Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

[Juha]

Thanks a lot histan! So at least 2 of the 6 losses on 8th Aug were combat losses.

Juha

[Michael Kenny]

This is all the 'Polish AD' books I have and they are all much the same:

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Black-Devils-M ... VILS+MARCH

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Man-Steel-Hono ... bc?ie=UTF8

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Armoured-Hussa ... ed+Hussars

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Armoured-Hussa ... ed+Hussars


https://www.amazon.co.uk/No-192-Polskie ... any+vol+II


https://www.amazon.co.uk/Dywizja-Pancer ... B00115ABMA

[MarkN]

My next research target was going to be the British Liaison Unit which I had assumed would have been attached to 1 Polish Armoured Division but I couldn't find that on the UK National Archives website. Does anyone know whether it was one of the numbered series - there are quite a few on their from Italy and the Middle East, just nothing from NW Europe.

I suspect that it was just a handful of chaps with language/communication skills to relay information back and forth rather than a fully-fledged unit.

[MarkN]

I was skeptical on Cyprek's info and theories on Polish claims but I was looking on info on Polish AFV losses on August 8th and 9th other than Hubert Meyer's 40 tanks which Reynolds more or less accepted as reliable.

Cyprek's post contained 2 components: the info he had lifted from other authors; and, his own musings thereafter to fit his Tiger claim theory.

And because I needed only the number, I needed the info to compare Allied losses to the claims of the JgPz IVs of the 1./SS-Pz.Jg.Abt 12 for a blog article, ...

From Maczek's report, it seems 2nd ArmdRegt bore the brunt of the fighting with help from the 10th MtdRifles. Until evidence to the contrary comes along, I see no reason to dispute the 24th Lancers post-war narrative that they lost 6 Shermans. It is not an unreasonable number. I have the 1st ArmdRegt's post war narrative and it contains nothing for 8th August suggesting they were merely bystanders that day. They do get interested on the 9th, however.

But please remember that the tank casualty report to 2nd Canadian Corps was a casualty report not a tank lost or tank destroyed report. There is no way of knowing how many from that number, 34, were due to battle damage nor to what extent: destroyed or minor damage. Moreover, as the words in the report itself state, perhaps it's not even the correct number.

Therefore, you are not - and never will be - really any closer to your holy grail.

[Michael Kenny]

This is the thesis that became a book. Very detailed loss records within. Page 172 for Aug 8th
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/ ... R54255.PDF


The book:

https://www.amazon.ca/dp/1473870712/ref ... _ti_hist_1

[MarkN]

http://www.polishwargraves.nl/info/24.pul.one.htm

Have no idea whether this is a summary of the past-war narrative that Cyprek was culling his information form, but none of it is there....

[Michael Kenny]

My next research target was going to be the British Liaison Unit which I had assumed would have been attached to 1 Polish Armoured Division............

They were caught by the short-bombing and the senior British Officer was killed

[histan]

Here is a fuller quote from the book:

"An examination of the diary of 10 PSK illustrates the problems of the offensive in the Falaise area. 8 August saw 10 PSK positioned between 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade (10 BK panc) and 2nd Tank Regiment (Polish). 2nd Tank Regiment was already fighting the enemy to the left and had the task of ensuring the safety of the offensive's left flank. 10 BK panc with 10 PSK to the rear, advanced further into the opening between Soliers and the Hubert-Folie railway crossing in the Bourgebus area. Here it was considered possible that the 5st Highland Division could have forced a breach in the enemy's lines. But as soon as the offensive began it was soon bogged down.

As it advanced between Sequr Le Campagne and Graceville 10 BK panc met with strong enemy resistance, including armour and artillery from the direction of St Aigan De Cramesnil. 2 Squadron 10 BSK, which had been assigned to protect the left flank, engaged the enemy and immediately lost a tank. Later during the afternoon, 2 Squadron moved again to hold Souling and also to reconnoitre the woods around Secqueville de Campagne. Despite encountering terrible terrain, 2 Squadron was able to carry out its assignments but not without loss. Encountering German Panther tanks, 2 Squadron 10 PSK lost two tanks and suffered their first casualties: 3 dead in addition to 4 wounded.

During this time 1 Squadron 10 PSK, with the Armoured Car Section, advanced to the north of Cramesnil (Map Reference 083576) where the 2th Uhlans were already engaged in fighting to the north-east of the area.

3 Squadron 10 PSK also engaged the enemy for the first time when they held the area around Sequeville le Campagne, supported by 2nd Tank Regiment and the Dragoons. All the units received casualties but took around 30 prisoners.

In the face of strong enemy resistance, the offensive became bogged down. The result was that 10 BK panc and other armoured units leading the offensive could not reach Bretville Le Rabet - St Sylvian road . It became apparent that the objective of the offensive was unrealistic.. At dusk, however, encouraging news began to filter through to the Polish lines; intelligence suggested that even though the Poles had failed to reach their objectives, the enemy was beginning to withdraw and that 10 PSK was to reconnoitre the Couvicourt asea."

His reference for this is given as "10 Pulk Strezelcow Konnych p 9 - 11.

Regards

John

[Juha]

Thanks a lot, John! Brilliant!

Hello Michael, thanks a lot for the link, seems to be very interesting. I'll look it carefully when I have time.

Hello Mark, don't worry, I'm well aware of the limitations of the material I have. Just trying to get as accurate picture of the situation as possible with reasonable amount of work for a net book review. And I gave a very brief description of the British/CW AFV recovery and repair system in it. The job went badly out of hand because I thought that the author's description of the combat (and Cromwell tank) was badly off and I thought that I should figure out myself what had happened from the sources I have. Sadly many authors are clearly less informed than many of you here.

Juha

[Tom from Cornwall]

I’ve got a few Bde wksp war diaries and what isn’t clear is at what point a tank was released from a regiment’s “charge” - while it was in the Bde wksps or only if the Bde wksps decided it was beyond their capacity. Does anyone know?

Regards

Tom

[MarkN]

Hello Mark, don't worry, I'm well aware of the limitations of the material I have. Just trying to get as accurate picture of the situation as possible with reasonable amount of work for a net book review. And I gave a very brief description of the British/CW AFV recovery and repair system in it. The job went badly out of hand because I thought that the author's description of the combat (and Cromwell tank) was badly off and I thought that I should figure out myself what had happened from the sources I have. Sadly many authors are clearly less informed than many of you here.

There are books written about history, and there are books written to tell a story about something in the past. Many people conflate the two, not least of all the authors of the latter who pretend to be authors of the former. Sometimes the latter do a great a job. Sometimes, more often than not, what they publish has FAR less historical value than they themselves attribute to it. Very often the latters' research is more geared towards confirmation bias than genuine historical research. In just the last week or two, these threads have highlighted how several authors have happily quoted/referenced others' work to 'evidence' their own words without bothering to confirm whether what they are using is historically accurate.

One of your first posts in this thread highlighted how an internet poster elsewhere had offered up his/her work based upon Reid and has 24th Lancers in a different location to that indicated in the 2nd Canadian Corps Ops Log. Which/who is correct? Your very first post was looking for confirmation of numbers; which of the many versions found in print is valid?

histan has kindly quoted an extract from The Black Devil's March by Evan McGilvray. His detail of where 10th Mounted Rifles were and what they were up to contradicts other narratives and reports. Others have 10th Mounted Rifles protecting the left flank as the Division rolled forward, then pushing up to support 2nd Armoured Regiment as it got into bother. McGilvray's "8 August saw 10 PSK positioned between 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade (10 BK panc) and 2nd Tank Regiment (Polish)" is nonsensical. How can 10PSK be between 10BK and 2TR when 2TR is part of 10BK? Perhaps it was between the HQ units of 10BK and 2TR - but then who was out protecting the left flank? McGilvray complaint about Montgomery is that the left flank was unprotected - a natural occurance whenever a formation pushes forward and is the responsibility of the formation itself to protect!

I've found a couple of Evan McGilvray's 'lecture notes' on the internet and he appears to be a storyteller. He clearly wishes to tell the story of Maczek and 1st Polish Armoured Division is the MOST favourable light. In his lectures, he presents the Polish 'failure' to reach their Day 1 objectives in Totalize was all the fault of Montgomery, Simonds and faulty British intelligence. He marshalls his evidence to tell that story rather than to present the evidence as a history for the reader to interpret as they wish. He claims 2nd Armoured Regiment lost 26 Shermans and 24th Lancers lost 14 Shermans. Where does that come from? Both pieces of information are contained in a single paragraph and the footnote to the whole paragraph references his own book!!!!

The only way to be sure that your understanding of the "British/CW AFV recovery and repair system" is not tainted by other authors' opinions and (poor) research is to read through all the appropriate primary documents yourself. Then you stand a chance of responding with history rather than responding with tainted storytelling.

[MarkN]

I've found on the internet a Polish 'book' - you know one of those glossy Osprey type pseudo thingies with lots of pics and little historical value - which boldly states that the Tiger claimed by Leon Wojtynowski (remember Cyprek's Tiger claim analysis) of 24th Lancers was the infamous 007 of Wittman himself!!!!

The modern age is such that, with a 10 minute google, you can find whatever history you want to believe is true written somewhere.

[Juha]

I’ve got a few Bde wksp war diaries and what isn’t clear is at what point a tank was released from a regiment’s “charge” - while it was in the Bde wksps or only if the Bde wksps decided it was beyond their capacity. Does anyone know?

Regards

Tom

Hello Tom, my understanding is (this is not a subject I know well) that in the British system tank battle casualties and breakdowns within last 24 hours which were not repairable within 24 hours by squadron fitters with the help of the Light Aid Detachment of its parent armoured regiment and with the possible extra help by the Brigade Workshop, if the resources of the latter allowed that, were stricken from the unit’s books at last light and handed over to workshops

But this is probably much more reliable source https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent ... ontext=cmh
Arthur Gullachsen, No Shortage of Tanks!: The Canadian Army’s System for the Recovery, Repair and Replacement of A and B Vehicles and Major Weapons Systems I'll myself read it when I have time for it.

Juha

[Juha]

Hello Mark
"McGilvray's "8 August saw 10 PSK positioned between 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade (10 BK panc) and 2nd Tank Regiment (Polish)" is nonsensical. How can 10PSK be between 10BK and 2TR when 2TR is part of 10BK? Perhaps it was between the HQ units of 10BK and 2TR - but then who was out protecting the left flank" It is also my interpretation that 10 PSK was between the HQ units of 10BK and 2TR initially and then its 2th Sqn reinforced with an A/T troop was sent to protect the flank of 2nd Arm Rgt.

I have MA in General/World History and I know that sources many times have reliable parts, suspectible parts and unreliable parts and some are more or less unreliable etc. It is researcher's duty to try to separate seeds from chaff.

Juha

[MarkN]

I have MA in General/World History and I know that sources many times have reliable parts, suspectible parts and unreliable parts and some are more or less unreliable etc. It is researcher's duty to try to separate seeds from chaff.

Of course it depends on the subject area and specific topic, but I take the view that the majority of the books out there cannot be be treated as 'sources' of historical information at all. Archives are the source of historical information; books are a source of somebody else's opinion.