From report on operations of the mechanized forces of the South-West Front 22.6-1.8.1941:
Numbers of armored vehicles on strength in six out of eight mechanized corps of the SWF (4, 8, 9, 14, 19, 22 mechanized corps) on 22.6.41:
272 KV, 494 T-34, 1378 BT-2/5/7, 1326 T-26, 49 T-35, 126 T-28, 65 T-37/38/40, 760 armored cars
Of them were in repair at factories or repair bases:
7 KV, 46 BT, 21 T-26, 1 T-35, 12 T-28, 7 armored cars
Left at quartering areas with the start of the war (had mechanical breakdowns before the war started):
10 KV, 8 T-34, 82 BT, 35 T-26, 10 T-35, 12 T-28, 39 armored cars.
Published in "Порядок в танковых войсках..." by D. Shein and A. Ulanov. There is a widely held opinion that most Soviet tanks or at least a large part of them were not in running condition when the war started. As these sample data demonstrate while some tanks were not operational, their numbers were not really that huge, and the bulk of vehicles were at least capable of movement. Yet, it must be mentioned, there are somewhat contradicting numbers in other documents.
Tank Technical Support
Re: Tank Technical Support
Report on status of battle and transport vehicles of the 8 Mechanized Corps on 20 July 1941:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=114792918
On strength on 22.6.41:
71 KV, 48 T-35, 100 T-24, 141 T-26 radio, 139 T-26 line, 344 T-26 (various types), 80 T-27, 242 BT-7, 20 BT-5, 15 BT-2, 23 T-27, 17 T-40, 99 BA-10, 75 BA-20, 3 BA-6, 7 FAI
Of them:
in repair at factories or repair bases:
5 KV, 16 T-26, 14 T-27, 42 BT-7, 3 BT-5, 1 BT-2, 3 T-27, 5 BA-20, 2 FAI
Left at quartering area when the war started:
6 KV, 10 T-35, 5 T-34, 14 T-26, 66 T-27, 48 BT-7, 13 BT-5, 8 BT-2, 20 T-37, 5 BA-20, 1 BA-6, 3 FAI
Committed to action:
60 KV, 38 T-35, 95 T-24, 311 T-26, 152 BT-5, 4 BT-5, 5 BT-2, 17 T-40, 99 BA-10, 65 BA-20, 2 BA-6, 2 FAI
of them left on march due to mechanical problems, lack of fuel etc:
15 KV, 8 T-35, 16 T-34, 53 T-26, 49 BT-7, 4 BT-5, 4 BT-2, 4 T-40, 19 BA-10, 19 BA-20
shipped by railroad to repair facilities:
12 KV, 15 T-34, 11 T-26, 28 BT-7, 5 T-40, 1 BA-10, 8 BA-20
So again most tanks were capable of moving by their own. It seems that older T-27 tankettes were employed as training vehicles and were for this reason all left at barracks. The reason why all T-37 were left was probably not related to their technical conditions either. However, even among tanks that were initially operational losses to non-battle reasons were very large. It is difficult to establish a ratio of battle and non-battle losses since many tanks were reported "missing", but in any case the numbers were comparable. Also worth to note that the number tanks shipped to repair facilities in the rear area was rather large (71) given very fluid and critical situation.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=114792918
On strength on 22.6.41:
71 KV, 48 T-35, 100 T-24, 141 T-26 radio, 139 T-26 line, 344 T-26 (various types), 80 T-27, 242 BT-7, 20 BT-5, 15 BT-2, 23 T-27, 17 T-40, 99 BA-10, 75 BA-20, 3 BA-6, 7 FAI
Of them:
in repair at factories or repair bases:
5 KV, 16 T-26, 14 T-27, 42 BT-7, 3 BT-5, 1 BT-2, 3 T-27, 5 BA-20, 2 FAI
Left at quartering area when the war started:
6 KV, 10 T-35, 5 T-34, 14 T-26, 66 T-27, 48 BT-7, 13 BT-5, 8 BT-2, 20 T-37, 5 BA-20, 1 BA-6, 3 FAI
Committed to action:
60 KV, 38 T-35, 95 T-24, 311 T-26, 152 BT-5, 4 BT-5, 5 BT-2, 17 T-40, 99 BA-10, 65 BA-20, 2 BA-6, 2 FAI
of them left on march due to mechanical problems, lack of fuel etc:
15 KV, 8 T-35, 16 T-34, 53 T-26, 49 BT-7, 4 BT-5, 4 BT-2, 4 T-40, 19 BA-10, 19 BA-20
shipped by railroad to repair facilities:
12 KV, 15 T-34, 11 T-26, 28 BT-7, 5 T-40, 1 BA-10, 8 BA-20
So again most tanks were capable of moving by their own. It seems that older T-27 tankettes were employed as training vehicles and were for this reason all left at barracks. The reason why all T-37 were left was probably not related to their technical conditions either. However, even among tanks that were initially operational losses to non-battle reasons were very large. It is difficult to establish a ratio of battle and non-battle losses since many tanks were reported "missing", but in any case the numbers were comparable. Also worth to note that the number tanks shipped to repair facilities in the rear area was rather large (71) given very fluid and critical situation.
Re: Tank Technical Support
Information on losses of battle and transport vehicles of the 23 Tank Division from 22.6 to 13.7.1941:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136823135
On strength on 22.6.41: 359 T-26, 17 "Vickers" 2 TKS, 3 T-26 transporters, of them:
left at quarters due to malfunctions:
15 T-26, 12 Vickers, 2 TKS, 3 T-26 transporters
went to the march on 18.6:
344 T-26 and 5 Vickers, of them
reported technical losses
18 T-26, 1 Vickers
shipped for capital repair to factories:
46 T-26, 1 Vickers
The count of vehicles in the last two categories was definitely incomplete. "Vickers" and TKS were appropriated from Polish and Baltic armies and were unsurprisingly in bad technical conditions. The bulk of Soviet-built T-25 were operational when the war started. Worth to point out again that the number of vehicles shipped for repair was relatively large considering circumstances (the division retreated several hundred kilometers all the way from the Prussian border)
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136823135
On strength on 22.6.41: 359 T-26, 17 "Vickers" 2 TKS, 3 T-26 transporters, of them:
left at quarters due to malfunctions:
15 T-26, 12 Vickers, 2 TKS, 3 T-26 transporters
went to the march on 18.6:
344 T-26 and 5 Vickers, of them
reported technical losses
18 T-26, 1 Vickers
shipped for capital repair to factories:
46 T-26, 1 Vickers
The count of vehicles in the last two categories was definitely incomplete. "Vickers" and TKS were appropriated from Polish and Baltic armies and were unsurprisingly in bad technical conditions. The bulk of Soviet-built T-25 were operational when the war started. Worth to point out again that the number of vehicles shipped for repair was relatively large considering circumstances (the division retreated several hundred kilometers all the way from the Prussian border)
Re: Tank Technical Support
And supplementary report to the last document (report on losses of the 23 Tank Division)
From D. Shein and A. UlanovLeft at winter quarters:
15 T-26: 3 from the 45 Tank Regiment and 12 from the 144 Tank Regiment.
All these vehicles were expecting medium repair and 3 were in need of capital repair.
Repair of these tanks was started, all spare parts and aggregates available in the division were replaced, there was a delay to to a lack of engines, spare parts of the piston groups and others. A part of details and aggregates were sent from the depot No.942 but hadn't been received by the division when the march started.
12 tanks of the 144 Tank Regiment were concentrated at Telsiai railroad station for shipment to factory repair. Only 3 tanks were shipped when the group commander received the order to cease shipment and abandon the station.
....
Technical losses:
T-26 - 18 vehicles: 9 with engine failures, 3 with fuel pump ruptures, 1 -with self-ignition, 2 with chassis failure, 1 with rupture of the fuel tank, 1 - ignition failure, 1 stuck on a roadside.
Of these 18 vehicles 9 were evacuated to the SPAM, part of them were dissembled for repair, but a threat of encirclement forced to destroy them. Frequent changes of location, swiftness of enemy's advance and a lack of evacuation means denied an opportunity to perform repair and evacuate tanks.
The other 9 tanks were abandoned at retreat, as a rule tanks belonging to rearguards. Damaged tanks were as a rule towed from the areas unoccupied by the enemy, during march damaged tanks were also towed by other tanks, but when combat started they were left in the rear areas and cut off by the enemy, especially during marches in vicinity of the enemy forces.
During the march from Madonna 15 T-26 tanks were towed which forced a 2-3 fold reduction of the column velocity and also led to a strong overheating of towing vehicles.
Due to constant operation of tanks in condition of a lack of spare parts most of remaining vehicles required overhaul of engines, of the remaining 44 tanks 12 were not in running order, the others had only 2-3 cylinders operational, and, when they were employed as towing vehicles, they as a rule caught fire.
Provided towing tractors had been available all tanks evacuated from the battlefield or having technical malfunctions would be evacuated to the rear and repaired, so the overall losses would be smaller by 30-40% .
...
Assistant commander (technical) of the 23 Tank Division major Morozov
20.7.41
Re: Tank Technical Support
Planned accumulation of the stock of tank spare parts in 1941, document from 15 May 1941
From D. Shein and A. Ulanov. That's a curios document but it leaves an open question how exactly the said requirements were calculated.Type of tanks/Requirements according to the TO&E/Planned accumulation in 1941
West Special Military District
KV tanks/15 spare part complements/9 complements
T-34/45/9
T-50/4/2
T-40/6/6
T-28/1/1
BT/30/13
T-26/28/28
Kiev Special Military District
KV/19/19
T-34/57/13
T-50/6/3
T-40/8/8
T-35/1/1
T-28/4/2
BT/40/36
T-26/40/40
Odessa Military District
KV/5/1/
T-34/17/2
T-40/2/2
BT/6/6
T-26/15/2
Baltic Special Military District
KV/5/1
T-34/10/2
T-40/2/1
T-28/1/1
BT/14/7
T-26/10/5
Leningrad Military District
KV/5/-
T-34/5/-
T-40/2/1
T-28/3/2
BT/16/8
T-26/12/6
Moscow Military District
KV/5/-
T-34/16/-
T-40/1/1
BT/11/5
T-26/9/4
Far East Front
KV/4/-
BT/9/5
T-26/22/21
Transbaikal Military District
KV/1/-
BT/7/6
T-26/2/-
Transcaucasus Military District
KV/2/-
T-34/2/-
T-40/1/1
BT/1/1
T-26/15/8
Central-Asian Military District
KV/2/-
T-34/8/-
T-40/1/1
BT/6/1
T-26/5/3
Siberian Military District
KV/1/-
T-34/1/-
T-40/1/-
BT/2/-
T-26/8/-
Kharkov Military District
KV/2/-
T-34/8/-
T-40/1/-
BT/4/-
T-26/5/-
Orel Military District
KV/2/-
T-34/8/-
T-40/1/-
BT/6/-
T-26/3/-
North-Caucasus Military District
KV/5/-
T-34/12/-
T-40/2/-
BT/15/-
T-26/8/-
In Siberian, Kharkov, Orel and North-Caucasus districts accumulation of the spare parts stocks will be made in 1942.
Spare parts requirements are calculated based on wartime TO&Es. In accordance to NKO order No.50 from 1941 one spare part complement is meant:
BT, T-26, T-28, T-34, KV, T-50 tanks - for a tank battalion of 50 vehicles
T-37, T-38, T-40 - for a tank company of 17 vehicles
One spare part complement provides tank operation for the period of:
- 2 months for heavy tanks
- 1 months for medium, light and small tanks
Norms of operations are taken as 450 hours in a year for heavy tanks and 900 hours in a year for medium, light and small tanks.
Based on availability and expected deliveries of materiel in 1941 spare parts will be accumulated:
BT, T-26, T-35, T-38, T-40 tanks:
a/ In two military districts (West and Kiev) a full number of complements
b/ In 7 districts (Odessa, Baltic, Leningrad , Far-East, Transbaikal, Transcaucasus and Central-Asian) - 50% of required numbers
c/ In other districts (Siberian, Ural, Volga, Moscow, Kharkov, Orel, North-Caucasus, Arkhangelsk) spare parts stock will be accumulated in 1942
KV, T-50, T-28 tanks:
In all military districts only 50% of the required numbers, that is 1 battalion complement for KV and T-28 and 2 battalion complement for T-50
Only a partial stockpile of KV's diesel engines.
T-34 tanks:
20% of requisite numbers in all military districts
Priority of spare parts accumulation:
1. West and Kiev districts, 1941
2. Odessa, Baltic, and Leningrad districts, 1941
3. Far East Front, Transbaikal, Transcaucasus, Central-Asian districts, 1941
4. Siberian, Ural, Volga, Moscow, Kharkov, Orel, North-Caucasus, Arkhangelsk districts, 1942
Stocks of tank spare parts are meant for tank and motorized divisions and will be kept with units, save for 10% kept at district depots as reserve.
Chief of Red Army's Main Auto-Tank Directorate lieutenant general of tank troops Fedorenko
Re: Tank Technical Support
Location of available motor repair bases in June 1941 (partial list)
Base No.1 - Moscow, Moscow Military District
No.2 - Moscow, Moscow MD
No.3 - Moscow, Moscow MD
No.4 - Leningrad, Leningrad MD
No.5 - Smolensk, West MD
No.6 - Bryansk, Orel MD
No.7 - Darnitsa, Kiev region, Kiev MD
No.8 - Kiev, Kiev MD
No.9 - Vinnitsa, Kiev MD
No. 10 - Zhitomir, Kiev MD
No.12 - Kharkov, Kharkov MD
No. 13 - Navtlug, region of Tbilisi, Trancaucasus MD
No.14 - Tashkent, Central Asian MD
No.15 - Nobosibirsk, Siberian MD
No.16 - Kuibyshev (Samara), Volga MD
No. 17 - Rostov-on-Don, North-Caucasus MD
No.18 - Khabarovsk, Far-East Front
No.19 - Blagoveshchensk, Far-East Front
No.20 - Borisov, West MD
No.22 - Moscow, Moscow MD
No.24 - Stryi, Kiev MD
No.25 - Voroshilov (Ussuriysk), Far-East Front
No.26 - Lutsk, Kiev MD
No.27 - ?
No.28 - ?
No.29 - Tartu, Baltic MD (under construction)
No.35 - Riga, Baltic MD (under construction)
No.36 - Kaunas, Baltic MD (under conctruction)
No.42 - Korosten, Kiev MD
No.66 - ?
No.77 - Voroshilov (Ussuriysk), Far-East Front
No.81 - Naro-Fominsk, Moscow MD
No.82 - Lvov, Kiev MD
No.83 - Kiev, Kiev MD
No.84 - Kiselevichi, Bobruisk region, West MD
No.85 - Star.Dorogi, Minsk region West MD
No.90 - Krasnaya Pakhra, Moscow region, Moscow MD
No.103 - Atamanovka, Chita region, Transbaikal MD
No.105 - Khabarovsk, Far-East Front
Or total 39 bases. According to Fedorenko there were 38+7=45 repair bases, so 6 are missing in the list, probably some of them those under construction in June 1941. There was a concentration of repair bases around Moscow (6 bases), others were distributed by military districts so that each of them had at least one base and the most important border districts -several bases.
Tank repair factories in June 1941 (all under construction and not completed):
No.1 - Kremenchug
No.2 - Ternopol
No.3 - Vitebsk
No.4 - Baranovichi
Information was partly compiled based on Rodionov's list of Soviet defense industry:
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics ... /vpk/data/
Until the end of 1941 several repair bases were lost, disbanded or reorganized as mobile repair bases, usually those in border areas, including: No.20, No.24, No.26, No.27, No.28, No.29, No.35, No. 36, No. 82, No.84, No. 85.
Evacuated by the end of 1941:
No.1 - from Moscow to Pugachevsk (Volga region)
No.2 - from Moscow to Yaisan (Ural)
No.3 - from Moscow to the vicinity of Ulyanovsk (Volga)
No.5 - from Smolensk to Sverdlovsk (Ural)
No.6 - from Bryanks to Bogorodsk (region of Gorky)
No.7 - from Darnitsa to Voronezh
No.8 - from Kiev to Kazan
No.9 - from Vinnitsa to Tambov
No.10 - from Zhitomir to Stalingrad
No.12 - from Kharkov to Prokhlandiy (North Caucasus)
No.17 - from Rostov to Otrado-Kubanskaya (North Caucasus)
No.22 - from Moscow to Kungur (Ural)
No.42 - from Korosten to Voronezh
No.66 - to Kamensk (Ural)
No.81- from Naro-Fominsk to Glazov (Ural)
No.83 - from Kiev to Engels (Volga)
No.90 - from Krasnaya Pakhra to Kotelnich (Volga)
Following changes in military situation bases Nos. 1, 2, 3, 22 were returned back to Moscow in early 1942. Bottom line: most available repair bases in the European part by the end of 1941 were either lost or evacuated and ceased operation temporarily.
Base No.1 - Moscow, Moscow Military District
No.2 - Moscow, Moscow MD
No.3 - Moscow, Moscow MD
No.4 - Leningrad, Leningrad MD
No.5 - Smolensk, West MD
No.6 - Bryansk, Orel MD
No.7 - Darnitsa, Kiev region, Kiev MD
No.8 - Kiev, Kiev MD
No.9 - Vinnitsa, Kiev MD
No. 10 - Zhitomir, Kiev MD
No.12 - Kharkov, Kharkov MD
No. 13 - Navtlug, region of Tbilisi, Trancaucasus MD
No.14 - Tashkent, Central Asian MD
No.15 - Nobosibirsk, Siberian MD
No.16 - Kuibyshev (Samara), Volga MD
No. 17 - Rostov-on-Don, North-Caucasus MD
No.18 - Khabarovsk, Far-East Front
No.19 - Blagoveshchensk, Far-East Front
No.20 - Borisov, West MD
No.22 - Moscow, Moscow MD
No.24 - Stryi, Kiev MD
No.25 - Voroshilov (Ussuriysk), Far-East Front
No.26 - Lutsk, Kiev MD
No.27 - ?
No.28 - ?
No.29 - Tartu, Baltic MD (under construction)
No.35 - Riga, Baltic MD (under construction)
No.36 - Kaunas, Baltic MD (under conctruction)
No.42 - Korosten, Kiev MD
No.66 - ?
No.77 - Voroshilov (Ussuriysk), Far-East Front
No.81 - Naro-Fominsk, Moscow MD
No.82 - Lvov, Kiev MD
No.83 - Kiev, Kiev MD
No.84 - Kiselevichi, Bobruisk region, West MD
No.85 - Star.Dorogi, Minsk region West MD
No.90 - Krasnaya Pakhra, Moscow region, Moscow MD
No.103 - Atamanovka, Chita region, Transbaikal MD
No.105 - Khabarovsk, Far-East Front
Or total 39 bases. According to Fedorenko there were 38+7=45 repair bases, so 6 are missing in the list, probably some of them those under construction in June 1941. There was a concentration of repair bases around Moscow (6 bases), others were distributed by military districts so that each of them had at least one base and the most important border districts -several bases.
Tank repair factories in June 1941 (all under construction and not completed):
No.1 - Kremenchug
No.2 - Ternopol
No.3 - Vitebsk
No.4 - Baranovichi
Information was partly compiled based on Rodionov's list of Soviet defense industry:
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics ... /vpk/data/
Until the end of 1941 several repair bases were lost, disbanded or reorganized as mobile repair bases, usually those in border areas, including: No.20, No.24, No.26, No.27, No.28, No.29, No.35, No. 36, No. 82, No.84, No. 85.
Evacuated by the end of 1941:
No.1 - from Moscow to Pugachevsk (Volga region)
No.2 - from Moscow to Yaisan (Ural)
No.3 - from Moscow to the vicinity of Ulyanovsk (Volga)
No.5 - from Smolensk to Sverdlovsk (Ural)
No.6 - from Bryanks to Bogorodsk (region of Gorky)
No.7 - from Darnitsa to Voronezh
No.8 - from Kiev to Kazan
No.9 - from Vinnitsa to Tambov
No.10 - from Zhitomir to Stalingrad
No.12 - from Kharkov to Prokhlandiy (North Caucasus)
No.17 - from Rostov to Otrado-Kubanskaya (North Caucasus)
No.22 - from Moscow to Kungur (Ural)
No.42 - from Korosten to Voronezh
No.66 - to Kamensk (Ural)
No.81- from Naro-Fominsk to Glazov (Ural)
No.83 - from Kiev to Engels (Volga)
No.90 - from Krasnaya Pakhra to Kotelnich (Volga)
Following changes in military situation bases Nos. 1, 2, 3, 22 were returned back to Moscow in early 1942. Bottom line: most available repair bases in the European part by the end of 1941 were either lost or evacuated and ceased operation temporarily.
Re: Tank Technical Support
Also information on mobile tank&motor maintenance units in June 1941:
In each of available tanks divisions: separate repair&reconstruction battalion. Peace-time TO&E 10/976 - total 179 men, 1 car, 3 "A" type mobile workshops, 11 "B" type mobile workshops, 19 other trucks, 3 motorcycles, 10 evacuation tractors (Komintern or ST-2 type). At mobilization battalion switches to wartime TO&E 010/26 total about 430 men with specialized mobile workshops, each based based on ZIS-6 truck with instruments: 12 assembly workshops, 4 engine workshops, 4 mechanical, 2 chassis, 2 final drive, 2 forging and welding, 2 electric welding, 2 vulcanization, 2 electric equipment, 2 radio, 2 electric battery workshops, 1 artillery (ordnance), 1 test station. Also 20 evacuation tractors and trucks for transportation of spare parts, fuel and rations.
In each of 31 motorized divisions: separate repair&reconstruction battalion. Peace-time TO&E 10/32 - total 256 men, 37 various automobiles, 20 evacuation tractors (Komintern/ST-2), tank reserve of 20 BT tanks. Presumably difference compared with 10/976 lays mostly in additional 10 tractors with crews and 20 BT tanks with crews (60 men). With mobilization switched to TO&E 05/81 (?) - total 494 men which is similar to 010/26 save for additional reserve of 20 BT tanks.
Note that both types of battalions are kept at reduced strength in peace time. In the second half of 1941 part of these battalions were destroyed or disbanded, some reorganized, some became separate maintenance units after parent divisions were disbanded.
Army repair&reconstruction battalion. Total 9 battalions in June 1941. Peace-time TO&E 10/881 (?) 101 men (according to Fedorenko), wartime 010/881 (231 men in 1942). Looks like they were mostly meant for repair of automobiles, whereas tank repair was to be performed by battalions of tank/motorized divisions.
In each of available tanks divisions: separate repair&reconstruction battalion. Peace-time TO&E 10/976 - total 179 men, 1 car, 3 "A" type mobile workshops, 11 "B" type mobile workshops, 19 other trucks, 3 motorcycles, 10 evacuation tractors (Komintern or ST-2 type). At mobilization battalion switches to wartime TO&E 010/26 total about 430 men with specialized mobile workshops, each based based on ZIS-6 truck with instruments: 12 assembly workshops, 4 engine workshops, 4 mechanical, 2 chassis, 2 final drive, 2 forging and welding, 2 electric welding, 2 vulcanization, 2 electric equipment, 2 radio, 2 electric battery workshops, 1 artillery (ordnance), 1 test station. Also 20 evacuation tractors and trucks for transportation of spare parts, fuel and rations.
In each of 31 motorized divisions: separate repair&reconstruction battalion. Peace-time TO&E 10/32 - total 256 men, 37 various automobiles, 20 evacuation tractors (Komintern/ST-2), tank reserve of 20 BT tanks. Presumably difference compared with 10/976 lays mostly in additional 10 tractors with crews and 20 BT tanks with crews (60 men). With mobilization switched to TO&E 05/81 (?) - total 494 men which is similar to 010/26 save for additional reserve of 20 BT tanks.
Note that both types of battalions are kept at reduced strength in peace time. In the second half of 1941 part of these battalions were destroyed or disbanded, some reorganized, some became separate maintenance units after parent divisions were disbanded.
Army repair&reconstruction battalion. Total 9 battalions in June 1941. Peace-time TO&E 10/881 (?) 101 men (according to Fedorenko), wartime 010/881 (231 men in 1942). Looks like they were mostly meant for repair of automobiles, whereas tank repair was to be performed by battalions of tank/motorized divisions.
Re: Tank Technical Support
According to an official publications ("Soviet Armed Forces Rear in the Great Patriotic War") formed in the second half of 1941 were the following motor maintenance units:
63 mobile repair bases (*)
18 separate repair&reconstruction battalions (**)
9 army repair&reconstruction battalions
5 railroad workshops
4 garrison workshops
2 mobile automobile repair factories (***).
* GKO decrees of 14 July and 11 August ordered formation of 53 mobile repair bases, the balance seem to be converted from pre-war static repair bases
** Likely former battalions of tank/motorized divisions which became separate units after their parent formations were disbanded
***One of them - mobile repair factory of the South-West front was later "legalized" as repair base No.11
63 mobile repair bases (*)
18 separate repair&reconstruction battalions (**)
9 army repair&reconstruction battalions
5 railroad workshops
4 garrison workshops
2 mobile automobile repair factories (***).
* GKO decrees of 14 July and 11 August ordered formation of 53 mobile repair bases, the balance seem to be converted from pre-war static repair bases
** Likely former battalions of tank/motorized divisions which became separate units after their parent formations were disbanded
***One of them - mobile repair factory of the South-West front was later "legalized" as repair base No.11
Re: Tank Technical Support
Organization of the mobile tank repair base (shtat 026/131 issued in the second half of 1941):
Command
Assembly-disassembly platoon (with three sections)
Special works platoon (with sections: aggregate repair, mechanical works, thermal treatment)
electric repair section
ordnance repair sections
Technical and general supply platoon (with equipment dump and supply section)
Personnel:
Base chief
Political deputy
deputy chief (technical officer)
commander of assembly-disassembly platoon
commander of special operations platoon
Commander of supply platoon
Controller-technician
administrative officer
Medical officer
total 9 officers
3 leaders of assembly-disassembly sections
leader of aggregate repair section
leader of mechanical works section
leader of thermal treatment section
chief of equipment dump (section leader)
leader of electric repair section
radio master
weapons master
supply sergeant (supply section leader)
2 controllers
Total 13 sergeants
27 assembly mechanics
2 turners
3 mechanics/drivers
1 electric welder
1 gas welder
6 drivers
1 carpenter
1 blacksmith
1 tinsmith/coppersmith
1 electrician
2 battery mechanics
1 storekeeper (motor equipment supply)
1 storekeeper (general supply)
1 cook
1 cobbler
1 weapons mechanic
2 tractor drivers
Total 53 privates
1 pickup car, 20 trucks and special type vehicles, 2 tractors,
Organization of the mobile automotive repair base (shtat 026/132 issued in the second half of 1941)
similar to 026/131, except:
no weapons repair section, but tire repair section instead
Personnel:
no weapons master (sergeant) and weapons mechanic
added leader of tire repair section (sergeant), tire mechanic, tire mechanic/driver
no blackmisth
added coppersmith
12 assembly mechanics instead of 27
2 mechanics/drivers instead of 3
20 drivers instead of 6
2 electricians instead of 1
Total 9 officers+13 sergeants+53 privates
some minor changes were introduced in 1942.
Command
Assembly-disassembly platoon (with three sections)
Special works platoon (with sections: aggregate repair, mechanical works, thermal treatment)
electric repair section
ordnance repair sections
Technical and general supply platoon (with equipment dump and supply section)
Personnel:
Base chief
Political deputy
deputy chief (technical officer)
commander of assembly-disassembly platoon
commander of special operations platoon
Commander of supply platoon
Controller-technician
administrative officer
Medical officer
total 9 officers
3 leaders of assembly-disassembly sections
leader of aggregate repair section
leader of mechanical works section
leader of thermal treatment section
chief of equipment dump (section leader)
leader of electric repair section
radio master
weapons master
supply sergeant (supply section leader)
2 controllers
Total 13 sergeants
27 assembly mechanics
2 turners
3 mechanics/drivers
1 electric welder
1 gas welder
6 drivers
1 carpenter
1 blacksmith
1 tinsmith/coppersmith
1 electrician
2 battery mechanics
1 storekeeper (motor equipment supply)
1 storekeeper (general supply)
1 cook
1 cobbler
1 weapons mechanic
2 tractor drivers
Total 53 privates
1 pickup car, 20 trucks and special type vehicles, 2 tractors,
Organization of the mobile automotive repair base (shtat 026/132 issued in the second half of 1941)
similar to 026/131, except:
no weapons repair section, but tire repair section instead
Personnel:
no weapons master (sergeant) and weapons mechanic
added leader of tire repair section (sergeant), tire mechanic, tire mechanic/driver
no blackmisth
added coppersmith
12 assembly mechanics instead of 27
2 mechanics/drivers instead of 3
20 drivers instead of 6
2 electricians instead of 1
Total 9 officers+13 sergeants+53 privates
some minor changes were introduced in 1942.
Re: Tank Technical Support
Sample data: Tank and automotive repair units of the South-West Front in December 1941:
one mobile repair factory (TO&E 026/151)
three repair columns
six repair bases - No. 6, 9, 12, 24, 27, 85 (TO&E 26/728)
six railroad repair workshops - No. 1, 3, 30, 39, 40, 1712 (TO&E 026/807)
two garrison workshops - no. 11 and 40 (TO&E 26/948)
From a list of units of the SWF as of 1.12.1941:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=114809798
one mobile repair factory (TO&E 026/151)
three repair columns
six repair bases - No. 6, 9, 12, 24, 27, 85 (TO&E 26/728)
six railroad repair workshops - No. 1, 3, 30, 39, 40, 1712 (TO&E 026/807)
two garrison workshops - no. 11 and 40 (TO&E 26/948)
From a list of units of the SWF as of 1.12.1941:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=114809798
Re: Tank Technical Support
Report on status of South-West Front’s armored unit, 31 January 1942
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=1142489531. SWF has 13 different types of tanks (KV, T-34, T-60, BT-2, BT-5, BT-7, BT-7M, T-26, T-26 twin-turret, T-26 flame, T-40, T-38) of which only T-34, KV and T-60 are modern types. Status of available units (nine tanks brigades and three tank battalions):
TO&E strength – 522 (105 KV, 177 T-34, 240 T-60)
On strength – 300 (14 KV, 99 T-34, 48 BT, 38 T-26, 5 T-38/40, 96 T-60)
Of them operational – 117 (10 KV, 44 T-34, 63 light tanks)
In need of repair – 183 (4 KV, 55 T-34, 124 light tanks)
2. Losses are replaced almost exclusively with damaged and repaired tanks, the quality of repair being extremely low. Usually in repair units tanks are given old details and aggregates, since new spare parts and aggregates are completely absent and are not received from the zone of interior. Due to faulty tactical employment there are large losses of tanks before the battle and in the battle itself. A large number of tanks require medium and capital repair at factories, hence a need in means of evacuation.
3. Tank brigades have a large shortfall of tanks. Available tanks are of poor quality and lack spare parts. Hence a limited tactical effectiveness of tank brigades. Only KV and T-34 are truly effective, the balance is just a burden and suffer huge technical losses. For example, the 10 Tank Brigade lost 29 tanks out of original 46 during a 60 km march. Most of these losses belong to older types of tanks. Hence a small durability of tank brigades which is also affected by an absence of tank replacement in the process of battle.
Conclusions
1. Multitude of tank types should be eliminated.
2. Tank brigades should be reinforced to the authorized strength.
3. Older types of tanks should be employed on sectors of secondary importance. At decisive points tank brigades have to be equipped with modern tanks (KV, T-34 etc) which are the only tactically effective types.
4. Tank brigades should receive an evacuation tractor company (KIM, “ST-2”, “Voroshilovets” tractors).
5. Front and army depots should receive supplies of spare parts in planned fashion.
6. Tank brigades should include maintenance battalions instead of maintenance companies which would provide for replacement of damaged aggregates in field conditions.
7. Evacuation companies of armies and front should be “legalized” and provided a standard TO&E (*).
8. All maintenance facilities and units should be centralized under front command, the same applies to the pool of damaged tanks.
9. Tank and motor vehicles pool of the front should receive replacements corresponding to losses.
10. Necessary measures for tank repair:
a/ A pool of spare parts and aggregates (engines – 30% to the number of tanks, gearboxes – 15%, side drives – 30%)
b/ the Front should receive regular supply of spare part by rail and motor transport.
*The front formed several improvised evacuation companies which were not authorized on higher level. An organization was probably a tractor company (16 tractors) in each of 4 armies.
Appendix. Status of tractors of the South-West Front as of 25 January 1941
Type Authorized number Available %
STZ 1393 1099 78%
ChTZ 2010 949 47%
Voroshilovets 72 9 7%
ST-2/Komintern 458 56 12%
Shortfall of 67 ‘Voroshilovets” type tractors belongs to the army evacuation companies. As a result of shortfall evacuation is performed by ChTZ-60/65 tractors, which is by no means an adequate replacement.
Of 458 authorized ST-2/”Komintern” type tractors 65 belong to the tank units, actually available are 4 tractors, the shortfall is replaced with less powerful ChTZ-60/65 tractors having smaller power and speed.
Re: Tank Technical Support
Sample data - tank and automotive maintenance units of the South Front, mid-November 1941:
total 7 repair&reconstruction battalions(*), 2 mobile repair bases (automotive), one railroad workshop, one static workshop, 2 evacuation companies and one evacuation platoon
* Two battalions (35 and 152) are at Stalingrad and attached to the Stalingrad Tractor Factory as additional workforce.
Sample data - tank and automotive maintenance units of the Volkhov Front in February 1942:
52 Army - 19 mobile repair base (automotive, monthly capacity 90 repairs), 52 mobile repair base (tractor, monthly capacity 30 repairs)
4 Army - 53 mobile repair base (tanks and automobiles, monthly capacity 90 repairs), 116 mobile repair base (automobiles, monthly capacity 90)
2 Shock Army - 46 repair&reconstruction battalion (automobiles, monthly capacity 90)
59 Army - 37 repair&reconstruction battalion (tanks and automobiles, monthly capacity 90/25)
Front - 60 repair&reconstruction battalion (tanks and automobiles, monthly capacity 90)
Two front repair bases are in the process of organization.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=156047386
total 7 repair&reconstruction battalions(*), 2 mobile repair bases (automotive), one railroad workshop, one static workshop, 2 evacuation companies and one evacuation platoon
* Two battalions (35 and 152) are at Stalingrad and attached to the Stalingrad Tractor Factory as additional workforce.
Sample data - tank and automotive maintenance units of the Volkhov Front in February 1942:
52 Army - 19 mobile repair base (automotive, monthly capacity 90 repairs), 52 mobile repair base (tractor, monthly capacity 30 repairs)
4 Army - 53 mobile repair base (tanks and automobiles, monthly capacity 90 repairs), 116 mobile repair base (automobiles, monthly capacity 90)
2 Shock Army - 46 repair&reconstruction battalion (automobiles, monthly capacity 90)
59 Army - 37 repair&reconstruction battalion (tanks and automobiles, monthly capacity 90/25)
Front - 60 repair&reconstruction battalion (tanks and automobiles, monthly capacity 90)
Two front repair bases are in the process of organization.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=156047386
Re: Tank Technical Support
Some conclusions/observations on the first period (1941)
1. Tank maintenance was not formally separated from automotive or tractor maintenance. The same types of units was supposed to handle all of them.
2. The fleet of the Red Army's motor vehicles underwent a very rapid expansion in the pre-war years and the maintenance system didn't quite keep up with it.
3. By June 1941 about 20% of all tanks, 28% of tractors and 23% of automobiles were in need of major or medium repair, even in peace time there were problems with timely repair.
4. Multitude of the type of tanks was a problem from a perspective of maintenance and spare parts supply.
5. In June 1941 most of Red Army's tanks were concentrated in large units (tank or motorized divisions), correspondingly the bulk of tank maintenance elements were in divisions. There were only few mobile motor maintenance units at higher echelons (corps, armies, fronts). After the war started tank and motorized divisions were disbanded, and smaller units (tank brigades and battalions) were organized instead. Correspondingly there was a shift toward separate maintenance units (battalions, mobile bases etc) at army of front level.
6. Repair battalions of tank/motorized divisions were kept at reduced strength in peace time and at least in border districts they entered action before the mobilization was completed. Another problem of field maintenance units was a lack of motor vehicles, equipment, instruments, spare parts, tractors etc.
7. Long-term repair mostly relied on military-controlled static installations (repair shops or repair bases) in the zone of interior employing civil workers and partly on civil factories which created strain on logistics and lengthened the duration of repair cycle. There was apparently no mobilization of this part of maintenance system and increase of capacity in wartime.
8. A considerable part of static repair installations in the European part was lost, most of the balance had to be evacuated and were temporarily out of action for some time (weeks or even months).
9. Additional formation of repair units (mobile repair bases) was undertaken after the war start using personnel and instruments partly drawn from civil industry. It was improvised and and made on a limited scale (total 53 repair bases, of them 20 tank repair bases with some 1500 men).
10. Heavy tractors needed for recovery of tanks, especially modern KV and T-34 were in very short supply. ChTZ tractors (available in larger numbers) were not quite an adequate replacement due to a limited speed and power. No specialized armored recovery vehicles were produced.
11. There were no evacuation (recovery) units above divisional level. After the war start provisional tractor companies in armies were improvised to collect disabled vehicles for examination, repair and shipment to interior, but they were not formally authorized and issued a standard TO&E.
12. The industry failed to meet the requirement of spare parts production and even failed to meet plans of spare parts production issued by the government.
13. Supply of spare parts in 1941 was unsurprisingly chaotic and units had to rely on cannibalization.
1. Tank maintenance was not formally separated from automotive or tractor maintenance. The same types of units was supposed to handle all of them.
2. The fleet of the Red Army's motor vehicles underwent a very rapid expansion in the pre-war years and the maintenance system didn't quite keep up with it.
3. By June 1941 about 20% of all tanks, 28% of tractors and 23% of automobiles were in need of major or medium repair, even in peace time there were problems with timely repair.
4. Multitude of the type of tanks was a problem from a perspective of maintenance and spare parts supply.
5. In June 1941 most of Red Army's tanks were concentrated in large units (tank or motorized divisions), correspondingly the bulk of tank maintenance elements were in divisions. There were only few mobile motor maintenance units at higher echelons (corps, armies, fronts). After the war started tank and motorized divisions were disbanded, and smaller units (tank brigades and battalions) were organized instead. Correspondingly there was a shift toward separate maintenance units (battalions, mobile bases etc) at army of front level.
6. Repair battalions of tank/motorized divisions were kept at reduced strength in peace time and at least in border districts they entered action before the mobilization was completed. Another problem of field maintenance units was a lack of motor vehicles, equipment, instruments, spare parts, tractors etc.
7. Long-term repair mostly relied on military-controlled static installations (repair shops or repair bases) in the zone of interior employing civil workers and partly on civil factories which created strain on logistics and lengthened the duration of repair cycle. There was apparently no mobilization of this part of maintenance system and increase of capacity in wartime.
8. A considerable part of static repair installations in the European part was lost, most of the balance had to be evacuated and were temporarily out of action for some time (weeks or even months).
9. Additional formation of repair units (mobile repair bases) was undertaken after the war start using personnel and instruments partly drawn from civil industry. It was improvised and and made on a limited scale (total 53 repair bases, of them 20 tank repair bases with some 1500 men).
10. Heavy tractors needed for recovery of tanks, especially modern KV and T-34 were in very short supply. ChTZ tractors (available in larger numbers) were not quite an adequate replacement due to a limited speed and power. No specialized armored recovery vehicles were produced.
11. There were no evacuation (recovery) units above divisional level. After the war start provisional tractor companies in armies were improvised to collect disabled vehicles for examination, repair and shipment to interior, but they were not formally authorized and issued a standard TO&E.
12. The industry failed to meet the requirement of spare parts production and even failed to meet plans of spare parts production issued by the government.
13. Supply of spare parts in 1941 was unsurprisingly chaotic and units had to rely on cannibalization.
Re: Tank Technical Support
GKO decree No.1287 of 15 February 1942:
NKO and several civil agencies are to form 63 field repair bases for repair of tanks, tractors and automobiles organized according to TO&Es 026/131 and 026/132. Equipment and instruments are to be produced in full by formation agencies. Motor transport, if needed, is to be supplied by the NKO. 30% of the requisite personnel is to be taken from repair bases and civil factories and 70% from the NKO (Army).
Appendix: plan of mobile repair bases formation. Total 63 bases, of them 7 for KV tanks, 16 for T-34, 8 for T-60, 8 for tractors, and 24 for automobiles. Of 63 bases 13 are formed by the Army (NKO), 23 by the People's Commissariat for Tank Industry, 14 by the People's Commissariat for Medium Machine-building, 3 by the People's Commissariat for Heavy Machine-building, 4 by the People's Commissariat for Automobile Transport of the Russian SFSR, 2 by the People's Commissariat for Automobile Transport of the Georgian SSR, 4 by the Moscow City Council.
Attachment: memorandum by Molotov, Malyshev and Biryukov (commissar of the GABTU) to Stalin: in accordance with the GKO's orders 52 mobile repair bases were organized in July-August 1941. A half-year experience proved their practical value. Each base has a capacity of 15-20 KV repairs or 20-35 T-34 repairs. In accordance with your instructions we propose to form additional 63 mobile repair bases, of them 7 for KV tanks, 16 for T-34, 8 for T-60, 8 for tractors, and 24 for automobiles. combined with already existing bases they would provide for 250-300 medium and major repairs of T-34 tanks monthly, 150-200 KV repairs, 300-350 T-60 repairs.
Attachment: list of available mobile repair bases by fronts:
4 bases for KV repair (3 at the Leningrad and 1 - West Front)
10 bases for T-34/BT/T-26 tanks (1 - North-West Front, 1 - Kalinin, 2 - West, 2 - Bryansk, 2 South-West, 1 South, 1 - Transbaikal Front)
6 bases for T-60 tanks (1 Kalinin, 2 West, 1 South-West, 1 South, 1 Transbaikal Front)
24 automobile repair bases
8 tractor repair bases.
NKO and several civil agencies are to form 63 field repair bases for repair of tanks, tractors and automobiles organized according to TO&Es 026/131 and 026/132. Equipment and instruments are to be produced in full by formation agencies. Motor transport, if needed, is to be supplied by the NKO. 30% of the requisite personnel is to be taken from repair bases and civil factories and 70% from the NKO (Army).
Appendix: plan of mobile repair bases formation. Total 63 bases, of them 7 for KV tanks, 16 for T-34, 8 for T-60, 8 for tractors, and 24 for automobiles. Of 63 bases 13 are formed by the Army (NKO), 23 by the People's Commissariat for Tank Industry, 14 by the People's Commissariat for Medium Machine-building, 3 by the People's Commissariat for Heavy Machine-building, 4 by the People's Commissariat for Automobile Transport of the Russian SFSR, 2 by the People's Commissariat for Automobile Transport of the Georgian SSR, 4 by the Moscow City Council.
Attachment: memorandum by Molotov, Malyshev and Biryukov (commissar of the GABTU) to Stalin: in accordance with the GKO's orders 52 mobile repair bases were organized in July-August 1941. A half-year experience proved their practical value. Each base has a capacity of 15-20 KV repairs or 20-35 T-34 repairs. In accordance with your instructions we propose to form additional 63 mobile repair bases, of them 7 for KV tanks, 16 for T-34, 8 for T-60, 8 for tractors, and 24 for automobiles. combined with already existing bases they would provide for 250-300 medium and major repairs of T-34 tanks monthly, 150-200 KV repairs, 300-350 T-60 repairs.
Attachment: list of available mobile repair bases by fronts:
4 bases for KV repair (3 at the Leningrad and 1 - West Front)
10 bases for T-34/BT/T-26 tanks (1 - North-West Front, 1 - Kalinin, 2 - West, 2 - Bryansk, 2 South-West, 1 South, 1 - Transbaikal Front)
6 bases for T-60 tanks (1 Kalinin, 2 West, 1 South-West, 1 South, 1 Transbaikal Front)
24 automobile repair bases
8 tractor repair bases.
Re: Tank Technical Support
GKO decree No.1043 of 19 December 1941 - plan of tank production in the Ist quarter of 1941
Combined plan of tank spare parts production (People's Commissariats for Tank Industry, Medium Machine-building and Fishing Industry):
KV tanks - 28 mln rubles in I quarter
T-34 - 18
T-50 - 0.5
T-60 - 6
BT - 10
T-26 - 11
V-2 engines - 2
M-17 engines - 1.5
GAZ-202 engines - 2
http://sovdoc.rusarchives.ru/#showunit& ... 14;tab=img
Combined plan of tank spare parts production (People's Commissariats for Tank Industry, Medium Machine-building and Fishing Industry):
KV tanks - 28 mln rubles in I quarter
T-34 - 18
T-50 - 0.5
T-60 - 6
BT - 10
T-26 - 11
V-2 engines - 2
M-17 engines - 1.5
GAZ-202 engines - 2
http://sovdoc.rusarchives.ru/#showunit& ... 14;tab=img