Avalancheon wrote: ↑02 Jan 2019, 11:00
That seems to contradict what the historical literature says on this topic.
You're right, good catch, I should have double-checked rather than go by memory.
Two were issued to Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 29 January 1944.
Two each to Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 506 and 509 on 1 February 1944.
One each to Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504 and 508 in mid-April 1944.
One to Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 on 20 April 1944.
One to Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 505 on 18 May 1944.
Two each Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 and Schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 654 in mid-June 1944.
Two each to Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 and 510 in early July.
Two to Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102 in late July 1944.
And so on...looks like 68 in total.
In war, theres no such thing as cheating.
Why exactly.
In the Normandy campaign, the Allied armies encountered numerous shortcomings in regards to their organisation and\or personnel. Morale among the British infantry was at a rather low point, and they wouldn't advance without massive artillery support. (This was noted by the Germans themselves) The Canadians had problems with tank-infantry coordination. And the Americans were let down by the poor quality of their junior officers, the so called 90 day wonders. Not to mention their use of replacement depots, which compromised unit cohesion.
To a degree yes, but the reason the British advanced only with massive artillery support was because that was doctrine and they could...remeber, there is no cheaating in war? Yes, the 1st ID had gained some experience in Tunisia and Sicily, but had extensive turnover in senior leadership...and also significant casualties that led to additional turnover. Elements of the 9th ID and 82d Airborne also had experience...but the rest of the 19 divisions assembled did not.
Nor was it really a problem with "poor quality" of junior officers, but their inexperience linked to the policy of "leading from the front" that led to so many becoming casualties before they gained experience...the schematic "linear" infantry tactics used initially (before experience led to better ways) and limited availability of supporting tank battalions didn't help, nor did the lack of training with tank units, which was endemic to all the British and American units.
Funnily enough, this same topic was addressed a few years ago by paulrward.
I'm sorry, but paulward doesn't have a clue and cannot provide any evidence to support his blather.
(snip blather)
Even a cursory glance at the Normandy campaign would show just how misguided this claim is.
Okay, cursory glance...the NEPTUNE assault force and immediate follow-on consisted of the V and VII Corps with a total of nine divisions (7 infantry and 2 airborne). They had six medium and one light tank battalion attached. By the end of the campaign, there were only 28 medium and two light separate tank battalions for 42 divisions in the theater.