Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Discussions on the vehicles used by the Axis forces. Hosted by Christian Ankerstjerne
Post Reply
Avalancheon
Member
Posts: 373
Joined: 23 Apr 2017, 07:01
Location: Canada

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#226

Post by Avalancheon » 02 Jan 2019, 13:37

Michael Kenny wrote:
02 Jan 2019, 13:14
Sorry but it is true.

Spielberger. Panther & Its Variants page 257

Date 23 January 1945.

Meeting of the Panzer Commision

there continues to be serious complaints regarding final drive breakdowns in all vehicle types...................General Thomale explained that in such circumstances an orderly utilisation of tanks is simply impossible...........

Prior to the 1945 eastern offensive there have been 500 defective drives on the Pz IV, from the Panther 370 and from the Tiger roughly 100............the troops lose their confidence and in some situations abandon the whole vehicle just because of this problem
These were manufacturing issues with components, that came at the end of the war. Not design flaws that were inherent to the vehicles themselves.

The Panzer III and IV were both quite reliable designs. And even the Panther and Tiger weren't as bad as many Teaboos claim, especially after their teething problems were fixed.
Michael Kenny wrote:
02 Jan 2019, 13:14
No. I am Spartacus, actually.

Man with fake name calls out man using his real name..................
Except this is a relevant question. If you are actually Nick Moran (someone who portends to be an tank expert, and is invited to give lectures on the subject), then your behavior comes across as rather unbecoming and juvenile.

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6349
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#227

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 Jan 2019, 17:28

Avalancheon wrote:
02 Jan 2019, 11:00
That seems to contradict what the historical literature says on this topic.
You're right, good catch, I should have double-checked rather than go by memory.

Two were issued to Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 29 January 1944.
Two each to Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 506 and 509 on 1 February 1944.
One each to Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504 and 508 in mid-April 1944.
One to Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 on 20 April 1944.
One to Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 505 on 18 May 1944.
Two each Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 and Schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 654 in mid-June 1944.
Two each to Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 and 510 in early July.
Two to Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102 in late July 1944.
And so on...looks like 68 in total.
In war, theres no such thing as cheating.
Why exactly. :D
In the Normandy campaign, the Allied armies encountered numerous shortcomings in regards to their organisation and\or personnel. Morale among the British infantry was at a rather low point, and they wouldn't advance without massive artillery support. (This was noted by the Germans themselves) The Canadians had problems with tank-infantry coordination. And the Americans were let down by the poor quality of their junior officers, the so called 90 day wonders. Not to mention their use of replacement depots, which compromised unit cohesion.
To a degree yes, but the reason the British advanced only with massive artillery support was because that was doctrine and they could...remeber, there is no cheaating in war? Yes, the 1st ID had gained some experience in Tunisia and Sicily, but had extensive turnover in senior leadership...and also significant casualties that led to additional turnover. Elements of the 9th ID and 82d Airborne also had experience...but the rest of the 19 divisions assembled did not.

Nor was it really a problem with "poor quality" of junior officers, but their inexperience linked to the policy of "leading from the front" that led to so many becoming casualties before they gained experience...the schematic "linear" infantry tactics used initially (before experience led to better ways) and limited availability of supporting tank battalions didn't help, nor did the lack of training with tank units, which was endemic to all the British and American units.
Funnily enough, this same topic was addressed a few years ago by paulrward.
I'm sorry, but paulward doesn't have a clue and cannot provide any evidence to support his blather.

(snip blather)
Even a cursory glance at the Normandy campaign would show just how misguided this claim is.
Okay, cursory glance...the NEPTUNE assault force and immediate follow-on consisted of the V and VII Corps with a total of nine divisions (7 infantry and 2 airborne). They had six medium and one light tank battalion attached. By the end of the campaign, there were only 28 medium and two light separate tank battalions for 42 divisions in the theater.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell


Michael Kenny
Member
Posts: 8251
Joined: 07 May 2002, 20:40
Location: Teesside

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#228

Post by Michael Kenny » 02 Jan 2019, 17:32

Avalancheon wrote:
02 Jan 2019, 13:37

Michael Kenny wrote:
02 Jan 2019, 13:14
No. I am Spartacus, actually.

Man with fake name calls out man using his real name..................
If you are actually Nick Moran........................
I guess the problem is you can't read?

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6349
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#229

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 Jan 2019, 17:44

Avalancheon wrote:
02 Jan 2019, 12:14
At no point in the war did they ever manage to match German projectile quality.
Which is absolutely true and does not contradict what I said. The testing standards began to improve in 1942-1943, but it was not until 1944 that they began to understand what the problems were as a result of those test results...and it was later still before the process of finding solutions occurred - the first, stopgap, being HVAP, but the real improvements were postwar...which was the same as the development of better engines and the transmission to support them.
Considering that the Panzer III and IV were built years before the M4 Sherman, their design shortcomings are actually excusable. They were relatively competent tanks at the time they were introduced, and did not become obsolescent until years later. This is not the case for the Sherman, unfortunately.
The basic design of the Medium Tank M4 began 26 May 1936 when the Medium Tank T5 was authorized. The Medium Tank M4 was arguably obsolescent for about thirty years, although it was declared obsolete by the U.S. Army in January 1956.
The ability of a tanks main gun to punch through enemy armor is obviously of very great importance. Perhaps not ''the most important aspect of the tank armament'', as ChristianMunich believes, but certainly very relevant. To blindly assert that there are no facts to support this viewpoint is kindof mindboggling.
Okay, then please assert some facts to the contrary. :D
Also, you are completely ignoring the reason why the Soviets decided to retain the 76mm F-34 gun past the point it became obsolescent.
No, I am not, but I am asserting that many of the same reasons were in play over the decision to retain the 75mm M3 Tank Gun in production until the end of 1943. For one thing, until the design of the 76mm mounting was complete, there was no real alternative.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Christianmunich
Banned
Posts: 801
Joined: 26 Nov 2018, 18:37
Location: Germany

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#230

Post by Christianmunich » 02 Jan 2019, 18:59

Which combat aspect of the main gun was more important than the ability to defeat the main tanks of the enemy. Name one, just a single one. Only one single thing more important than punching holes in stuff.

Stiltzkin
Member
Posts: 1159
Joined: 11 Apr 2016, 13:29
Location: Coruscant

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#231

Post by Stiltzkin » 02 Jan 2019, 23:03

I cemented this claim by arguing "weak" main armament was completely ditched and tanks were primarily designed to combat enemy tanks, like the Germans did it in mid and late war.
Is that why the Wehrmacht experienced its apex in operational art before the improvement of AT capabilities? Tanks do not always engage enemy tanks, in fact that is only part of their job, this gradually developed throughout the war. To proclaim that any Army which did not possess these features was "garbage", is rather silly, counter examples exist (e.g. Finland, Winter War).
Furthermore, short barreled designs (potentially) inflict higher infantry losses (HE fragmentations to shrapnel velocity ratio, which will translate into a greater ground scatter). The US 76mm gun was extremely accurate, top engineering, there may have been issues with the projectile design (nose hardness, as mentioned in Miles AFV News article), the Soviets faced similar problems.
Tanks are only one asset of the armed forces, their importance is frequently inflated. The effectiveness of German Panzer Divisions cannot be just reduced to their their tanks, it is rather the attached artillery. Contrasting the F-34 with the 75mm M series, it becomes apparent that the accuracy difference may have been slightly in favour of the Soviet gun (due to length), but it outpenetrates the F-34 when striking FHA and to some extent RHA (APCR may be an exception, but these rounds were not common in the Soviet stock) caused by the qualitative difference of the projectile (this is limited to one failure mode though). The mobility was perhaps not great but adequate (depending on which variant you look at), the "ride" on the other hand was excellent (Kummersdorf trials). This does not even involve crew comfort, gun stability, preemptive shot capabilities/initative, internal features, comm quality etc. The Sherman might have not been the worst "Übergangsmodell". The mentality involved (and Patton was perhaps one of the greatest advocates) was to sacrifice materiel for personnel. The American and German Army both invested into 105 and 150mm artillery designs (the state of the art of the 30s), the Soviets could not match such firepower at these levels, so they suffered 3-6 casualties for each inflicted.
Which combat aspect of the main gun was more important than the ability to defeat the main tanks of the enemy. Name one, just a single one. Only one single thing more important than punching holes in stuff.
Perhaps not more important but equally important was the engagement of fortifications. The IS-2 and ISU 152s were utilized as fortification busters, for instance.

Christianmunich
Banned
Posts: 801
Joined: 26 Nov 2018, 18:37
Location: Germany

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#232

Post by Christianmunich » 02 Jan 2019, 23:30

Stiltzkin wrote:
02 Jan 2019, 23:03
I cemented this claim by arguing "weak" main armament was completely ditched and tanks were primarily designed to combat enemy tanks, like the Germans did it in mid and late war.
Is that why the Wehrmacht experienced its apex in operational art before the improvement of AT capabilities? Tanks do not always engage enemy tanks, in fact that is only part of their job, this gradually developed throughout the war. To proclaim that any Army which did not possess these features was "garbage", is rather silly, counter examples exist (e.g. Finland, Winter War).
Furthermore, short barreled designs (potentially) inflict higher infantry losses (HE fragmentations to shrapnel velocity ratio, which will translate into a greater ground scatter). The US 76mm gun was extremely accurate, top engineering, there may have been issues with the projectile design (nose hardness, as mentioned in Miles AFV News article), the Soviets faced similar problems.
Tanks are only one asset of the armed forces, their importance is frequently inflated. The effectiveness of German Panzer Divisions cannot be just reduced to their their tanks, it is rather the attached artillery. Contrasting the F-34 with the 75mm M series, it becomes apparent that the accuracy difference may have been slightly in favour of the Soviet gun (due to length), but it outpenetrates the F-34 when striking FHA and to some extent RHA (APCR may be an exception, but these rounds were not common in the Soviet stock) caused by the qualitative difference of the projectile (this is limited to one failure mode though). The mobility was perhaps not great but adequate (depending on which variant you look at), the "ride" on the other hand was excellent (Kummersdorf trials). This does not even involve crew comfort, gun stability, preemptive shot capabilities/initative, internal features, comm quality etc. The Sherman might have not been the worst "Übergangsmodell". The mentality involved (and Patton was perhaps one of the greatest advocates) was to sacrifice materiel for personnel. The American and German Army both invested into 105 and 150mm artillery designs (the state of the art of the 30s), the Soviets could not match such firepower at these levels, so they suffered 3-6 casualties for each inflicted.
Which combat aspect of the main gun was more important than the ability to defeat the main tanks of the enemy. Name one, just a single one. Only one single thing more important than punching holes in stuff.
Perhaps not more important but equally important was the engagement of fortifications. The IS-2 and ISU 152s were utilized as fortification busters, for instance.
How does this dispute anything of what I said? I feel many people just like to read their own posts.

I claim engaging tanks was of utmost importance which is proven by every major army completely switching to tanks with guns that had the priority of defeating opposing tanks.

What is so hard about this? Nothing of what you said disputes anything of what I said. I specifically said the knowledge was "created" during WW2 and was eventually adopted by everybody. How does referencing German guns in early war make sense here? The Germans completely ditches this, all major tanks were upgunned to feature guns that would defeat enemy tanks. Who does even deny this?

Every time I ask a single question where the answer would support my case people straight up don't answer the question.

So again. which combat aspect of the tank main gun was more important than defeating opposing tanks? Every army fully adopted priority anti tank guns as main armament, every other aspect was subordinated. Nobody cares if the gun was awesome at HE if the AP ability was crap. Nobody.

Stiltzkin
Member
Posts: 1159
Joined: 11 Apr 2016, 13:29
Location: Coruscant

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#233

Post by Stiltzkin » 03 Jan 2019, 00:18

So again. which combat aspect of the tank main gun was more important than defeating opposing tanks? Every army fully adopted priority anti tank guns as main armament, every other aspect was subordinated. Nobody cares if the gun was awesome at HE if the AP ability was crap. Nobody.
Then the approch in itself is a bit problematic, since you are trying to demonstrate that US doctrine was flawed, without considering the following points:
The US started to adjust and prepare for ground warfare later (the Nazis and Soviets started to build up their forces since the 20s), with the overall focus on Aircraft and the Navy. They entered the war with significantly less armoured warfare experience and hit the European continent not before the end of 1943.
To this has to be added, that American private firms were selling AFV technology to the USSR prewar, which capabilities the US agencies may have (initially) not recognized, the very same technology historians are trying to attribute to "Soviet innovation". There were of course concerns and flaws which made them uninteresting for operations in the Pacfic Theatre. This is more of a question of the environment.
There were also short barrelled tanks in the German Army, still in 1944, as well as in the Soviet AFV park and judging that Soviet standard guns did not outpenetrate American 75mm guns, while 76mm guns had superior penetration to 85mm Soviet guns, this significantly weakens your point.
I cannot see a big flaw in the American system, other than inexperience, which leaves us with the summary: American guns outpenetrated Soviet standard guns, additionally they deployed Bazookas, AT guns and TDs. Soviet technology struggled hard in the Nazi-Soviet War, the Korean War against American forces and against the IDF in the Independence and Six days war.
Otherwise you will just make the impression of being the equivalent of the typical (desperate) " the German Army was not motorized" member, "they used PzI and IIs" or equalled by the Russian "we had T-34s", yet their tanks were getting annihilated. American AT capabilities seemed to have been better compared to what the Soviets had to offer, this point still stands, despite their "flawed" doctrine.

Christianmunich
Banned
Posts: 801
Joined: 26 Nov 2018, 18:37
Location: Germany

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#234

Post by Christianmunich » 03 Jan 2019, 00:32

Stiltzkin wrote:
03 Jan 2019, 00:18

The US started to adjust and prepare for ground warfare later (the Nazis and Soviets started to build up their forces since the 20s), with the overall focus on Aircraft and the Navy. They entered the war with significantly less armoured warfare experience and hit the European continent not before the end of 1943.
You are just explaining why they were behind. You don't deny they were behind. That is what I claimed all along. I am just more blunt the US was amateurish in many aspects of doctrine. What aspects of my claims are you even opposed to?
There were also short barrelled tanks in the German Army, still in 1944
Like which ones? What was their share of the German tank force?
I cannot see a big flaw in the American system, other than inexperience,
This is Lawyer speak, right? Inexperience is a flaw in itself. Explaining the flaws is not denying the flaws. You also miss the point that the US was bad at doctrine compared to the Red Army which had for example trouble with execution. The US forces landed thousand upon thousands of M4s with 75mms in Europe despite already knowing it is pointless. The fact that historians like Nicholas Moran show how much "debate" was going on about the 75mm shows that the US didn't get it. What is there to debate? The tank main gun has to be able to defeat the enemy tanks, after the war nobody had this "debate" again, tanks now were fully geared to fight tanks. The Germans learned this in 1941/42 and the US apparently post-war. Germans were ahead in this regard...

User avatar
Cult Icon
Member
Posts: 4472
Joined: 08 Apr 2014, 20:00

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#235

Post by Cult Icon » 03 Jan 2019, 00:43

Stiltzkin wrote:
03 Jan 2019, 00:18
. American AT capabilities seemed to have been better compared to what the Soviets had to offer, this point still stands, despite their "flawed" doctrine.
Late war: In the West, their AT was based on plentiful vehicles (eg. the German report would, say claim for every 100 tank kills but only 20 anti-tank guns destroyed) responding to German armored attacks and less so on a mixture of Anti-tank guns, minefields, and armor. In the East, the ratio reported by the German forces was often 1:1 or greater between anti-tank guns and armor.

There were also different armored tactics employed. Artillery and air support of the Soviets was of a significantly lower magnitude in the East and generated less combat value in general. Attacks of various types by Soviet armor and infantry bore a much greater share of the combat burden.

+ look at Soviet production/losses of anti-tank guns and they are similar to those of armor. There are opinions that I've seen (notably of Wittmann from the Agte Tiger book) that the Soviet anti-tank guns were more dangerous to fight than the armor in the East. Wittmann was supposedly have believed that an Anti-tank gun was worth two tanks or something like that.

+Dunn and Glantz have indicated in their books that the key behind de-toothing German panzers offensively in the East (1943 onward) was the escalation of anti-tank countermeasures: Escalation/proliferation of 1. mine warfare 2. the Soviet destroyer arm (self-propelled guns with heavier calibers) 3. saturation of the frontline with larger anti-tank gun equipped units. This is neatly matched by the operational and unit histories.

The effect of strong anti-tank defenses was that the Soviets could keep their Tank armies, mech corps, and tank corps in the rear for offensive operations while the combined arms-armies fought German armored attacks.
Last edited by Cult Icon on 03 Jan 2019, 15:58, edited 3 times in total.

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6349
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#236

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 Jan 2019, 03:17

Christianmunich wrote:
03 Jan 2019, 00:32
Stiltzkin wrote:
03 Jan 2019, 00:18
I cannot see a big flaw in the American system, other than inexperience,
This is Lawyer speak, right?
No, it is English-speak and is defined as:

1a: direct observation of or participation in events as a basis of knowledge

1b: the fact or state of having been affected by or gained knowledge through direct observation or participation

2: practical knowledge, skill, or practice derived from direct observation of or participation in events or in a particular activity

3 : something personally encountered, undergone, or lived through

The U.S. Army's first "direct observation of or participation in events" was Dieppe, followed by Alamein. The first saw limited engagement with German tanks. The second saw more...but also saw the D-I Panzerarmee flee in disorder after suffering enormous losses, so what lesson do you think that experience taught? Meanwhile, the experience gained led directly to many of the modifications embodied into the "Ultimate Medium Tank M4" redesign begun in July 1943 and programmed into production in January 1944.
Inexperience is a flaw in itself.
Please explain how not having experience in a thing can be a "flaw" rather than a state of being. :roll:
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

User avatar
Don Juan
Member
Posts: 623
Joined: 23 Sep 2013, 11:12

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#237

Post by Don Juan » 03 Jan 2019, 16:01

Avalancheon wrote:
02 Jan 2019, 13:37
The Panzer III and IV were both quite reliable designs. And even the Panther and Tiger weren't as bad as many Teaboos claim, especially after their teething problems were fixed.
The Panzer III and IV both had fairly poor durability. The Maybach HL 120 engine had a life mileage of 2500 km (~1500 miles) and a recommended overhaul life of 2000km (~1200 miles) which is about the same as the Liberty engine in a Crusader, which was itself artificially limited by that tank's external air cleaners. Otherwise, the Liberty could achieve a 3000 mile life mileage. This was even before the big armour upgrades, so I suspect that the engine mileage on the later Panzer IV's declined significantly. On the other end of the scale, the GMC engined Valentine could achieve 4000+ miles between overhauls.

The Panther and Tiger were every bit as bad as claimed, but that really is due to them being far too ambitious designs. I don't think anyone could have made a reliable 60+ ton tank during the war, or even for the two decades afterwards. Likewise a 30 mph 45 ton tank is really stretching it for the development period available.

But generally, the automotive quality of German tanks was mediocre to begin with and declined as the war progressed. The Panzer II was absolutely great though.
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941

User avatar
Don Juan
Member
Posts: 623
Joined: 23 Sep 2013, 11:12

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#238

Post by Don Juan » 03 Jan 2019, 16:14

Christianmunich wrote:
02 Jan 2019, 00:52
Lawyer jargon for failure. What they got was a tank without protection with a shitty gun with low mobility due to horrendous ground pressure as a result of very high "medium" tank weight and silly suspension layout. The trinity of failure.
There is much more to mobility than ground pressure. There is also belly clearance, low end torque, front hull shape (to prevent bulldozing in mud), spacing of bogie wheels, etc. For example, despite its relatively low ground pressure, British testing continually demonstrated that the cross country mobility of the Tiger I was poor.
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941

User avatar
Don Juan
Member
Posts: 623
Joined: 23 Sep 2013, 11:12

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#239

Post by Don Juan » 03 Jan 2019, 17:01

Avalancheon wrote:
02 Jan 2019, 12:14
At no point in the war did they ever manage to match German projectile quality. CriticalMass has talked about this alot. Its true that American shells were superior to what the Soviets were using, especially when they introduced armor piercing caps. But they were still inferior to the Pzgr 39 pattern shells. Their cap designs weren't as good, and their heat treatment was inadequate.
I think projectile quality is a rather marginal aspect of the performance of any gun. The real problem with the US 76mm was that its initial muzzle velocity was about 300 fps too low i.e. ~2600 fps against the 2950 fps of the 17 pounder. This in turn was the result of the decision by the US Ordnance Board not to produce the original M1 variant of the gun, and to instead introduce the M1A1 with a reduction in the number of calibres.

I can't see projectile quality mattering except in those cases where the shell is at the limit of its ability to penetrate. In any case, the British thought that the Germans reduced the effectiveness of their AP shells by persisting with a bursting charge, which they considered reduced the kinetic energy of the shell, while having little positive effect on any post-penetration damage.
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6349
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

#240

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 Jan 2019, 18:55

Don Juan wrote:
03 Jan 2019, 17:01
I think projectile quality is a rather marginal aspect of the performance of any gun. The real problem with the US 76mm was that its initial muzzle velocity was about 300 fps too low i.e. ~2600 fps against the 2950 fps of the 17 pounder. This in turn was the result of the decision by the US Ordnance Board not to produce the original M1 variant of the gun, and to instead introduce the M1A1 with a reduction in the number of calibres.
I'm sorry, but this is not correct. The "original M1 variant of the gun" was the 76mm T1, which was the 50 caliber 3" Tank Gun M7, but slimmed down and elongated. By adjusting the propellant charge, it had exactly the same performance as that gun, 2600 FPS Mv, but was 57 calibers. However, its length proved too great for the modified M34 Gun Mount, so 15" (5 calibers) were cut off the muzzle, reducing it to 52 calibers. The performance was maintained by again adjusting the propellant to again maintain 2600 FPS Mv. After those modifications it was standardized as the 76mm M1 Tank Gun. The M1 was replaced in manufacture by the M1A1, which changed the contour of the tube and slide surfaces to again improve balance in different mountings, and then by the M1A2, which changed the twist in the rifling from 1:40 to 1:32 and added threading for mounting of a muzzle brake. All still were 2600 FPS Mv.

Ordnance preferred 2600 FPS Mv as the best balance of performance and maintenance of the gun, operating under the prewar standard for tube life.
I can't see projectile quality mattering except in those cases where the shell is at the limit of its ability to penetrate. In any case, the British thought that the Germans reduced the effectiveness of their AP shells by persisting with a bursting charge, which they considered reduced the kinetic energy of the shell, while having little positive effect on any post-penetration damage.
That is the problem...the projectile was at the limit of its ability to penetrate. Increasing Mv would do nothing to improve the basic limit of the projectile...it would simply shatter more often. They got around that via HVAP and in the 90mm AP by developing T33, which was rehardened, but did not do anything about the problem or increase the Mv in the 76mm AP until postwar.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Post Reply

Return to “The Ron Klages Panzer & other vehicles Section”