At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 08 Jan 2019 16:43

Hanny wrote:
08 Jan 2019 12:02
jesk wrote:
07 Jan 2019 20:15
Your opinion from illiteracy and misunderstanding of military history. Falaise pocket 1000% work of Hitler. Bagration 1 million percent! 2 defeat without Hitler would never have happened!
It is amusing, my posts criticize, but cannot show where I am not right. All answer consists: no jesk. Why not?
Wars are won by the material balance of resources
It is ridiculous. What do you know about Waterloo? Against what there material resources won?
However, logisticaly taking Kiev was what was possible and taking lenningrad and Moscow were not logistiocaly viable. Thats why it turned out that way. See R Crevald supplying war, Murray strategy for defeat.
No. I already quoted von Bock and Halder. On June 25 Hitler weakened the external front, having offered Germans battles on an environment to the west of Minsk. On July 10 von Bock said that he considers time for offensive at Moscow exclusively favorable. Hitler refused a request. On July 5-7 Germans could enter Moscow if the wrong decision was not made on June 25. Or on July 20, if on July 10 it was authorized.
In Jan 42 only 15% of the LW 100,000 MTV were in operation.By March 42 33% of the Heer in the East had been lost, that started the Invasion, not counting those on the sick list, AFV losses ran to 100% of start numbers with 873 replacement. March 30th 140 combat ready AFV was all there was. A report by OKH states that of 162 divisions in the East 8 were suitable for offensive operations,3 could be brought up to full offensive capacity after a rest,47 could perform limited offensive operationms.The rest suitable only for defensive operations. AGN and AGC lost practicly all its transport, which went to AGS, thus 2 AG were limited to defensive operations only due to logistical contraints. This re organization, including paraticaly all replacemnts going to AGS, gave AGS 80% of its TOE at the expense of the other AGs.

At the beginning of February 1942, Hitler’s Minister of Armaments Fritz Todt was warning that Germany could not hope to keep pace even with the Soviet Union, let alone with the British Empire and the United States as well. Each of these three enemy powers was out-producing Germany on its own: together their economic strength was unmatchable.

Please read a book that explains why things turn out the way they do, rather than describe what turns out, untill you do, your childlike understanding of history will remain just that.
There were alternatives. Hitler refused to disband, as promised earlier, 20 divisions. Also formed new. As a result there were problems with a complete set of combat units. The text is lower.

Image

http://www.e-reading.club/bookreader.ph ... 3-1945.pdf

Meaning the further expansion of army happening at the opponent and also being
convinced that it would be impossible to make ground forces completely again
efficient to spring of 1942, a counterproposal of the chief of the General Staff
focused on transition in 1942 to defense to give to field army time
for replenishment of the forces and to transfer thereby an approach initiative to the opponent. In
the course of this approach the opponent would spend the forces and then would be beaten in
result of the prepared German counterattack.
However Hitler rejected this offer [9]. Planned developments of summer approach of 1942
d. were continued on the basis of Hitler's wishes and are reported to him on March 28, 1942 Hitler
approved them.
About the promise made by it in November to disband about about twenty divisions that
to improve fighting capacity of ground forces, now there was no speech also. On the contrary, regardless of
the fact that at this time many new divisions had already been formed, Hitler in the middle
March 1942, categorically refused his November promises and motivated his
rejection "also political and propaganda goals"
[10].
He was afraid that disbandment of divisions will have the demoralizing impact on troops and
the population of Germany and that the opponent, the neutral countries and allies of Germany will see in
it recognition of the defeat suffered by the German side. He furiously and persistently rejected with
that time and further during all war any offers on disbandment of divisions.
Hitler did not want or could not recognize this need. On the contrary, he constantly put forward
requirements about formation of new divisions. And as it at the same time interfered
to timely preparation of the required reserves, decline of ground forces began. Fighting
losses in staff were sustained first of all by infantry for which replenishment any more not
reserves could prepare. Therefore once the established ratio between active
fighters and support personnel in infantry became irrational because number
the last at reduction of number of active fighters remained almost the same. In connection with all
the increasing losses of infantry its quality worsened. Losses, in particular in
officer and unter-officers, became irreplaceable, more and more continued
to decrease the level of combat training of infantry. Decrease also was added to it
maneuverability. It, in turn, was a consequence of the fact that in maneuverable
operations to which conducting troops were forced, for example at retreat,
considerable losses of weapon and equipment became inevitable.

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 08 Jan 2019 16:51

my sources is better. Halder and Bock graduated from military academies, they have a fighting experience and they are the hell Germans!

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Globalization41
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Globalization41 » 08 Jan 2019 16:52

[The chain of supplies to Britain had started in September 1939. Lend-Lease got signed into law in March 1941.] … The U.S. began mass producing armaments and food after Pearl Harbor. Supplies to Britain before 1942 were mostly window dressing. By 1944 the U.S. had supplied Britain with an invasion force capable of landing in Europe, at least while the main bulk of the German Army was tied down on the Eastern Front.

Globalization41.

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 08 Jan 2019 16:58

Globalization41 wrote:
08 Jan 2019 16:52
[The chain of supplies to Britain had started in September 1939. Lend-Lease got signed into law in March 1941.] … The U.S. began mass producing armaments and food after Pearl Harbor. Supplies to Britain before 1942 were mostly window dressing. By 1944 the U.S. had supplied Britain with an invasion force capable of landing in Europe, at least while the main bulk of the German Army was tied down on the Eastern Front.
60 divisions on the western front, with their effective use, even half would be enough to win. Hitler was afraid of new amphibious operations, and even at the beginning of August, at the time of the encirclement in the Falaise region, 15 German divisions were inactive in the north of France. Hitler did not allow them to shoot at the allies.

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 08 Jan 2019 17:34

http://www.20art.ru/articles/p2_articleid/202

Blucher, playing cat and mouse with the marshal of Pear, pursuing him, approached Waterloo. Pears also behaved, to put it mildly, very strange. When guns rumbled under Waterloo on the morning of June 18, his senior officers demanded that the marshal move the troops to the sound of cannon fire. But Pears refused to do so. Military historians believe that if he approached Waterloo before the Prussians, the Allied forces would have been defeated. But what happened, happened.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 08 Jan 2019 18:54

jesk wrote:
08 Jan 2019 16:43
It is ridiculous. What do you know about Waterloo? Against what there material resources won?s
Jesk its actual history.

Wars contain campaigns and campaigns contain engagements. Your childish remark what about waterloo the battle is typical of you.

100 days Campaign overall European force levels.
France 280000
Allies 900000

France outnumbered 3.2 to 1.

100 Days campaign NW europe Theatre.
UK/Allied Wellington 107000
Germany Blucher 123000
France Napoleon 125000
France outnumbered 1.8 to 1.

Forces present at Waterloo
UK/allied 68000
Germany 50000
France 73000
France outnumbered 1.6 to one.

By end of Waterloo/Ligny/Quatre Bras Napoeon had lost around 50,000, and the main Armies of the coalition stood poised to invade France, Napoeon abdicated, saying he had dared to much.War was over, because not even a military genius could overcome the resource imbalance
jesk wrote:
08 Jan 2019 16:43
No. I already quoted von Bock and Halder. On June 25 Hitler weakened the external front, having offered Germans battles on an environment to the west of Minsk. On July 10 von Bock said that he considers time for offensive at Moscow exclusively favorable. Hitler refused a request. On July 5-7 Germans could enter Moscow if the wrong decision was not made on June 25. Or on July 20, if on July 10 it was authorized.
You seem unaware that has no relevance to what i posted, your usual one trick pony i want to tell you how you know more about war than those who fought it and can do it better attitude cuts no ice.

No Jesk, arguing that things that never happened could have happened is a childish argument. I already pointed out what happened in July is not relavent. But what had haappened was that not enough logistical support existed and in Dec that came home to roost.

On 9 December, with temperatures ranging between minus 5 and 0 degrees Celsius, von Bock sent an urgent request to the Army High Command: “Army Group needs more men!” A deeply concerned Generaloberst Franz Halder at the Army High Command wrote in his diary: “Phone talk with General Field Marshal von Bock: [General] Guderian reports that the condition of his troops is so critical that he does not know how to fend off the enemy.”

General der InfanterieGeorg Thomas, head of the War Economy and Armaments Office, had warned both Goring and Keitel in a detailed report that stocks would be exhausted by late October.

'It is crucial,to seize quickly and exploit the Caucasus oilfields, at least the areas around Maikop and Grozny. In oilfields that have not been completely
destroyed, it will take about a month to resume production, and another month for its transport; the areas concerned will have to have been seized by us by no later than the end of the second month of operation: this includes transport facilities (tankers on the Black Sea, an operational route from Odessa to Przemysl on a Russian gauge so as to take advantage of Russian stocks of tankwagons). If this is not successful, we must expect the most serious
repercussions, with unpredictable consequences for military operations after 1.9.41 and for the survival of the economy.


https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... p_0001.htm
Halder observed on 16 August that total expenditures of ammunition over the preceding 15 days amounted to 340 trains. At 370 short tons net per train this would be 123,800 tons or an average of 8,220 tons per day. The estimates figures for division-days of each kind of fighting multiplied by ammunition requirements for each for Period III, 2-19 August, give 1,255,563 tons, an average of 66,082 per day. Yet for a particular sector during this period the estimate was three times too low. Halder remarked' on 3 August that North was supposed to get 7 to 8 munitions trains daily, that is 2590 to 2960 short tons, whereas the report's tabulation showed a requirement in this sector at this time for only 920 tons.

The estimate of fuel needs was low in the one period we can check it. Halder complained, on 26 September that the three fronts would get only 26 trains of fuel daily against requirements for 30. 30 trains would carry 11,100 short tons, 26 trains 9620; the estimate reckoned for this period division day requirements that total only 6525 short tons, to which a small unspecified amount should be added for truckage from the railheads.

Over-all, the overestimates greatly outweighed the underestimates. An infantry division doing heavy fighting was calculated to need 1364 tons per day, almost twice the 700 tops Von Paulus, cut off a year later at Stalingrad in presumably much heavy fighting with the equivalent of ten divisions, said he would need to get by air, and not much less than the 1500 tons he said he'd later need when his stores ran out. Probably the greatest single source of error in estimating requirements was the unspoken assumption that except for the 12.8% attrition allowed in numbers of divisions the armies had been kept up to strength in men and material, whereas in fact they had fallen to about half of original combat strength.19 While in some sense such replacements are a requirement, it had clearly not been planned to make them until the 1941 campaign was over.
jesk wrote:
08 Jan 2019 16:43

There were alternatives. Hitler refused to disband, as promised earlier, 20 divisions. Also formed new. As a result there were problems with a complete set of combat units.


Posting a link without understanding that it does not help your argument is a childish thing to do.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 08 Jan 2019 19:16

Hanny wrote:
08 Jan 2019 18:54
jesk wrote:
08 Jan 2019 16:43
It is ridiculous. What do you know about Waterloo? Against what there material resources won?s
Jesk its actual history.

Wars contain campaigns and campaigns contain engagements. Your childish remark what about waterloo the battle is typical of you.

100 days Campaign overall European force levels.
France 280000
Allies 900000

France outnumbered 3.2 to 1.

100 Days campaign NW europe Theatre.
UK/Allied Wellington 107000
Germany Blucher 123000
France Napoleon 125000
France outnumbered 1.8 to 1.

Forces present at Waterloo
UK/allied 68000
Germany 50000
France 73000
France outnumbered 1.6 to one.

By end of Waterloo/Ligny/Quatre Bras Napoeon had lost around 50,000, and the main Armies of the coalition stood poised to invade France, Napoeon abdicated, saying he had dared to much.War was over, because not even a military genius could overcome the resource imbalance
It ignores fight events. For example, the rain which prevented Napoleon to beat the British before approach of Germans.

https://www.dailyhistory.org/Why_was_Na ... aterloo%3F

Another factor was the terrible weather, heavy rain had turned much of the battlefield into a mud bath, and this had greatly slowed the French during their attacks.This was particularly the case given that the forces of Napoleon were attacking uphill.[15] The weather had also delayed the French attack by several hours and this was to prove crucial.

If the French had been able to attack in the early hours they could have swept the British from the field before the arrival of their Prussian allies.


jesk wrote:
08 Jan 2019 16:43
No. I already quoted von Bock and Halder. On June 25 Hitler weakened the external front, having offered Germans battles on an environment to the west of Minsk. On July 10 von Bock said that he considers time for offensive at Moscow exclusively favorable. Hitler refused a request. On July 5-7 Germans could enter Moscow if the wrong decision was not made on June 25. Or on July 20, if on July 10 it was authorized.
You seem unaware that has no relevance to what i posted, your usual one trick pony i want to tell you how you know more about war than those who fought it and can do it better attitude cuts no ice.

No Jesk, arguing that things that never happened could have happened is a childish argument. I already pointed out what happened in July is not relavent. But what had haappened was that not enough logistical support existed and in Dec that came home to roost.

On 9 December, with temperatures ranging between minus 5 and 0 degrees Celsius, von Bock sent an urgent request to the Army High Command: “Army Group needs more men!” A deeply concerned Generaloberst Franz Halder at the Army High Command wrote in his diary: “Phone talk with General Field Marshal von Bock: [General] Guderian reports that the condition of his troops is so critical that he does not know how to fend off the enemy.”


https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... p_0001.htm
Halder observed on 16 August that total expenditures of ammunition over the preceding 15 days amounted to 340 trains. At 370 short tons net per train this would be 123,800 tons or an average of 8,220 tons per day. The estimates figures for division-days of each kind of fighting multiplied by ammunition requirements for each for Period III, 2-19 August, give 1,255,563 tons, an average of 66,082 per day. Yet for a particular sector during this period the estimate was three times too low. Halder remarked' on 3 August that North was supposed to get 7 to 8 munitions trains daily, that is 2590 to 2960 short tons, whereas the report's tabulation showed a requirement in this sector at this time for only 920 tons.

The estimate of fuel needs was low in the one period we can check it. Halder complained, on 26 September that the three fronts would get only 26 trains of fuel daily against requirements for 30. 30 trains would carry 11,100 short tons, 26 trains 9620; the estimate reckoned for this period division day requirements that total only 6525 short tons, to which a small unspecified amount should be added for truckage from the railheads.

Over-all, the overestimates greatly outweighed the underestimates. An infantry division doing heavy fighting was calculated to need 1364 tons per day, almost twice the 700 tops Von Paulus, cut off a year later at Stalingrad in presumably much heavy fighting with the equivalent of ten divisions, said he would need to get by air, and not much less than the 1500 tons he said he'd later need when his stores ran out. Probably the greatest single source of error in estimating requirements was the unspoken assumption that except for the 12.8% attrition allowed in numbers of divisions the armies had been kept up to strength in men and material, whereas in fact they had fallen to about half of original combat strength.19 While in some sense such replacements are a requirement, it had clearly not been planned to make them until the 1941 campaign was over.
All this indirect reasons. Germans were on July 10 in Smolensk, could appear there earlier if not Hitler. Then a pause till September 30. 70 days of inaction and not necessary fairy tales about logistics, cars and other nonsense. 70 days, Karl, 70 days in Smolensk and not to a step forward!

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 08 Jan 2019 19:18

Globalization41 wrote:
08 Jan 2019 16:52
[The chain of supplies to Britain had started in September 1939. Lend-Lease got signed into law in March 1941.] … The U.S. began mass producing armaments and food after Pearl Harbor. Supplies to Britain before 1942 were mostly window dressing. By 1944 the U.S. had supplied Britain with an invasion force capable of landing in Europe, at least while the main bulk of the German Army was tied down on the Eastern Front.

Globalization41.
True, also US had frozen all SU assets, and now released them, as well as agreeing to LL for SU.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Hanny
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 08 Jan 2019 19:22

jesk wrote:
08 Jan 2019 19:16

It ignores fight events. For example, the rain which prevented Napoleon to beat the British before approach of Germans.
Not relavent.

jesk wrote:
08 Jan 2019 19:16
All this indirect reasons. Germans were on July 10 in Smolensk, could appear there earlier if not Hitler. Then a pause till September 30. 70 days of inaction and not necessary fairy tales about logistics, cars and other nonsense. 70 days, Karl, 70 days in Smolensk and not to a step forward!
No Jesk, facts that are relavent as to why.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 08 Jan 2019 19:26

Hanny wrote:
08 Jan 2019 19:22
Not relavent.
Unfortunately, I have to take your opinion and quotations from Halder about the cars that do not correspond to the reasons for the Wehrmacht’s failures. The pause of July 10 - September 30 at the Moscow direction is solely on Hitler’s conscience. And absolutely no logistics.
The discussion has stalled. Good luck!

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 09 Jan 2019 09:42

jesk wrote:
08 Jan 2019 19:26
Hanny wrote:
08 Jan 2019 19:22
Not relavent.
Unfortunately, I have to take your opinion and quotations from Halder about the cars that do not correspond to the reasons for the Wehrmacht’s failures. The pause of July 10 - September 30 at the Moscow direction is solely on Hitler’s conscience. And absolutely no logistics.
The discussion has stalled. Good luck!
No Jesk, its not just my opinion, its the opinion expressed in every book on the conflict. It was also known to the Germans before they started. It was also known by them as it happened to them

On 27 November 1941, Eduard Wagner, the Quartermaster General of the German Army, ( who had advised AH pre invasion that it was only possible to supply the invasion for 20 days with both POL/Food/munitions) reported that “We are at the end of our resources in both personnel and material. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of deep winter.”



https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a279709.pdf

THE PAULUS STUDY
In September of 1940 Major General Friedrich Paulus was appointed as
Head Quartermaster I of the Army General Staff. His first tasking by
Halder was to conduct a study of the Soviet problem independent of the
Greiffenberg-Feyeraband (an earlier OKH study), and the Marcks' plan.
The Paulus plan (and subsequent wargames conducted in December) brought
several issues to the forefront. The initial thrusts should be conducted to
the Dneper-Smolensk-Leningrad line. At that point, an operational pause
was required in order to determine the status of the supply situation, and
then to subsequently replenish the armies. <13>

Paulus was also deeply concerned about the prospect of the Red Army
retreating further into Russia and thereby severely complicating the Nazi
time-space problem. Wargames conducted in December reinforced
concerns about logistic lines, but they also demonstrated that the
available German forces would be barely able to meet the operational
objectives. Indeed, one game demonstrated that the army would arrive at
the gates of Moscow depleted of reserves, and in addition, resupply would
be almost impossible.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 09 Jan 2019 19:39

Hanny wrote:
09 Jan 2019 09:42
jesk wrote:
08 Jan 2019 19:26
Hanny wrote:
08 Jan 2019 19:22
Not relavent.
Unfortunately, I have to take your opinion and quotations from Halder about the cars that do not correspond to the reasons for the Wehrmacht’s failures. The pause of July 10 - September 30 at the Moscow direction is solely on Hitler’s conscience. And absolutely no logistics.
The discussion has stalled. Good luck!
No Jesk, its not just my opinion, its the opinion expressed in every book on the conflict. It was also known to the Germans before they started. It was also known by them as it happened to them

On 27 November 1941, Eduard Wagner, the Quartermaster General of the German Army, ( who had advised AH pre invasion that it was only possible to supply the invasion for 20 days with both POL/Food/munitions) reported that “We are at the end of our resources in both personnel and material. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of deep winter.”



https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a279709.pdf

THE PAULUS STUDY
In September of 1940 Major General Friedrich Paulus was appointed as
Head Quartermaster I of the Army General Staff. His first tasking by
Halder was to conduct a study of the Soviet problem independent of the
Greiffenberg-Feyeraband (an earlier OKH study), and the Marcks' plan.
The Paulus plan (and subsequent wargames conducted in December) brought
several issues to the forefront. The initial thrusts should be conducted to
the Dneper-Smolensk-Leningrad line. At that point, an operational pause
was required in order to determine the status of the supply situation, and
then to subsequently replenish the armies. <13>

Paulus was also deeply concerned about the prospect of the Red Army
retreating further into Russia and thereby severely complicating the Nazi
time-space problem. Wargames conducted in December reinforced
concerns about logistic lines, but they also demonstrated that the
available German forces would be barely able to meet the operational
objectives. Indeed, one game demonstrated that the army would arrive at
the gates of Moscow depleted of reserves, and in addition, resupply would
be almost impossible.
Pause 5 days or 80? July 10 on the line of Smolensk were 50% of the army group "Center". 4 and 9 armies west of Minsk fought with the surrounded Soviet armies. Von Bock believed that 50% of the forces would be enough to cover 400 km from Smolensk to Moscow. Supplies for them, too, required less. Thus, the need even in a pause of 5 days fell away.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Paul Lakowski » 09 Jan 2019 19:58

May 1945- that's when Germany lost the war.

Hanny
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 10 Jan 2019 10:50

jesk wrote:
09 Jan 2019 19:39

Pause 5 days or 80? July 10 on the line of Smolensk were 50% of the army group "Center". 4 and 9 armies west of Minsk fought with the surrounded Soviet armies. Von Bock believed that 50% of the forces would be enough to cover 400 km from Smolensk to Moscow. Supplies for them, too, required less. Thus, the need even in a pause of 5 days fell away.
None of this fantasy of your has anything to do with US entry into the war.

Pre war logistical planning showed that after 20 days logistical effort, to support an operational bound of 300 miles in which Russian forced were to be destroyed and the war won) supplies would drop to 10-20% of requirments and an operational pause would result, so as to build up supplies for any further offensives.

Maths shows an average of 70 tons per day per formation was all that could be delivered.
If priority was given to the Panzer forces, then 33 formations daily requirements could be meet, leaving nothing for any other formations.

To go beyond the 300 operational bound ment resupply from the RR, first bound ended at Smolensk, RR conversion to German gauge took till August to convert, so 30 days after gettingb there, the logistical ability to go on from there became present.

The logistics branch of the OKH was blunt in its prediction for anothwer advance from smolensk to moscow: ( supply branch of the OKH warned Brauchitsch, Halder and Bock) 'if the intensity of fighting and the operational rythm was to be similar to that of the summer campaign, the supply system would be able to cover a bit over 50% of AGC's needs for a space of time of two weeks. More than that, and the system would collapse and the it would be able to deliver just between 10-20% of the total load of supplies needed'.
jesk wrote:
09 Jan 2019 19:39
There were alternatives. Hitler refused to disband, as promised earlier, 20 divisions. Also formed new. As a result there were problems with a complete set of combat units.
Fantasy. In the real world things happened for reasons, none of which mean anything to you in your childlike fantasy

July 14th AH re jigs Germany economy, LW and KG now got priority, and 40 Heer divsions were to be disbanded acording to Halders evidence at Nuremburg.

Hitler and the OKH had accepted that the war against the USSR would not be won in 1941 ( both were advised that the fall of moscow would not entail the surrender of the Soviet state by their inteligence officers, but that was where the SU was massing its forces) and that a further campaign would be needed in 1942. But what should be done with the four-six weeks of good weather that they had still available? And here the real differences emerged between Halder and Hitler.

Hitler had to worry about feeding the Reich, it was food defiecent region and required imports, which SU had provided pre war,so he need the Ukraines cerial crops, and a large undefeated forces was there on the flank of any further advance by AGC. Denial of that region would also make SU economic posistion much worse for the next years decisve campaign. he just vastly expanded LW and KG allowence of production, and that bit him in tharse next year as the heer lacked the munitions and material it needed and could have had.

Halder wanted to go to Moscow because that where the centre of gravity was, defeat the ememy main military force and politicaly it dont matter what they want as they lack the means to resist. To do that in July was logisticaly impossible, but Halder returned to this later, and was wrong then as well, but hey he was wrong about force ratios before starting into Russia.

AH chose, to spend the logistics available and that ment that Leeb encircled Leningrad and that the Germans won the amazing encirclement battle at Kiev, he chose well.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 10 Jan 2019 11:20

Hanny wrote:
10 Jan 2019 10:50
jesk wrote:
09 Jan 2019 19:39

Pause 5 days or 80? July 10 on the line of Smolensk were 50% of the army group "Center". 4 and 9 armies west of Minsk fought with the surrounded Soviet armies. Von Bock believed that 50% of the forces would be enough to cover 400 km from Smolensk to Moscow. Supplies for them, too, required less. Thus, the need even in a pause of 5 days fell away.
None of this fantasy of your has anything to do with US entry into the war.

Pre war logistical planning showed that after 20 days logistical effort, to support an operational bound of 300 miles in which Russian forced were to be destroyed and the war won) supplies would drop to 10-20% of requirments and an operational pause would result, so as to build up supplies for any further offensives.

Maths shows an average of 70 tons per day per formation was all that could be delivered.
If priority was given to the Panzer forces, then 33 formations daily requirements could be meet, leaving nothing for any other formations.

To go beyond the 300 operational bound ment resupply from the RR, first bound ended at Smolensk, RR conversion to German gauge took till August to convert, so 30 days after gettingb there, the logistical ability to go on from there became present.
You ignore 400,000 trucks at Germans, the delivery by air to Stalingrad and Demyansk (under enemy fire). In 1941, without fire exposure.
And try to argue with von Bock. So tell: the field marshal did not understand military logistics. Such an early attack on Moscow was just his childhood fantasy.

July 13

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http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng6.pdf

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