Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Post Reply
Sid Guttridge
Member
Posts: 10158
Joined: 12 Jun 2008, 12:19

Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

#106

Post by Sid Guttridge » 29 Sep 2018, 15:45

Hi Jesk,

You are now definitely entering the realms of fantasy - "the entire Red Army"? Most of it wasn't even on the Oder and a good chunk was half the globe away in the Far East!

I think this conversation has just about its sensible course.

Cheers,

Sid

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6347
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

#107

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Sep 2018, 17:32

Stugbit wrote:
29 Sep 2018, 05:22
Abandoning Crete would be fine.
Not insofar as the German strategic estimate had it. Crete was a steppingstone to Greece and the Balkans, just as Greece and the Balkans were steppingstones to Crete for the Germans. Hitler's and OKH's sensitivity regarding the vulnerability of the Rumanian oilfields and refineries is unlikely to get them to agree with your assessment that abandoning Crete would be fine. :D In any case, abandoning Crete would "save" all of a single two-regiment fortress division. :D
But, in my opinion, it would not be so necessary to abandon Italy and the Balkans because those places are very easy to defend with fewer forces and losing them could compromise the Axis position and the moral as well.
While easy to defend, Italy was also easy to attack, as the Allies demonstrated...and the vital airfield complexes fell very quickly, obviating the reason for defending Italy in the first place. The Balkans were susceptible to seaborne raids and the indigenous partisan movement made it easy for the Allies to make it a thorn in Germany's side.
Finland we can say the same, it is not an easy place to invade anyway and even when the Soviet started an offensive against that country in 44, they had many setbacks fighting the Finns.
The Soviet offensive of 9 June 1944 exhausted Finnish reserves with German assistance barely stabilized the front by 9 July and by 17 August Finland was reaching out to the Soviets for peace.
One mistake for sure was Hitler abandoning the Afrika Korps to the Allied in Tunisia, those trained troops could have been enough to defend Italy itself, maybe.
Unlikely.
However, the biggest mistake was really attacking Kursk. The aftermath of that battle weighed very much. Have a look in the numbers of German tanks destroyed in the months of August to October 43, I have seen some authors arguing that it was something like one third of all tanks Germany had back then.
On 2 July 1943 there were 3,738 tanks and assault guns with the Ostheer or in route, of which 2,840 were operational
On 11 July there were 3,863 of which 3,199 were operational
On 2 August there were 3,681 of which 2,233 were operational
On 11 August there were 3,547 of which 1,874 were operational
On 11 September there were 3,500 of which 1,465 were operational

That mirrored the pattern for 1942 and was latter mirrored for 1944. While attritional loss played a part, the simple inability of the Germans to maintain decent operational readiness was a bigger factor and was due to limited spare parts availability and limited support infrastructure. Kursk played its part in reducing readiness just because so many tanks were committed, especially the not ready for prime time Panthers, but I suspect the Soviet counteroffensives played a bigger part.

Cheers!
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell


User avatar
Stugbit
Member
Posts: 246
Joined: 01 Sep 2013, 19:26
Location: Goiânia

Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

#108

Post by Stugbit » 29 Sep 2018, 18:43

Hello, Richard.
abandoning Crete would "save" all of a single two-regiment fortress division.
lol I did not knew it was just two regiments.
While easy to defend, Italy was also easy to attack, as the Allies demonstrated...and the vital airfield complexes fell very quickly, obviating the reason for defending Italy in the first place. The Balkans were susceptible to seaborne raids and the indigenous partisan movement made it easy for the Allies to make it a thorn in Germany's side.
But the Italic Peninsula at least, don`t you think if the Germans commited a bit more of troops there they couldn`t hold better the place?

They almost repulsed the Allied back to the sea at Salerno.
The Soviet offensive of 9 June 1944 exhausted Finnish reserves with German assistance barely stabilized the front by 9 July and by 17 August Finland was reaching out to the Soviets for peace.
But do you think the Soviet would try harder to get into Finland? Because, from what I know about the place, there`s very heavy woodlands and marshlands, very difficult to troops get into, not to talk about tanks. And with a more stood German defense in the South the Soviet would have to commit more forces there, instead of secundary fronts like Finland, don`t you think?


Best Regards.

jesk
Banned
Posts: 1973
Joined: 04 Aug 2017, 09:19
Location: Belarus

Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

#109

Post by jesk » 29 Sep 2018, 20:27

Sid Guttridge wrote:
29 Sep 2018, 15:45
You are now definitely entering the realms of fantasy - "the entire Red Army"? Most of it wasn't even on the Oder and a good chunk was half the globe away in the Far East!

I think this conversation has just about its sensible course.
2-3 million Soviet soldiers are quite good too. Napoleon won wars for 1-2 fights. 1 fight - 1 conquered country. Hitler liked to be at war more often. Even in 1945 when Germany had no chances, across the whole Europe there passed tens of battles. Napoleon also couldn't dream of such saturated career of the commander!

jesk
Banned
Posts: 1973
Joined: 04 Aug 2017, 09:19
Location: Belarus

Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

#110

Post by jesk » 29 Sep 2018, 20:34

The path to the victory of Germany, according to Winston Churchill, passed through the creation of 30-40 divisions in central Germany. And Hitler struggled with this. On the eastern front, first the Germans lost an army group in Courland, then in East Prussia, in March the 2nd army in Pomerania. It was Hitler's fight against the Central Reserve.

https://www.rulit.me/books/vtoraya-miro ... 147-8.html

During this period, Hitler made a gross mistake in the strategy and conduct of the war. The fall of Italy, the victorious offensive of Russia, the clear preparation of Britain and the United States to force the English Channel — all this would have prompted him to concentrate and deploy the most powerful German army as a central reserve. Only in this way could he use the outstanding qualities of the German command and combat troops and at the same time fully benefit from the central position occupied by Germany, with its internal borders and remarkable communications. As General von Tom once said during his time in captivity with us, “our only chance is to create a position where we can make full use of the army.” Hitler, as I indicated in the previous volume, in essence, wove a web, but forgot about the spider. He tried to keep all that captured. Huge forces were squandered in the Balkans and in Italy, although the situation on these fronts could not be decisive. A central reserve of 30-40 divisions of the highest combat capability and mobility would give Hitler the opportunity to strike at any of the opponents advancing on him and conduct a general battle with great chances of success. A year later, he could, for example, meet the British and Americans on the 40th or 50th day after their disembarkation in Normandy with fresh and far superior forces. He, perhaps, could so place his troops to decide the outcome of the war. He had no need to waste his forces in Italy and the Balkans, and the fact that he acted in this way should be regarded as a last opportunity he had missed.

Knowing that he had such a choice, I also wanted to be able to strike either on the right flank in Italy, or on the left flank - through the English Channel, or in either place at once. The improper disposition produced by Hitler allowed us to strike a direct blow to the main line in conditions that promised good prospects and brought success.

jesk
Banned
Posts: 1973
Joined: 04 Aug 2017, 09:19
Location: Belarus

Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

#111

Post by jesk » 29 Sep 2018, 20:49

Gilles de Rais wrote:
28 Sep 2018, 15:03
Richard Anderson wrote:
27 Sep 2018, 02:53
The reality is that Heersgruppe A, with 438,213 men as of the end of 1944, was opposed by about 2.2-million Soviets in 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukranian Fronts. So nearly six to one odds, which was about the same for armor, although not quite as bad as for artillery. Inserting one or two million unorganized, unequipped, and unsupplied personnel equipped with rifles and Panzerfaust on the German side will not effect the outcome...other than the death toll for the Germans.

That's exactly five to one. Suddenly you don't care anymore about exact ratio...

You forget that the average Soviet infantryman was also not particularly well armed, organised, equipped and supplied. Which is the reason Soviet casualties were in the range of hundreds of thousands for even minor operations. You make Soviets look as undefeatable force and yet even late in the war they were soundly beaten or stopped by significantly smaller German forces at Lauban, Bautzen, Breslau, Seelow Heights (for four days, but that contrasts sharply with instant Soviet breaktroughs in Bagration and Vistula, especially considering the size of German forces) and other places. One million additional man would have surely made a difference and you forget that average German front-line soldier in 1945 was not much different in terms of training and equipment from his Ersatzheer counterpart, so your argument simply does not stand.
Not certainly in that way. 438 thousand included 20 divisions at the front of 400 km and 5 divisions in reserve. At each site, the Russians easily created excellence. 80 divisions are already 40 in the line of defense with good density and as much in reserve. Such forces can already be maneuvered along the front in search of enemy weaknesses. Ratio of 438 thousand / 2,2 million Russians victory. 1 million Germans against 3 million Soviet soldiers a victory of Wehrmacht.

Gilles de Rais
Member
Posts: 83
Joined: 23 Jul 2009, 19:29

Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

#112

Post by Gilles de Rais » 29 Sep 2018, 21:43

Sid Guttridge wrote:
29 Sep 2018, 10:43
Hi GdR,

If the Nazi High Command had been ignored, Germany would have had none of the gains it made until 1941 because informed military opinion was against almost all of them, from the remilitarization of the Rhineland to the invasion of the USSR. What Hitler's unorthodox risk taking gained Germany until 1941 was lost by his unorthodox risk taking over 1942-45.

Yup. Much Soviet manpower was under trained, but they had rather more of it. Germany had to make up for its numerical deficit through superior quality - which required training.

Surely your US example illustrates my point, not yours: "The American replacement system, which focused on quantity over quality, ensured that the majority of fresh troops reaching the front lines were not properly trained for combat. It was not unusual for half a unit's replacements to become casualties within the first few days of combat." This sounds a lot like what you are effectively wishing on German infantry in your enthusiasm to expose them to combat when under trained.

You are describing expulsions, confiscations and massacres, not an attempt to exterminate the German race. There is a clear difference between these and the actual genocide Nazi Germany attempted against the Jews. Most of the Germans who fled or were expelled from Eastern Europe survived. Most Jews are in ash heaps. One can condemn both, but one can't equate them. If what the Nazis attempted against the Jews was genocide, then the fate that befell eastern Germans falls well below it.

So, you think that Germany "couldn't undergo any punishment", despite the 40-odd million dead that resulted from its collective actions? Germany acted collectively and collectively it was punished - except almost all the punishment fell on Prussians and Saxons. But that relative unfairness you should take up with the Rhinelanders, Hanoverians and Bavarians who did not suffer the same consequences for identical actions.

Cheers,

Sid.

Hmmm... Not really. There were many disputes among the senior German leadership during all phases, but the fact is that Hitler and his closest aides were rapidly losing touch with reality on the ground and many of their decisions were not rational from any point of view. Hitler also made many mistakes until 1941 as well.

Not really. Soviets were rather short with manpower by 1945. Which is the reason why they were using Bulgarians, Poles and other nations on the Eastern Front. It was certainly not due to their affinity for these people. Soviet lossess during the war are a subject a dispute, but even with about 20 million killed, by 1945 Soviet Union would have had huge problems replenishing its ranks.

Germany needed numbers for the defence of its core territories. While using such soldiers for offensive operation would be morally unjustified, when defence of your country is in question, such behaviour is understandable. And by the end of 1944, Germany still had a huge number of veterans on the front, who might provide leadership for these recruits, so it's not true they would be left for slaughter.

Check the definition of genocide. I'm not interested in playing "The numbers game". Genocide is a genocide. To use a modern example; Rohingya were never totally exterminated by the government of Myanmar, so that does not constitute a genocide. Neither do ISIL massacres and expulsions of Yazidis. Your viewpoint on genocide is very exclusivist and I don't support it.

According to your logic, common US citizens might be held accountable for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Tokyo and whole range of other democides commited by their government? Based on your logic, Japanese vigilantes would have the right to shoot, rape, plunder and expel any random American simply for being American? Sorry my friend, but that's a very dangerous way of thinking. Only the German who killed or ordered the killing can be held accountable for his/her crimes. No one else. Others can only feel the moral guilt because they haven't done their human duty to prevent that crime.

All the best

jesk
Banned
Posts: 1973
Joined: 04 Aug 2017, 09:19
Location: Belarus

Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

#113

Post by jesk » 29 Sep 2018, 22:27

The Italian campaign could be a problem for the allies. Huge 1,33 million total number. All the same, probably the success of Germans was primarily in the timely evacuation of Norway and the remote corners of eastern front (Courland, East Prussia.)

Image

jesk
Banned
Posts: 1973
Joined: 04 Aug 2017, 09:19
Location: Belarus

Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

#114

Post by jesk » 29 Sep 2018, 22:49

The Germans had so many alternatives, using even 10% of them, they could win the war. Hitler 100% solutions- 100% errors. Each of his orders in favor of the enemy.
There is benefit from the defeat of Germany. The world is united. French, Germans, Spaniards are not all modern and the stone age of history. One indivisible Europe with a European nationality. Europe remembered well the lessons of the two world wars and would never allow war anymore.

Europe forever

Image

User avatar
Robert Rojas
In memoriam
Posts: 2658
Joined: 19 Nov 2002, 05:29
Location: Pleasant Hill, California - U.S.A.
Contact:

RE: Ersatzheer And German PIECEMEAL Strategy - (Well Sort Of But Not Really).

#115

Post by Robert Rojas » 30 Sep 2018, 06:34

Greetings to both citizen Jesk and the community as a whole. Howdy Jesk! Well sir, in deference to your point OR points-of-view as articulated within your posting of Saturday - September 29, 2018 - 12:49pm, at the risk of annoying the core contributors of this thread, old yours truly will digress from the central thrust of this topical creation to broach a few incidental questions of yourself. It is your assertion that a benefit of a defeated Germany is a world united. Do you genuinely believe your own utopian assertion OR is this just so much colorful hyperbole on your part? Now, from outward appearances anyway, you seem to suggest that there are segments of contemporary French, German and Spanish society that have never ascended from the Neanderthal period of human development. Given the finer nuances of language, have I misinterpreted OR taken something out of its proper context here? Apparently, you are also under the notion that contemporary Europe is an "indivisible" collective entity with a "European Nationality". If this is the case, would you care to explain why the United Kingdom has chosen to extricate itself from the "indivisible" European Union? Finally, it is your contention that Europe remembered "WELL" the lessons of the Two World Wars and would never allow war anymore. In light of this particular contention, would you care to explain to the neighborhood-at-large about the passion play that was the BALKAN WARS of the 1990's? On an peripheral matter, you often appear to be an enthusiastic booster of the idea of the European Union throughout the course of your disparate threads. Just to sate my personal curiosity, given your clearly EUROCENTRIC sentiments, what exactly is your motivation to reside in the nation of Belarus which, of course, is NOT a constituent member of the European Union? Europe forever indeed! In any case, I would like to convey my thanks in advance for entertaining my pointed inquiries. Well, that is my initial two Yankee cents worth on these tangential issues of concern - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of White Russia.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" - Robert E. Lee

jesk
Banned
Posts: 1973
Joined: 04 Aug 2017, 09:19
Location: Belarus

Re: RE: Ersatzheer And German PIECEMEAL Strategy - (Well Sort Of But Not Really).

#116

Post by jesk » 30 Sep 2018, 07:30

Robert Rojas wrote:
30 Sep 2018, 06:34
It is your assertion that a benefit of a defeated Germany is a world united. Do you genuinely believe your own utopian assertion OR is this just so much colorful hyperbole on your part?
Of course, what do you know about the "cold" war that made the Western countries unite. Do you really think that without the defeat of Germany, the USSR would anyone take seriously?

Image
Now, from outward appearances anyway, you seem to suggest that there are segments of contemporary French, German and Spanish society that have never ascended from the Neanderthal period of human development. Given the finer nuances of language, have I misinterpreted OR taken something out of its proper context here?
The Spaniard, German, Frenchman no longer has such nationalities. They are all Europeans.
Apparently, you are also under the notion that contemporary Europe is an "indivisible" collective entity with a "European Nationality". If this is the case, would you care to explain why the United Kingdom has chosen to extricate itself from the "indivisible" European Union?
Britain has always had an independent position, even retained its currency. Brexit is not critical.
Finally, it is your contention that Europe remembered "WELL" the lessons of the Two World Wars and would never allow war anymore. In light of this particular contention, would you care to explain to the neighborhood-at-large about the passion play that was the BALKAN WARS of the 1990's?

Europe judged criminals in Hague. The wars were caused by the collapse of the country. The Czech Republic and Slovakia split peacefully, it did not happen in the Balkans.
On an peripheral matter, you often appear to be an enthusiastic booster of the idea of the European Union throughout the course of your disparate threads. Just to sate my personal curiosity, given your clearly EUROCENTRIC sentiments, what exactly is your motivation to reside in the nation of Belarus which, of course, is NOT a constituent member of the European Union? Europe forever indeed!
Belarus is in some way a fragment of the eastern bloc, strongly Russified. As you know, Russia is not a supporter of European integration and stands for its own way. But the opposition is here, people are unhappy with the authorities, trying to change anything without leaving the country.

User avatar
Robert Rojas
In memoriam
Posts: 2658
Joined: 19 Nov 2002, 05:29
Location: Pleasant Hill, California - U.S.A.
Contact:

RE: Ersatzheer And German PIECEMEAL Strategy - (Well Sort Of But Not Really).

#117

Post by Robert Rojas » 30 Sep 2018, 14:53

Greetings to both citizen Jesk and the community as a whole. Howdy Jesk! Well sir, in respect to your posting of Saturday - September 29, 2018 - 9:30pm, old yours truly would like to convey my appreciation for your efforts to address my pointed inquiries. I have no retort for your impeccable weltanschauung. Oh, and by the way, this might come as a rude surprise to you, but old Uncle Bob is "mildly acquainted" with the "COLD" war that made the Western countries unite. The retired uniform still hangs in my closest and I'll leave it at that. Well, that is my latest two Yankee cents worth on these tangential issues of concern - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of the Russian Federation's vassal state of Belarus.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :roll: :|
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" - Robert E. Lee

Gilles de Rais
Member
Posts: 83
Joined: 23 Jul 2009, 19:29

Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

#118

Post by Gilles de Rais » 30 Sep 2018, 15:15

I think the last posts have gone totally off-topic...

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6347
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

#119

Post by Richard Anderson » 30 Sep 2018, 17:31

Gilles de Rais wrote:
29 Sep 2018, 21:43
Hmmm... Not really. There were many disputes among the senior German leadership during all phases, but the fact is that Hitler and his closest aides were rapidly losing touch with reality on the ground and many of their decisions were not rational from any point of view. Hitler also made many mistakes until 1941 as well.
The decision to strip other fronts in order to send ill-armed infantry into combat along the Vistula isn't rational either. Italy was stripped in the fall of 1944 and the result was the collapse of the front and request for armistice in April 1945. Strip additional forces and the collapse occurs earlier. Without WACHT AM RHEIN and NORDWIND the collapse of OKW would likely occur earlier as well. Half of the Norwegian evacuation, including the most valuable units in Lapland, would have to occur by sea...what exactly prevents the British and American naval and air forces from intercepting and sinking such a hasty agglomeration of ships? The twelve German divisions in HG E and HG F began withdrawing in September 1944 and were harassed all the way. All they eventually did was supply cannon fodder for the Soviet assault on Vienna and Czechoslovakia.
Not really. Soviets were rather short with manpower by 1945. Which is the reason why they were using Bulgarians, Poles and other nations on the Eastern Front. It was certainly not due to their affinity for these people. Soviet lossess during the war are a subject a dispute, but even with about 20 million killed, by 1945 Soviet Union would have had huge problems replenishing its ranks.

Germany needed numbers for the defence of its core territories. While using such soldiers for offensive operation would be morally unjustified, when defence of your country is in question, such behaviour is understandable. And by the end of 1944, Germany still had a huge number of veterans on the front, who might provide leadership for these recruits, so it's not true they would be left for slaughter.
Not really. Germans were rather short with manpower by 1945. Which is the reason why they were using former Soviets, Hungarians, Poles, Scandinavians, Danes, Dutch, French, Italians and other nations both at the front as cannon fodder and service support and as slave labor in their factories.

The reality is the Soviet armed forced average strength during 1944 was about 6,550,000. They suffered 5,685,785 casualties during that year. Germany's Ostheer facing them averaged 2,327,000 during 1944. And suffered 2,033,000 casualties. With turnovers of about 87% each, the notion either still had a huge number of veterans in their combat arms at the end of 1944 is delusional.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Gilles de Rais
Member
Posts: 83
Joined: 23 Jul 2009, 19:29

Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

#120

Post by Gilles de Rais » 30 Sep 2018, 18:34

Richard Anderson wrote:
30 Sep 2018, 17:31
Gilles de Rais wrote:
29 Sep 2018, 21:43
Hmmm... Not really. There were many disputes among the senior German leadership during all phases, but the fact is that Hitler and his closest aides were rapidly losing touch with reality on the ground and many of their decisions were not rational from any point of view. Hitler also made many mistakes until 1941 as well.
The decision to strip other fronts in order to send ill-armed infantry into combat along the Vistula isn't rational either. Italy was stripped in the fall of 1944 and the result was the collapse of the front and request for armistice in April 1945. Strip additional forces and the collapse occurs earlier. Without WACHT AM RHEIN and NORDWIND the collapse of OKW would likely occur earlier as well. Half of the Norwegian evacuation, including the most valuable units in Lapland, would have to occur by sea...what exactly prevents the British and American naval and air forces from intercepting and sinking such a hasty agglomeration of ships? The twelve German divisions in HG E and HG F began withdrawing in September 1944 and were harassed all the way. All they eventually did was supply cannon fodder for the Soviet assault on Vienna and Czechoslovakia.
Not really. Soviets were rather short with manpower by 1945. Which is the reason why they were using Bulgarians, Poles and other nations on the Eastern Front. It was certainly not due to their affinity for these people. Soviet lossess during the war are a subject a dispute, but even with about 20 million killed, by 1945 Soviet Union would have had huge problems replenishing its ranks.

Germany needed numbers for the defence of its core territories. While using such soldiers for offensive operation would be morally unjustified, when defence of your country is in question, such behaviour is understandable. And by the end of 1944, Germany still had a huge number of veterans on the front, who might provide leadership for these recruits, so it's not true they would be left for slaughter.
Not really. Germans were rather short with manpower by 1945. Which is the reason why they were using former Soviets, Hungarians, Poles, Scandinavians, Danes, Dutch, French, Italians and other nations both at the front as cannon fodder and service support and as slave labor in their factories.

The reality is the Soviet armed forced average strength during 1944 was about 6,550,000. They suffered 5,685,785 casualties during that year. Germany's Ostheer facing them averaged 2,327,000 during 1944. And suffered 2,033,000 casualties. With turnovers of about 87% each, the notion either still had a huge number of veterans in their combat arms at the end of 1944 is delusional.

In your rush to attack my arguments you made several huge mistakes...

Italy was not relevant to the defence of Germany and you forget that north of Italy there are Alps, which are practically impenetrable to any attack. Withdrawing to the Alps was the best option for the Germans in the Southern theater of the war.

I won't even comment the idea that sending the last remaining reserves to attack Allies in winter of 1944 actually prolonged the German defence...

What would prevent them is the same thing that prevented the Allies from interdicting the German supplies of ore that came from Sweden. Strong German defences in the straits between the North and Baltic seas...

Which is probably a reason why Soviets occupied Austria and Czech Republic only in May of 1945...

Hungarians and Italians were their allies and the idea that Germans used Poles and Russians in any significant numbers is simply laughable (now I expect you to quote some obscure source which shows there were 1490 Polish volunteers in 1945 and 16823 Russian anti-Bolsheviks). Time and again Russian anti-communists begged Hitler to arm them and he always refused that. Just look at the problems Vlasov had with his man. Hitler never seriously thought about using Poles as soldiers, while Stalin equipped whole armies by 1945. Your argument is totally without any substance.

The majority of victims you mention were fresh recruits and the longer the soldier stayed at the front, the greater were his chances for survival. By 1945 there were numerous veterans who served from 1941 and who were wounded as much as 4-5 times.

Post Reply

Return to “German Strategy & General German Military Discussion”