Italy invading Malta in 1940

[Wargames]

... then there is a major problem for the Italians...water. There is no significant source of water in Marfa other than surface catchments and a few shallow private wells. Where does the water come from to supply the invasion force?

You are correct that water became a critical part to the Italian invasion. The Navy had declined to provide for the Italian Army supply needs post landing. It was left to Regia Aeronautica to parachute in supplies. They calculated supply two different ways; minimum supplies and maximum supplies and in both calculations "potable water" was a huge factor (number one priority). However, they said they could supply it.

No mention was made (in what limited info I could produce) of what supplies would be landed with them (Or how they were to be gotten ashore even if they did.). Safety margin IMO was that 2,000 tons of supplies be landed with the invasion force, including 400 tons of water.

[Wargames]

Now, it is apparent that the British Commonwealth cannot effectively defend the Island of Malta and the Italians cannot effectively assault the Island of Malta. In short, what we now have here is a classic MEXICAN standoff with apparently no practical course of military action to break the figurative log jam.

You're now getting to the point of my original question. The Italians cannot effectively assault the island on June 29, 1940 which is why I had to change the invasion date to August 28. Even then most of the main problems don't change. It's very difficult for the Italians to land artillery (I did, eventually find a way but the Italians, with 100% certainty, were not going to use it on June 29.). This eventually invites the British to hole up in Valletta (which was defensible to land attack) and leaving the Italians on the outside looking in. It leads to Valletta becoming another Tobruk. Imagine two Italian divisions without artillery trying to take Tobruk defended by two British brigades. Not only does it became a Mexican stalemate but the British might even break out.

On the British side Admiral Cunningham did believe Malta could be defended (Pound and Somerville not so much). It's why I asked for the British response. Just as there are problems for the Italians there are also problems for the British. Does Pound approve sending Valiant to Malta? Because if the answer is yes one can draw similarities to Crete. And, no, the Italians do not need help from the Germans.

[Richard Anderson]

I'll guess that the answer to that will be some but not all.

The 6-inch howitzer battery, or some of its guns at least, may already be in range of the chosen beaches. Which considering the tiny size of the beaches, the fire from the howitzers is a doleful prospect. There are also the Heavy Anti-Aircraft guns, which with time and effort, could be redeployed. Though some of the HAA positions will be in range as it is.

The entire Marfa coast is probably under 8,000 yards from most of the positions in the Victoria Lines, so easy range for almost anything there.

Once the landing area is identified the infantry defending the other coastal areas would be thinned out I would have thought.

The battalion sectors were fairly large, plus there was the worry...after April and May...of paratroopers in the interior.

The British will treat the prisoners kindly.

[LColombo]

One minor, but relevant detail is that air-support and the departure of naval units in the Italian attack on Malta would have happened from territory hostile to the central Fascist government (as demonstrated in 1943).

The secrecy needed for such action would be severely compromised.

Are you talking about Sicily, and the largely friendly reception of the Allies by the local population in Summer 1943? If so, I don’t really think this can be taken into account in a scenario set in 1940. The behaviour of the Sicilian population in summer 1943, I would say, had much more to do with disillusionment and war-weariness than long-standing hostility to the regime. Sicily was for three years a key base for operations in the Mediterranean, with cruisers, destroyers, submarines, torpedo boats and MTBs routinely operating from naval bases in Messina, Trapani, Augusta, etc., pretty much all minelaying operations in the Central Mediterranean being carried out from naval bases in Sicily, air support for every operation in the Central Mediterranean being provided from airfields in Sicily, convoys for North Africa often making call in Sicilian ports, etc. No problem whatsoever came from that.

[jwsleser]

Finally able to drop back in. Many Veterans’ Day weekend activities and I read through all 48 pages of the earlier Malta invasion thread. Of the latter, some good discussion mixed with a lot of bad information.

Italian special operation forces. X MAS had the Siluro a Lenta Corsa (the human torpedoes, AKA the Pigs), small boat units, and their Gamma Frogmen. How these forces were to be used is not discussed in the limited documents I have available, but they existed and the Italian were quite innovative in using such forces.

Reggimento San Marco. A second (reserve) battalion was mobilized in June 1940, giving the force a total 1,200 men. Both battalions were practicing assault landings near La Spezia in June 1940 in preparation for a landing behind French lines along the Mediterranean coast. A decision to invade Malta would mean more practice. It was a possible that a third battalion could have been mobilized as was later done.

Reggimento Fanti dell'aria. Two battalion of 500 each. The regiment executed a large scale mass-tactical jump in 1938 which included seizing an airfield and air-landing a full infantry regiment and artillery (some artillery was parachuted). In all, nearly 5,000 troops were flown-in or dropped. A smaller exercise was repeated in 1939. The 1940 plan had the regiment landing near Zurrico (Zurrieq) and either seizing Hal Far airfield or, failing that, defending the Nigret hills.

My point in listing the three capabilities above is to demonstrate that the Italians would not have been cutting whole cloth out of thin air for a 1940 invasion. They had considered the requirements, developed doctrine, and then practiced that doctrine for forced entry prior to the war. The occupation of Albania in 1939, while not contested, was done as a landing and provided practice in transporting to and landing large forces on a foreign shore.

As I previous stated, the Regio Esercito was well suited for this type of operation. This was an army that was focused between the wars on large scale operations in rugged, isolated terrain. Everything was design to be man-packed. The batteria d’accompagnamento (infantry support guns, both the 47/32 and 65/17) were man-potable. The 75/18 mountain howitzer broke down in eight sections for transport. In the discussion about water, the R.E. had several different sized back-pack water and food containers specifically designed to distribute water and food in rugged terrain. These items were the common issued equipment, not speciality items that needed to be manufactured and issued. This is not an army whose equipment was designed to be haul around by jeeps and trucks. The R.M. would be able to supply the needed water.

I still have issues on why the obstacles are seen as a problem. They are certainly not as extensive and complex as what the R.E. had previously dealt with. More importantly, obstacles are only good if they are covered by fire. The lack of prepared infantry positions (pill boxes do have their limitations) including firing pits and trenches that are needed to create an integrated defense means the the defenders are almost as vulnerable to artillery fires as the attackers. The rocky terrain also means that the garrison would be exposed to the R.A. and their bombs. The small size of the garrison meant that they can’t take a large number of losses. As I previously stated, this will be an attrition fight where skill will play a small role. If the Italians have a strong suit, it is their artillery. They can get it ashore and they know how to use it.

Landing artillery on Gozo and Comino is part of all the plans. Here the shorter ranges of most of the main artillery types is a negative, but to establish and maintain the northern part is good to go.

Use of Valletta by the R.N. Certainly damaged ships could use the harbor in am emergency, but does anyone believe the R.N. would operate out of that port during an invasion? When and how do they use Valletta? At night? What happens when the Italians mine the approaches or take other actions (see X MAS above)?

Fort Campbell. As an infantry strong point it might be okay, but its coastal guns are woefully vulnerable. I would be surprised if any of those guns are operational by the time the landings begin. Between the 5-day prep in the plan and the actions on the day of the invasion, they are likely to be out of action. Most of the defenses are of the type that can’t protect coastal and field artillery against air or naval bombardment, especially in the north.

The R.N. The Italian plan states that the sailing time for the British to Malta is a minimum of 36 hours. The sailing time for the invasion ships is 11 hours. 5 day invasion prep. The challenge for the R.N. is when to sail. Once they leave port, they are burning fuel. 36 hours is high speed, a lot of fuel. When they sail and how much flex the Italians build into their plan are factors. The prep works against the UK. If some success in the first few days (especially in the north), it might ultimately cause the UK to decide to cut their losses and not sortie.

Staying on station is just as important as getting there. The Japanese sortie that resulted in the Battle of Salvo Island didn’t stop the invasion. To say the Italians would crack if they lose a naval battle is betting on hope as a method. The R.N. can’t stay in the area. As has been previously noted, the R.N. was acutely aware of their ship shortage and Malta was seen as a loss cause in 1940.

Airfields to support the operations. The airfields on Pantelleria and A.S. were to be used as well as on Sicilia. 300 bombers and 200 fighters in the plan.

As previously stated, nothing presented here will prove or disprove whether a 1940 invasion could succeed. What I hope to have done is show that an invasion wouldn’t have been a half-cocked and thrown together effort by the Italians as perceived by many. They had been working on the Malta invasion since 1935 and had developed and tested many of the capabilities needed to execute such an invasion. I don't see a Mexican stand-off. If the Italians are serious, they can take the island. It won't be pretty, it won't be neat, but it is well within their capabilities if they are determined to do it.

Pista! Jeff

[Gooner1]

The entire Marfa coast is probably under 8,000 yards from most of the positions in the Victoria Lines, so easy range for almost anything there.

The battalion sectors were fairly large, plus there was the worry...after April and May...of paratroopers in the interior.

The British would want good observation of the landing areas though. If I was the British Player, uh Commander, and had lost on the beaches I would defend the narrow neck of land SW of Mellieha, at its narrowest only 1,300 yards across. Lacking armour and much in the way of artillery and heavy weapons, a battalion + could defend that whilst paratroopers are dealt with.

[Gooner1]

Fort Campbell. As an infantry strong point it might be okay, but its coastal guns are woefully vulnerable. I would be surprised if any of those guns are operational by the time the landings begin. Between the 5-day prep in the plan and the actions on the day of the invasion, they are likely to be out of action. Most of the defenses are of the type that can’t protect coastal and field artillery against air or naval bombardment, especially in the north.

I wouldn't be sure about that.

[Richard Anderson]

Finally able to drop back in. Many Veterans’ Day weekend activities and I read through all 48 pages of the earlier Malta invasion thread. Of the latter, some good discussion mixed with a lot of bad information.

I feel your pain.

Italian special operation forces...[snip interesting and detailed information, thank you Jeff.]

Reggimento Fanti dell'aria. Two battalion of 500 each. The regiment executed a large scale mass-tactical jump in 1938 which included seizing an airfield and air-landing a full infantry regiment and artillery (some artillery was parachuted). In all, nearly 5,000 troops were flown-in or dropped. A smaller exercise was repeated in 1939. The 1940 plan had the regiment landing near Zurrico (Zurrieq) and either seizing Hal Far airfield or, failing that, defending the Nigret hills.

British dispositions to oppose such a move placed the Queen's Own 2d RWK defending the airfields against parachute assault, with one company each at Ta' Qali, Luqa, and Hal Far, and a reserve company at Saint George's Barracks providing an anti-parachute reserve for Pembroke Sector. The 2d KOMR were stationed just to the northwest in Zebbag with responsibility for the west coast from including Tal Virtu. The Zurrieq area eventually became part of the responsibility of 3d KOMR, but it is unclear if they were operational by the end of August. So an assault by 1,000 paratroopers would have been a major problem for the British. Did the RA have sufficient airlift to move the whole regiment to Malta in one lift?

My point in listing the three capabilities above is to demonstrate...[snip further good information.]
I still have issues on why the obstacles are seen as a problem. They are certainly not as extensive and complex as what the R.E. had previously dealt with. More importantly, obstacles are only good if they are covered by fire. The lack of prepared infantry positions (pill boxes do have their limitations) including firing pits and trenches that are needed to create an integrated defense means the the defenders are almost as vulnerable to artillery fires as the attackers. The rocky terrain also means that the garrison would be exposed to the R.A. and their bombs. The small size of the garrison meant that they can’t take a large number of losses. As I previously stated, this will be an attrition fight where skill will play a small role. If the Italians have a strong suit, it is their artillery. They can get it ashore and they know how to use it.

My specific point regarding the barbed wire obstacle was related to the insane notion the Italians would attempt a direct assault into St. Paul's or Mellieha bays. Those two specifically were the best prepared positions in the northern half of the island, designed as part of the evolving beach defense strategy. I cannot see how the Italians could have carried out such a mad scheme, whether or not they had a strong corps of night assault, sailing fishing vessel-delivered ninja warriors (sorry, the whole idea of a sneak attack by fishing boat - not your idea BTW - made be giggle, it reminds me of certain old arguments regarding flying in Japanese SLNF to seize the mountain passes in Hawaii ).

Landing artillery on Gozo and Comino is part of all the plans. Here the shorter ranges of most of the main artillery types is a negative, but to establish and maintain the northern part is good to go.

Yep. Yet another problem for the British not resolvable in 1940 and still problematic in 1942. Comino is probably the better Italian choice, given it places most of Pembroke and Melleiha sectors within 5-8 kilometers, but Gozo is mostly over 8 kilometers.

Use of Valletta by the R.N. Certainly damaged ships could use the harbor in am emergency, but does anyone believe the R.N. would operate out of that port during an invasion? When and how do they use Valletta? At night? What happens when the Italians mine the approaches or take other actions (see X MAS above)?

Yeah, except possibly for MTB Valletta would be a non-starter for the RN in this scenario.

Fort Campbell. As an infantry strong point it might be okay, but its coastal guns are woefully vulnerable. I would be surprised if any of those guns are operational by the time the landings begin. Between the 5-day prep in the plan and the actions on the day of the invasion, they are likely to be out of action. Most of the defenses are of the type that can’t protect coastal and field artillery against air or naval bombardment, especially in the north.

Curiously enough that is the general supposition, but German experience in Normandy proved to be the opposite. They found that while the open-pit form of coast artillery position could be suppressed it was very hard for the Allies to cause critical damage or casualties to them. OTOH, enclosed gun positions such as Marcouf proved very problematic to short rounds grazing into them and causing havoc when they exploded inside the gun chamber. In this situation too, until the Italians can field a viable dive bomber force, air attack would be very hit or miss.

So what did the 5-day prep phase and actions on D-Day envision? Was there to be a sustained naval bombardment of the coast defense positions?

The R.N. The Italian plan states that the sailing time for the British to Malta is a minimum of 36 hours. The sailing time for the invasion ships is 11 hours. 5 day invasion prep. The challenge for the R.N. is when to sail. Once they leave port, they are burning fuel. 36 hours is high speed, a lot of fuel. When they sail and how much flex the Italians build into their plan are factors. The prep works against the UK. If some success in the first few days (especially in the north), it might ultimately cause the UK to decide to cut their losses and not sortie.

Staying on station is just as important as getting there. The Japanese sortie that resulted in the Battle of Salvo Island didn’t stop the invasion. To say the Italians would crack if they lose a naval battle is betting on hope as a method. The R.N. can’t stay in the area. As has been previously noted, the R.N. was acutely aware of their ship shortage and Malta was seen as a loss cause in 1940.

Yep, an RN attempt to disrupt the invasion by the Fleet would probably be a non-starter. At best they might risk a cruiser-destroyer force...but even that could be dicey. The problem is that unlike the British incursions into Italian waters at this time, the Italians have the initiative and can decide on time and place.

Airfields to support the operations. The airfields on Pantelleria and A.S. were to be used as well as on Sicilia. 300 bombers and 200 fighters in the plan.

To me, the oddest element of British strategy for Malta in the 1935-1940 time frame is that they greatly expanded the airfields on Malta...and then failed to station any reasonable air strength there. I understand why they did not, but the building of the airfields seems almost an invitation to the Italians to fly in at their leisure. I mean, it isn't like the British were not aware of the Italian paratroop and airlift exercises. So why make it easier for the Italians to execute such an attack on Malta?

As previously stated, nothing presented here will prove or disprove whether a 1940 invasion could succeed. What I hope to have done is show that an invasino wouldn’t have been a half-cocked and thrown together effort by the Italians as perceived by many. They had been working on the Malta invasion since 1935 and had developed and tested many of the capabilities needed to execute such an invasion. I don't see a Mexican stand-off. If the Italians are serious, they can take the island. It won't be pretty, it won't be neat, but it is well within their capabilities if they are determined to do it.

All true...but then, as already mentioned, how does that affect Italian operations against Greece and in North Africa?

[jwsleser]

They found that while the open-pit form of coast artillery position could be suppressed it was very hard for the Allies to cause critical damage or casualties to them. OTOH, enclosed gun positions such as Marcouf proved very problematic to short rounds grazing into them and causing havoc when they exploded inside the gun chamber.

Interesting. I was looking at the Pacific experience and the loss of gun crews. Much depends on how many bombs and rounds the Italians throw at the island. The R.A. definitely lack the ability to affect enclosed gun positions, but the open positions are something else.

Did the RA have sufficient airlift to move the whole regiment to Malta in one lift?

Yes, I believe so. I need to check Arena's book again to make sure. IIRC, the 1938 exercise had the entire Fanti dell'aria dropped in the first lift, with the air-landing elements in the following cycles. The SM 82s were beginning to arrive for the R.A. in 1940.

I cannot see how the Italians could have carried out such a mad scheme, whether or not they had a strong corps of night assault, sailing fishing vessel-delivered ninja warriors (sorry, the whole idea of a sneak attack by fishing boat - not your idea BTW - made be giggle, it reminds me of certain old arguments regarding flying in Japanese SLNF to seize the mountain passes in Hawaii ).

The actual bragozzi planned for use were much larger than the small boats described and they were motorized. The picture should have indicated that. It is unclear whether the initial wave would ride in the bragozzi from the debarkation ports or go over the side from larger ships a la landing craft. From the shipping requirement, I suspect the former with subsequent waves doing the latter, but can't be sure. The larger bragozzi can certainly make the trip. No plan for a night landing unless it was by X MAS or some similar capability.

So what did the 5-day prep phase and actions on D-Day envision? Was there to be a sustained naval bombardment of the coast defense positions?

The D-5 to D-1 prep was the R.A. The R.M. came in on D-Day from what Gabriele offers. It is clear that Gabriele had access to all the 1938-1940 planning documents, but only provides parts based on his narrative and the fact the 1940 operation was never carried out. Even in those he provides, some parts are abridged (many ... after incomplete sentences). In the Progetto di sbarco a Malta della primavera 1940 (appendice II), under V. Piano generale per l'attacco only the 1) Generalità and 2) Azione aerea sections are provided, the latter heavily abridged. The naval and military sections are omitted. While looking at the 1942 plan provides some insights, the fact that the main effort changed from the north to the southwest makes it difficult to say what was in the 1940 plan. His narrative in the chapters offers more details, but doesn't answer everything.

BTW, the four landing ships were designed to handle the light tanks, so armor support (for what it was) could be available. Those carri L were designed to operate in this type of terrain and could do quite well, especially the carri lanciafiamme.

Pista! Jeff

[jwsleser]

All true...but then, as already mentioned, how does that affect Italian operations against Greece and in North Africa?

It will most certainly affect everything else. As I previously quoted, Comando Supremo didn't believe multiple efforts could (or should) be simultaneously carried out. If you look at the historical timing, nothing happens in A.S. until September and Greece doesn't become an apple in Mussolini's eye until roughly the same time. I feel this is due to the fact that until the Battle of Britain had been resolved (or at least could be called, with the resulting impact on Seelöwe), Mussolini was willing to sit by and wait. If Malta is in the picture starting June (with the invasion August-ish), I don't feel Mussolini would be thinking about anything else. Comando Supremo and the branch staffs certainly would fight back hard if Mussolini started talking about another adventure while Malta was in the mix. The 18 June appreciation didn't initiate anything new with its call to wait on Malta as Mussolini was willing to wait. It is September when the Mussolini begins to feel he needs to do something else after France. Of course, the CAI wouldn't deploy to France for the BoB, but note that the historical decision for that deployment was also made in September.

If Malta happens with the expected large losses, none of the military leadership will be willing to do anything for quite awhile. I doubt the invasions into Egypt and Greece would happen in 1940. A hard-fought but successful invasion would curb the appetite for a period of time, while a loss would be a major shock and instant retrenchment.

Pista! Jeff

[Wargames]

The entire Marfa coast is probably under 8,000 yards from most of the positions in the Victoria Lines, so easy range for almost anything there.

This is a common misconception by those who believe the Italians couldn't invade. One cannot see the beaches from the Victoria Line. This would require artillery spotting from the forward area. If you examine the 1942 British artillery map of Malta you will find they had an average visibility of only 1,200 yards. If every single British gun was turned inland in 1940 they could only cover one third of the island.

To hit a target you first have to see it.

[MarkN]

To hit a target you first have to see it.

Garbage!!!!

[Richard Anderson]

This is a common misconception by those who believe the Italians couldn't invade.

Who would those be pray tell?

One cannot see the beaches from the Victoria Line.

Who said anything about seeing beaches from the Victoria Lines?

This would require artillery spotting from the forward area.

Which is something the British, like many nations, were quote proficient at.

If you examine the 1942 British artillery map of Malta you will find they had an average visibility of only 1,200 yards.

WHAT has an "average visibility of only 1,200 yards"? The battery area and BOP or the FOP? The BOP at Fort Campbell has visibility out to the maximum range of its 6" guns - or more. Many of the pillboxes in Malta were built with a second "story" intended for observation. They were also interlinked by telephone and I would suspect given the British predication for artillery survey pretty much every square inch of the island was accurately mapped and could be effectively ranged from any position able to fire on a target.

BTW, what is the source for this "1942 British artillery map of Malta" you are finding these measurements on?

If every single British gun was turned inland in 1940 they could only cover one third of the island.

Why would they turn them "inland" in 1940 or any year? You seem to be very confused about the siting and tactical employment of artillery.

To hit a target you first have to see it.

Indeed, yes you are confused about how modern field artillery works.

[Richard Anderson]

Interesting. I was looking at the Pacific experience and the loss of gun crews. Much depends on how many bombs and rounds the Italians throw at the island. The R.A. definitely lack the ability to affect enclosed gun positions, but the open positions are something else.

Well, similar positions as at Corregidor, but without the gunshields as mounted on the British 6" guns (I don't recall if the 9.2" were eventually fitted with gunshiuelds) were actually effective for quite a long time versus the Japanese counter-battery and air assault. Even in Normandy, the large number of 155 GPF positions in open pits without gunshields apparently suffered few crew casualties and only minor damage to the guns, although eventually the Allies did suppress them at will few were knocked out. That was part of the reason that SWORD was quickly abandoned as a landing beach...the Germans just had too easy a time harassing the landing vessels and the danger to the larger ships trying to subdue them from the heavier batteries at Le Havre was too great, so I suspect a similar situation might play out. BTW, the reason the same did not happen at UTAH was that overrunning the coastal batteries along the Cotentin was part of the plan.

Yes, I believe so. I need to check Arena's book again to make sure. IIRC, the 1938 exercise had the entire Fanti dell'aria dropped in the first lift, with the air-landing elements in the following cycles. The SM 82s were beginning to arrive for the R.A. in 1940.

Yes, please, because what I found was that the first series of 50 SM. 82 were delivered between December 1939 and December 1940? So I suspect the 1938 exercise was with earlier and less capable aircraft?

The D-5 to D-1 prep was the R.A. The R.M. came in on D-Day from what Gabriele offers...snip more excellent detail, thanks again!]

I would only comment that any sort of sustained prep by the R.A. flying level bombing missions would be unlikely to do a whole lot, except by chance, unless the Italians were able to execute a better air operational intensity than what they did historically.

And, yes, the L3 would help...except that the large number of 18-pdr sited as beach and AT artillery might limit their role.

[Wargames]

I wouldn't be sure about that.

Do you see the metal roof over the gun?

It wasn't added until 1943. Nice picture though.