Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

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Gorque
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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by Gorque » 04 Jan 2019 14:39

j keenan wrote:
04 Jan 2019 04:52
Gorque wrote:
04 Jan 2019 01:23
j keenan wrote:
04 Jan 2019 00:12
Christianmunich wrote:
04 Jan 2019 00:02
Richard Anderson wrote:
03 Jan 2019 23:29


Sorry doodle, I told you a while ago I don't deal with batshit crazies and fantasists, especially ones who believe their opinions are facts. You're back on ignore for a while, since your posts continue to lack any actual content.
You are just avoiding to answer the question.

Here it is again:

Which combat aspect of the tank main gun was of more importance than the ability to defeat the tanks of the enemy?
Stupa
A monumental pile of earth or other material, in the memory of Buddha or a Buddhist saint, and commemorating some event or marking a sacred spot?!? 8O
Brummbär Stupa
Wirbelwind Keksdose
Whose main armaments were not designed to knock out tanks

Thanks for taking the time to explain it to me, as before I was quite at a loss. :thumbsup:

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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by j keenan » 04 Jan 2019 16:43

Gorque wrote:
04 Jan 2019 14:39
j keenan wrote:
04 Jan 2019 04:52
Gorque wrote:
04 Jan 2019 01:23
j keenan wrote:
04 Jan 2019 00:12
Christianmunich wrote:
04 Jan 2019 00:02


You are just avoiding to answer the question.

Here it is again:

Which combat aspect of the tank main gun was of more importance than the ability to defeat the tanks of the enemy?
Stupa
A monumental pile of earth or other material, in the memory of Buddha or a Buddhist saint, and commemorating some event or marking a sacred spot?!? 8O
Brummbär Stupa
Wirbelwind Keksdose
Whose main armaments were not designed to knock out tanks

Thanks for taking the time to explain it to me, as before I was quite at a loss. :thumbsup:
:D :thumbsup:

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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by Richard Anderson » 04 Jan 2019 18:49

critical mass wrote:
04 Jan 2019 14:29
(snip)
In this context, the netto ground pressure of the M4 was as You stated but the mean maximum pressure of TIGER and PANTHER are considerably lower than the MMP of M4 owing to the more equal distribution of weight over many large diameter, overlapping road wheels of the Kniekamp runnign gear.
I´d agree that the TIGER-1 is not quite to M4 levels but within the same ballpark (it has, however, better obstacle clearing abilities). The PANTHER and CHURCHILL, are considerably superior in their ability to negotiate mud or difficult terrain to any version of the M4.
Um, the original context was the comparison of the near design contemporaries, the Panzer IV and the Medium Tank M4. The problem for the Americans was going from a suspension and track design intended for a 15-ton medium tank, to using it in a 28-ton tank. You see the gradual increase in GP through the Medium Tank M3 weight growth, to the T6, and then the steadily growing weight increases in the M4. Extended end connectors were a stop-gap, but many other solutions were experimented with including HVSS and the T9 modification...the Germans though, insofar as I can recall, did not make as much an effort to improve the Panzer IV suspension and track?
What I am curious is how the Cromwell, which happened to have quite a poor MMP, managed to be up to M4 levels in terrain traverse.
Because MMP is not the only factor in the equation? Recall, engine power, effective torque, ground clearance, and nose resistance when "bull-dozing" all effected the end result as well.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Don Juan
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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by Don Juan » 04 Jan 2019 18:59

Richard Anderson wrote:
04 Jan 2019 18:49
Because MMP is not the only factor in the equation? Recall, engine power, effective torque, ground clearance, and nose resistance when "bull-dozing" all effected the end result as well.
Indeed. The Cromwell benefited from the British insistence on an 80% gradient performance, as opposed to the US 60% standard. This aided cross country running as well as dedicated climbing ability.

The front hull shape of the Tiger I was considered to be particularly prone to bulldozing, which meant that the moment it bellied it was stuck. British reports from the Italian theatre indicate that Tigers stuck to the roads and almost never travelled cross country. The Churchill could get out of some very precarious situations due to its extremely low 1st gear, which was (iirc) somewhere in the region of 260:1.
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941

Michael Kenny
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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by Michael Kenny » 04 Jan 2019 19:26

Don Juan wrote:
04 Jan 2019 18:59


Indeed. The Cromwell benefited from the British insistence on an 80% gradient performance, as opposed to the US 60% standard. This aided cross country running as well as dedicated climbing ability.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KyuSIkt-eTs

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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by Michael Kenny » 04 Jan 2019 19:41

Film of a Cromwell being recovered and the amount of 'play' in the suspension of the two tanks at 2m:45s is amazing.

https://film.iwmcollections.org.uk/record/1665

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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by Richard Anderson » 04 Jan 2019 20:20

Michael Kenny wrote:
04 Jan 2019 19:41
Film of a Cromwell being recovered and the amount of 'play' in the suspension of the two tanks at 2m:45s is amazing.
I do hope that loose cable doesn't get tangled in something. :lol: I also like the guy inspecting and tossing away the crap track pins... :lol:
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by Michael Kenny » 04 Jan 2019 20:26

Richard Anderson wrote:
04 Jan 2019 20:20


I do hope that loose cable doesn't get tangled in something. I also like the guy inspecting and tossing away the crap track pins...
I can imagine someone checking that field with a metal-detector and thinking he has hit the jackpot!

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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by critical mass » 04 Jan 2019 20:27

Richard Anderson wrote:
04 Jan 2019 18:49

Um, the original context was the comparison of the near design contemporaries, the Panzer IV and the Medium Tank M4. The problem for the Americans was going from a suspension and track design intended for a 15-ton medium tank, to using it in a 28-ton tank. You see the gradual increase in GP through the Medium Tank M3 weight growth, to the T6, and then the steadily growing weight increases in the M4. Extended end connectors were a stop-gap, but many other solutions were experimented with including HVSS and the T9 modification...the Germans though, insofar as I can recall, did not make as much an effort to improve the Panzer IV suspension and track?
The Pz IV, too, started at 15t and in some versions (Sturmpanzer IV) ended up at approx. 28t. The running gear in this tank wasn´t particularely interesting -and fairly limited in suspension travel compared to other designs (Pz IIIe/Tiger/Panther) but the high number of small diameter road wheels distributed the weight reasonably evenly. The contention that no running gear experiments were conducted on Pz IV cannot be confirmed. FgstNr. 81005 & 81006 were modified in 1941 for tests of Kniekamps interleaved suspension with 700mm diameter roadwheels, different track pitch and trackwidth (16.5"). These experiments went nowhere, The more armored and consequently heavier Pz IVF1 series introduced different, 16" (40cm) wide gs.61/400/120 tracks, a modified idler and driver wheels, instead in late 1941. Whether or not the 1942 period Pz IVF1/-2 and early M4 (VVSS) were on par in regard of cross country mobility is unknown to me. Relevant documents should be found in the WaPrüf6 files. That´s outside my realm of expertise.
Richard Anderson wrote:
04 Jan 2019 18:49
Because MMP is not the only factor in the equation? Recall, engine power, effective torque, ground clearance, and nose resistance when "bull-dozing" all effected the end result as well.
Notice, that I do not judge here, I want to understand these issues. From my understanding, it were the British, who after ww2 worked out that MMP is a better proxy for floatation than NGP.

That beeing said, Richard A., Don J and MK, thanks for taking the time to respond to my memo, much appreciated.

best,
cm

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Don Juan
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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by Don Juan » 04 Jan 2019 21:15

critical mass wrote:
04 Jan 2019 20:27
Notice, that I do not judge here, I want to understand these issues. From my understanding, it were the British, who after ww2 worked out that MMP is a better proxy for floatation than NGP.
That might be the case, but flotation is not necessarily the critical aspect for crossing difficult terrain. In theory, even the most excellent flotation is no good if the belly of your vehicle is only a few inches off the ground.

Anyway, you might find this of interest:

https://vdocuments.site/soil-and-water- ... mance.html
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941

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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by Avalancheon » 05 Jan 2019 05:37

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 Jan 2019 16:28
Nor was it really a problem with "poor quality" of junior officers, but their inexperience linked to the policy of "leading from the front" that led to so many becoming casualties before they gained experience...the schematic "linear" infantry tactics used initially (before experience led to better ways) and limited availability of supporting tank battalions didn't help, nor did the lack of training with tank units, which was endemic to all the British and American units.
U.S. army officers had many deficiencys, chief among them was their lack of initiative. When the fight veered away from the plan, they tended to halt and wait for orders, rather than improvise a new plan on the spot. They also had little understanding of how the armys other branches worked. An infantry officer knew nothing about artillery or armor, and an armor officer knew nothing about infantry or artillery. There was no cross branch training, as in the German army.

The tactics of infantry officers were particularly unimaginative and rudimentary (as you noted yourself). This came down to the deficiencys of the officer candidate schools where they were trained. They had been brought into existence in 1940 with little forethought to create large numbers of junior officers with minimal delay, and were based on the West Point academy whose shortcomings had been criticised in the 1930s.

''The American second lieutenants, who were then about four to six years older than their German counterparts, left West Point to command their platoons -or even companys- without a deeper understanding of tactics and the efficiency of weapons in the inventory of the U.S. Army. Without the help of seasoned NCOs, they would excel in spit and polish operations but not much else.'' -Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, by Jorg Muth.
Richard Anderson wrote:
02 Jan 2019 16:28
Okay, cursory glance...the NEPTUNE assault force and immediate follow-on consisted of the V and VII Corps with a total of nine divisions (7 infantry and 2 airborne). They had six medium and one light tank battalion attached. By the end of the campaign, there were only 28 medium and two light separate tank battalions for 42 divisions in the theater.
You're forgetting operation Atlantic and operation Spring, where the Canadians failed to breakthrough German lines. And numerous instances during operation Epsom and Goodwood when the British also failed to breakthrough. These failures were caused mainly by the inadaquate armor and firepower of the Sherman.
The ability of a tanks main gun to punch through enemy armor is obviously of very great importance. Perhaps not ''the most important aspect of the tank armament'', as ChristianMunich believes, but certainly very relevant. To blindly assert that there are no facts to support this viewpoint is kindof mindboggling.
Richard Anderson wrote:
02 Jan 2019 16:44
Okay, then please assert some facts to the contrary. :D
]The most self evident fact of all is that the tank division is the main maneuver element for an entire army. When they achieve breakthroughs into enemy lines, they will tend to be counter-attacked by enemy tanks. This requires one of two separate approachs. You either have two types of specialised tanks, one to deal with infantry and one to deal with tanks. Or you have one type of general tank which can deal with both, by use of a dual purpose gun.

ChristianMunich is overstating his case by saying that the armor penetration of a tank gun is its most important attribute (to the exclusion of everything else). But it is nonetheless a very important requirement. The armored divisions reliance on the poorly armed Sherman tank is what caused many promising operations to come to a premature and unsatisfying end. In operation Goodwood, you will recall that while most of the divisions managed to break through German lines to some degree, they were unable to stop the armored counter-attack that came afterwards.
Also, you are completely ignoring the reason why the Soviets decided to retain the 76mm F-34 gun past the point it became obsolescent.
Richard Anderson wrote:
02 Jan 2019 16:44
No, I am not, but I am asserting that many of the same reasons were in play over the decision to retain the 75mm M3 Tank Gun in production until the end of 1943. For one thing, until the design of the 76mm mounting was complete, there was no real alternative.
Thats obviously not the case, because the strategic situation of Russia and America were polar opposites of each other in 1942 and 1943. America would get to pick the time and place where it chose to fight the Germans, and would have plety of time to choose the weapons it needed without the pressure of time or circumstance. Its main problem was that it had to cross the Atlantic before facing its enemy.

Russias situation could not have been more different. It was already engaged in a desperate fight for survival with the Germans, who were occupying a large portion of the Soviet Union. Thousands of men were dying each and every day, and they had to choose weapons based on how quickly and how many of them could be produced. They had no choice but to continue making obsolescent weapons for their armys, because any attempt to change their production lines would result in a potentially fatal shortage of the new weapons needed.

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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by Avalancheon » 05 Jan 2019 06:05

Don Juan wrote:
03 Jan 2019 15:01
The Panther and Tiger were every bit as bad as claimed, but that really is due to them being far too ambitious designs. I don't think anyone could have made a reliable 60+ ton tank during the war, or even for the two decades afterwards. Likewise a 30 mph 45 ton tank is really stretching it for the development period available.

But generally, the automotive quality of German tanks was mediocre to begin with and declined as the war progressed. The Panzer II was absolutely great though.
The bolded part is completely untrue. Teaboos love to throw around that postwar report by the French claiming that the Panthers needed to have their final drives replaced every 150 km, but this is because they put their tanks through forced marchs without stopping for maintenance every 20-25 km. Their drivers abused the tanks and rode them mainly in 3rd gear, and even worse, they used the accelerator to control speed (!).

Of course if the Panthers were used in this way, then they would get worn out quickly. But if they were driven properly by a trained German crew (not by a bunch of French morons), then they could potentially go much further. By regulation, the tanks only required a major overhaul every 800 km or so, and some Panthers drove much further than this before their final drives broke.
Don Juan wrote:
03 Jan 2019 16:01
I think projectile quality is a rather marginal aspect of the performance of any gun. The real problem with the US 76mm was that its initial muzzle velocity was about 300 fps too low i.e. ~2600 fps against the 2950 fps of the 17 pounder. This in turn was the result of the decision by the US Ordnance Board not to produce the original M1 variant of the gun, and to instead introduce the M1A1 with a reduction in the number of calibres.

I can't see projectile quality mattering except in those cases where the shell is at the limit of its ability to penetrate. In any case, the British thought that the Germans reduced the effectiveness of their AP shells by persisting with a bursting charge, which they considered reduced the kinetic energy of the shell, while having little positive effect on any post-penetration damage.
Absolutely false, as pointed out by CriticalMass. Projectile design has a huge impact on the penetration of a gun. Having a high velocity is nice and all, but without a properly capped, heat treated shell, it ain't gonna do much against a Panther or Tiger tank. The projectile designs of both Americans and British were inferior to what the Germans used. A 75mm or 76mm shell will leave a nice little splash mark on the front of the tank, and make just enough noise to put the crew on alert.
Don Juan wrote:
03 Jan 2019 15:14
There is much more to mobility than ground pressure. There is also belly clearance, low end torque, front hull shape (to prevent bulldozing in mud), spacing of bogie wheels, etc. For example, despite its relatively low ground pressure, British testing continually demonstrated that the cross country mobility of the Tiger I was poor.
Alright then, why don't you enlighten us. What factor led to the Tigers suboptimal mobility in the mud? It couldn't have been the ground clearance, since this was the same as on the Sherman and many other tanks. it couldn't have been power to weight ratio, either. So what was the design flaw, mr. Don Juan?

edit: In your latest comments, you point to the Tigers hull shape as the problem, but don't elaborate further. Why was it more prone to 'bulldozing' than other tanks?

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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by Michael Kenny » 05 Jan 2019 07:21

Avalancheon wrote:
05 Jan 2019 06:05


The bolded part is completely untrue. Teaboos love to throw around that postwar report by the French claiming that the Panthers needed to have their final drives replaced every 150 km, but this is because............ they put their tanks through forced marchs without stopping for maintenance every 20-25 km. Their drivers abused the tanks and rode them mainly in 3rd gear, and even worse, they used the accelerator to control speed (!).

Of course if the Panthers were used in this way, then they would get worn out quickly. But if they were driven properly by a trained German crew (not by a bunch of French morons)..............
Examples of German 'morons' who found the exact same problems:



Spielberger. Panther & Its Variants page 257

Date 23 January 1945.


Meeting of the Panzer Commision


there continues to be serious complaints regarding final drive breakdowns in all vehicle types...................General Thomale explained that in such circumstances an orderly utilisation of tanks is simply impossible...........
200 breakdowns with the 38(t).........
Prior to the 1945 eastern offensive there have been 500 defective drives on the Pz IV, from the Panther 370 and from the Tiger roughly 100............the troops lose their confidence and in some situations abandon the whole vehicle just because of this problem



Avalancheon wrote:
05 Jan 2019 06:05

A 75mm or 76mm shell will leave a nice little splash mark on the front of the tank, and make just enough noise to put the crew on alert.
75% of all hits on a Panther penetrated.

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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by Richard Anderson » 05 Jan 2019 07:30

Avalancheon wrote:
05 Jan 2019 05:37
U.S. army officers had many deficiencys, chief among them was their lack of initiative.
Sigh...they did not "lack initiative", but they were not trained to use initiative, and it was not part of doctrine, to emphasize initiative in junior officers. That problem was even more pronounced in British junior officers...and was a feature of the leadership problems identified by the Heer in 1939-1940. So from that experience they worked on it and emphasized dealing with the problem,
When the fight veered away from the plan, they tended to halt and wait for orders, rather than improvise a new plan on the spot.
Indeed, a salient problem with junior leadership in all armies, over all ages...creating a means and a training regimen to cure it became a major focus for the Germans during the war and for the British and Americans late war and postwar.
They also had little understanding of how the armys other branches worked. An infantry officer knew nothing about artillery or armor, and an armor officer knew nothing about infantry or artillery. There was no cross branch training, as in the German army.
That, in fact, is quite incorrect. Many of the "Armor" officers in the U.S. Army were actually Artillerymen, others were Infantry, Cavalry, and Engineers. If a junior Infantry officer knew anything in the U.S. Army, it was to work with his Artillery liaison - that was where the "combined arms" training emphasis was. It was failing to include armor - direct support tank units - in the training regimen that was the major fault.
The tactics of infantry officers were particularly unimaginative and rudimentary (as you noted yourself).
The "tactics" you refer to were actual doctrinal and were based on limited interwar exercises and aa false belief in what worked in the Great War. So, as one battalion S-3 of my acquaintance put it, when it came time for his battalion to execute a counterattack in the Ardennes (106th ID on 17 December), his battalion commanders orders were "form up on me, I'm the line of departure, Rifle Company on line on the left, Rifle Company on line on the right, Rifle Company in reserve, and Weapons Company in support". This at a time when experienced battalions were advancing in column of companies or even platoons (and in one case I know of, by individuals) through dead ground. Experience again.
This came down to the deficiencys of the officer candidate schools where they were trained. They had been brought into existence in 1940 with little forethought to create large numbers of junior officers with minimal delay, and were based on the West Point academy whose shortcomings had been criticised in the 1930s.
Sorry, but NON, SENSE. The requirement for OCS was c. 1941, when the Army began expanding from ten peacetime reduced strength divisions to what was eventually 89 divisions. West Point was an engineering school first and foremost and not a tactical training school at all, the notion that it trained junior officers for wartime is a pernicious notion that will not die.
''The American second lieutenants, who were then about four to six years older than their German counterparts, left West Point to command their platoons -or even companys- without a deeper understanding of tactics and the efficiency of weapons in the inventory of the U.S. Army. Without the help of seasoned NCOs, they would excel in spit and polish operations but not much else.'' -Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, by Jorg Muth.
Interesting. Herr Muth might want to do some math. If an "American second lieutenant" graduated at age 21 (typical, especially with the accelerated wartime graduations, then that means that his "German counterparts" that were five to six years younger were 15 or 16 years old. :lol:
You're forgetting operation Atlantic and operation Spring, where the Canadians failed to breakthrough German lines. And numerous instances during operation Epsom and Goodwood when the British also failed to breakthrough. These failures were caused mainly by the inadaquate armor and firepower of the Sherman.
Um, Canadians? How am I "forgetting" Canadians when I am addressing an issue with the American Army organization and doctrine? Please try to follow along.
The ability of a tanks main gun to punch through enemy armor is obviously of very great importance. Perhaps not ''the most important aspect of the tank armament'', as ChristianMunich believes, but certainly very relevant. To blindly assert that there are no facts to support this viewpoint is kindof mindboggling.
It is, quite literally, at most, about half of its "very great importance". Blindly asserting the contrary is the hallmark of a wheraboo...or a WoT addict.
The most self evident fact of all is that the tank division is the main maneuver element for an entire army. When they achieve breakthroughs into enemy lines, they will tend to be counter-attacked by enemy tanks. This requires one of two separate approachs. You either have two types of specialised tanks, one to deal with infantry and one to deal with tanks. Or you have one type of general tank which can deal with both, by use of a dual purpose gun.
Yep, WoT wehraboo. Sorry to be cruel, but that simply is as schematic as the notion that armored divisions were designed for exploitation only. Anyway, the U.S. Army did have "one type of general tank which can deal with both", rather than a breakthrough heavy tank, a heavy medium tank and a light medium tank, for breakthrough and exploitation...so where is the problem?
ChristianMunich
Is an idiot and a poser. Full stop.
is overstating his case by saying that the armor penetration of a tank gun is its most important attribute (to the exclusion of everything else). But it is nonetheless a very important requirement. The armored divisions reliance on the poorly armed Sherman tank is what caused many promising operations to come to a premature and unsatisfying end. In operation Goodwood, you will recall that while most of the divisions managed to break through German lines to some degree, they were unable to stop the armored counter-attack that came afterwards.
There is simply no evidence that a more heavily armored and armed tank would have made much difference in Normandy or later. The armored counterattack in GOODWOOD had virtually no effect...and a similar ineffective counterattack on 29/30 July did nothing to stop the breakout. Same tanks, similar defense, different result. Go figure.
Thats obviously not the case, because the strategic situation of Russia and America were polar opposites of each other in 1942 and 1943. America would get to pick the time and place where it chose to fight the Germans, and would have plety of time to choose the weapons it needed without the pressure of time or circumstance. Its main problem was that it had to cross the Atlantic before facing its enemy.
Um, in 1942...at the beginning of the year, just four weeks after being pitchforked into the war, the U.S. military committed to producing 25,000 medium tanks...in that year. At the time, the War Department was committed to and planning on building 880 medium tanks. Please explain to me how they had "plety" or plenty of time to do so.
Russias situation could not have been more different. It was already engaged in a desperate fight for survival with the Germans, who were occupying a large portion of the Soviet Union. Thousands of men were dying each and every day, and they had to choose weapons based on how quickly and how many of them could be produced. They had no choice but to continue making obsolescent weapons for their armys, because any attempt to change their production lines would result in a potentially fatal shortage of the new weapons needed.
Yep, and they were already programmed to produce nearly 3,000 tanks per year.

{Edit: Sorry, hopefully those corrections clear up some of my late-night thoughts]
Last edited by Richard Anderson on 05 Jan 2019 16:48, edited 2 times in total.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

critical mass
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Re: Tiger I versus 76mm ( US )

Post by critical mass » 05 Jan 2019 16:42

Don Juan wrote:
04 Jan 2019 21:15
critical mass wrote:
04 Jan 2019 20:27
Notice, that I do not judge here, I want to understand these issues. From my understanding, it were the British, who after ww2 worked out that MMP is a better proxy for floatation than NGP.
That might be the case, but flotation is not necessarily the critical aspect for crossing difficult terrain. In theory, even the most excellent flotation is no good if the belly of your vehicle is only a few inches off the ground.

Anyway, you might find this of interest:

https://vdocuments.site/soil-and-water- ... mance.html
Thanks. Yes, You may be right. I am interested in the mechanics behind. The following tabulations are official specifications (and Rowlands MMP calculations), not sure how they correlate with practical tests, though.


ground clearance:

PzIVh: 0.400m
Cromwell Mk IV:0.406m
M4A3: 0.432m
Cromwell MKVIIwE: 0.456m
Tiger-1: 0.475m
Tiger-2: 0.500m
Panther:0.560m

climb (in percent):
PzIVh: 57% (25°)
Cromwell Mk IV: 54% (24°) or 80%?
M4A3: 60%
Cromwell MKVIIwE: 54% (24°) or 80%?
Tiger-1:80% (35°)
Tiger-2: 70% (30°)
Panther: 80% (35°)

MMP:
PzIVh: 184-191 (depending on tracks)
Cromwell Mk IV: 352
M4A3: 282-200
Cromwell MKVIIwE: 300
Tiger-1:192
Tiger-2: 183
Panther: 155

The trackwidth of the Cromwell is particularely narrow (14", later 18"), if compared with any other tank. The one significant advantage the Cromwell has over all other is power to weight ratio, and, to a lesser degree, step climbing ability (0.91m compared to 0.6m for the PzIV, 0.61m for M4 and 0.8/0.85m for the TIGER-1 /-2, respectively). What am I missing here?
MichaelKenny wrote: Avalancheon wrote: ↑
Today, 07:05

A 75mm or 76mm shell will leave a nice little splash mark on the front of the tank, and make just enough noise to put the crew on alert.

75% of all hits on a Panther penetrated.
MK,
You might want to modify the words of Your response, considering that Avalancheon referred only to the "front" of tank and Your response does, as far as I recognize, also cover (mainly) hits from the flanks (without pointing out this subtle but important difference).
Last edited by critical mass on 05 Jan 2019 16:51, edited 1 time in total.

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