There still the base appeared. Record for July 17.Hanny wrote: ↑11 Jan 2019, 12:58Nop jesk i gave facts, and some maths, you understand neither.
AGC base of suppy in July was minsk 200 miles from Smolensk, thats where all the supplies are, coming by RR from the Reich, from their they move on by trucks, kindly explain using maths how the 14000 tons a day forward lift capacity of AGC can supply an assault on Moscow. Kindly expain why your explanation is different from every German logistical officers findings.
Subject at a forum it was discussed earlier. In each group of armies was a transport part with a loading capacity of 4500, 6000, 9000 tons. By these cars carried, for example, from Minsk to Mogilev, it was overloaded in transports of divisions further.
viewtopic.php?f=50&t=85630
The Kw.Tr.Rgt. 602 with a tonnage of 4500 tons, was 3000 men and 2200 vehicles, including motorcycles. The tonnage of Regiment 605 was 6000 tons, that of Regiment 616 was 9000 tons.
1939-1941
Infantry Division
- Staff Div. Supply Leader
- 6 small vehicle col., 30 t each
- 1 small fuel column, 30 t
- 1 vehicle repair platoon
- 1-2 wagon columns, 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (?t-mot?), 3 platoons
- 1 ammunitioin command at division supply leader
Infantry Division (mot.)
- 10 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (mot.), 2 platoons
Panzer Division
- 10 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (mot.), 2 platoons
296 and 298 divisions moved ahead behind supply on distance up to 400 km. Up to 700 km figure for other divisions appear. 600-700 km from the railroad are not a problem. Difficulties arose only with the shortage of trophy trains for a broad Russian gage.
viewtopic.php?f=50&t=85630&hilit=supply+flow
Yes the model was often changed according to the situation. I remember a divsional report about supply I read a few days ago where the divisional supply columns needed 2 days to return from depots 200-400km away from the front (296.Inf.Div. 1941)
The subject logistics was not considered at refusal of approach of tank groups. I will remind, the chief of supply assured on July 5 and 12, supply will last out to Moscow. Communication between logistics and refusal of offensive at Moscow your imagination. There are no sources in confirmation of it.No jesk, the proposed operation ( Only the elimination of [Moscow] . . . will remove the possibility of the enemy rebuilding their defeated armed forces and reestablishing them on an operationally effective basis . . . . [T]he offensive by Army Group Center cannot continue after October on account of the weather conditions . . . . [T]he operation can be successful only if the forces of Army Group Center are systematically concentrated on this single goal to the exclusion of other tactical actions which are not essential for the success of the operation.) Was refused because not only was it not what AH wanted, and was not in acordence with the AH order setting pre conditions for an attack on Moscow, but because every logistician said it was impratcible.
But there continuation of the quote. It will provide 8.5 trains. 5.5 more will be enough for 35 divisions, with unloading to Dnieper. It is not sure that the figure of 6300 tons is specified by Halder correctly. Capacity of the Soviet carriage is 60 tons, one train up to 3000 tons. 6300 tons on 14 trains are not enough. Doubtfully for me that Halder could tell about sufficient supply of 2500 tons for 35 divisions."In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk"
Yours the reference to cia source are doubtful. 45 * 1100 does not correspond to anything. 100 tons for an infantry division in day of active actions normal figure. Canned food and fuel do not weigh so much.So?, 45 ID and 15 Pzr/Mech in AGC, in heavy fighting losing 200k losses against SU attacks just east of Smolensk in late July early August requires 45*1100=49500 tons a day. The Pzr/Mech were going where AH wanted them leaving Bock in place. How is your 50,000 tons getting to East of Smolonsk?. Kindly explain using maths how 50,000 tons gets there from Minsk. From Smolonsk and thus to createa stock for a future operation to assualt Moscow once the conditions set out are completed, Halder asked Hitler on July 13 to postpone a direct advance on Moscow until the flanks were cleared.