The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Stugbit and the community as a whole. Howdy Stugbit! Well sir, in deference to your point OR points-of-view as articulated within your posting of Thursday - November 22, 2018 - 8:06am, old yours truly would like to make it crystal clear that it was NOT at all my intention to besmirch the honor of Brazilian womanhood. I was paying a social compliment to that wonderful institution known throughout the world as your CARNAVAL! I certainly hope this clears the air on this contentious matter. Well, that's my latest and hopefully last two Yankee cents worth on this purely incidental issue. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day down in your corner of the ever exotic Federative Republic of Brazil.


Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Stugbit]

That`s fine.

Thanks for the explanation, Bob. And I`m sorry if I was somehow inconvenient.

Best Regards.

[gracie4241]

my disagreement is with Peter89 and his bland, unsupported assertion that all was lost after failure before Moscow. It wasn't. It appears he feels he has a better handle on Soviet prospects now in 2018 than Stalin did in 1942. I think not. Respectfully, my surmise is that he is unduly influenced by the "March on Moscow" crowd who were disastrously wrong but spinned (ie lied) about affairs to postwar interrogators, who lazily accepted statements that were contradicted-if checked- by their own statements during the war and the underlying facts. The premise of the "moscow" group was that the russians would be forced to risk their remaining reserves to protect the capitol, giving the germans the chance to destroy them in a climactic battle. This even animated the irresponsible decision at the Orsha conference on November 13, 1941 to continue the offensive in the belief the russians were finished; the problem was that these Generals(Hitler doubted the Moscow strategy) had NOT THE SLIGHTEST IDEA OF WHAT THE SOVIET RESERVES WERE.Hitler correctly understood that the achilles heel of the Soviets was their economic resource base in the south.Stalin's proclamation on july 27, 1942 unambiguously makes clear that he understood how precarious their position was, because central government offices can be relocated, armies rebuilt, and factories moved, but coal and iron mines, wheat fields, oil wells etc CANNOT be, and they were near being lost in 1942.A more focused(no caucasus diversion), and geographically limited Operation Blau could have put Stalin in an untenable economic position, and like Lenin in 1918 forced him to make peace with Germany.Mass starvation and his regime was finished, and he knew it and said it.Sorry, Peter 89, but all was Definitely NOT lost in 1942, but germany had no margin for error(like Directive no 45), of that there is no doubt

[Peter89]

my disagreement is with Peter89 and his bland, unsupported assertion that all was lost after failure before Moscow. It wasn't. It appears he feels he has a better handle on Soviet prospects now in 2018 than Stalin did in 1942. I think not. Respectfully, my surmise is that he is unduly influenced by the "March on Moscow" crowd who were disastrously wrong but spinned (ie lied) about affairs to postwar interrogators, who lazily accepted statements that were contradicted-if checked- by their own statements during the war and the underlying facts. The premise of the "moscow" group was that the russians would be forced to risk their remaining reserves to protect the capitol, giving the germans the chance to destroy them in a climactic battle. This even animated the irresponsible decision at the Orsha conference on November 13, 1941 to continue the offensive in the belief the russians were finished; the problem was that these Generals(Hitler doubted the Moscow strategy) had NOT THE SLIGHTEST IDEA OF WHAT THE SOVIET RESERVES WERE.Hitler correctly understood that the achilles heel of the Soviets was their economic resource base in the south.Stalin's proclamation on july 27, 1942 unambiguously makes clear that he understood how precarious their position was, because central government offices can be relocated, armies rebuilt, and factories moved, but coal and iron mines, wheat fields, oil wells etc CANNOT be, and they were near being lost in 1942.A more focused(no caucasus diversion), and geographically limited Operation Blau could have put Stalin in an untenable economic position, and like Lenin in 1918 forced him to make peace with Germany.Mass starvation and his regime was finished, and he knew it and said it.Sorry, Peter 89, but all was Definitely NOT lost in 1942, but germany had no margin for error(like Directive no 45), of that there is no doubt

Why do you keep talking in my name? Bad manners, anyway. I only answer in discussions with myself, and not with the self you claim to be me.

USSR would never ran out of food, oil, etc. Have you ever heard of Lend-Lease? The whole world was mobilised against the Axis.
USSR was supported by the Western Allies with 4.5Mt food and 2.7Mt POL products, making up for 58% of high-octane aviation fuel.

Yes, the Axis might have fared better in 1942, but they couldn't change the outcome of the war. Especially not with economic means.

[gracie4241]

Sorry for an apparent duplication. Surely Stalin knew about Lend Lease in July 27, 1942?So you still haven't explained Stalin's level of Panic about his raw material base EVEN with Lend Lease.The 11 million tons of food shipped 1941-45 WOULD NOT have replaced the Ukraine and Caucasus.If, Stalin had chosen as a result of their loss to make a separate peace-which i think he would have, the entire strategic situation. The problem (admittedly)with alternate history is that it is in fact ALTERNATE. It didn't happen. Many historians, understandably committed to the History that DID happen, can't conceive readily different decisions changing the landscape.FWIW my scenario is , upon a second Brest-Litovsk(and Hitler having his eastern LEBENSRAUM), he offers to 1. Withdraw from ALL western occupied territory(except Alsace-Lorraine)
2 From Greece and North Africa..3 Immediate return of all western prisoners to their home counties..In return all german prisoners are exchanged, AND the allies recognize his eastern annexations.At this point, no unconditional surrender demand being in place, however difficult for Churchill and Roosevelt, could they rally their publics to fight a war to liberate Kharkov for Stalin? Thet would in fact have liberated western europe and their prisoners. That would be a TOUGH sell. PS BTW a considerable amount of lend lease, including food was transported from Iran THROUGH the Caucasus, which in my scenario could not have happened

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both gracie4271 and the community as a whole. Howdy gracie4271! Well sir OR madam, in deference to your point OR points-of-view as articulated within your posting of Saturday - November 24, 2018 - 8:54pm, old yours truly is mildly surprised that you have not, in fact, proposed your SECOND BREST-LITOVSK approach as an alternative conclusion to the conflict in Europe to the learned Sanhedrin that informally holds sway over on the adjacent WHAT IF section of the forum. Without a doubt, your theoretical THREE POINT EUROPEAN ARMISTICE would certainly provide a great deal of speculative fodder for the legion of Doubting Thomases that take relish with the intellectual challenge of a hypothetical TOUGH SELL. Incidentally, when the time avails itself, you might want to peruse the wide range of voluminous topics that populate the WHAT IF section of the forum. I believe that you will discover that there have been a healthy number of similar variations to your stated theme generated within the WHAT IF section of the forum since the genesis of this organization. It's just a friendly suggestion to one of the newer kids on the block. Oh, and by the way, welcome to our merry little asylum! Well, that's my latest two cents, pence, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this expansive topic of interest - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day from sea to shining sea.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Peter89]

Sorry for an apparent duplication. Surely Stalin knew about Lend Lease in July 27, 1942?So you still haven't explained Stalin's level of Panic about his raw material base EVEN with Lend Lease.The 11 million tons of food shipped 1941-45 WOULD NOT have replaced the Ukraine and Caucasus.If, Stalin had chosen as a result of their loss to make a separate peace-which i think he would have, the entire strategic situation. The problem (admittedly)with alternate history is that it is in fact ALTERNATE. It didn't happen. Many historians, understandably committed to the History that DID happen, can't conceive readily different decisions changing the landscape.FWIW my scenario is , upon a second Brest-Litovsk(and Hitler having his eastern LEBENSRAUM), he offers to 1. Withdraw from ALL western occupied territory(except Alsace-Lorraine)
2 From Greece and North Africa..3 Immediate return of all western prisoners to their home counties..In return all german prisoners are exchanged, AND the allies recognize his eastern annexations.At this point, no unconditional surrender demand being in place, however difficult for Churchill and Roosevelt, could they rally their publics to fight a war to liberate Kharkov for Stalin? Thet would in fact have liberated western europe and their prisoners. That would be a TOUGH sell. PS BTW a considerable amount of lend lease, including food was transported from Iran THROUGH the Caucasus, which in my scenario could not have happened

Brest-Litovsk was conceived amidst of a regime change, when the communists needed peace to stabilize their power.

In 1942 the regime's grip on the USSR society was hard and fast, the system only needed to keep on fighting.

Besides, the USSR didn't only get raw materials, but tanks, aircrafts, trucks, railstock, etc. as well. The area we are talking about regarding Case Blue is simply not big or important enough to ultimately cripple SU's warmaking capability.

[AriX]

There was ,at least, a single senior officer who regreat the idea of separating AG South on two ??

[jesk]

There was ,at least, a single senior officer who regreat the idea of separating AG South on two ??

There is a lot of mistakes. In July Halder protested against senseless concentration of almost all tank divisions near Rostov, as a result the Stalingrad direction was weakened.

[jesk]

The easiest way to win in the Caucasus. This is rarely discussed. In Dagestan, along the Caspian Sea, a strip 20-30 km wide plains and not large hills. Passing along the coast to Baku meant cutting off all Soviet troops in the Caucasus from supplies. Understandably, Hitler did the opposite.

[dgfred]

Thanks for the maps.

[jesk]

On the coast of Dagestan little rains. The climate is like in the desert. In the Tuapse region, due to heavy rains in the fall, the German offensive sank in the mud. And this is work of the Fuhrer ...

1333 vs 365

[jesk]

On this scheme it is noticeable as Germans wrong attacked. Instead of the concentrated blow from Makhachkala to Baku (350 km), approach by spread fingers across all Caucasus. This episode is practically not considered in sources about the German offensive in the south. A lot of reasonings about Stalingrad. In refusal to move along the Caspian Sea historians do not notice strangenesses. And it is strange.