German opinions on Panther tank or crew experience.

[Paul Lakowski]

The first post seems to have a number of links to pages of this report.......Survey of Allied Tank Casualties in WWII

http://sturgeonshouse.ipbhost.com/topic ... s-in-wwii/

Question what time period was this data sampled from?

[Michael Kenny]

This thread started almost a month ago and up until a few days ago its been good exchange of information.

Indeed.
The revelation that 75% of hits on a Panther penetrated was a surprise to many.
Some though consider it a heresy that has to be challenged and buried under an avalanche of excuses, exceptions & qualifiers in order to dilute the implications. Turns out that Allied tanks had a reasonable chance of destroying Panthers in combat and it was not the oft-portrayed scenario of helpless rabbits (I.E. 'Shermans') caught in the spotlight. Allied tanks were only at a disadvantage if it was a head-on encounter. As only around a third of hits strike the front of any tank it means that at most you can reduce your losses by c.30%. Having an invulnerable front does not make your tank invulnerable. It just reduces your risk rather than removing it altogether.

[Michael Kenny]

Question what time period was this data sampled from?

It is from the early 1950s but the info is mostly late WW2 Allied. I contacted Naisawald over this paper a few years back and got some insight into how it was compiled. I would not use it as the final word on the subject but rather a good collection of leads that can be followed up. Overall accurate but not something than can be used to isolate and analyse specific campaigns or battles in the detail anoraks crave.

[Paul Lakowski]

Question what time period was this data sampled from?

It is from the early 1950s. I contacted Naisawald over this paper a few years back and got some insight into how it was compiled. I would not use it as the final word on the subject but rather a good collection of leads that can be followed up. Overall accurate but not something than can be used to isolate and analyse specific campaigns or battles in the detail anoraks crave.

But where and when was the data sampled from during the war ? What front & when?

Unless it has some kind of context too reference to - its useless.

[Michael Kenny]

Unless it has some kind of context too reference to - its useless.

It is online. Page 104 (no 149 on the pdf count) starts the list of sources.


https://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/Ball ... es_WW2.pdf

[David Thompson]

This thread is temporarily locked due to poster misconduct.

[Christian Ankerstjerne]

The majority of the posts of this thread have been removed. The thread has been re-opened.

[Yoozername]

The majority of the posts of this thread have been removed. The thread has been re-opened.

Perhaps you can break off the side discussion regarding Tigers into a new thread?

[Richard Anderson]

But where and when was the data sampled from during the war ? What front & when?

Unless it has some kind of context too reference to - its useless.

Paul, the data set included:

Western Europe - 4,257 US and 1,685 UK cases for 1944-1945, plus 815 Canadian cases for 1944-1945 and 30 for 1942
North Africa - 277 US cases 1942-1943, 1,718 cases 1941-1943, 39 French cases 1943
Sicily - 89 US and 20 Canadian cases
Italy - 685 US, 895 UK, and 719 Canadian cases 1943-1945
Burma - 102 UK cases 1945
Pacific - 809 US cases 1942-1945
Total 12,140 cases

[Paul Lakowski]

The majority of the posts of this thread have been removed. The thread has been re-opened.

Thanks Christian for bring balance back to the thread!!

[Paul Lakowski]

But where and when was the data sampled from during the war ? What front & when?

Unless it has some kind of context too reference to - its useless.

Paul, the data set included:

Western Europe - 4,257 US and 1,685 UK cases for 1944-1945, plus 815 Canadian cases for 1944-1945 and 30 for 1942
North Africa - 277 US cases 1942-1943, 1,718 cases 1941-1943, 39 French cases 1943
Sicily - 89 US and 20 Canadian cases
Italy - 685 US, 895 UK, and 719 Canadian cases 1943-1945
Burma - 102 UK cases 1945
Pacific - 809 US cases 1942-1945
Total 12,140 cases

Which starts to approach the heart of the matter. I assume APDS & HVAP were in increasing usage through to the end of the war, and no WW-II tanks were designed to defeat them. So the Panther was the right 'first step", but by no means enough! In fact the WC ammo vs WW-II heavies spot lighted the future - along with Rocket Propelled HEAT Grenades for the infantry.

With regard the document Michael posted - I note that one of the main conclusions was the majority of these tanks on both sides - were hit more in the hull flanks than any other area, minimizing the offensive capability of all future tank action.

[Cult Icon]

I recently read "WAFFEN-SS ARMOUR IN NORMANDY. THE COMBAT HISTORY OF SS PANZER REGIMENT 12 AND SS PANZERJÄGER ABTEILUNG 12, NORMANDY 1944".

What strikes me as different is the larger number of write-offs of German armor relative to drops in operational numbers - probably a function of all the close combat which denied the German side the ability to retrieve their vehicles.

[Mobius]

BTW, here is a link to the PDF of the survey. Pretty big.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a951850.pdf

[Yoozername]

Anyway, hope is that the thread does not get off topic and speculative...in that regards, another GERMAN report that stays on topic...

Report of the Generalleutnant of the Waffen-SS Walter Krüger, commander of the SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Das Reich", dated 14.4.1943 and where he tries to justify to the SS-Panzer-Korps the, in comparison with other units, high number of non-operational tanks within the 'SS-Panzer-Regiment 2' after the defense operations and subsequent reconquest of Charkow (Ukraine).
SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Das Reich"

Subject : Report on the maintenance of armored vehicles
With reference to : Telegram Gen d Schn Tr of 19.3.1943 (914/43 geh.)
Annexes : none

Directed to the Generalkommando SS-Panzer- Korps


In relation to the matter announced above, the SS-Pz-Gren.Div. "Das Reich" reports:

The high number of armored vehicles in an inoperative state within SS-Pz.Reg. 2 is mainly due to the following reasons:


A) Drivers and specialized personnel poorly or insufficiently instructed.
The I./SS-Pz.Reg. 2 was formed in Fallingbostel and then moved to France. Due to the shortage of fuel, until the moment in which it entered first in combat, the regiment crossed with the tanks hardly a total of 300 km. II./SS-Pz.Reg. 2 received its tanks 14 days before moving east. To instruct drivers only an extremely short period of time of between 8 and 10 days was available because very little fuel was available.

The drivers did not have any practice under winter conditions. In France there was neither snow nor ice so they could not train on similar terrain. For this reason the drivers have been completely overcome by the very difficult terrain conditions in the Charkow area. By stalling their vehicles in the abundant snow and ice there have been many failures in the clutches and tractor components.

Many operations have had to be carried out during the night, something totally new for the drivers.

When the II.Abteilung was formed , the specialized personnel for the maintenance services ( I-Dienste ) had to be obtained from the same division. It is natural that the troops did not deliver the best of what was available. Tank mechanics, engine mechanics and gearbox mechanics were instructed in short courses. Especially problematic has been the fact that in many cases this staff was not trained by qualified specialists but originally from other offices and subsequently readjusted.

The SS-Pz.Reg. 2 also has 60 unfilled vacancies of specialized technicians.

The truly specialized technicians have been retained in the workshop company ( Werkstatt-Kompanie ) with the aim of being able to carry out major maintenance work, which is why maintenance groups ( I-Gruppen ) of the companies do not find one hundred percent specialized personnel.

The little specialized staff that is available invests a very important part of their time in the instruction and monitoring of the rest of the staff.

Keep in mind that often drivers with less experience do not notice early breakdowns that could be repaired with the tools on board. The result is serious breakdowns that require repair by the workshop company ( Werkstatt Kompanie ).

B) Have increased the difficulties during the maintenance of the vehicles
Due to the fact that for the transport of spare parts only the extremely limited capacity of the load is available. Zgkw 1 to (Sd.Kfz.10 ). Additional trucks are needed urgently to transport the spare parts.

The storage capacity and tonnage of spare parts available to the workshop company ( Werkstatt Kompanie ) are too low.

Some components in spare parts stores are available only in a very limited number, for example turrets and occasionally engines.

The maintenance groups ( I-Gruppen ) within the armored companies are not equipped with special tools. For example, there are no devices available for the removal of wheels and shock absorbers, which is why in order to carry out this type of work the tanks have to be transported to the workshop company ( Werkstatt Kompanie ).

The trucks of low platform have not been able to be used in very narrow roads and with a lot of snow. The tanks that have suffered damages in their rolling system have had to be towed, which in many occasions has caused still greater damages. This has been especially problematic in case of breakdowns in the steering boxes.

The current equipment of the workshop company ( Werkstatt Kompanie ) with towing vehicles is insufficient. Continuously you have to carry out repair work where it is necessary to raise the turret or the rear of the tank. According to the KAN ( Kriegsausrüstungsnachweis ) we have a crane vehicle with a capacity of 3 tons (Kfz. 100). The vehicle with crane giratória with a capacity of 6 tons (Sd.Kfz.9 / 1) that according to the KAN also corresponds to us has not been assigned to us, when it is totally necessary because to raise a turret the capacity of the Kfz. 100 is insufficient.

To solve this situation, the following is proposed:
Immediate assignment of personnel already trained and specialized, ideally personal until now declared as necessary ( UK-Stellung ) within the armament industry in the factories of the fatherland.

Equipment of maintenance groups ( I-Gruppen ) with special tools.

Modification of the KAN so that the maintenance groups ( I-Gruppen ) of the companies are assigned additional trucks for the transport of spare parts.

The same number of medium trucks and heavy trucks in the companies' workshops.

Delivery of the necessary crane vehicles (Kfz. 100)

Because the workshop company ( Pz.-Werkstatt-Kompanie ) is generally quite far from the battlefield, the damaged tanks have to be currently towed along great distances.

To avoid this, the following is proposed:

Equip each Panzer-Abteilung with an additional maintenance group ( I-Gruppe ) that is capable of carrying out repairs in the field. In this way the workshop company would not be forced to make small repairs and consequently the tanks could be repaired and delivered to the troops faster.

It is proposed to equip the maintenance group (I-Gruppe ) in the following way:

Motor vehicles:
1 tow truck (Kfz. 100)
1 heavy truck (A) with equipment for the workshop
2 heavy trucks (A) for spare parts
2 light off-road cars ( l.gl.Pkw. )

Personnel:
1 workshop manager ( Werkmeister ) (K)
1 worker manager ( Vorhandwerker )
8 tank mechanics ( Panzerwarte )
1 tank radio equipment mechanic ( Panzerfunkwart )
1 tank electrician ( Panzer-Elektriker )
1 master's assistant of weapons ( Waffenmeistergehilfe )

This equipment has been tested with very good success within the SS-Pz.Reg. 2 . However, both personnel and vehicles have had to be removed from the armored workshop ( Panzer-Werkstatt ), which is why their performance has been dramatically reduced. The equipment of the maintenance bracket ( I-Staffel ) with special tools is absolutely necessary.

The equipment of the tank recovery platoon ( Panzer-Berge-Zug ) with 6 s.Zgkw. 18t (Sd.Kfz.9) is insufficient.

Under the conditions of the terrain and meteorological suffered during the last operations, that is to say, large accumulations of snow and totally muddy roads, to recover a tank two tugs have had to be used. Due to the high overload, tugs have often suffered breakdowns in their clutches and steering boxes. This fact has slowed the transport of damaged tanks. During the combats of withdrawal and because they could not be towed due to lack of recovery vehicles, tanks had to be blown up in the air. The loss of recovery vehicles by enemy fire as well as by mines has aggravated this situation even more.Berge-Zug ) of the heavy armored company ( s.Pz.Kp. ) has been able to be used additionally in recovery work of the Pz.Kpfwg. III and IV.

Towing the Pz.Kpfwg. VI using 3 Zgkw tugboats . 18t is only possible on good ground; this measure must be understood as provisional. The development of more powerful towing means is absolutely necessary.

Despite the ban on towing a Pz.Kpfwg. VI with Tigers, the recovery of a Pz.Kpfwg. VI when it has stalled on bad ground is only possible when several Tigers are used as a means of towing.


Signed Krüger
SS-Gruppenführer and Generalleutnant of the Waffen-SS

[Alejandro_]

Anyway, hope is that the thread does not get off topic and speculative...in that regards, another GERMAN report that stays on topic...

Interesting. Do you have a source (book) for it?