Different German Oil Strategy

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ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 15 Aug 2018 08:34

1. More fuel reserves does not allow much larger and farther reaching mobile operations, as many other things are needed for mobile operations,things as tanks,trucks, drivers, mechanics,and more fuel does not mean more tanks,trucs, etc
2.Germany HAD more fuel in 1943 than in 1941:10,5 million ton to 8,5 million ton and the military situation was NOT better .
3.Mobile operations on themselves do not mean success,as the German mobile divisions lacked the needed firepower and manpower (see the failures of Guderian in 1941 )
4. More fuel production does not mean that more fuel would arrive at the front,because the Reichsbahn was unable to transport the needed coal/oil (source : the collapse of the German war economy 19044-1945 ,by Mierjezewski )
5.More oil /coal would demand more aircraft for protection against allied air attacks.
6.There is no proof that the synthetic oil plants could produce more oil if they had more coal .
7.It would take years to restart the oil production of the Caucasus and to transport even only one million ton of oil to Germany (Source :Germany and WWII);for coal it was out of the question : German production of hard/brown coal was 492 million ton in 1941/1942 and 532 million in 1943/1944 .
8. The Jet production/deployment problems were not caused by oil shortages, but mainly by shortages of trained pilots .
9.Greater fuel reserves does not mean greater supply of armor.
In the HTL the Reichsbahn had big problems to transport the needed coal,oil,etc, where it was needed . If you increase in the ATL the production of coal, fuel, ... this would only increase the transport problems .A coal train could carry 40 waggons of 20 ton capacity = 800 ton,if 4 million ton more of coal was available, where would the Reichsbahn find an additional number of 5000 trains with 200000 waggons and how could they transport these 4 million tons from Russia to Germany ?
Coal and oil that were not transported ,were useless.

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Paul Lakowski » 16 Aug 2018 05:02

ljadw wrote:
15 Aug 2018 08:34
1. More fuel reserves does not allow much larger and farther reaching mobile operations, as many other things are needed for mobile operations,things as tanks,trucks, drivers, mechanics,and more fuel does not mean more tanks,trucs, etc


Which were all available at the time . Most fighting on the Eastern Front required twice as much fuel as planned .



2.Germany HAD more fuel in 1943 than in 1941:10,5 million ton to 8,5 million ton and the military situation was NOT better .




Wrong again they had less monthly fuel excess in 1943 compared to 1941 [ 160-280,000 tons excess per month excess consumpsion in 1943 compare to 360-430,000 tons per month excess in 1941] . How they use these resources is more critical, with less monthly fuel excess; then fewer mobile Korps can be mobilised each month for on going combat operations .


3.Mobile operations on themselves do not mean success,as the German mobile divisions lacked the needed firepower and manpower (see the failures of Guderian in 1941 )




Every thing is potential , but without these excess fuel & munitions- in the first place , nothing can be achieved.


4. More fuel production does not mean that more fuel would arrive at the front,because the Reichsbahn was unable to transport the needed coal/oil (source : the collapse of the German war economy 19044-1945 ,by Mierjezewski )




That all depends on how these resources are used, and using1944/45 standards to judge the rest of the war is a definite RED HERRING.



5.More oil /coal would demand more aircraft for protection against allied air attacks.




Not if they are jet fighters.




6.There is no proof that the synthetic oil plants could produce more oil if they had more coal .




No they also need more steel and labour, as I already articulated in my previous post.



7.It would take years to restart the oil production of the Caucasus and to transport even only one million ton of oil to Germany (Source :Germany and WWII);for coal it was out of the question : German production of hard/brown coal was 492 million ton in 1941/1942 and 532 million in 1943/1944 .





More RED HERRINGS.....


8. The Jet production/deployment problems were not caused by oil shortages, but mainly by shortages of trained pilots .




Even More RED HERRINGS..... comparing combat situation at the end of the war to mid war potential.



The main limiter to earlier jet expansion was lack of critical alloying assets to make the jet engines work. These assets were already historically invested into THE WEST WALL & ATLANTIC WALL. So alternatively they could have been reassigned. However sortie for sortie , jets consume more fuel than conventional propeller engines.



9.Greater fuel reserves does not mean greater supply of armor.



No but the 90,000 tons of naval armor invested in THE WEST WALL and 100,000 tons invested in THE ATLANTIC WALL would provide the alloying materials for jet engine construction program and enough armoring materials to produce all of the 3/4 tracktor as "Waffentragger" . More importantly most AFV built during the war had 1/3 to 1/4 % tonnage as armor , THUS limiting any combat roles to light AFV or support roles. If the AFV tonnage % can be raised to 50% [through more armor available] , then the AFV built can be of 'tank/assault gun level capability .





In the HTL the Reichsbahn had big problems to transport the needed coal,oil,etc, where it was needed . If you increase in the ATL the production of coal, fuel, ... this would only increase the transport problems .A coal train could carry 40 waggons of 20 ton capacity = 800 ton,if 4 million ton more of coal was available, where would the Reichsbahn find an additional number of 5000 trains with 200000 waggons and how could they transport these 4 million tons from Russia to Germany ?
Coal and oil that were not transported ,were useless.




Wrong again they were excellent resources for bilateral trade before and during the war to raise much need cash reserves to purchase these needed fuels etc etc..



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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 16 Aug 2018 06:53

Paul Lakowski wrote:
16 Aug 2018 05:02
ljadw wrote:
15 Aug 2018 08:34
1. More fuel reserves does not allow much larger and farther reaching mobile operations, as many other things are needed for mobile operations,things as tanks,trucks, drivers, mechanics,and more fuel does not mean more tanks,trucs, etc


Which were all available at the time . Most fighting on the Eastern Front required twice as much fuel as planned .



2.Germany HAD more fuel in 1943 than in 1941:10,5 million ton to 8,5 million ton and the military situation was NOT better .




Wrong again they had less monthly fuel excess in 1943 compared to 1941 [ 160-280,000 tons excess per month excess consumpsion in 1943 compare to 360-430,000 tons per month excess in 1941] . How they use these resources is more critical, with less monthly fuel excess; then fewer mobile Korps can be mobilised each month for on going combat operations .


3.Mobile operations on themselves do not mean success,as the German mobile divisions lacked the needed firepower and manpower (see the failures of Guderian in 1941 )




Every thing is potential , but without these excess fuel & munitions- in the first place , nothing can be achieved.


4. More fuel production does not mean that more fuel would arrive at the front,because the Reichsbahn was unable to transport the needed coal/oil (source : the collapse of the German war economy 19044-1945 ,by Mierjezewski )




That all depends on how these resources are used, and using1944/45 standards to judge the rest of the war is a definite RED HERRING.



5.More oil /coal would demand more aircraft for protection against allied air attacks.




Not if they are jet fighters.




6.There is no proof that the synthetic oil plants could produce more oil if they had more coal .




No they also need more steel and labour, as I already articulated in my previous post.



7.It would take years to restart the oil production of the Caucasus and to transport even only one million ton of oil to Germany (Source :Germany and WWII);for coal it was out of the question : German production of hard/brown coal was 492 million ton in 1941/1942 and 532 million in 1943/1944 .





More RED HERRINGS.....


8. The Jet production/deployment problems were not caused by oil shortages, but mainly by shortages of trained pilots .




Even More RED HERRINGS..... comparing combat situation at the end of the war to mid war potential.



The main limiter to earlier jet expansion was lack of critical alloying assets to make the jet engines work. These assets were already historically invested into THE WEST WALL & ATLANTIC WALL. So alternatively they could have been reassigned. However sortie for sortie , jets consume more fuel than conventional propeller engines.



9.Greater fuel reserves does not mean greater supply of armor.



No but the 90,000 tons of naval armor invested in THE WEST WALL and 100,000 tons invested in THE ATLANTIC WALL would provide the alloying materials for jet engine construction program and enough armoring materials to produce all of the 3/4 tracktor as "Waffentragger" . More importantly most AFV built during the war had 1/3 to 1/4 % tonnage as armor , THUS limiting any combat roles to light AFV or support roles. If the AFV tonnage % can be raised to 50% [through more armor available] , then the AFV built can be of 'tank/assault gun level capability .





In the HTL the Reichsbahn had big problems to transport the needed coal,oil,etc, where it was needed . If you increase in the ATL the production of coal, fuel, ... this would only increase the transport problems .A coal train could carry 40 waggons of 20 ton capacity = 800 ton,if 4 million ton more of coal was available, where would the Reichsbahn find an additional number of 5000 trains with 200000 waggons and how could they transport these 4 million tons from Russia to Germany ?
Coal and oil that were not transported ,were useless.




Wrong again they were excellent resources for bilateral trade before and during the war to raise much need cash reserves to purchase these needed fuels etc etc..


Claims are not proofs .
1 . What is your proof for your claim that more fuel , and a lot of idle drivers, mechanics, crews ,.. were waiting on additional fuel 2 . You are wrong : Germany had more oil in 1943 than in 1941, not less oil as you are claiming .
3 . Irrelevant answer .
4. It does not depend on how these resources are used and these problems did not occur in 1944 but started in 1939 and increased when the production increased .
5. No : jet fighters are not more efficient at night than classic fighters ,besides there were no jet fighters before 1944 and there could not be jet fighters before 1944 .
6. There was not more steel and labour available ,besides the railways could not transport more fuel than they did in the HTL
7. It was impossible to increase the available amount of oil and coal by imports from the occupied territories of the SU: this is not a Red Herring .You talk about Red Herring because you have no argument .
8.Jet fighters without pilots are useless .
9.No : more armor for AFV does not mean better AFV:it would increase fuel consumption, it would make it more difficult to use the AFV, speed would decrease,..;besides : the main role of AFV was a support role .
Which were these excellent resources before and during the war and where would Germany buy additional oil during the war and why would it buy additional oil before the war ?

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Paul Lakowski » 16 Aug 2018 21:25

ljadw wrote:
16 Aug 2018 06:53


Claims are not proofs .
1 . What is your proof for your claim that more fuel , and a lot of idle drivers, mechanics, crews ,.. were waiting on additional fuel 2 . You are wrong : Germany had more oil in 1943 than in 1941, not less oil as you are claiming .
3 . Irrelevant answer .
4. It does not depend on how these resources are used and these problems did not occur in 1944 but started in 1939 and increased when the production increased .
5. No : jet fighters are not more efficient at night than classic fighters ,besides there were no jet fighters before 1944 and there could not be jet fighters before 1944 .
6. There was not more steel and labour available ,besides the railways could not transport more fuel than they did in the HTL
7. It was impossible to increase the available amount of oil and coal by imports from the occupied territories of the SU: this is not a Red Herring .You talk about Red Herring because you have no argument .
8.Jet fighters without pilots are useless .
9.No : more armor for AFV does not mean better AFV:it would increase fuel consumption, it would make it more difficult to use the AFV, speed would decrease,..;besides : the main role of AFV was a support role .
Which were these excellent resources before and during the war and where would Germany buy additional oil during the war and why would it buy additional oil before the war ?
You don't seem to understand what's being discussed in this thread!!!!

They are looking for an alternative strategy for fuel in this war.

What is your strategy?

BTW all your answers are red herrings that are so specific to the limitations of history to even have any kind of broad application to the thread. Your attitude seems to be "we won the war so we are always right" .

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 17 Aug 2018 05:48

There was no alternative strategy possible , the only viable strategy was the existing one ;the alternative strategy that is proposed to make a German victory possible, would accelerate Germany's defeat .If there was a better alternative strategy, the Germans would have followed it.They didn't, thus there was no better one .

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Paul Lakowski » 17 Aug 2018 18:46

ljadw wrote:
17 Aug 2018 05:48
There was no alternative strategy possible , the only viable strategy was the existing one ;the alternative strategy that is proposed to make a German victory possible, would accelerate Germany's defeat .If there was a better alternative strategy, the Germans would have followed it.They didn't, thus there was no better one .

Then you need to read up on German History before Hitler and his 4 year plan. Deterministic history is an easy out and quite frankly useless in alternate history unless you have the data can dissect the comparable actual history. I will give you a clue...focusing on anecdotal incidents [like Guderian in front of Moscow during the winter of 1940/41] OUT OF CONTEXT cloud's the issue rather than clarifies it. Statistics leading to 'big data' is the only routes that can balance the basis of POV and offer reasonable alternatives.


Do you know that fuel consumption is driven mostly by # wheeled vehicles involved and is only weakly related to AFV consumption? So changing the AFV fuel situation may change tactical fuel consumption but has little impact on strategic operations.

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 17 Aug 2018 20:44

It was you who said that the fighting in the east required the double of fuel that was planned, which means that the consumption was the double as was planned,and still the Germans lost .They would also have lost if the triple of fuel that was planned,was consumed .And there is the problem ,hided by the Alternate "Historians " how the additional fuel would be produced in the Caucasus, would be transported to Germany to be refined and would go back to the east to be used by the Ostheer .
Alternate History must be founded on the facts of the HTL ,not on wishful-thinkingand one of the facts is that more fuel does not result in victory and that less fuel does not result in defeat :the Soviets advanced til Berlin with 60% of their pre-war oil production.And,it is not so that with more oil,they would be in Berlin earlier .
And,it was the same for the Germans :
the consumption of aviation oil was going uptil 1945, but the situation of the LW was going down
in 1940 : 863000 ton
in 1941 : 1274000 ton
in 1942 : 1426000 ton
in 1943 : 1825000 ton
in 1944 : 1403000 ton
more aviation oil does not mean more aircraft and more aircraft does not mean more pilots .It was the same for motor petroleum and for diesel : in 1944 the consumption of diesel was higher than in 1940.
The big fault of all these Alternate scenarios is that they give A more fuel,or tanks, ... but neglect totally B ,while the truth is that if A is acting differently, B will do the same .

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Stugbit » 18 Aug 2018 14:07

There was no alternative strategy possible , the only viable strategy was the existing one ;the alternative strategy that is proposed to make a German victory possible, would accelerate Germany's defeat .If there was a better alternative strategy, the Germans would have followed it.They didn't, thus there was no better one .
You may be right about the oil structural situation of Germany during the war, Ijadw, I agree, but I think we just can`t say that there was no German winning possibility because of that.

Wars aren`t made only of structural factors. There`s many social, political, psychological, etc. factors influencing such historical process as well. Carl von Clausewitz wrote a entire book, On War about those kind of contingencies. So, we can`t know for sure how history would develop if the decisions made back then were different. We can`t precise very well how leaders would respond, especially if we understand that human beings commit mistakes very often.

Luck have a important role. Just note that the 1940 Campaign in the West was won hugely because a matter of luck. The Germans weren`t planning for an attack from the Vorges Hills, their main plan was to attack the Allied forces directly face to face. They would put their Pz I, Pz II against Somuas, Char B. The entire campaign would be like a Battle of Arras. They changed their plans because the aircraft with the original plan felt into enemy territory.

And we`re talking about a many front war. There was the Desert, the Ostfront, the Atlantic... All these together with science and technology playing also their role. What about Malta? How would the balance of the Desert War stand if this island had fallen into Axis hands? Middle East had oil too.

On the other hand, I personally don`t think that even if there was a better alternative, the Germans would necessary follow. German strategic leadership in WWII was in many aspects quite irrational. Hitler was irrational! Hitler was the kind of guy that would dream about an Allied invasion of Norway and would relocate there his entire fleet of submarines fighting the crucial economic war of the Atlantic!. We just can`t say that the crazy blind attack on Moscow in Winter had no strategic importance, the same for the crazy attrition war attack on Stalingrad and the stupid offensive towards Kursk! Aren`t those things playing a role in the war development? The Stalin`s and Zhukov`s decisions made don`t matter anymore, is that you saying?

The German structural situation for a war was indeed quite difficult, it`s true, but if you say that there was no winning possibility, you are just throwing the entire von Clausewitz work right into the garbage with full strength!

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 06 Sep 2018 14:22

Stugbit wrote:
18 Aug 2018 14:07
There was no alternative strategy possible , the only viable strategy was the existing one ;the alternative strategy that is proposed to make a German victory possible, would accelerate Germany's defeat .If there was a better alternative strategy, the Germans would have followed it.They didn't, thus there was no better one .
You may be right about the oil structural situation of Germany during the war, Ijadw, I agree, but I think we just can`t say that there was no German winning possibility because of that.

Wars aren`t made only of structural factors. There`s many social, political, psychological, etc. factors influencing such historical process as well. Carl von Clausewitz wrote a entire book, On War about those kind of contingencies. So, we can`t know for sure how history would develop if the decisions made back then were different. We can`t precise very well how leaders would respond, especially if we understand that human beings commit mistakes very often.

Luck have a important role. Just note that the 1940 Campaign in the West was won hugely because a matter of luck. The Germans weren`t planning for an attack from the Vorges Hills, their main plan was to attack the Allied forces directly face to face. They would put their Pz I, Pz II against Somuas, Char B. The entire campaign would be like a Battle of Arras. They changed their plans because the aircraft with the original plan felt into enemy territory.

And we`re talking about a many front war. There was the Desert, the Ostfront, the Atlantic... All these together with science and technology playing also their role. What about Malta? How would the balance of the Desert War stand if this island had fallen into Axis hands? Middle East had oil too.

On the other hand, I personally don`t think that even if there was a better alternative, the Germans would necessary follow. German strategic leadership in WWII was in many aspects quite irrational. Hitler was irrational! Hitler was the kind of guy that would dream about an Allied invasion of Norway and would relocate there his entire fleet of submarines fighting the crucial economic war of the Atlantic!. We just can`t say that the crazy blind attack on Moscow in Winter had no strategic importance, the same for the crazy attrition war attack on Stalingrad and the stupid offensive towards Kursk! Aren`t those things playing a role in the war development? The Stalin`s and Zhukov`s decisions made don`t matter anymore, is that you saying?

The German structural situation for a war was indeed quite difficult, it`s true, but if you say that there was no winning possibility, you are just throwing the entire von Clausewitz work right into the garbage with full strength!
I have to disagree with all points :
The Campaign in the West was not a question of luck .
Malta was irrelevant for the outcome of the Desert War : Malta was ''good '' for only a part of the axis supply losses,and if these supplies were not lost but arrived at Tripoli, this would not help the Axis ,as the big problem was not to transport supplies to NA ports, but to transport them from these ports to the front .
Hitler was not irrational : only a small part of his UBoats were going to Norway, for justified reasons : LL transports to Murmansk and the Swedish iron ore transpoprts .
There was no crazy blind attack on Moscow in the winter,or a crazy attrition war attack on Stalingrad,or a stupid offensive onwards Kursk :there were justified reasons for Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk ( for which Hitler was not very enthusiastic ).
Germany could have survived, with difficulty, the victory in Poland,but not victory in the West, or a possible surrender of Britain, or victory in the east ,because Germany was to weak to dominate Europe : the SU could not occupy Eastern Europe indefinitely, how could Germany dominate the whole of Europe indefinitely ?

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 06 Sep 2018 14:35

The Axis lost 16,3 % of their supplies that went to NA, of which 58 % by Malta ,which is some 10 % of the supplies .
Source : Malta and British strategic policy P188 Table 19.
BUT ,it is unclear if these figures include also the supplies that were going to NA via Crete AND these figures are relating only to the supply losses, not the losses of ships/ship tonnage,for which the % were much lower.
Whatever, 10 % is not decisive .

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by jesk » 06 Sep 2018 20:08

ljadw wrote:
06 Sep 2018 14:22
There was no crazy blind attack on Moscow in the winter,or a crazy attrition war attack on Stalingrad,or a stupid offensive onwards Kursk :there were justified reasons for Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk ( for which Hitler was not very enthusiastic ).
Germany could have survived, with difficulty, the victory in Poland,but not victory in the West, or a possible surrender of Britain, or victory in the east ,because Germany was to weak to dominate Europe : the SU could not occupy Eastern Europe indefinitely, how could Germany dominate the whole of Europe indefinitely ?
But this is a reasoning without analyzing the fighting. In fact, Germany was strong enough to defeat Russia. Just like throwing into the sea the bridgeheads of the Allies in Normandy. Hitler ignored the calls of the military to weaken the coast of France elsewhere, for the sake of success in Normandy.

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 06 Sep 2018 20:14

jesk wrote:
06 Sep 2018 20:08
ljadw wrote:
06 Sep 2018 14:22
There was no crazy blind attack on Moscow in the winter,or a crazy attrition war attack on Stalingrad,or a stupid offensive onwards Kursk :there were justified reasons for Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk ( for which Hitler was not very enthusiastic ).
Germany could have survived, with difficulty, the victory in Poland,but not victory in the West, or a possible surrender of Britain, or victory in the east ,because Germany was to weak to dominate Europe : the SU could not occupy Eastern Europe indefinitely, how could Germany dominate the whole of Europe indefinitely ?
But this is a reasoning without analyzing the fighting. In fact, Germany was strong enough to defeat Russia. Just like throwing into the sea the bridgeheads of the Allies in Normandy. Hitler ignored the calls of the military to weaken the coast of France elsewhere, for the sake of success in Normandy.
Germany was NOT strong enough to defeat the SU : German victory was depending on a Deus ex Machina .
Germany failed in the summer of 1941, it failed in the autumn of 1941 .

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by jesk » 06 Sep 2018 20:31

ljadw wrote:
06 Sep 2018 20:14
jesk wrote:
06 Sep 2018 20:08
ljadw wrote:
06 Sep 2018 14:22
There was no crazy blind attack on Moscow in the winter,or a crazy attrition war attack on Stalingrad,or a stupid offensive onwards Kursk :there were justified reasons for Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk ( for which Hitler was not very enthusiastic ).
Germany could have survived, with difficulty, the victory in Poland,but not victory in the West, or a possible surrender of Britain, or victory in the east ,because Germany was to weak to dominate Europe : the SU could not occupy Eastern Europe indefinitely, how could Germany dominate the whole of Europe indefinitely ?
But this is a reasoning without analyzing the fighting. In fact, Germany was strong enough to defeat Russia. Just like throwing into the sea the bridgeheads of the Allies in Normandy. Hitler ignored the calls of the military to weaken the coast of France elsewhere, for the sake of success in Normandy.
Germany was NOT strong enough to defeat the SU : German victory was depending on a Deus ex Machina .
Germany failed in the summer of 1941, it failed in the autumn of 1941 .
But it's been known for a long time that Hitler made mistakes. No encircles to Moscow, according to the initial plan, was not expected. Hitler imposed a double ambiance to the Germans west of Minsk. Because of what the pace of the offensive was lost.

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Stugbit » 06 Sep 2018 20:58

Dear Ijadw, how have you been? Nice talking to you once more.

I have to remember you that I didn`t said it was a question of luck, I said it was hugely a question of luck.

As long as I`m concerned, the main plan for Fall Gelb was to attack the Allied forces head-to-head, not make a turn in the Vorges hills. Do you think if they followed the original plan things would developed in the same way?

About the Uboats, it was a researcher called James Mason that said that Hitler dreamed about a
Allied invasion of Norway and shifted many forces there so it had a considerable impact at the Battle of the Atlantic. Do you think that Mason lied?

From what I know about the Battle of Moscow, when the snow first started to get thick and temperatures felt, many of the German commanders advancing east, like Guderian, asked Hitler to stop the attack since they measured their units situation and understood that it was not possible advancing anymore. Hitler instead of listening to them and ordering to dug in, as it would avoid more losses, kept his orders to advance at all costs. So, the Soviet superior forces caught the Germans off guard.

There was truly a attrition war at Stalingrad. There was heavy fighting on the streets of that city, not only the fight, but also Stukas and the whole Luftwaffe aiming at destroying buildings of the city instead of the artillery and support Soviet forces behind the Volga.

This is not me talking, this is Antony Beevor.

He said Stalingrad was a mistake, he said naming Paulus as the commander of the Sixth Army was a mistake and he believes Hitler was somehow irrational for doing so. The Germans had already reached the Volga and it was not a necessity for them to capture the city, they could very well have made a siege there, like they did in Leningrad. Doing so, they would have reinforced their allies in the flanks.

But if you want to argue with Beevor, go ahead...

The Operation Citadel not only was a mistake, not only was irrational, but it was also a trap from the Soviet.

A Frenchman historian named Jean Lopez wrote a book called "koursk", and in his book he explains very clearly that the Soviet were preparing to launch two enormous flank attacks against the German forces there, but it didn`t happened at the right moment because the Germans started to withdrawal their forces as the Invasion of Italy was taking place. The Soviet attack would began a bit latter, and they took the Germans even more unprepared. The Fourth Battle of Kharkov is just an example of it.

And yes, Hitler was not ok with attacking Kursk and the plan was not his. Yet, he was still the main leader there and he still would have the power to stop it from happening, as many advised him doing so.

About Malta: when I said about the island I meant the Allied supplies, not the Axis. There was success in bombing the Allied convoys there with the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica fighting together.

Malta was a important stop to the Allied convoys, if the island felt to Axis hands it would need the British to take a detour from Cape Good Hope to reach their forces in the western desert. Rommel was handling 1:10 enemy’s forces there, if they could minimize that amount a little bit, perhaps he could size the Suez Channel. It would be a even bigger blow to the British, not to tell that many Arabs in Middle East were Pro-Axis, by the way.

Luck is still an important factor in history development and such an assessment can`t be denied.

And yes, human beings do commit mistakes! Commanders and leaders are not an exception to it. If you have any doubt, have a look at you and Jesk debating military history with me here in the forum, for example. But I don`t blame you, guys. I know that you do your best debating here and it`s very difficult to get things right, but it`s always very nice talking to you, anyway.

My best Regards.
Last edited by Stugbit on 06 Sep 2018 22:26, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by jesk » 06 Sep 2018 21:10

Stugbit wrote:
06 Sep 2018 20:58
And yes, human beings do commit mistakes! Commanders and leaders are not an exception to it. If you have any doubt, have a look at you and Jesk debating military history with me here in the forum, for example. But I don`t blame you, guys. I know that you do your best debating here and it`s very difficult to get things right, but it`s always very nice taking to you, anyway.
I have no doubt about the First World War. There everything was correct. Second world a solid alternative. Each episode was original and could have been different.

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