What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

[Gooner1]

25-pdr Fld artillery guns were not reroled as ATk guns. They were, however, expected to do their bit if their location was charged by pantsers. Which happened quite often due to poor British tactical command and employment of resources and assets.

Snipped the disingenuous bullshit.

From Notes From Theatres of War, No.10

"I. The superiority in artillery with which the Eighth Army accepted battle on May 27th failed to produce the results expected, though almost without exception guns were fought with the utmost gallantry and determination.
The principal reasons were:-
<>
(c) Confusion in the minds of many officers as to the two roles of the 25-pr. as a field gun and as an anti-tank weapon."

[MarkN]

Where a German Pz.IV could lob an HE shell 2,000yds, a British CS panster could lob an HE shell 2,000yds.

So the 3.7" Mortar and the 3" Howitzer in the CS tanks are as good as the 7.5cm KwK 37 of the PzIVs now?

Did I say that? No. You're just trolling.

The British CS pantser had the capability to fire HE shells to ferret out and neutralize an enemy ATk screen in front of the pantsers. Just like the Germans did with their Pz.IV in the example at el Duda that you keep referring to.

In the fantasy world where the 2-pdr is the equal of the German 5cm guns and the 88 barely exists, sure, why not.

Trolling.

Where the German practical approach saw anti-tank guns as an excellent adjunct to panzerwaffe and closely integrated them into all their schemes, the British practical approach seemed at a loss as to what to do with their anti-tank guns. Why have them accompany a pantser which has it's own ATk gun???? Why exploit their excellently engineered 360deg traverse and low profile when you can put them on the back of truck and play faux pantser????

How many times does it need to be said? One-step forward, one-step back.
The German Pak38 anti-tank gun was superior to their tank guns which were themselves superior to the British tank guns. What does bringing 2-pdr anti-tank guns to the fight achieve? They have the same inadequate killing power as the tanks but with added vulnerability.

More trolling.

How many times does it have to be said? The 2-pdr could penetrate Pz.III and Pz.IV at ranges in excess of 1,200yds. The PaK38 was a bit better, but if it had been neutralized by HE from a CS pantser, it would be irrelevant.

Where German doctrine suggested that an advance should be commenced after an anti-tank screen had been neutralized, the British written doctrine hints at the same - but in practice they just advanced when the watch told them to.

Damn sight easier to neutralise an enemy anti-tank screen, when your tanks can cruise about not too far from them in complete safety. Indeed cam pretty much charge home in comparative safety.

Absolutely. The British had the means to do it, they had the written theory on how to do it. But that failed to do it. The user was the problem not the equipment.

Snipped the disingenuous bullshit.

No. What you snipped was a summary of the blatant falsehoods you have tried to peddle in the last 24-48 hours. If your understanding of what happened, and why, is based upon those falsehoods, no wonder you are so off the mark.

The British had the wherewithall to conduct an identical approach to the one the Germans did at el Duda. Why the didn't do such is down to the user NOT the equipment and capabilities at his disposal. Emphasis on equipment at his disposal despite your attempts to deceive others into the falsehood that the equipment and capabilities were not there.

[Gooner1]

Did I say that? No. You're just trolling.

The British CS pantser had the capability to fire HE shells to ferret out and neutralize an enemy ATk screen in front of the pantsers. Just like the Germans did with their Pz.IV in the example at el Duda that you keep referring to.

Not trolling. Genuine question, after all you'd have to be pretty stupid to expect identical results with inferior weapons.

The 2-pdr could penetrate Pz.III and Pz.IV at ranges in excess of 1,200yds. The PaK38 was a bit better, but if it had been neutralized by HE from a CS pantser, it would be irrelevant.

As if the British didn't try.

Absolutely. The British had the means to do it, they had the written theory on how to do it. But that failed to do it. The user was the problem not the equipment.

No. Your problem is when the facts don't fit the theory, you want to change the facts.

The British had the wherewithall to conduct an identical approach to the one the Germans did at el Duda.

No. The Germans had longer ranged tank-killing weapons and the British Cruiser and Stuart tanks were more weakly armoured.

[MarkN]

No. Your problem is when the facts don't fit the theory, you want to change the facts.

And yet it is YOU that is trying to deceive others by questionning whether the British had artillery observers (FAO) forward with the pantsers to direct field arty fire onto targets such as enemy ATk screens and by stating falsehoods about armoured brigades not having capabilities and equipment that they did in historical reality.

It is YOU that is trying to rewrite a false history when it doesn't fit YOUR theory.

For Op CRUSADER, 7 and 22 Armoured Brigades had CS pantsers and 25-pdr field arty under direct command to conduct exactly the same sort of tactical approach as the Germans at el Duda - the example you keep refering back to. 4 Armoured Brigade had the 25-pdr field arty but not the CS pantsers. They all had FAOs in pantsers up with the front line of pantsers to direct that fire. What the Germans did in the example you keep refering back to was not beyond the equipment capabilities of the British, nor was it far beyond what British written doctrine theorized.

[Sheldrake]

That is not so. 103 Heavy AA were given a secondary role in Home Forces as a Anti tank against the threat of German heavy tanks in the event of the invasion. Source Regimental History 103 Regiment HAA Manuscript from Firepower Archive.

By "heavy" tanks the British thought that the Germans might have tanks with 80+ mm armour, so I think these preparations were mainly against tanks that they believed might have existed, but in fact didn't.

Maybe not. But the logic that drove the planning for the 17 pounder from late 1940 assumed that the Germans would be likely to have some heavy tanks. After all: The Brits were planning the Churchill from mid 1940.

[MarkN]

That is not so. 103 Heavy AA were given a secondary role in Home Forces as a Anti tank against the threat of German heavy tanks in the event of the invasion. Source Regimental History 103 Regiment HAA Manuscript from Firepower Archive.

By "heavy" tanks the British thought that the Germans might have tanks with 80+ mm armour, so I think these preparations were mainly against tanks that they believed might have existed, but in fact didn't.

Maybe not. But the logic that drove the planning for the 17 pounder from late 1940 assumed that the Germans would be likely to have some heavy tanks. After all: The Brits were planning the Churchill from mid 1940.

Difficult to argue against the idea that the orderly progression from 2-pdr to 6-pdr and then 17-pdr was anything other than down to an understanding that the armor on pantsers was going to increase as the war went on.

The logic for the disorderly attempt to get 100 ex-HAA 3-inch tubes fitted to Churchill pantsers also seems to have been driven by the fear of such pantsers have already made a bow. Moreover, it also seems likely the stop/start nature of the development hada alot to do with the receeding fear of invasion and the unlikelyhood of Pz.V, Pz.VI and PZ.VII existence coming into play.

Where, in either of these two scenarios, do you perceive any imperative to get a bigger gun into service due to a belief that the 2-pdr was failing to deal with existing pantsers?

[Gooner1]

And yet it is YOU that is trying to deceive others by questionning whether the British had artillery observers (FAO) forward with the pantsers to direct field arty fire onto targets such as enemy ATk screens

Yeah, because asking a question as to whether arty FOs were in tanks already is an attempt to deceive

For Op CRUSADER, 7 and 22 Armoured Brigades had CS pantsers and 25-pdr field arty under direct command to conduct exactly the same sort of tactical approach as the Germans at el Duda - the example you keep refering back to. 4 Armoured Brigade had the 25-pdr field arty but not the CS pantsers. They all had FAOs in pantsers up with the front line of pantsers to direct that fire. What the Germans did in the example you keep refering back to was not beyond the equipment capabilities of the British, nor was it far beyond what British written doctrine theorized.

What was beyond the capabilities of the British was an anti-tank gun that could knock out the panzers sufficiently far away that they wouldn't get spotted.
What was beyond the capabilities of Cruiser tanks was getting close enough to Jerry anti-tank guns that they could spot them without getting knocked out.
Also, attacking out of the sun at dusk proved tricky for the Brits

[Sheldrake]

That is not so. 103 Heavy AA were given a secondary role in Home Forces as a Anti tank against the threat of German heavy tanks in the event of the invasion. Source Regimental History 103 Regiment HAA Manuscript from Firepower Archive.

By "heavy" tanks the British thought that the Germans might have tanks with 80+ mm armour, so I think these preparations were mainly against tanks that they believed might have existed, but in fact didn't.

Maybe not. But the logic that drove the planning for the 17 pounder from late 1940 assumed that the Germans would be likely to have some heavy tanks. After all: The Brits were planning the Churchill from mid 1940.

Difficult to argue against the idea that the orderly progression from 2-pdr to 6-pdr and then 17-pdr was anything other than down to an understanding that the armor on pantsers was going to increase as the war went on.

The logic for the disorderly attempt to get 100 ex-HAA 3-inch tubes fitted to Churchill pantsers also seems to have been driven by the fear of such pantsers have already made a bow. Moreover, it also seems likely the stop/start nature of the development hada alot to do with the receeding fear of invasion and the unlikelyhood of Pz.V, Pz.VI and PZ.VII existence coming into play.

Where, in either of these two scenarios, do you perceive any imperative to get a bigger gun into service due to a belief that the 2-pdr was failing to deal with existing pantsers?

Alanborooke made the following notes in his diary while Commander Home Forces

18 June 1941
..motored to Larkhill to see a demonstration of anti tank weapons. I was disappointed by the standard and shall; have to start a campaign to improve matters.

3rd July ...making plans to employ 3" (20cwt) guns to engage 70 and 90 ton tanks should any of these monsters be landed to overcome beach defences.

10 July 1941
...I flew to Netheravon to go to Larkhill to watch some anti tank trials. Some improvement since I last saw them buy much more improvement required.

21 July 1941
... proceeded to see Beaverbrook concerning production of A/T Ammunition for 3" and 3.7" AA Guns to deal with large tanks should they be landed.

9 September 1941

Motored on to Larkhill for anti tank trials and conference on improvements. Anti-tank shooting beginning to make some progress. Had 2 pdr, 6 pdr 75mm, Bofors and 3.7" all firing.

Observations.

#1 A satisfactory demonstration in front of GOC Home Forces at the Royal School of Artillery should refute any claims that the 3.7" gun could not be used in the anti tank role.

#2 Brooke clearly wasn't satisfied with the 2 Pdr as the sole anti tank gun. Although the spectre of heavy tanks landing in Op Sealion 1941 did not happen. By September 1941 the British did have a capability to use heavy AA guns in an anti tank role, supported by Anti tank ammunition and had been thinking about how they were used.

#3 The characteristics of an a anti tank gun that could defeat the armour of a heavy ntank at close range allow it to be effective against a not so heavily armoured tank at beyond the effective range of a 2pdr. The 2 pounder and 25 pdr were both OK against 1941 era tanks up to ranges of C 1000metres. Unfortunately the effective range of co-ax MG and HE from the Panzer IV was greater than this. A few big guns might have forced the Germans to keep their distance.

#4 The fall off in interest in some of these projects may simply reflect the change in Command at Home Forces. Brooke had a bee in his bonnet about anti tank guns. Paget thought all divisions should be structured as Panzer Grenadier. By 1942 Brooke was CIGS and he had other things to worry about.

PS here is another pet project of Brookie

19 July 1941
Mr Thomas came from the Nuffield works with a model of Bofors gun mounted on tank which I had asked him for. I had a meeting of experts to examine it, but as it cut across the cruiser tank production, I decided to mount it on wheeled vehicle for the present.


The normal story is that Nuffield produced these for their Home Guard. The 40mm on the FAT Chassis fits the description.

[MarkN]

And yet it is YOU that is trying to deceive others by questionning whether the British had artillery observers (FAO) forward with the pantsers to direct field arty fire onto targets such as enemy ATk screens

Yeah, because asking a question as to whether arty FOs were in tanks already is an attempt to deceive

You have spent most of your effort in this thread telling the world that you understand the issue, the problems and have the answer to it all. When, in reality, you haven't even bothered to get to grips with the basics. You have spend most of your time deceiving people with your guesswork. Guesswork based upon historical falsehoods.

For Op CRUSADER, 7 and 22 Armoured Brigades had CS pantsers and 25-pdr field arty under direct command to conduct exactly the same sort of tactical approach as the Germans at el Duda - the example you keep refering back to. 4 Armoured Brigade had the 25-pdr field arty but not the CS pantsers. They all had FAOs in pantsers up with the front line of pantsers to direct that fire. What the Germans did in the example you keep refering back to was not beyond the equipment capabilities of the British, nor was it far beyond what British written doctrine theorized.

What was beyond the capabilities of the British was an anti-tank gun that could knock out the panzers sufficiently far away that they wouldn't get spotted.

A capability that the German's didn't possess either. Even today, technology has yet to deliver a stealth/invisible ATk gun. Mind you, in 1941, mounting a 2-pdr ATk gun on the back of a lorry and using it as a faux pantsers went a long way to removing any chance of camouflage and concealment from one side of the equation.

What was beyond the capabilities of Cruiser tanks was getting close enough to Jerry anti-tank guns that they could spot them without getting knocked out.

A skill which the Germans developped with the quite unremarkable concept of using one's support pantsers to remove the enemy ATk gun screen. An unremarkable concept given that virtually an identical concept is written into British doctrine too. Additionally, field guns of the RHA were to be employed to assist in this.

Also, attacking out of the sun at dusk proved tricky for the Brits

Shouldn't have done during Op CRUSADER.

Well done Gooner1, you have identified three areas in which the British user failed to exploit equipment and situational capabilities readily available to him.

And returning back to this one,

The 2-pdr could penetrate Pz.III and Pz.IV at ranges in excess of 1,200yds. The PaK38 was a bit better, but if it had been neutralized by HE from a CS pantser, it would be irrelevant.

As if the British didn't try.

Try what? Neutralizing enemy ATk with their CS pantsers. Scott-Cockburn certainly didn't try. Not even with the 25-pdr Fld guns he had under commander either. He just charged as if he was riding the 4.30 at Haydock Park. Davy arranged a 25-pdr Fld gun barrage before he sent his pantsers forward, but didn't bother to ascertain the results, the pantsers just charged according to when their watches reached the pre-determined start time. And on and on it goes...

[MarkN]

Alanborooke made the following notes in his diary while Commander Home Forces

18 June 1941
..motored to Larkhill to see a demonstration of anti tank weapons. I was disappointed by the standard and shall; have to start a campaign to improve matters.

3rd July ...making plans to employ 3" (20cwt) guns to engage 70 and 90 ton tanks should any of these monsters be landed to overcome beach defences.

10 July 1941
...I flew to Netheravon to go to Larkhill to watch some anti tank trials. Some improvement since I last saw them buy much more improvement required.

21 July 1941
... proceeded to see Beaverbrook concerning production of A/T Ammunition for 3" and 3.7" AA Guns to deal with large tanks should they be landed.

9 September 1941

Motored on to Larkhill for anti tank trials and conference on improvements. Anti-tank shooting beginning to make some progress. Had 2 pdr, 6 pdr 75mm, Bofors and 3.7" all firing.

Thanks Sheldrake.

More evidence that the imperative to give HAA guns a more useful ATk capability was based on fears of heavy pantsers. 70-90 ton beasts none the less!!! I doubt anybody would push an argument that a 2-pdr would be adequate against such behomoths.

Observations.

#1 A satisfactory demonstration in front of GOC Home Forces at the Royal School of Artillery should refute any claims that the 3.7" gun could not be used in the anti tank role.

Does anybody doubt the penetration power of the 3.7-inch HAA gun? Did the demonstration consider how the 3.7-inch HAA gun would fit into the highly mobile battles where mobility and survive were the watchwords?

#2 Brooke clearly wasn't satisfied with the 2 Pdr as the sole anti tank gun. Although the spectre of heavy tanks landing in Op Sealion 1941 did not happen. By September 1941 the British did have a capability to use heavy AA guns in an anti tank role, supported by Anti tank ammunition and had been thinking about how they were used.

If you expect 70-90 ton pantsers landing at Dungeness, you would be right not to be satisfied with only the 2-pdr in the inventory.

#3 The characteristics of an a anti tank gun that could defeat the armour of a heavy ntank at close range allow it to be effective against a not so heavily armoured tank at beyond the effective range of a 2pdr. The 2 pounder and 25 pdr were both OK against 1941 era tanks up to ranges of C 1000metres. Unfortunately the effective range of co-ax MG and HE from the Panzer IV was greater than this. A few big guns might have forced the Germans to keep their distance.

The Pz.IV firing HE in a support role was a threat to soft targets not pantsers. The British had CS pantsers to do the same job. The Pz.IV can still lob his HE from behind the hill, or sand dune, or whatever - thus putting out of reach of a direct-fire 3.7-inch gun despite being within range. Given the Germans already used the 88mm as an ATk weapon, understanding its capabilities and value on the pantser battlefield, I'm sure they already had a plan in mind should the British show up with a troop of 3.7-inch guns. I imagine the Germans would probably have come up with a workeable solution on the hoof before the battle had ended. The idea that a handful of 3.7-inch guns would have been a game changer is, in my mind quite daft. The 88mm was not a game changer for the Germans either.

#4 The fall off in interest in some of these projects may simply reflect the change in Command at Home Forces. Brooke had a bee in his bonnet about anti tank guns. Paget thought all divisions should be structured as Panzer Grenadier. By 1942 Brooke was CIGS and he had other things to worry about.

I agree. No documentation that I have seen confirms one thing or another. The 100 ex HAA 3-inch tube story in Churchill pantsers and mounted on 17/25-pdr carriages is just one of many British weapon follies of WW2. A story of wasted time, effort and resources. Mind you, if they had been able to wave a magic wand and make them operational before a 70-90 ton behomoth landed at Dungeness, who knows what would have happened?

[Gooner1]

You have spent most of your effort in this thread telling the world that you understand the issue, the problems and have the answer to it all. When, in reality, you haven't even bothered to get to grips with the basics. You have spend most of your time deceiving people with your guesswork. Guesswork based upon historical falsehoods.

The basics here are very simple. The superiority of German armaments in this period.

You are in denial of them because it doesn't fit your fixed ideas - which can be neatly summarised as "The British were Stupid and Shit (MarkN is Great!).

A capability that the German's didn't possess either. Even today, technology has yet to deliver a stealth/invisible ATk gun.
A skill which the Germans developped with the quite unremarkable concept of using one's support pantsers to remove the enemy ATk gun screen. An unremarkable concept given that virtually an identical concept is written into British doctrine too. Additionally, field guns of the RHA were to be employed to assist in this.

And yet the British spent many days trying to remove the enemy anti-tank gun screen at El Alamein using all the artillery and HE throwing tanks at their disposal and still had to launch a desperate tank charge to breakthrough.

Oh dear, I think I may have provided more evidence for your fixed ideas …

[Gooner1]

the highly mobile battles where mobility and survive were the watchwords?

Mobility, yes ok somewhat, but survive was a watchword?

And you have the nerve to accuse others of making things up!

The 100 ex HAA 3-inch tube story in Churchill pantsers and mounted on 17/25-pdr carriages is just one of many British weapon follies of WW2. A story of wasted time, effort and resources.

A rather modest amount of wasted time, effort and resources compared to the production of nearly 25,000 2-pdr guns in 1942 and 1943, the vast majority of which were unlikely to have ever fired a shot in anger.

[MarkN]

You have spent most of your effort in this thread telling the world that you understand the issue, the problems and have the answer to it all. When, in reality, you haven't even bothered to get to grips with the basics. You have spend most of your time deceiving people with your guesswork. Guesswork based upon historical falsehoods.

The basics here are very simple. The superiority of German armaments in this period.

The basics are simple. The British armoured brigades had the all-arms equipment to deal with the scenarios you presented - but they repeatedly failed.

You are in denial of them because it doesn't fit your fixed ideas - which can be neatly summarised as "The British were Stupid and Shit (MarkN is Great!).

You are in denial of them because it doesn't fit your fixed ideas - which can be neatly summarised as "Blame it on the Tools! (Gooner1 is Great!).

A capability that the German's didn't possess either. Even today, technology has yet to deliver a stealth/invisible ATk gun.
A skill which the Germans developped with the quite unremarkable concept of using one's support pantsers to remove the enemy ATk gun screen. An unremarkable concept given that virtually an identical concept is written into British doctrine too. Additionally, field guns of the RHA were to be employed to assist in this.

And yet the British spent many days trying to remove the enemy anti-tank gun screen at El Alamein using all the artillery and HE throwing tanks at their disposal and still had to launch a desperate tank charge to breakthrough.

So?

Oh dear, I think I may have provided more evidence for your fixed ideas …

How so?

And you have the nerve to accuse others of making things up!

I pointed out your falsehoods regarding the 7th and 22nd Armoured Brigade's orbats. Falsehoods which, conveniently, suited your argument. Same with the (feigned) ignorance of FAOs.

The 100 ex HAA 3-inch tube story in Churchill pantsers and mounted on 17/25-pdr carriages is just one of many British weapon follies of WW2. A story of wasted time, effort and resources.

A rather modest amount of wasted time, effort and resources compared to the production of nearly 25,000 2-pdr guns in 1942 and 1943, the vast majority of which were unlikely to have ever fired a shot in anger.

We could spend all of next year discussing British manufacturing and procurement follies and still not cover half of them. Your point is?

[Urmel]

This maybe of interest. These are the penetration numbers expected by the British before the start of CRUSADER

[Sheldrake]

Does anybody doubt the penetration power of the 3.7-inch HAA gun? Did the demonstration consider how the 3.7-inch HAA gun would fit into the highly mobile battles where mobility and survive were the watchwords?

#1 Lots of people, including senior Gunners, have claimed that the carriage could not cope with fire in l;ow trajectory or the lack of sights.

#2 Anti tank guns don't usually do a lot of movement, even in mobile battles. The deploy and fire from where there. Hooked in guns and detachments in unarmoured tractors are vulnerable to just about any thing.

#3 There is a father ted phenomena related to survivability
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MMiKyfd6hA0 A 2 pounder or 50mm pak is smaller than a 3.7" or 88mm HAA. But the HAA can open fire from far away.

A 6 pounder gun has a height of 1.28 metres and a width of 1.8 metres. At 1000 meters it subtends and angle of 1.3 mils vertically and 1.8 mils horizontally.

A 3.7" Gun has a height of 2.5 metres and a width of 2.4 metres. At 2000 meters it subtends and angle of 1.25 mils vertically and 1.2 mils horizontally.

They are just as hard to see at the range at which they will engage a tank in per terrain as per the Western Desert.

The Pz.IV firing HE in a support role was a threat to soft targets not pantsers. The British had CS pantsers to do the same job. The Pz.IV can still lob his HE from behind the hill, or sand dune, or whatever - thus putting out of reach of a direct-fire 3.7-inch gun despite being within range. Given the Germans already used the 88mm as an ATk weapon, understanding its capabilities and value on the pantser battlefield, I'm sure they already had a plan in mind should the British show up with a troop of 3.7-inch guns. I imagine the Germans would probably have come up with a workeable solution on the hoof before the battle had ended. The idea that a handful of 3.7-inch guns would have been a game changer is, in my mind quite daft. The 88mm was not a game changer for the Germans either.

If you want to talk about indirect fire solutions to identified anti tank positions, use field artillery not tanks. British CS tanks in the western desert lacked the range to engage HAA guns at 2,000m and neither British nor German tank crews were professionals in the indirect fire business. I don't know the probable error in range for the 75mm L24 firing HE. Do you, or anyone else on the board dedicated to Axis forces point me in the direction of an HE range table for this gun?

It was not easy to accurately estimate the range or location of objects in the desert. Field artillery was surprisingly survivable, especially when firing alongside tanks. I read of an account of The Chestnut Troop RHA brought up its 25 pdr guns in support of the Grants at Gazala firing over open sights. All guns survived unlike half the Grants.

The capability of the 88mm gun to hit tanks at long range cast a profound psychological shadow over British and American tank crews. It may not have been a game changer, but it tilted the table. Owning a weapon system that worried the enemy is generally a good thing.