Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

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Juha
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#106

Post by Juha » 14 Jan 2019, 16:33

MarkN wrote:
14 Jan 2019, 16:15
Having posted my previous, I've just been going through some 1947 aerial imagery of the area and there is a copse (small wood) and a hedgerow off to the east on the way Poussy. Neither of which is shown on the contemporary 1:100,000 map and only the copse on the 1:25,000 map being used by the troops. In effect, it could be that Skibinski and Maczek were talking about the same spot after all. But this assumes somebody was indeed sitting in a copse or being a hedgerow between them and Poussy. Who?
The copse is shown on the British 1944 1:50,000 map 7F/4 St Pierre-Sur-Dives. Maybe a few A/T guns.

Juha

Juha
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#107

Post by Juha » 14 Jan 2019, 17:14

Hello John
Does the claim of 5 SP Guns tie in with one or more engagements with the Panzerjäger?
According to the unit history of 1st Northants Yeo, the rgt claimed as destroyed four S.P. Guns, of which three during a night skirmish during the advance to Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil. They also claimed two S.P. Guns during the day battle S / SE of Sant-Aignan as knocked out. During a night skirmish between No. 2 Troop of the A Squadron/1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry and a troop of German S.P. guns very early on 8th August during the Allies night attack which opened the Operation Totalize. Maybe also some Jagdpanzer IVs of the 2./SS-Pz.Jg.Abt. 12 participated this skirmish. The company was in the area or near of it according to a map in Számvéber’s book. British talked of Bumblebees which is the English translation of Hummel but why would Hummels have been so forward, about two miles behind the German frontline, and anyway the only formation that had Hummels in the sector of the I. SS Panzer Korps at that time was the 12. SS-Panzer Division which was, but the parts participating operations further west, in the area SE of Bretteville-sur-Laize. Both Brummbärs and Hummels were armed with a 150 mm howitzer but very different kind ones and both were built on the chassis or modified chassis of the Panzer IV. British identifications of AFVs of their opponents were often somewhat haphazard. On the other hand the effects of at least some of the hits on Shermans during this skirmish clearly like those of armour piercing shells of 75 mm L/48 and not like those of hollow charge shells of a 150 mm howitzer.


Juha
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#108

Post by Juha » 14 Jan 2019, 17:27

Hello Mark
Sturm.Pz.Abt.217 was under command II./SS-Pz.Regt.12 and, although not mentionned as being part of the attack, there is no reason to assume it just got left behind. This was a combined arms effort to take out an infantry and armour position. I suspect that SP guns claimed by 1NY could be SturmPanzer NOT PanzerJager.
During the day 8 Aug some StuPz IVs were deployed in the area between Cintheaux and Quilly or Cailloet, cannot remember which and cannot remember right now from where I read that. Also StuPz IVs were sometimes attached to HJ and sometimes to 89. Div during the last days before the beginning of the Oper. Totalize.

Juha

histan
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#109

Post by histan » 14 Jan 2019, 17:45

Hi Guys

What about looking at 272 Inf Div?

Divisional Commander wrote FMS B-702. The English version on Fold3 is almost unreadable but the original German version is clear, so I am posting extracts from that.
272 Inf Div 01.jpg
272 Inf Div 02.jpg
272 Inf Div 03.jpg
272 Inf Div 04.jpg
272 Inf Div 05.jpg
One more page to follow

Regards

John

histan
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#110

Post by histan » 14 Jan 2019, 17:46

last page
272 Inf Div 06.jpg
This division would be on the left flank of 1 Polish Armoured Division.

Regards

John

Juha
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#111

Post by Juha » 14 Jan 2019, 18:14

Hello John
Thanks a lot for the Hasso Neitzel's memo. have seen parts of it quoted in some books but nice to see its relevant part in full.

MarkN
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#112

Post by MarkN » 14 Jan 2019, 18:36

I know Simonds and the Poles have come in for some serious criticism over Op TOTALIZE. The more I read about it, the more I think they got off lightly because the criticism levelled against them was off the mark.

They may have made up for it later, by the showing on the 8th by the Poles was dreadful. They drove forward, got bounced, and decided the only alternative was to retreat. No attempt to manouver. And, yes, there was room. Whilst they may have been encouraged to maintain a narrow advance in general, there was nothing to prevent them flanking the positions to the east before getting back on track. Poor show from the formation commanders.

As for Simonds, the criticism levelled against him regarding rigidness in his timings etc seems unfair to me as it is no different from the group think surrounding him and above him. Where I feel he performed poorly was in his inability/inaction to deal with issues at Corps level. The British 'system' - and thus the Canadian and Polish too - conferred on subordinates very little initiative. It was generally discouraged and as one commentator has written (my paraphrasing) one unit/formation would stand watching a neighboring unit/formation being smashed without intervening as they had not received permission/orders to do so.

This wee 'Robertmesnil' encounter involved elements of no less than four separate divisions. The onus was therefore upon the Corps commander to have the greatest situational awareness possible to ensure those four divisions maximised their efforts. Simonds had to be the coordinator as there was no system in place for the divisions to cooperate directly with one another. He failed. He stood back urging the formations forward without a grasp of what was happening on the ground.

Others have criticised Simonds for delaying at St.Aignan after Phase I and allowing the Germans to regroup rather than pushing on through virtually empty countryside. In my opinion, the opportunity presented, because of the delay, was a chance to destroy the main (almost only) force capable of blunting their advance. KG Waldmuller had banged up against 154th Brigade and been brought to a halt. Perfect opportunity for the Canadian 4th Division and Polish 1st Division to outflank them, encircle them and destroy them. Instead of manouvering as a formation to deliver this blow, the two divisions just carried on with the written down Phase II plan piecemeal as if KG Waldmuller didn't exist.

If you don't allow your subordinates the room to use their own initiative, you have to make sure you yourself are on the ball. Simonds wasn't.

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#113

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 14 Jan 2019, 19:19

Hi John,

Many thanks for posting up the remaining pages of the 89 Div and the pages of the 272 Div studies. It is good to get some details on the less well known German formations in Normandy - for many authors it seems that unless it is a Tiger or at least SS, then it is simply not worth mentioning!

From the map in the 89 Div study it looks like their main artillery and anti-tank screen was about and just to the west of Cintheaux which explains the difficulties that the Canadian Grenadier Guards had when trying to move forward after Wittmann had been defeated.

Regards

Tom

MarkN
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#114

Post by MarkN » 14 Jan 2019, 19:34

Juha wrote:
14 Jan 2019, 17:27
Sturm.Pz.Abt.217 was under command II./SS-Pz.Regt.12 and, although not mentionned as being part of the attack, there is no reason to assume it just got left behind. This was a combined arms effort to take out an infantry and armour position. I suspect that SP guns claimed by 1NY could be SturmPanzer NOT PanzerJager.
During the day 8 Aug some StuPz IVs were deployed in the area between Cintheaux and Quilly or Cailloet, cannot remember which and cannot remember right now from where I read that. Also StuPz IVs were sometimes attached to HJ and sometimes to 89. Div during the last days before the beginning of the Oper. Totalize.
The primary documentation is contradictory and I suspect there was a bit of a disagreement between the formations as to who 'owned' 1./St.Pz.Abt.217.

The Pz.Regt.12 KTB information transcribed/translated by Svamveber shows 1./St.Pz.Abt.217 moving in tandem with KG Prinz (II./SS-Pz.Regt.12) and is loacted alongside them in Fontaine Halbout early on 7th August. Svamveber (in footnote 58) states they are still subordinated to II./SS-Pz.Regt.12 on the 9th. No indication that they were reassigned out and back in during the meantime.

On the otherhand, Pz.Armee.West reports to Heeresgruppe.B are all over the place. They mention a 2./ and 3./Stu.Abt.217 but no 1./Stu.Abt.217. On 4th August, 1.SS-Pz-Div held 12 Sturmpanzer IV and KG Wunsche held 13. None are recorded on the 5th with anybody. On the 6th, 89.Inf-Div have 13 and 2./Stu.Abt.217 had 3 as part of 21.Pz-Div. It makes little sense.

My guess. 89.Inf-Div had none under their direct control but call upon those held by 1./Stu.Abt.217 with KG Prinz in 1.SS Korps reserve. During the night 6/7 August those Sturmpanzer moved with II./SS-Pz.Regt.12 (according to Svamveber) from the Maizieres area to Fonteine Halbout. Next morning, II./SS-Pz.Regt.12 is rushed to Cintheaux. No mention of 1./Stu.Abt.217. On the 9th, their back together again by Soignolles. At what point did they hop over to 89.Inf-Div? Is Svamveber making it up?

Juha
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#115

Post by Juha » 14 Jan 2019, 19:51

Hello Mark
agree with most you wrote. Only difference is the "virtually empty countryside" before the Canadiens after Phase I. There were the Fus.Abt of the 89. D, parts of the infantry of the 89. D, some 8 Tigers of the SS-sPz.Abt. 101, some JgPz IVs, some StuPz IVs, 75 mm Paks of the 3./SS-Pz.Jg.Abt. 12, 88 mm AA guns, at least most of the arty of the 89. D and that of 12. SS-Pz.D, some Werfer units. KG Waldmüller coming up. 89. D was fighting much better than Sepp Mayer and some historians claimed/claim, still stubbornly defending some key positions behind Allied front line and badly hampering Allied 2nd Phase units and Allied artillery units movements forward.

IMHO British /CW rigidly was at least partly because of Monty's sceptism on the ability of British/CW commanders. Roberts, the Commanding General of the 11th Armoured Div, criticised that untrust of British division and brigade commanders. British had some first class commanders but also several poor ones and also at least some Canadians failed, difficult to understand why Booth was not kicked out even before the Oper Totalize but that he was allowed to continue as Brigadier even after he was found hopelessly drunk on 8 Aug is very odd.

There were also some bad flaws in the plan, etc how they handled Gaumesnil. And signal problems, e.g. at Gaumesnil the infantry unit ordered to capture it did not know that a tank unit was already around it, according to the CO of Sherbrooke Fusiliers already in position on the grounds of the chateau.

Juha
Last edited by Juha on 14 Jan 2019, 20:10, edited 2 times in total.

MarkN
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#116

Post by MarkN » 14 Jan 2019, 19:55

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
14 Jan 2019, 19:19
Many thanks for posting up the remaining pages of the 89 Div and the pages of the 272 Div studies. It is good to get some details on the less well known German formations in Normandy - for many authors it seems that unless it is a Tiger or at least SS, then it is simply not worth mentioning!

From the map in the 89 Div study it looks like their main artillery and anti-tank screen was about and just to the west of Cintheaux which explains the difficulties that the Canadian Grenadier Guards had when trying to move forward after Wittmann had been defeated.
Read carefully where Neitzel (author of the 89.Inf-Div narrative) places their eastern boundary with 272.Inf-Div (and thus how the Grenadier battalions are deployed) and compare it to where everybody else puts them all.

Schack in the 272.Inf-Div narrative tallies with everybody else.

Edited.
Got my west and east mixed up again. :roll:
Last edited by MarkN on 14 Jan 2019, 21:02, edited 1 time in total.

Juha
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#117

Post by Juha » 14 Jan 2019, 20:00

Hello Mark
on StuPz IVs of the Pz.Abt.217 I based my thinking on the KTB of the 5. PzA, Számvéber pre-views and http://sturmpanzer.com/Default.aspx?tab ... em=3&sec=3 . I was also confused on what was the truth and you guess can well be a correct one.

MarkN
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#118

Post by MarkN » 14 Jan 2019, 20:14

Juha wrote:
14 Jan 2019, 19:51
agree with most you wrote. Only difference is the "virtually empty countryside" before the Canadiens after Phase I.
I don't believe it was virtually empty. That is the comment others have levelled against Simonds for not pushing straight on when Phase I reached their objectives at about 0600B. It's a commentary based upon an obsession with Meyer's post-war interviews and the SS in general. Halting after Phase I was exactly the British way of doing things: rigid timetable, sequence of events, initiative is bad.
Juha wrote:
14 Jan 2019, 19:51
IMHO British /CW rigidly was at least partly because of Monty's sceptism on the ability of British/CW commanders.
Montgomery was very much part of the problem.
Juha wrote:
14 Jan 2019, 19:51
There were also some bad flaws in the plan, etc how they handled Gaumesnil. And signal problems, e.g. at Gaumesnil the infantry unit ordered to capture it did not know that a tank unit was already around it, according to the CO of Sherbrooke Fusiliers already in position on the grounds of the chateau.
There was very bad command and control throughout. Formation commanders were running the battles from lines on maps and dots added based upon radio reports - and guesses. Very poor situational awareness. Simonds was at his map shouting at is signals staff to get sitreps and urging the divisional commanders to get a hurry on. The divisional commanders were sitting at their maps shouting at their signals staff to get sitreps and urging the brigade commanders to get a hurry on. The brigade commanders were sitting at their maps (some fast asleep) shouting at their signals staff to get sitreps and urging the battalion commanders to get a hurry on. And so on. The German Army Commander went up to Cintheaux to see for himself, discuss with his divsional commander, the KG commander and even one of the company commanders as to what was happenning etc etc. BIG difference.

German generals got killed quite frequently on the frontlines. British and Canadian generals often got injured by the USAF bombing behind the wrong lines!

Hardly any cooperation between sub-units of the same unit - let alone with sub-units of other formations. The British, Canadians and Poles had had 4 years to practice in the UK to get combined arms and such like worked out. They didn't. Why? The capbadges were too busy fighting amongst themselves for various parts of the glory to bother to work together. By Normandy, August 1944, finally they were starting to put together 'battle groups'. But they were not a formation trained together, they were random sods thrown together and told to get on with it. They may have been standing closer together than ever before, but they still weren't communicating or making any effort to work out how they could do things any better.

Juha
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#119

Post by Juha » 14 Jan 2019, 20:16

MarkN wrote:
14 Jan 2019, 19:55
Tom from Cornwall wrote:
14 Jan 2019, 19:19
Many thanks for posting up the remaining pages of the 89 Div and the pages of the 272 Div studies. It is good to get some details on the less well known German formations in Normandy - for many authors it seems that unless it is a Tiger or at least SS, then it is simply not worth mentioning!

From the map in the 89 Div study it looks like their main artillery and anti-tank screen was about and just to the west of Cintheaux which explains the difficulties that the Canadian Grenadier Guards had when trying to move forward after Wittmann had been defeated.
Read carefully where Neitzel (author of the 89.Inf-Div narrative) places their western boundary with 272.Inf-Div (and thus how the Grenadier battalions are deployed) and compare it to where everybody else puts them all.

Schack in the 272.Inf-Div narrative tallies with everybody else.
Notized that also, e.g. Hart in his Oper Totalize puts the right "border" of 89. D's sector east of La Hogue.

Juha

Juha
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Re: Losses of the Polish 24th Lancers on 8 August 1944 SE of Saint-Aignan-de-Cramesnil?

#120

Post by Juha » 14 Jan 2019, 20:30

Hardly any cooperation between sub-units of the same unit - let alone with sub-units of other formations. The British, Canadians and Poles had had 4 years to practice in the UK to get combined arms and such like worked out. They didn't. Why? The capbadges were too busy fighting amongst themselves for various parts of the glory to bother to work together. By Normandy, August 1944, finally they were starting to put together 'battle groups'. But they were not a formation trained together, they were random sods thrown together and told to get on with it. They may have been standing closer together than ever before, but they still weren't communicating or making any effort to work out how they could do things any better.
Hello Mark
IMHO you are a bit too harsh, IMHO during the Oper Bluecoats at least some of the TFs (Armoured Rgt, Inf. Bn, Arty and A/T Troop) of the 11th Arm.D worked together fairly well, but not all, the 2nd Northants Yeo, which was lacking tanks armed with 17-pdr, they got their first Challengers some days later, was badly mauled by Tigers and PzGren on 3 Aug, while a S.P. A/T Troop was sitting a mile or two behind them. And at least Roberts with his Command Group operated fairly forward during Oper. Epsom, Goodwood and Bluecoat.

Juha

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