaison vehicles jeopardized communications between the brigade and the corps. The brigade should have 4-5 armored carriers or armored cars for a role of liaison vehicles.
- Recon company should be introduced in the brigade organization. In the brigade HQ T&O an additional recon&intelligence officer (assistant CoS) and an interpreter should be added to the existing officer (deputy CoS).
- Available brigade's artillery is not sufficient for operations as a corps vanguard and should be reinforced.
- Tank rider infantry company should be added to the organization of the tank battalion, and the motor battalion should be carrier on trucks (*).
- For operations as a corps vanguard additional infantry and artillery should be attached to the brigade

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=113132583

* According to the tables of organization one of three infantry companies of the motor battalion was designated "tank-rider company". In practice it didn't mean a thing, since all the three companies were transported on tanks due to endemic lack of motor transport.

[Art]

From the already quoted report on radio communications in the 1 GTA (Vistula-Oder operation):

1. Communications between the tank (mechanized corps) and the tank brigade:
- between corps and brigade staffs - via truck-mounted RSB radio
- between corps and brigade commanders - via RSB radios on tanks

2. Typical radio communications in the tank brigade
- staff network between brigade and battalion staffs
- tank network (tank radios)
- motor battalion network (portable A-7 radios)
- reconnaissance/intelligence network
- liaison (with neighbor units)
- anti-aircraft company network (*)

* At this point the brigade's anti-aircraft company was typically equipped with lend-lease M17 half-tracks having their own radios

Also several comments on radio communications:
- Soviet command tanks (unlike German or US) were equipped with only one radio (transmitter and receiver). That means that commanders couldn't monitor two network simultaneously. Instead brigade or battalion commanders had to switch between superiors and subordinates, which wasn't quite convenient, of course.
- RB (typical short-range staff radio). RSB and standard tank radios (9-R) had their frequency overlapping so it was possible to communicate between them and switch between different networks
- Tank brigade's motor battalion was better supplied with radios than typical Soviet infantry where usually the highest echelon where a radio can be found was the battalion staff. However, intrabattalion network as said above relied on A-7 radios (an artillery radio formally). Its range was two short for fluid situation, especially considering that on march or in pursuit the motor battalion was broken up by companies, so battalion staff couldn't communicate with them. Moreover, A-7 was an FM radio which worked in a different frequency range than tank and staff radios. So tank battalion or tanks companies could only have radio communication with the motor battalion staff but not with infantry companies even when they were attached to them. Only personal liaison was possible. The same applies to communication with artillery units having A-7 radios.