Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

[ljadw]

I really don't understand if Balkan delay and Rain affect the outcome of Soviet-German war , or at least a draw at the end of 1941. One more month only probably enabled German to destroyed two or three more Russian Armies ? German army were exhausted without getting a large quantity of supplies or manpower. Soviet still can frantically raise another ten Armies in Nov 1941. If German cleared up the remant of Western, Briansk and Reserve Fronts in Oct, she still needed to face ten fresh Armies from the East. The result is the same.

In Poland, German had an edge in manpower and military hardware. German had 1,513,000 men committed in invasion of Poland plus 50,000 Slovakian troop. Polish Army had 1 million men. in Every battle, German can depoly two or three time of force in annhilating Polish troop. In Radom, 8 German divisions against 3 Polish division, in Andrzejewo, 4 German against 1 Polish divisoin, in Kutno, 18 German divisions against 8 Polish divisions plus 3 Brigades. And German had air superiority , much larger tank force and stronger motorized troop.

In France, German superiority was not so obvious, German even had less manpower in front. But French had almost mobilize all troops and its industrial area and capital is closed to border which enabled German to win the war in initial period of war.

In Russia, they just wanted to repeat battle of France, so one blow will led to collapse of Russia. Given the size of USSR, manpower, resources, and above all, political stability. German leadership all assumption are based upon history record : 1917 Revolution brought the collapse of Russia after one by one military disaster. In house discontent also led to revolution. Finnish war of 1939-40 confirmed the weakness of Russian military after purge. But they igoned the same time Soviet victories in Nomonhan in Aug 1939. Guderian figure on large Soviet tank fleet, was ignored too. German only committed 3,050,000 men for war in Russia plus 550.000 allied troop for such huge territories. For France and Lower Countries, German had 2,760,000 men.
Complacency led to all these mistake.

They must know the vast territories of Russia, ableit the sharp increase of motorized troop in comparsion with 1940 campaign, it was not enough for that job. If not revolution happened in Russia, they will go on the war forever. the power of Luftwaffe was less in Russia than in France in 1940. Even German friendly policy toward Soviet minoities, I suspect if it work for collapse of Russia. Many authors always focused on this point is main factor for defeat of Russia.

Well, Halder's line of reasoning was approximately as follows
1. Campaign must focus not on territorial gains but on defeat of the main Ref Army's forces
2. Since these main forces were concentrated in the central sector on the way to Moscow, the German offesnive there must be the top priority
3. Once these main forces are defeated, the Soviet Army won't be able to reconstruct a coherent front and a further conquest of territory won't be much a problem.
4. The loss of Moscow as an economical and political center would be a huge blow to the SU, also the loss of the transport center would cut the soviet territory in two ill-connected parts with little.

It's argued that a delay in the offensive in the central sector ruined this plan. In a retrospective view Halder was wrong in his basic premises. Namely: Soviet forces in Ukraine were approximately as strong as those in front of Moscow, albeit less concentrated. After defeat at Vyazma-Bryansk the SU was able to mobilize new forces and achieve a stalemate. Also note a certain contradiction between 1) and 4).
In general, I believe, Halder was too much a hostage of traditional tenets of Napoleonic-style "decisive battle". On the Eastern Front of 1941 such a decisive battle was hardly possible.

Point 3 is not correctly described :better would be '' a further occupation of territory would not be much a problem .''
And, Hitler and Halder agreed on the principle of the Schlieffen/Clausewitz Vernichtungsschlacht,because the alternative was a long war which Germany could not win .
While we know that Halder's/Hitler's basic premises were wrong, Hitler and Halder knew that they had to be correct ,to give them a chance to defeat the SU .
The reality was that, from a defensive POV, the SU was invincible .

[ljadw]

The claim of a German complacency,resulting in a too weak Ostheer is not correct ; there was no complacency,as almost all fighting able units were committed for Barbarossa .
It is also irrelevant,as success or failure of Barbarossa did not depend on the strength of the Ostheer : Germany could have won with a weaker Ostheer and would have lost with a stronger Ostheer .

[Kelvin]

The claim of a German complacency,resulting in a too weak Ostheer is not correct ; there was no complacency,as almost all fighting able units were committed for Barbarossa .
It is also irrelevant,as success or failure of Barbarossa did not depend on the strength of the Ostheer : Germany could have won with a weaker Ostheer and would have lost with a stronger Ostheer .

I know you mean victory or defeat is dependent on USSR ( coup or revolution inside or political stability).

But from military POV, at least one more Panzerarmee was needed in Ukraine, which enabled them to carry out something like Minsk-Biaystok in Moscow axis ? And large stock of French and British vehicles at least equipped 20 more fully motorized infantry divisions ? This enabled them produced " Vizama" in July.

In Poland, there force ratio is overkill but still needed 36 days to finish off Polish forces and 36 days short campaign also thank to Russian stab in the back hastened the collapse of Polish Army. Steve Zaloga book on Poland 1939 mentions Russian helps saved German time by several weeks. Guderian memoir also mentioned Russian help to destroy Poland

Regarding the collpse of strong French Army and a commitant collapse of Dutch, Belgian Forces and BEF, correct stragety and " Luck" played important roles in that battle. Obviously, Geramn leadership is obessed by 1940 Victories.

[DavidFrankenberg]

What information I could gather about weather and road conditions in October 1941 is in good qualitative accord with Radey and Sharp. Namely it supports their thesis about large regional variations. In the south in the black-soil region around Bryansk, Orel and Tula the mud period came earlier, lasted longer and was the most atrocious. In its height roads were described as almost unusable even for animal transport. In the north - area around Kalinin - roads were good until about 20 October. After that rains and melting snow made certain problems, but not nearly as dramatic as in the south and not much different from earlier rainy periods. Worth to remind that the German command used this window of opportunity for an advance to Kalinin and than from Kalinin to Torzhok that is in a direction completely opposite from Moscow. Nobody was responsible for this mistake but them.

Hi,

Did the Germans go in Kalinin before the 20 october ?

[ljadw]

1 Was it possible for the Germans to have more (4) PzD and more (20) motorized divisions ? Could they have the needed tank crew, drivers, mechanics, supplies ,tanks and trucks ? NO .
2 . Did they needed more PzD and Mot D ? No :Barbarossa was founded on the knowledge that a) the existing forces could defeat the existing Soviet forces and b) that this could only happen on the area between the border and the DD line . Thus additional forces were not needed .
3. What were the benefits of additional Pz and Mot D ,which implies LESS ID and less fighting manpower ? I don't see any benefits
4.What would be the disadvantages ?
Less fighting manpower
The problem for the railways to transport these divisions to the border without alerting the Soviets :there were already problems with the transport of the existing forces.
How would these divisions be supplied ?
How would they operate on the existing execrable Soviet road system ?
The Allies failed with their motorized divisions to cross the Rhine in 1944,thus why should the German mobile forces be able to capture Moscow in 1941 ?
The mobility of the motorized divisions was more than neutralized by their shortage of manpower and firepower .
A lot of Western writers are still writing revilingly about the Germans who attacked the SU with 700000 horses ;this proves that they have no notion about the situation of 77 years ago in central-eastern Europe,where it was not possible for fully motorized units to operate successfully ,and these authors '' forget '' conveniently that the western motorized units did not better than the German infantry units .
Last point : the Germans were not obsessed by the 1940 victories :the Schlieffen Plan, Fall Gelb and Barbarossa were founded on the knowledge that Germany could not win a long war and that it had to search for a Napoleontic victory = a Vernichtungsschlacht .
As Germany could not win a long war against the SU , the only alternative was a short campaign ,wchich implies a campaign on the border .

[Max Payload]

Did the Germans go in Kalinin before the 20 october ?

Elements of First Panzer Division reached Kalinin on 14 October after covering around two hundred kilometres in a few days from jumping off positions near Viazma. To have achieved that I guess the roads must have been in reasonably good condition.

[Kelvin]

1 Was it possible for the Germans to have more (4) PzD and more (20) motorized divisions ? Could they have the needed tank crew, drivers, mechanics, supplies ,tanks and trucks ? NO .
2 . Did they needed more PzD and Mot D ? No :Barbarossa was founded on the knowledge that a) the existing forces could defeat the existing Soviet forces and b) that this could only happen on the area between the border and the DD line . Thus additional forces were not needed .
3. What were the benefits of additional Pz and Mot D ,which implies LESS ID and less fighting manpower ? I don't see any benefits
4.What would be the disadvantages ?
Less fighting manpower
The problem for the railways to transport these divisions to the border without alerting the Soviets :there were already problems with the transport of the existing forces.
How would these divisions be supplied ?
How would they operate on the existing execrable Soviet road system ?
The Allies failed with their motorized divisions to cross the Rhine in 1944,thus why should the German mobile forces be able to capture Moscow in 1941 ?
The mobility of the motorized divisions was more than neutralized by their shortage of manpower and firepower .
A lot of Western writers are still writing revilingly about the Germans who attacked the SU with 700000 horses ;this proves that they have no notion about the situation of 77 years ago in central-eastern Europe,where it was not possible for fully motorized units to operate successfully ,and these authors '' forget '' conveniently that the western motorized units did not better than the German infantry units .
Last point : the Germans were not obsessed by the 1940 victories :the Schlieffen Plan, Fall Gelb and Barbarossa were founded on the knowledge that Germany could not win a long war and that it had to search for a Napoleontic victory = a Vernichtungsschlacht .
As Germany could not win a long war against the SU , the only alternative was a short campaign ,wchich implies a campaign on the border .

Hi, Ljadw, thank for your reply. Interest POV on motorization. Liddell Hart in WWII book mentions if German fully motorized its forces, the war is won. Generally speaking, Fully motorized force can go faster to reach Moscow and see TV drama about US 101 Airborne , US soldier laughed at German as they were very backward by still using horse for transport but still waged the war throughout Europe. Some authors commented if German troop was motorized in 1914, Schlieffen Plan will emerge victorious. Your point is terrible road system hindered German march even German had more motorized troop.

[Richard Anderson]

Liddell Hart in WWII book mentions if German fully motorized its forces, the war is won.

And if pigs had wings they'd be pigeons. Liddell Hart was wrong, as he was in so many things.

Generally speaking, Fully motorized force can go faster to reach Moscow

No, they can't.

and see TV drama about US 101 Airborne , US soldier laughed at German as they were very backward by still using horse for transport but still waged the war throughout Europe.

Try not to get your history from TV.

Some authors commented if German troop was motorized in 1914, Schlieffen Plan will emerge victorious.

Some authors, like Liddell Hart, have no idea what they are talking about.

Your point is terrible road system hindered German march even German had more motorized troop.

Is that what his point was? I'm never quite sure.

[Art]

Hi, Ljadw, thank for your reply. Interest POV on motorization. Liddell Hart in WWII book mentions if German fully motorized its forces, the war is won.

I rather put my money on Germany running out of gasoline in few weeks.

[Kelvin]

Liddell Hart in WWII book mentions if German fully motorized its forces, the war is won.

And if pigs had wings they'd be pigeons. Liddell Hart was wrong, as he was in so many things.

Generally speaking, Fully motorized force can go faster to reach Moscow

No, they can't.

and see TV drama about US 101 Airborne , US soldier laughed at German as they were very backward by still using horse for transport but still waged the war throughout Europe.

Try not to get your history from TV.

Some authors commented if German troop was motorized in 1914, Schlieffen Plan will emerge victorious.

Some authors, like Liddell Hart, have no idea what they are talking about.

Your point is terrible road system hindered German march even German had more motorized troop.

Is that what his point was? I'm never quite sure.

Hi, Richard, how are you ? Yes, advice accepted, need to digest what TV show saying and rethinking. Liddell Hart view on 1941 campaign was German was defeated by natural factor such as weather and bad road situation in his another book about indirect approach. Motorization was another factor in his book WWII history.
Another author Poish General Anders, Hitler defeat in Russia ,commented Russian weakness lied in the south. German should have another thrust from Turkey which would increase the chance to defeat Russia. Back to German previous war, apart from French campaign, German obviously had geographical advantages over Poland and Yugoslavia. German encircled Poland from three direction : West, North and South. Same thing applied to Yugoslavia. But in Russia, they did not have that advantage.

[Kelvin]

Hi, Ljadw, thank for your reply. Interest POV on motorization. Liddell Hart in WWII book mentions if German fully motorized its forces, the war is won.

I rather put my money on Germany running out of gasoline in few weeks.

Hi, Art, yes, I omitted this point. Gasoline is of vital importance in German war machine.

[ljadw]

1 Was it possible for the Germans to have more (4) PzD and more (20) motorized divisions ? Could they have the needed tank crew, drivers, mechanics, supplies ,tanks and trucks ? NO .
2 . Did they needed more PzD and Mot D ? No :Barbarossa was founded on the knowledge that a) the existing forces could defeat the existing Soviet forces and b) that this could only happen on the area between the border and the DD line . Thus additional forces were not needed .
3. What were the benefits of additional Pz and Mot D ,which implies LESS ID and less fighting manpower ? I don't see any benefits
4.What would be the disadvantages ?
Less fighting manpower
The problem for the railways to transport these divisions to the border without alerting the Soviets :there were already problems with the transport of the existing forces.
How would these divisions be supplied ?
How would they operate on the existing execrable Soviet road system ?
The Allies failed with their motorized divisions to cross the Rhine in 1944,thus why should the German mobile forces be able to capture Moscow in 1941 ?
The mobility of the motorized divisions was more than neutralized by their shortage of manpower and firepower .
A lot of Western writers are still writing revilingly about the Germans who attacked the SU with 700000 horses ;this proves that they have no notion about the situation of 77 years ago in central-eastern Europe,where it was not possible for fully motorized units to operate successfully ,and these authors '' forget '' conveniently that the western motorized units did not better than the German infantry units .
Last point : the Germans were not obsessed by the 1940 victories :the Schlieffen Plan, Fall Gelb and Barbarossa were founded on the knowledge that Germany could not win a long war and that it had to search for a Napoleontic victory = a Vernichtungsschlacht .
As Germany could not win a long war against the SU , the only alternative was a short campaign ,wchich implies a campaign on the border .

Hi, Ljadw, thank for your reply. Interest POV on motorization. Liddell Hart in WWII book mentions if German fully motorized its forces, the war is won. Generally speaking, Fully motorized force can go faster to reach Moscow and see TV drama about US 101 Airborne , US soldier laughed at German as they were very backward by still using horse for transport but still waged the war throughout Europe. Some authors commented if German troop was motorized in 1914, Schlieffen Plan will emerge victorious. Your point is terrible road system hindered German march even German had more motorized troop.

Hart is wrong : Patton's forces were fully motorized, but still were unable to cross the Rhine .
All would depend on the possibility to defeat the Soviets on the border,which had to result in the collaps of the Soviet state :
if the Soviets were defeated and the SU collapsed, there would be no need for motorized forces to go to the AA line (NOT to Moscow ),besides it would be impossible as WWII tanks were made to drive short distances only, the same for trucks ,the Germans would go to the AA line by railway ,as they did in 1918,when they resumed the offensive after the Treaty of Brest-Litowsk in Operation Faustschlacht.
And,if the Soviets were not defeated at the border and the SU did not collaps, the possibility for motorized forces to go to the AA line would even be smaller : motorized divisions need more supplies than infantry divisions ...

After D Day 9 and 10 SS were leaving Poland and were going to Normandy by train. In October 1962,during the Cuba crisis, a US AD was going from the interior of the south to the coasts of Florida ,by train ,In May 1940 the tanks of the 7th Army of Giraud were going to Breda...by train ....
More motorisation would not help the Germans, it would hinder them .
The theory that the Schlieffen Plan could have succeeded if the Germans were motorized is nonsense :
1 the French would also be motorized.
2 in the HTL the Sclieffen Plan failed because of the French resistance,not because of lack of motorization .
3 motorized forces could not operate on the roads of 1914.The speed of a motorized column in 1944 was less than 20 km per hour, it would be less, much less in 1914 and as in WWII,motorized units would be more vulnerable than units marching on foot .
4 there was no way to supply an advancing army by trucks in 1914 .

[Art]

What information I could gather about weather and road conditions in October 1941 is in good qualitative accord with Radey and Sharp. Namely it supports their thesis about large regional variations. In the south in the black-soil region around Bryansk, Orel and Tula the mud period came earlier, lasted longer and was the most atrocious. In its height roads were described as almost unusable even for animal transport. In the north - area around Kalinin - roads were good until about 20 October. After that rains and melting snow made certain problems, but not nearly as dramatic as in the south and not much different from earlier rainy periods.

For illustration: records regarding weather and roads from the Bryansk Front's war diary, September-November 1941. Region of Bryansk-Orel-Tula:

1.9
Temperature: day +18-20 day, +7-10 night. Road conditions – satisfactory.
2.9
Temperature: +20-22 day, +8-10 night. Roads, especially unpaved, strongly suffer from ruts. Movement of automobiles, combat vehicles and tractors is problematic.
3.9
Temperature: +17-19 day, +7-10 night. Road conditions - satisfactory.
4.9
Temperature: +14-16 and raining during the day, +7-9 at night. Road conditions - satisfactory.
5.9
Temperature: +10-12 day, +6-8 night. Road conditions deteriorated.
6.9
Temperature: +10-12 day, +3-5 night. Low clouds in the morning. Road conditions are satisfactory.
7.9
Temperature: +14-16 day, +5-7 night. Road conditions are satisfactory.
8.9
Temperature: +10-12 day, +2-4 night. Cold. Road conditions are satisfactory.
9.9
Temperature: +9-11 day, +3-5 night. Cold, drizzling rain, road conditions are satisfactory.
10.9
Temperature: +8 day, +2 night. Cloudy. Light rain. Road conditions are unsatisfactory, ruts.
11.9
Temperature: +3-4 day, +1-2 night. Drizzling autumn rain throughout the day. Mud and ruts on roads.
12.9
Thunderstorm in the night 11/12.9. Heavy rain throughout the day. Temperature: +5-7 day, +2-3 night. Road conditions are unsatisfactory, movement of motor transport is hampered.
13.9
Temperature: +14-16 day, +7-9 night. Light rain beginning from the morning. Road conditions are unsatisfactory.
14.9
Temperature: +15-17 day, +8-10 night. Road conditions are unsatisfactory.
15.9
Temperature: +12-15. Road conditions are poor.
16.9
Temperature: +8-10 day, +4-6 night. Cloudy. Road conditions are unsatisfactory.
17.9
Temperature: +5-7 day, +1-2 night. Cloudy. Road conditions are poor.
18.9
Temperature: +5-7 day, 0+2 night. Heavy clouds. Road conditions are unsatisfactory.
19.9
Temperature: +5-7 day, 0+2 night. Road conditions are satisfactory.
20.9
Temperature: +5-7 day, +1-3 night. Road conditions are unsatisfactory.
21.9
Temperature: +4-6 day, +1-3 night. Low clouds. Rain. Road conditions are unsatisfactory.
22.9
Temperature; +5-7 day, +1-3 night.
23.9
Temperature: +5-7 day, 2-3 night.
24.9
Frost at dawn. Temperature: -2. First hoarfrost. +2-3 during the day.
25.9
Temperature: +5-6 day, +1-2 night. Road conditions are unsatisfactory.
26.9
Temperature: +10-12 day, +7-9 night. Road conditions are unsatisfactory.
27.9
Temperature: -2 night, +3 day. Road conditions are satisfactory.
28.9
Temperature: +7 day, +2 night. Rain during the day. Road conditions deteriorate.
29.9
Temperature: +8-10. Rain almost all day long. Road conditions deteriorate.
30.9
Temperature: +5-7. Road conditions are satisfactory.
1.10
Temperature: +8-10. Cloudy. Road conditions are satisfactory.
2.10
Temperature: +6-8. Cloudy. Road conditions are satisfactory.
3.10
Temperature: +8-10. Clear. Road conditions are satisfactory.
4.10
Temperature: +12-14. Sunny. Road conditions are satisfactory.
5.10
Temperature: +7-9. Road conditions are satisfactory.
6.10
Temperature: +1-3. Frost at night. Paved roads are satisfactory, unpaved and field roads – unsatisfactory.
7.10
Temperature: -2 at night. Frost, snowstorm. Road conditions are unsatisfactory.
8.10
Temperature: +2-5. Roads are in poor conditions. Mud. Hundreds of vehicles bogged down on dirt roads. Some vehicles sunk so much in mud that they could be extricated only with tractors. During relocation of the Front HQ many vehicles were observed abandoned on roads, some of them fully operational. Along the entire route roads and bridges were in poor conditions.
9.10
Temperature: -2. Road conditions are unsatisfactory.
10.10
Temperature: +1-3. Road conditions are unsatisfactory.
11.10
Temperature: -1-2. Road conditions are unsatisfactory.
12.10
Temperature: -2. Roads are unsatisfactory and ill-passable for motor transport.
13.10
Temperature: -3-4
14.10
Temperature: +5-7. Roads are unsatisfactory and almost impassable for motor transport.
15.10
Temperature: +5-7. Roads are almost impassable for motor transport.
16.10
Temperature: +5-7. Mud. Roads are unsatisfactory and almost impassable for motor transport.
17.10
Temperature: +7-9. Mud. Roads are almost impassable for motor transport.
18.10
Temperature: +4-6. Roads are almost completely unsatisfactory. Heavy mud made roads almost impassible for motor transport.
19.10
Cloudy. Roads are soaked and almost impassible for all kinds of transport.
20.10
Rain in the night and morning. Cloudy, continues clouds at 100-200 meters. Drizzling rain throughout the day. Fog. Visibility 1-2 km. Temperature +1-2. Roads are soaked and impassible for transport.
21.10
Light rain, occasional fog. Temperature +5. Roads are impassible for motor transport and ill-passable for horse-drawn transport.
22.10
Clouds 7-10 points at 300-600 meters, occasional precipitation. Visibility 6-10 km, 2-4 km in the precipitation zone. Wind – W 3-5 m/s. Temperature +2-3.
23.10
Rainy, roads are soaked and impassible for motor transport. Visibility 4-6 km. Cloudy. Temperature +3-5.
24.10
Clouds 4-7 points at 600-800 meters. Occasional fog. Visibility 4-10 km. Wind - W 2-3 m/s. Temperature +4. Roads are impassible for motor transport and ill-passable for animal transport.
25.10
Clouds: 8-10 points at 100-200 meters, occasional fog and drizzling rain. Wind – E 3-5 m/s. Temperature +3. Roads are impassable for motor transport. Orel-Yelets road is getting drier.
26.10
Roads are still impassable for motor transport and ill-passable for animal transport.
27.10
Roads are still impassable for motor transport and ill-passable for animal transport.
28.10
Temperature +1. Road conditions didn’t improve. Clouds 3-5 points at 500-1000 meters. Visibility limited to 10 km.
29.10
Clouds 3-5 points at 600-1000 meters, wind – N 3-5 m/s. Roads are impassable for motor transport.
30.10
Clouds 10 points at 200-300 meters, wind – SE 3-5 m/s. Visibility – 2-4 km. Temperature +5. Roads are impassable for motor transport – all in deep and viscous mud.
31.10
Clouds 1-2 points at 600-1000 meters. Visibility 4-10 km. wind SE 1 m/s. Temperature +7. Fog. Drizzling rain. Roads are impassible for motor transport and ill-passable for animal transport.
1.11
Temperature +9. Wind – 3-5 m/s. clouds 2-4 points at 600-1000 meters. Road conditions haven’t improved.
2.11
Temperature: +6. Continuous light rain in some places. Clouds 9-10 points at 300-600 meters, visibility – 4-10 km. wind – NW 1-2 m/s. Temperature +6. Roads are still impassable for motor transport and ill-passable for animal transport.
3.11
Clouds 10 points at 300-500 meters. Wind – NW 1-2 m/s. Temperature +5. Roads didn’t dry.
4.11
Clouds 10 points at 300-600 meters. Wind NW 3-5 m/s. Temperature +4. Roads are impassable.
5.11
Clouds 7-10 points at 300-600 meters. Wind – N 1-2 m/s. Temperature -2. Roads have frozen but haven’t improved.
6.11
Temperature -2. Roads have frozen somewhat but are still ill-passable for motor transport.
7.11
Temperature: -4. Roads have improved somewhat due to frost. Clouds 7-10 points at 200-300 meters, light snowfall. Wind – SE 1 m/s.
8.11
Clouds 3-5 points at 300-600 meters. Visibility 4-10 km. Wind SE 3-5 m/s. Temperature +2. Roads are melting and deteriorating.
9.11
Clouds 9-10 points at 100-200 meters. Snowfalls, occasional fog. Visibility 2-3 km. Wind SW 5-7 km. Temperature +2. Roads have soaked and deteriorated.
10.11
Clouds 7-10 points at 200-300 meters, occasional fog. Wind SW 1-2 m/s. Temperature +1. Roads are melting and deteriorating.
11.10
Clouds 10 points at 300-600 meters, Visibility 2 km. Wind NE 7-10 m/s. Temperature -2. Roads are freezing and improving.

Again, the impression is that the start of "Typhoon" coincided with a time window of favorable weather.

[Art]

And records from the situation reports of the Soviet 30 Army (region of Kalinin)

17.00 16.10
Clear. Roads are passable for motor transport
16.00 17.10
Clear. Roads are passable for motor transport
17.00 17.10
Cloudy. Roads are passable for motor transport
5.00 18.10
Clear. Roads are passable for motor transport
5.00 19.10
Cloudy, roads are passable for motor transport
17.00 19.10
Cloudy, occasional snowfall. Roads are passable for motor transport
5.00 20.10
Cloudy. Occasional rains. Roads are passable for motor transport
17.00 20.10
Cloudy, rain. Roads are passable for motor transport.
5.00 21.10
Cloudy, occasional rains. Roads are ill-passable for motor transport
17.00 21.10
Cloudy, occasional rain
4.00 22.10
Cloudy, occasional rain
16.00 23.10
Cloudy, occasional rains. Roads are ill-passable for motor transport
4.00 24.10
Alternating weather, occasional rains and snow. Unpaved roads are ill-passable for motor transport
4.00 25.10
Cloudy, occasional rain. Roads are ill-passable for motor transport
16.00 25.10
Cloudy
4.00 26.10
Partly cloudy. Roads are passable for motor transport.
15.00 26.10
Cloudy, rainy. Roads are ill-passable for motor transport.
3.00 27.10
Rainy. Roads are ill-passable for motor transport
16.00 27.10
Cloudy, roads are ill-passable for motor transport
4.00 28.10
Clear. Roads are ill-passable for motor transport.
16.00 28.10
Cloudy, occasional rain and snow. Roads are ill-passable for motor transport
4.00 29.10
Partly cloudy. Roads are passable for motor transport
16.00 29.10
Clear. Roads are ill-passable for motor transport
4.00 30.10
Clear, light frost. Roads are ill-passable for motor transport
16.00 30.10
Rainy, roads are ill-passable for motor transport.
4.00 31.10
Rainy, ice.
16.00 31.10
Cloudy, occasional snowfall. Roads are ill-passable for motor transport
4.00 1.11
Cloudy, occasional rain and snow. Roads are ill-passable for motor transport
16.00 1.11
Weather is rainy, roads are ill-passable for motor transport
4.00 2.11
Rainy, roads are ill-passable for motor transport
16.00 2.11
Cloudy, occasional rains. Roads are ill-passable for motor transport
4.00 3.11
Cloudy, occasional rains, field roads are ill-passable for motor transport
16.00 3.11
Cloudy, roads are ill-passable for motor transport
20.00 3.11
Cloudy, frost. Roads are ill-passable for motor transport
4.00 4.11
Cloudy, occasional rains. Field roads are ill-passable for motor transport
16.00 4.11
Cloudy, snowfall. Roads are passable for motor transport
4.00 5.11
Clear, roads are passable for motor transport
4.00 6.11
Clear, roads are passable for motor transport
16.00 6.11
Clear, roads are passable for motor transport
4.00 7.11
Clear, roads are passable for motor transport
16.00 7.11
Cloudy, occasional snow. Roads are passable for motor transport
4.00 8.11
Cloudy, occasional snow. Roads are passable for motor transport
16.00 8.11
Cloudy, occasional snow. Field roads are ill-passable for motor transport
16.00 9.11
Cloudy, occasional snow. Field roads are ill-passable for motor transport
4.00 10.11
Cloudy, occasional snow. Field roads are ill-passable for motor transport
16.00 10.11
Cloudy, occasional snow. Field roads are ill-passable for motor transport
4.00 11.11
Cloudy, ice. Field roads are ill-passable for motor transport
16.00 11.11
Clear, ice. Field roads are passable for motor transport

[ljadw]

Hi, Ljadw, thank for your reply. Interest POV on motorization. Liddell Hart in WWII book mentions if German fully motorized its forces, the war is won.

I rather put my money on Germany running out of gasoline in few weeks.

The problem would not only be to find the additional needed oil,but also to transport it to the eastern front .
In 1941 Germany produced 1,160,000 tons of motor petroleum, it imported 1,124,000 tons and had at the end of 1940 a stock of 599,000 tons ,which is a total of 2,883,000 tons .
The consumption was 2,504,000 tons (697000 tons more than in 1940 ).
Kelvin mentioned the number of an additonal 24 Pz and Mot Divisions for Barbarossa : how much more oil would this mean and how many more trains ?