Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

[Michael Kenny]

considering that I have most of the material mentioned by him and in Christian's articles.............he and I go way back on ACG up to 2009, you have no experience of the numerous threads locked from fights and other mayhem. Bannings, too of course.

I have never been banned anywhere.

[Christianmunich]

Prove it

[Sheldrake]

The choice of the point at which the allies broke the German lines in Normandy was determined as much by the Germans as by the Allies.

100% agree with the excerpt I’ve quoted here, as well as, the rest of your post. But would like to mention in addition that Normandy being the decisive battleground made the job easier for tac air than the job would have been if they had to fly further into France. Also, Normandy allowed the Allies to take full advantage of naval gunfire support and in the event of a proper German assault on the bridgehead it may have proved vital.

Nice to have 100% agreement You raise an interesting point.

The further the allies pushed into France the further they were from both UK Airfields and from their naval gunfire support.

It is sometimes forgotten that the objective of Op Overlord was to secure a lodgement area with port facilities capable of supporting a force of 26-30 divisions and a reinforcement rate of three to five divisions a month. (SHAEF 22 -44 dated 10 March 1944)

The only inland objective was for airfield sites. The delay in capturing the area between Caen and Falaise is the stick used to beat Montgomery. But this specific ground was self evidently not essential to achieving air superiority or winning the campaign.

There is nothing there about achieving specific K/D ratios with enemy armour. The onus was for the Germans to drive the Allied lodgement into the sea. The operational essence of the Normandy campaign was a race to build up forces between the allies using air and sea and Germans using road and rail.

To return to the topic. The Allied anti tank defences were never really tested.
Here is the planned build up of (Artillery manned anti tank guns. The reality was delayed from 19-24 June by the great storm.

(Appx 1 to Annex B to RA Branch 21 Army Group War Diary May 1944)
(These are in addition to the 17 pdr tanks and infantry manned anti-tank guns

Each British infantry Division had 32 x 17pdr (76mm) and C 16 x 6 Pdr
Each Armoured Division and Army Corps had 24 x Towed 17 Pdr and 24 x M10 (around 60% with 17 Pdr)
These were deployed in layers with the towed 17 Pdrs as back stops to the brigade anti tank defences - though after real (MkVI) tigers appeared the 17 pdrs were much further forwards.

Behind the divisions and corps were the Heavy AA Batteries defending the beacheads. 44 x 3.7" and 48 x 90mm HAA on D Day rising to 312 x 3.7" and 272 US 90mm equipments by 1st July. The Tiger tanks, designed as a breakthrough tank never came remotely close to breaking through allied anti tank screens in Normandy.

I wonder if the Germans might have done better with a deeper lying strategy fighting beyond the range of Naval gunfire. Let the Allies reach Villers Bocage by D+1. Suck them into an over extended bridgehead where they can be mauled as at Anzio.

[Christianmunich]

I wonder if the Germans might have done better with a deeper lying strategy fighting beyond the range of Naval gunfire. Let the Allies reach Villers Bocage by D+1. Suck them into an over extended bridgehead where they can be mauled as at Anzio.

I think this is the essence. Any kind of attritional scenario was a must lose for German forces. The only ever remote possibility of withstanding the landing was several powerful units strick at once. Most notably the 12th SS should have been in striking distance on D-Day. The 12th SS arrived piece mail and also their conduct made no sense for me , same with the 21st. There was no aborting "bad" attacks there was only relentless attack until self destruction or defeat. I have trouble understanding the decisions made by German officers. Halting the attack for a late date? There was no later date. The 21st and 12th certainly failed when they switched to more passive posture on in the first days.

The Allied planning left little room for German reactions. It was all or nothing on the first day beyond that the Allies left nothing to chance. They only ever remote chance of "victory" was an immediate massive counter-attack within the first days, but even this was unlikely.

The attrition rates were heavily influenced by artillery consumptions and the GErmans were unable to keep up with the Allies, there was not "mauling" of Allied forces possible. It was all or nothing directly after the landing.

A lot of hindsight talk so this is just my personal opinion on this. But I have little doubt that the collapse of one part of the bridgehead would have collapsed the rest as well. US forces were pretty good at cutting down GErman armoured advances so I think the best chances were in the Commonwealth sector.

[Michael Kenny]

. US forces were pretty good at cutting down GErman armoured advances so I think the best chances were in the Commonwealth sector.

It was tried in early July in The Commonwealth Sector. The German attack was totally crushed and barely got past its start line. Seems Like Monty was also 'pretty good at cutting down German armoured advances'

[Christianmunich]

Nah he wasn't his casualty rates were the worst in the Allied units, he was atrocious at this. His advances were the slowest, his force ratios the heaviest, his gains the smallest.

He was the man behind Market Garden. Case close. Go tell us who knocked the 23rd Hussars tanks.

[Sheldrake]

Nah he wasn't his casualty rates were the worst in the Allied units, he was atrocious at this. His advances were the slowest, his force ratios the heaviest, his gains the smallest.

He was the man behind Market Garden. Case close. Go tell us who knocked the 23rd Hussars tanks.

A couple of points:-
#1 Casualties rates of British and US troops in Normandy were very close as % of troops ashoire.
#2 One of Montgomery's talents was to pre-empt German plans. The aim of Op Overlord was to establish a lodgement. The objective of the Gewrmans was to eliminate the lodgement. The onus was on the Germ,ans to attack. However not until August were the Germans able to mount an offensive operation. Until then Monty got there first and forced the Germans to respond.

[Michael Kenny]

However not until August were the Germans able to mount an offensive operation. Until then Monty got there first and forced the Germans to respond.

The German counter-attack launched whilst EPSOM was in play was their first 'proper'offensive to try and reach the beaches and split the Allies. It was a disaster for the Germans and the newly arrived reinforcements were simply stopped in their tracks.

[Michael Kenny]

His advances were the slowest...... .

Obviously never heard of the 'Great Swan'.

his force ratios the heaviest...........

and has never seen Bradley's 'force-ratio' for COBRA!

[Sheldrake]

However not until August were the Germans able to mount an offensive operation. Until then Monty got there first and forced the Germans to respond.

The German counter-attack launched whilst EPSOM was in play was their first 'proper'offensive to try and reach the beaches and split the Allies. It was a disaster for the Germans and the newly arrived reinforcements were simply stopped in their tracks.

Up to a point. The Germans ordered the IInd Pz Corps to assemble for a full blooded attack by all the armour in Normandy on a line between Caen and Caumont.
Here is a sketch prepared on 19 June by Army Group G for option 1 - in the event of the Calvados front remaining static

Rommel 19 June Sketch 1.jpg (226.83 KiB) Viewed 976 times

Option 2 is in the event of an allied push in the direction Falaise- Paris. Note. Rommel's fixation is with action on the Eastern sector. Montgomery knows how Rommel will think and the Allied land strategy unfolds to plan.

Rommel 19 June sketch 2.jpg (80.82 KiB) Viewed 976 times

The real test of Tiger v 76mm would have pitted 90 tigers from two heavy tank battalion against some 700 hundred anti tank guns 76mm before they reached 100+ 3.7" Guns.
But this did not happen.

Op Epsom map.jpg (106.38 KiB) Viewed 976 times

The planned counter attack by seven panzer divisions and two heavy tank battalions is reduced to a series of local counter attacks against the "Scottish corridor" with the with the troops at hand and those arrivals. They were ground down in an attritional battle - dancing to "The Master's" tune.

[Avalancheon]

I also meant the US won the battles as well as the war. The only setback in Normandy was the storm that destroyed a Mulberry, the rest went pretty much as expected. Or, at least, largely conforming to one of the contingency plans.

Yes, they won battles that were hard to lose given the force ratios and material disparity involved. The Americans also suffered more tactical setbacks, heavier casualties, and slower progress than they should have. There was a study back in the 1970s that looked at 78 different battles in the Italian and French campaigns, which revealed the unmistakable signs of a performance disparity in most of these battles. Tp put it simply, the U.S. army was punching under its weight.

''The record shows that the Germans consistently outfought the far more numerous Allied armies that eventually defeated them... On a man for man basis the German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and they did not, when they won and when they lost.'' -A Genius For War, by Trevor Dupuy.

Aren’t sure why you mention 1940. Aachen to, say, Le Havre is much shorter distance travel than Newport News to Utah beach.

Its a useful comparison to make between the opposing armys. In 1940, Germany conquered Holland, Belgium, and France in just 6 weeks. In 1944, a crushingly superior Allied force retook France (and most of Belgium) in 15 weeks. Of course, you'll probably argue that the extra time required by the British and Americans was simply a function of it being an amphibious invasion.

Yes, ULTRA wasn’t good for the Germans. Was a pity for them they couldn’t do computers.

The Enigma cypher wasn't cracked by computers, though: It was cracked by bombes. You're thinking of the Lorenz cypher, which was a more formidable encryption machine. The Germans were totally complacent with the security of their radio traffic. They knew that a colossal effort would be needed to break into their cypher networks, and hence, they assumed that this alone would be enough to deter their adversarys from even trying.

Yes, air superiority would have been nice for them to have. Was a pity, for them, they couldn’t match Allied high performance fighters.

It wasn't a problem of quality so much as it was of quantity. The Germans could never have hoped to muster enough fighters to even begin restoring the gross disparity in air power over Normandy. Especially not with the severe fuel shortages they were experiencing at this time, which also cut into the number of sorties they could mount, and the length of time they could train pilots.

But the 3 to one… When was that, late July? Is a bit pointless trying to divie up the responsibility, for that coming to pass, between the Allies and the Germans. But, it could be argued that was 100% due to German ineffectiveness.

Somewhat. Part of the problem was that the Germans had lots of forces tied up guarding the coastlines, and waiting in strategic reserve for the landing at the Pas de Calais. They got totally duped by operation Fortitude. If they had thrown more divisions into the fight, they would have been able to hold out even longer than they historically did.

Though to be fair, air interdiction of the bridges over the Seine and other rivers was limiting their ability to resupply their forces already in Normandy.

I’d deny the German army had a higher fighting power. If I had to classify it, I’d describe the German army, of WW2, as being unfit for purpose and being a collection of vain- glorious egotists led by criminally incompetent morons. To be generous, I could perhaps describe it as lions being led by donkeys.

You can't possibly believe any of the things you have just said. Ignoring the question of how the British army suffered repeated, catastrophic setbacks against an army that was 'unfit for purpose' in 1940 and 1941 (Norway, Belgium, France, Greece, Crete, Libya, etc), your claim is verifiably untrue.

The German army had better leadership at all levels of its hierarchy, from NCOs, to junior officers, to senior officers, all the way up to flag officers. Officer and NCO training was far superior to both the Americans and British. In order to become a 2nd Lieutenent, the American candidate underwent 3 months of training, while the British candidate underwent 4-6 months of training. In contrast, German NCOs alone were trained for 6 months (!). This is the mark of a truly professional force that did not cut corners.

This gap in quality wasn't just a low level phenomenon, either. It was present among flag officers as well. How many famous British generals can you name off the top of your head? Maybe Wavell, Auchinleck, Slim, Montgomery, etc. How many famous German generals can you name off the top of your head? Guderian, Hoth, von Kleist, Rommel, von Manstein, Student, Model, Manteuffel, etc. No other army was able to churn out such a large, consistently high quality portfolio of generals. The Germans were able to do what few other nations could, and effectively found a way to 'institutionalise excellence', as Trevor Dupuy put it.

I wouldn’t, unequivocally, take that as a given. But that’s quite possible/ probable.

In retrospect, serial production and issuing of the M26 to combat formations earlier seems like a good idea, but see above comment.

The slow progress in Normandy was a function of many things. To focus on the U.S. army, they had problems with bad leadership, inadequate training, inadequate tank-infantry cooperation, and tank that were deficient in gun and armor. Its a complex tactical dilemma. However, you could make a case that the tanks were the real weak link in the chain.

They had to spearhead the attacks into the teeth of the enemy defenses, and somehow break through their lines and punch through the rear. Numerous episodes showed that they just weren't up to the job. Replacing the M4 Shermans with M26 Pershings wouldn't have been a silver bullet solution to all their tactical problems, but it would have undoubtedly improved their performance in Normandy.

By 1944, pretty much every massed armoured attack would get splatted a lot. There wasn’t many Mathilda I/ II or T34/ KV1 vs. 37mm mismatches anymore. Actually, you don’t really need to go that deep in the WW2 timeline. Right through North Africa you had the 8th Army or D.A.K/ Italians armoured attacks getting splatted on the opposition’s AT guns.

To be fair, the balance between offense and defense had shifted in the 4 years since Germanys blitzkrieg in 1940. All of the major armys involved had a better idea of how to stop an enemy armored forces from breaking through into their strategic depths. But theres no denying that the kindof tank used to spearhead a breakthrough would also have an influence on how successful the attackers were. Neither the British or Americans used heavy tanks for this purpose. Thats why they cut their teeth so badly against German defenses. They were using medium tanks in a role they weren't really suited for.

But about the British in North Africa. One of the major problems there wasn't so much the choice of tanks used, so much as the manner in which the attacks were launched. The British tended to use their armored brigades and divisions in something that often resembled a headlong cavalry charge. They were never supported by infantry, and rarely supported by artillery. The Germans were smart enough to avoid tank on tank clashs, because thats just hammer on hammer. Instead, they withdrew their panzers behind a screen of anti-tank guns, where the pursuing Brits were shot to pieces.

[MarkF617]

Why is it that anyone arguing about which tank is better only argue about which is better at killing other tanks? Killing tanks is not the main purpose of tanks. IIRC only 30% of ammunition carried by allied tanks was AP, infantry, guns, bunkers and, when breakthrough occured, soft vehicles were what tanks mostly fought. This is why the 75mm was CHOSEN, not forced upon the tank forces (remember that the British removed the 6 pounder from Churchills and Cromwells and replaced them with the 75mm to get a better HE shell). We also need to remember that the 75mm could destroy the majority of enemy tanks ,ie Panzer 4, that they would meet ( I'm not even sure if the Americans saw a Tiger in Normandy).
The British answer to the occasional heavy tank was to include a Firefly in each troop meaning the troop still had good HE but also had the answer to any big cats that turned up. The Russian solution was an extra large (85mm) medium velocity gun to keep the good HE with a reasonable AP shot too. The American answer was the 76mm, decent AP but with a sacrifice to HE. 3 completely different solutions to the same problem but all chosen not forced upon the allies.
The supporters of the big cats always seem to remain quiet when manouverability and reliability come up. At the end of the day the Tiger and Panther aremechanically poop. This accusation is often leveled at early war British tanks but for some reason not mentioned when talking about the cats. After the breakout from Normandy as British and American tanks raced across France Patton was correct in saying that German tanks could not have done it.
The way Judge tanks (or any peice of equipment) is to look at whether it was fit for purpose. The Tiger was designed as a heavy breakthrough. In Normandy it repeatedly failed to do this. However allied tanks designed to support infantry then race through any breech in the defences were successful thus fit for purpose.

Thanks

Mark

[MarkF617]

Looking to answer the original question reveals another question. Did 76mm Shermans ever clash with a Tiger I? 76mm Shermans only appeared aftef the Tiger I was out of production. IIRC American forces (main user of the 76mm gun) faced more Tiger II than Tiger I.

Thanks

Mark

[Cult Icon]

^^
Viewing this issue from the POV of the allies is wrong. In the German POV improving their AT capabilities were paramount to their survival since the winter of 1941. The original concepts for the Panther began in that year. Towed Anti-tank guns were considered obsolete in 43' and very problematic in 41-42'.

The majority of Soviet tanks were destroyed by German armor (tank, AG, TD) in the mid/late war 43-45.

[Cult Icon]

The Tiger was designed as a heavy breakthrough. In Normandy it repeatedly failed to do this.

In the Eastern Front it was decent in the breakthrough role, particularly against Anti-tank gun belts.

German forces all failed to break through in Normandy-for reasons far greater than the tank model employed. (exponential artillery supremacy more than the others). The armored campaign in Normandy is about 3% or so of armored warfare in WW2.

IMHO the Tiger Tank was most flawed mainly in its execution/organization- like General der Panzertruppen Balck believed, they were better employed as part of elite divisions than as independent battalions 43-45. The Tigers would then have access to the support and repair resources of an entire panzer division. Instead most Tiger units were spread out in the Eastern Front and used like a far more costly and less economical stug battalion/brigade.