What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#181

Post by Urmel » 03 Dec 2018, 21:27

For 19 November it was 3 CLY. Queen's Bays were taken apart in January 42.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#182

Post by Don Juan » 03 Dec 2018, 22:16

Gooner1 wrote:
03 Dec 2018, 14:13
Soviet tests of the 2-pdr against a Pz38:
"The 40 mm AP shell does not penetrate front armour 50 (25+25) mm thick. The reason for this is poor quality of the shells. They are destroyed completely on impact.
The 30 mm side armour can be penetrated from 800-1000 meters."
Stug III
"At 50 meters, the 2-pounder only forms a 20 mm deep dent in the StuG's front armour. However, at 100 meters, it manages to penetrate the upper part of the front plate. That result does not repeat, as another shot from 100 meters only makes a 25 mm deep dent. 4 shots from the side, all at 850 meters, go through.
Conclusion: "The 40 mm tank gun penetrates the side of the hull, 30 mm thick, from 850 meters. The front of the hull, 50 mm thick, is not reliably penetrable at any distance due to the poor shell quality. Upon impact, the shells shatter into small fragments."
Pz III
The results are similar to the StuG. It cannot penetrate the front at 100, or even 50, meters.
In the conclusions, the following is noted: "The British 40 mm shell, when fired at a 50 mm armour plate from 50-100 meters, makes a 20-25 mm dent and shatters. "
http://tankarchives.blogspot.com/2013/0 ... tanks.html
Quoting this is meaningless unless you can prove that the 5cm KwK 38 would have done a better job against the same targets.

Which it wouldn't.
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941


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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#183

Post by Don Juan » 03 Dec 2018, 22:25

MarkN wrote:
03 Dec 2018, 18:59
The users didn't lack the ability to make a pure HE shell for the 2-pdr, they chose not to because it didn't suit their practical doctrine of how to do tank and anti-tank warfare. They had an APHE round from the very beginning of the war but decided it was less effective than the AP round so discontinued its manufacture and, in Egypt, even removed the HE content from their remaining APHE stocks and backfilled with sand.
There was a proven 2 pounder HE shell already in existence, although it was designed to suit the cartridge of the naval 2-pounder rather than the QF 2 pounder used by the army. Eventually the cartridge of the QF 2 pounder was modified to accept this shell, although these only started to appear in War Office inventories from mid-1943.

I think the missing 2 pounder HE shell is another red herring, tbh, because I've never seen a British report that complains about the efficacy of the 5cm HE shell. I think the British idea of creating the 3" howitzer, which could be used in the same mounting as the 2 pounder, was the better route to go during early part of the war. My own view is that each armoured regiment should have been supplied with a stock of spare 3" howitzers, and the mix of 2 pounders to 3" howitzers could then have been adjusted by the unit armourers according to the type of operations envisaged. This would have required a degree of tactical flexibility though....
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#184

Post by MarkN » 03 Dec 2018, 23:15

Don Juan wrote:
03 Dec 2018, 22:25
MarkN wrote:
03 Dec 2018, 18:59
The users didn't lack the ability to make a pure HE shell for the 2-pdr, they chose not to because it didn't suit their practical doctrine of how to do tank and anti-tank warfare. They had an APHE round from the very beginning of the war but decided it was less effective than the AP round so discontinued its manufacture and, in Egypt, even removed the HE content from their remaining APHE stocks and backfilled with sand.
There was a proven 2 pounder HE shell already in existence, although it was designed to suit the cartridge of the naval 2-pounder rather than the QF 2 pounder used by the army. Eventually the cartridge of the QF 2 pounder was modified to accept this shell, although these only started to appear in War Office inventories from mid-1943.

I think the missing 2 pounder HE shell is another red herring, tbh, because I've never seen a British report that complains about the efficacy of the 5cm HE shell. I think the British idea of creating the 3" howitzer, which could be used in the same mounting as the 2 pounder, was the better route to go during early part of the war. My own view is that each armoured regiment should have been supplied with a stock of spare 3" howitzers, and the mix of 2 pounders to 3" howitzers could then have been adjusted by the unit armourers according to the type of operations envisaged. This would have required a degree of tactical flexibility though....
All of which is telling us that the 'inadequacies' of the 2-pdr in respect of different projectile types was a user issue not a weapon issue; the user made a series of decisions that left tank and A/Tk crews with just two types of projectile during Op CRUSADER: the AP and the APSAND (a former APHE backfilled with sand to make it perform more like an AP round)

There are an infinite number of post-war myths vociferously argued about on the internet medium. Historical fact is generally not welcome by those desperate to propagate their deliberate falsehoods or misinformed opinions. The 2-pdr HE round is indeed a red herring since it didn't exist at the time it didn't affect the performace of the gun. But it's non-existence was a product of choices made by the user. It was not because they couldn't produce one, nor because they didn't have the gift of magic, but because they chose not to. A 2-pdr HE round did not fit their practical doctrinal ideas and plans. Why would a Cruiser Tank need an HE round when all a Cruiser Tank was going to do was engage another pantser? Nothing else. Just other pantsers. :roll: Although having an HE shell made sense in an Infantry Tank. However, shelling enemy positions with HE was an RA role and they were had no intention in giving up that role to the RAC! Can't have that, can we?

The 2-pdr firing the AP round was "bloody useless" supposedly. And yet, at the time, the Germans had enough respect for the damage/destruction it caused to go to the lengths of neutralizing that threat before they sent their pantsers forward. Additionally, documentary evidence shows that 2-pdr with AP rounds were taking out Pz.III 'Specials' with upgraded armor, spare track links and additional sandbags (which the Germans obviously thought were needed to protect themselves from the 2-pdr) attached at Gazala. Unfortunately, in this age of the internet , and as another poster recently wrote:
Gooner1 wrote:
30 Nov 2018, 14:45
... lets not forget that seventy-six years later and with all the information we have to hand, some people still refuse to accept ...

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#185

Post by Don Juan » 03 Dec 2018, 23:17

MarkN wrote:
03 Dec 2018, 19:21
The difference was in tactical approach. The British advanced at a specific time regardless of the state of the enemy; the Germans approached when they felt comfortable that the enemy A/Tk guns had been neutralized.

27 May 1940
10th Hussars cavalry charged the 2.Inf-Div(Mot) at Huppy. They do so an hour early beacuse they had not received the message that the French preliminary arty bombardment had been delayed. It was more important for the commander to start his charge on time as per his orders than it was to wait until the German defences had been softened up. The 10th Hussars were ripped apart by PaK36 37mm guns. They didn't use any of their own CS pantsers in any way.

27 May 1940
Queen's Bays cavalry charged the 2.Inf-Div(Mot) at Huppy. Having received the message that the French prelimary bombardment had been delayed, they charged at the revised and correct time. However, the French bombardment was of a general softening up nature rather than specifically targetting German A/Tk defences. It was more important for the commander to start his charge on time as per his orders than it was to wait to see the effect of the softening up. The Queen's Bays were ripped apart by PaK36 37mm guns. They didn't use any of their own CS pantsers in any way.

19 November 1941
Scott-Cockburn's 22nd Armoured Brigade has CS tanks capable of lobbing HE into the Italian A/Tk screen. At least one for each of his pantser squadrons, often a pair. He also had a battery of eight 25-pdrs. He used neither to neutralize the Italian A/Tk screen. He just charged straight into it. The Queen's Bays were ripped apart by Italian 47mm guns as well as field arty firing over sights. His CS pantsers fired a lot of smoke that day. The arty battery was used rather belatedly to offer some pay-back.

21 November 1941
Davy's 4th Armoured Brigade is tasked to grab part of the escarpment overlooking the Trigh Capuzzo and to send a single panser squadron to link up with the Tobruk breakout. He allocates 48 x 25-pdrs to soften up the enemy position for a few minutes before the cavalry and infantry charge goes in. The arty regiments also have FOOs up in the front line with the pantsers to offer further support if necessary. The 6th RTR starts its charge at the alloted time as per the plan - a time which has NOTHING to do with the state of German defences. One squadron and RHQ is wiped out charging across the valley by 47mm Pz.Jag.I guns - perhaps some of SR.155's A/Tk guns too, whilst another is badly mauled trying to offer some flank protection. Also mauled by 47mm Pz.Jag.I and whatever SR.155's had to hand.

British practical doctrine did not allow for A/Tk defences to be neutralized before the cavalry charges commenced. Practical doctrine put the priority on starting at the time stated in the operational order. The range of the various weapons was completely irrelevant to when the charge started.
I think the chief lesson from the events of May 1940, and one that the RAC were absolutely determined not to learn, was that the Cruiser tanks were not the right tanks for use as their main battle tanks. The Cruisers were only really suitable for reconnaissance, scouting and protecting flanks. What was needed as the main battle tanks were the Infantry tanks, as part of an all-arms team with the artillery, infantry etc.

The RAC actually adopted this kind of tactic during and after 2nd Alamein, with each regiment being divided into two "heavy" squadrons, each with Shermans and Grants, and a single "light" squadron made up of Crusaders. This worked quite well, with the Crusaders locating enemy strongpoints and seizing unoccupied ridges, and the Grants and Shermans (plus artillery and motorized infantry) following up to deal with any substantial Axis opposition.

However, rather than admitting that they had got their approach wrong from the start, the RAC instead span a narrative that it was only the new American tanks and their 75mm guns that had made the difference, and their previous failures had been almost entirely due to their "inferior" equipment. This was a narrative that was taken up with gusto in the post-war period, especially among historians who themselves had a background in the RAC, and still persists today.
Last edited by Don Juan on 03 Dec 2018, 23:18, edited 1 time in total.
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#186

Post by MarkN » 03 Dec 2018, 23:18

Don Juan wrote:
03 Dec 2018, 22:16
Gooner1 wrote:
03 Dec 2018, 14:13
Soviet tests of the 2-pdr against a Pz38:
"The 40 mm AP shell does not penetrate front armour 50 (25+25) mm thick. The reason for this is poor quality of the shells. They are destroyed completely on impact.
The 30 mm side armour can be penetrated from 800-1000 meters."
Stug III
"At 50 meters, the 2-pounder only forms a 20 mm deep dent in the StuG's front armour. However, at 100 meters, it manages to penetrate the upper part of the front plate. That result does not repeat, as another shot from 100 meters only makes a 25 mm deep dent. 4 shots from the side, all at 850 meters, go through.
Conclusion: "The 40 mm tank gun penetrates the side of the hull, 30 mm thick, from 850 meters. The front of the hull, 50 mm thick, is not reliably penetrable at any distance due to the poor shell quality. Upon impact, the shells shatter into small fragments."
Pz III
The results are similar to the StuG. It cannot penetrate the front at 100, or even 50, meters.
In the conclusions, the following is noted: "The British 40 mm shell, when fired at a 50 mm armour plate from 50-100 meters, makes a 20-25 mm dent and shatters. "
http://tankarchives.blogspot.com/2013/0 ... tanks.html
Quoting this is meaningless unless you can prove that the 5cm KwK 38 would have done a better job against the same targets.

Which it wouldn't.
Straws and clutching spring to mind again.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#187

Post by MarkN » 03 Dec 2018, 23:29

Don Juan wrote:
03 Dec 2018, 23:17
I think the chief lesson from the events of May 1940, and one that the RAC were absolutely determined not to learn, was that the Cruiser tanks were not the right tanks for use as their main battle tanks. The Cruisers were only really suitable for reconnaissance, scouting and protecting flanks. What was needed as the main battle tanks were the Infantry tanks, as part of an all-arms team with the artillery, infantry etc.

The RAC actually adopted this kind of tactic during and after 2nd Alamein, with each regiment being divided into two "heavy" squadrons, each with Shermans and Grants, and a single "light" squadron made up of Crusaders. This worked quite well, with the Crusaders locating enemy strongpoints and seizing unoccupied ridges, and the Grants and Shermans (plus artillery and motorized infantry) following up to deal with any substantial Axis opposition.

However, rather than admitting that they had got their approach wrong from the start, the RAC instead span a narrative that it was only the new American tanks and their 75mm guns that had made the difference, and their previous failures had been almost entirely due to their "inferior" equipment. This was a narrative was taken up with gusto in the post-war period, especially among historians who themselves had a background in the RAC, and still persists today.
Exactly. Blame somebody or something else.

In 1940, it was a case of blaming the French.

The RAC wags made a point of explaining to their French counterparts that a British Armoured Division was made up of lightly armoured pantsers unsuited for attacking a defended position. The French were to blame for the losses at Huppy for that reason AND for not having their arty and infantry ready.

The notion that the 10th Hussars attacked an hour before they were supposed to because it was more important to attack on time is ignored.
The notion that the Germans would have the audacity to set up an A/Tk screen is ignored.
And so on, and on, and on....

The British threw away the 1st Armoured Division themselves through their own poor choices and abysmal tactical thought, awareness and effort.

The Scott-Cockburn pre-battle memo to his troops states thay had been training for two years for this moment to come. So, when he decided to charge his brigade against a defended location with his lightly armoured pantsers and with no prior preparation of any sort, he was copying the idiocy of the 10th Hussars 18 months earlier. He also took it upon himself to order exactly what the British claimed was a French mistake. Had he trained to do that for two years because it was the DS answer or did he just lose his head or was he just tactically incompetent?

Davy then sent 6th RTR to do virtually the same a couple of days later.

There is a consistent pattern here.

In all of these engagements, the 2-pdr's alleged inadequacies were an irrelevancy. 3" HAA guns reroled would have been irrelevant.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#188

Post by Gooner1 » 04 Dec 2018, 15:11

MarkN wrote:
03 Dec 2018, 18:59
Really? Is that how you describe docimented results from practical tests? :roll:
Which 'docimented results from practical tests' measured 'hitting power'? :roll:

And clearly you and Don Juan are selective in the penetration tests you want to believe.

The users didn't lack the ability to make a pure HE shell for the 2-pdr, they chose not to because it didn't suit their practical doctrine of how to do tank and anti-tank warfare.
Any evidence for this?

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#189

Post by Gooner1 » 04 Dec 2018, 15:15

Don Juan wrote:
03 Dec 2018, 22:16

Quoting this is meaningless unless you can prove that the 5cm KwK 38 would have done a better job against the same targets.
Which it wouldn't.
It proves (again) that the 2-pdr shot fails at the frontal armour of the most common German tank in the desert.

If you think that is meaningless, well ... get a new hobby?

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#190

Post by Don Juan » 04 Dec 2018, 15:26

Gooner1 wrote:
04 Dec 2018, 15:15
It proves (again) that the 2-pdr shot fails at the frontal armour of the most common German tank in the desert.

If you think that is meaningless, well ... get a new hobby?
This has not been disputed at any time during this entire thread. The 2 pounder does nonetheless succeed against the sides of the most common German tank in the desert from extended distances - between 1000 and 1500 yards.

However, the 5cm KwK 38 fails against both the front and sides of the main British Infantry tanks - the Matilda and Valentine. These could have been the most common British tanks in the desert, but the RAC decided otherwise.

There was no British inferiority in equipment, except for that voluntarily chosen by the RAC.
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#191

Post by Urmel » 04 Dec 2018, 15:33

42 R.T.R. at Omar Nuovo

Phase I
A Sqdn. Many (14) tanks lost on mine fields. Two hit by 88s.
B Sqdn. took their objective with the infantry. One tank hit by 88.

Phase II
Sqdn. 44 R.T.R. comes under 88 fire, many tanks holed. 1 tank rallies at 2100.
Composite Sqdn. 42 R.T.R. similar story.

Objectives were taken.

Out of three squadrons and HQ, 45 tanks out of 50 put out of action at least temporarily. Based on the German diary, claims primarily from 88s, but also 75mm AA, at least one M-kill from a 37mm. Italians and Germans also fielded 47mm ATG.

The whole point of the action is that by working as an integrated all-arms team 7 Indian Brigade and 42 R.T.R. got the job done. Despite there being 88s and whatnots. Most of the 88s were put out of action by direct and indirect fire eventually.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#192

Post by Gooner1 » 04 Dec 2018, 15:46

Urmel wrote:
04 Dec 2018, 15:33
42 R.T.R. at Omar Nuovo

Phase I
A Sqdn. Many (14) tanks lost on mine fields. Two hit by 88s.
B Sqdn. took their objective with the infantry. One tank hit by 88.

Phase II
Sqdn. 44 R.T.R. comes under 88 fire, many tanks holed. 1 tank rallies at 2100.
Composite Sqdn. 42 R.T.R. similar story.

Objectives were taken.

Out of three squadrons and HQ, 45 tanks out of 50 put out of action at least temporarily. Based on the German diary, claims primarily from 88s, but also 75mm AA, at least one M-kill from a 37mm. Italians and Germans also fielded 47mm ATG.

The whole point of the action is that by working as an integrated all-arms team 7 Indian Brigade and 42 R.T.R. got the job done. Despite there being 88s and whatnots. Most of the 88s were put out of action by direct and indirect fire eventually.
Yes, good.

Also there were no German tanks around to counter-attack.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#193

Post by Gooner1 » 04 Dec 2018, 15:48

Don Juan wrote:
04 Dec 2018, 15:26
There was no British inferiority in equipment, except for that voluntarily chosen by the RAC.
It was Churchill who chose not to put the 6-pdr into production when it was ready to go in Summer 1940.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#194

Post by Urmel » 04 Dec 2018, 15:56

Gooner1 wrote:
04 Dec 2018, 15:46
Urmel wrote:
04 Dec 2018, 15:33
42 R.T.R. at Omar Nuovo

Phase I
A Sqdn. Many (14) tanks lost on mine fields. Two hit by 88s.
B Sqdn. took their objective with the infantry. One tank hit by 88.

Phase II
Sqdn. 44 R.T.R. comes under 88 fire, many tanks holed. 1 tank rallies at 2100.
Composite Sqdn. 42 R.T.R. similar story.

Objectives were taken.

Out of three squadrons and HQ, 45 tanks out of 50 put out of action at least temporarily. Based on the German diary, claims primarily from 88s, but also 75mm AA, at least one M-kill from a 37mm. Italians and Germans also fielded 47mm ATG.

The whole point of the action is that by working as an integrated all-arms team 7 Indian Brigade and 42 R.T.R. got the job done. Despite there being 88s and whatnots. Most of the 88s were put out of action by direct and indirect fire eventually.
Yes, good.

Also there were no German tanks around to counter-attack.
Err, no. They came the next day and were summarily dealt with. Twice. Are you seriously claiming you never heard of the 25 Nov action at Sidi Omar?
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

#195

Post by Gooner1 » 04 Dec 2018, 16:19

Not sure I would call an action two days later a counter-attack.

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