AbollonPolweder wrote:But to say that the quantitative miscalculations of the OKH made it impossible to surround Moscow in September 1941, is absolutely wrong. Compare the losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in September 1941.
Please explain the logical connection between the two.
The desire to fight for Stalin by Russian soldiers was minimal. The spirit of the troops plummeted.
Source for such statement?
And note that the Soviet Union lost about half of its regular army, and had to be replaced it by young untrained soldiers. Therefore, the resistance of the Red Army was significantly reduced.
Axis lost large numbers of trained fighting force (e.g. Gyorshadtest lost 50% of its personnel during the Ukraine campaign). Combined with logistical difficulties and that materiel was not properly replaced, effectiveness of Axis armies was also significantly reduced.
Hitler's mistake was to waste time fighting a fictional threat from the North ( Leningrad) and South (Kiev) flanks, giving up the blitzkrieg and moving to an economic war of attrition.
Trade-off Moscow for Kiev/Kharkov/Leningrad industrial centers (which would have been the trade off in a Moscow-centric operation) favors the Soviet side economically.
Moscow-myth, like the Dunkirk-myth convinced me that the Nazi generals who created it are shameless incompetent liars, who take their readers for fools.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion