The only clue I have are remarks by some historians concerning a telephone call between Georges and Gamelin mid morning on 10 May. Georges is supposed to have asked 'So its Plan D then? Gamelin replies 'Yes. What else can we do?' Since this is not a complete summary of the telephone conversation, & a translation of unknown quality its difficult to draw conclusions about Georges independence in this.Steen Ammentorp wrote: ↑06 Nov 2018, 23:22...
Carl raises an interesting question. Would it have change anything, maybe not. However had Gamelin been sacked on the 9th of May, would the new CinC have initiated plan D? It was Gamelins scheme, and especially if the new CinC were Giraud, previously commander of 7th Army - the Army that according to the plan were to advance through Belgium to southern Netherlands. Changing not only the CinC but also the commander of 7th Army at that moment may have postponed the initiation of the plan, perhaps long enough to give the French the strategic reserve they later lacked.
As for the Dyle vs the Escaut Plan; I have gamed this campaign quite a bit and found the Escaut plan places the Allies in a worse situation. It leaves the Belgian army isolated and subject to east destruction unsupported. The Belgians can neither fight for long in their isolated forward deployment, nor have a chance of retreating to France. They are typically pocketed and destroyed in several groups. The deployment of the French British field armies from the Escaut River in Flanders, to Givet significantly extends the front, but has fewer combat units to cover it since the Belgian army is lost. There is a argument the Escaut Plan takes advantage of the French frontier fortifications. This I think overlooks how easily the German 19th Corps smashed the frontier defense at Sedan, which had eight months worth of entrenchment and bunker construction. Randal Reed remarked that the Dyle Plan would require aggressive and swift execution for success. While some portions of the French Army may have been capable of such, there were too many poorly trained Series C units, and commanders/staff who were incapable of rapid action.