jesk wrote: ↑10 Jan 2019, 22:37
This moment total distortion of historical reality. Halder, Bock, Guderian insisted on offensive at Moscow. Hitler explained it with the reasons, but only not supply. I will repeat, impudent distortion of history.
Nop jesk i gave facts, and some maths, you understand neither.
AGC base of suppy in July was minsk 200 miles from Smolensk, thats where all the supplies are, coming by RR from the Reich, from their they move on by trucks, kindly explain using maths how the 14000 tons a day forward lift capacity of AGC can supply an assault on Moscow. Kindly expain why your explanation is different from every German logistical officers findings.
jesk wrote: ↑10 Jan 2019, 22:37
Stocks it is correct, but has no relation to reasons for refusal of offensive at Moscow in July.
No jesk, the proposed operation ( Only the elimination of [Moscow] . . . will remove the possibility of the enemy rebuilding their defeated armed forces and reestablishing them on an operationally effective basis . . . . [T]he offensive by Army Group Center cannot continue after October on account of the weather conditions . . . . [T]he operation can be successful only if the forces of Army Group Center are systematically concentrated on this single goal to the exclusion of other tactical actions which are not essential for the success of the operation.) Was refused because not only was it not what AH wanted, and was not in acordence with the AH order setting pre conditions for an attack on Moscow, but because every logistician said it was impratcible.
"In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk"
jesk wrote: ↑10 Jan 2019, 22:42
- The infantry division requires from 80 (inaction) to 1100 (heavy fighting) tons per day. Tank - 30 and 700, respectively.[/i]
So?, 45 ID and 15 Pzr/Mech in AGC, in heavy fighting losing 200k losses against SU attacks just east of Smolensk in late July early August requires 45*1100=49500 tons a day. The Pzr/Mech were going where AH wanted them leaving Bock in place. How is your 50,000 tons getting to East of Smolonsk?. Kindly explain using maths how 50,000 tons gets there from Minsk. From Smolonsk, when it becames an operational base of supply, and thus to createa stock for a future operation to assault Moscow once the conditions set out are completed, Halder asked Hitler on July 13 to postpone a direct advance on Moscow until the flanks were cleared.
jesk wrote: ↑11 Jan 2019, 07:50
I was not too lazy to look at Halder's diary about the supply. On July 5 and 12, the Wehrmacht’s chief of supply confirmed the presence of reserves of tank groups for an offensive up to Moscow.
Lazy and incompetent, Halder calculated that by the end of the month (July) only 431 tanks would be available from the OKH reserve and current production to replace those destroyed or broken down out of the original total of 3350. But to make matters worse, Hitler gave orders that new tanks should be kept in Germany for equipping fresh Panzer divisions for use in the offensives planned for 1942 in the Middle East, but he was able to secure 350 replacement AFV engines.
jesk wrote: ↑10 Jan 2019, 22:42
Von Bock considered 2 panzer groups sufficient to capture Moscow in July. The battle map is a visual confirmation of the correctness of his proposals.
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SDf ... sk&f=false
Barbarossa Derailed: The German advance to Smolensk, the encirclement battle ...
By David M. Glantz
Pages 140-142
Please read those pages.
Generally showing what you post, to be childish nonsense.
Specificly:
2 Pzr Groups logistical requirments 2000 munitions 4000 POl 450 rations, German army transportation chief guaranteed 6,300 tons, its all about the maths sonny.
That leaves nothing for the rest of AGC.
jesk wrote: ↑11 Jan 2019, 07:56
You need to quote sources, by the own words can raise doubts. Because other quotes from the diary allow to assume polar.
Did so, your just incapable of understanding them, and your contradicting your own sources.
jesk wrote: ↑11 Jan 2019, 11:09
On July 23 Halder in the diary noted problems with supply, but coordinated them to the increased expense of ammunition, caused in turn by a delay of approach of army group Center. Germans attacked on the wide front, Hitler for 10 days refused earlier the plan of offensive by the narrow front by 2 tank groups at Moscow. Advance to Moscow not only increased possibilities of its falling, reduced an expense of ammunition, improved supply.
The current needs of troops for objects of supply are satisfied generally smoothly, and will proceed so, [176] even if it is necessary to take special measures for a covering of the increased expense of ammunition connected with a delay of advance of troops of group of Centre armies.
Creation of stocks, that is creation new even small front-line base of supply at the present situation when everything that arrives while it is impracticable is spent. However it will need to be made as transportation of objects of supply to troops demands motor transport stage on distance to 300 km from the bases of supply leaning on the railroads, and it is unprofitable.
Yes jesk, quote Halder explaining you to have made a complet arse of yourself is certainly usfull. Thats Halder explaining its not possible to create stocks from minsk when fighting heavily at Smolensk, SU was attacking with 600k men against AGC and it had to deend itself, hense teh munitions delivered and supplied data i posted for you, and stocks will rise when Smolensk become the new base of supplies
Many of the German generals, including Rundstedt, Kleist, Blumentritt and Manstein, cited factors ranging from logistical/strategic problems, weather and Hitler himself. What is important to remember is that these generals blamed everyone but themselves when stating why the invasion failed. Very few considered the Russian had anything to do with it.
Ewald von Kleist
"Russia also lacked railways, we were unable to bring up supplies to our advancing troops".
Blumentritt
"On the Moscow route, the principal line of advance, they repeatedly held on long enough to be encircled, The badness of the roads became our worst handicap, Faulty intel1igence had underestimated Soviet strength, The restoration of railway traffic became delayed by the change of gauge beyond the
Russian frontier. The supply problem in the Russian campaign became a very serious problem, complicated by local conditions.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.