Juha wrote: ↑14 Jan 2019, 19:51
agree with most you wrote. Only difference is the "virtually empty countryside" before the Canadiens after Phase I.
I don't believe it was virtually empty. That is the comment others have levelled against Simonds for not pushing straight on when Phase I reached their objectives at about 0600B. It's a commentary based upon an obsession with Meyer's post-war interviews and the SS in general. Halting after Phase I was exactly the British way of doing things: rigid timetable, sequence of events, initiative is bad.
Juha wrote: ↑14 Jan 2019, 19:51
IMHO British /CW rigidly was at least partly because of Monty's sceptism on the ability of British/CW commanders.
Montgomery was very much part of the problem.
Juha wrote: ↑14 Jan 2019, 19:51
There were also some bad flaws in the plan, etc how they handled Gaumesnil. And signal problems, e.g. at Gaumesnil the infantry unit ordered to capture it did not know that a tank unit was already around it, according to the CO of Sherbrooke Fusiliers already in position on the grounds of the chateau.
There was very bad command and control throughout. Formation commanders were running the battles from lines on maps and dots added based upon radio reports - and guesses. Very poor situational awareness. Simonds was at his map shouting at is signals staff to get sitreps and urging the divisional commanders to get a hurry on. The divisional commanders were sitting at their maps shouting at their signals staff to get sitreps and urging the brigade commanders to get a hurry on. The brigade commanders were sitting at their maps (some fast asleep) shouting at their signals staff to get sitreps and urging the battalion commanders to get a hurry on. And so on. The German Army Commander went up to Cintheaux to see for himself, discuss with his divsional commander, the KG commander and even one of the company commanders as to what was happenning etc etc. BIG difference.
German generals got killed quite frequently on the frontlines. British and Canadian generals often got injured by the USAF bombing behind the wrong lines!
Hardly any cooperation between sub-units of the same unit - let alone with sub-units of other formations. The British, Canadians and Poles had had 4 years to practice in the UK to get combined arms and such like worked out. They didn't. Why? The capbadges were too busy fighting amongst themselves for various parts of the glory to bother to work together. By Normandy, August 1944, finally they were starting to put together 'battle groups'. But they were not a formation trained together, they were random sods thrown together and told to get on with it. They may have been standing closer together than ever before, but they still weren't communicating or making any effort to work out how they could do things any better.