What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

[MarkN]

Irrelevant to 1941 and Op CRUSADER.

Yes, you're right. The armour on the Crusader tank got magically weaker between November 1941 and May 1942

The comparison of Crusader armor performance against Grant armour performance is UTTERLY irrelevant to 1941 and Op CRUSADER.

Col Drew was one of the key users. Why would he want to fool himself?

Colonel Drew would know better than to be fooled I expect. He's just putting the best possible 'spin' on the effectiveness of the weapon.

The tests produced certain results. Either he reported those results as is or he manipulated the numbers to spin the narrative. I belive it to be the former.

The German tactics generally observed meant that they placed themselves well within the effective range of the British 2-pdr gun.

German pantsers didn't have sides, rears, tops and bottoms - a frontal aspect and nothing else.

I have never disputed that 2-pdr rounds under certain conditions/ranges shattered against German face-hardened plate. British testing proved it as well as the Russian ones.

no contradictions there!

I am fascinated how you think British anti-tank guns could have targeted the tops armour of the German tanks.

But yes, if German tactics were to deliberately expose their sides, rears, tops and bottoms to the 2-pdr within a 1,000 yards or so then there are chances of a getting a penetration.

Whether then the anaemic qualities of the 2-pdr projectile would then cause much damage in the German tank is another issue you won't want to get into.

Wibble.

The British had all the tools in the box to replicate what the Germans did at El Duda. They even had the written doctrine that informed us all on how it should be done in theory. Why local commanders chose not to do so is another story....

A bit mule headed not to say fanatical in your beliefs, aren't you?

Strange that, I was just thinking that you're a bit mule headed not to say fanatical in your beliefs, aren't you?

The British lacked a tank that could cruise about slowly at a range of 900 yards from enemy anti-tank guns and not be holed. Simple as that.

Indeed. So did the Germans. Although, I accept that 900yds was about reaching the limit of effective 2-pdr fire. But, other than the infamous 88mm, which German gun could reliably take out a Crusader CS at 900yds? Anyway, that role should have been done by filed artillery standing off completely - as in AR.33 at El Duda.
Nevertheless, 900yds is a bit of a headline red herring. That was the distance used based upon experience not a definitive must be distance.

[Gooner1]

Not in the British documents I'm reading.

You're reading them wrong. Not really a surprise, you seem to have a great ability to read everything that comes before your eyes badly.
" A and D Companies watched a brief duel at 900 yards' range between an anti-tank troop and thirty tanks to the south which the tanks won."

Interesting that you're now using "German tanks" rather than grasping at the specific Pz.IV doing all the work from a distance too great to be touched by British effort. More baby steps in the right direction. Remember, your original point was that the Pz.IV would not have been able to do what it did if ex.HAA 3-inch guns were there to plink them.

I only ever said German tanks.
The 3-inch guns would have been easy able to plink PzIIIs at the same distance.

A fairly accurate and utterly simplistic comment that does nothing to advance understanding of what impact the ex. HAA 3-inch gun would have had if it had been there.

It would have been able to kill panzers more effectively and at greater range than any other gun until the arrival of the Sherman and the M61 75mm shell.

Does that help you dear?

Ah, but this particular specimen was towed off the battlefield after being lit up by British guns.

You mean it burned after being hit by 2-pdrs! Well blow the seven trumpets!


Do you not think your belief in the efficiency of the 2-pdr should be dimmed somewhat by how rarely that happened?

I'm not interesting in proving anything to you.

So why the fcuk do you keep dribbling on, keyboard hero.

[Gooner1]

The comparison of Crusader armor performance against Grant armour performance is UTTERLY irrelevant to 1941 and Op CRUSADER.

There really should be a medal for stupidity on that level.

The firing trials were against the Crusader II tank. This was the most common British tank during the operation. It was found that the armour on the Crusader tank gave much less protection than was expected.

Jesus wept! Its not rocket surgery

Indeed. So did the Germans. Although, I accept that 900yds was about reaching the limit of effective 2-pdr fire. But, other than the infamous 88mm, which German gun could reliably take out a Crusader CS at 900yds?

You remember that bit about the armour on the Crusader tank (above) giving much less protection than expected?

So other than the 88, the 5cm Pak38 would have no trouble at all, the 5cm L/42 should manage it no problem as would the 7.5cm L/24. The 4.7cm(t) should produce a hole and quite probably the 47/32 as well.
It should be immune from the Pak36 at that distance though, if it helps?

Anyway, that role should have been done by filed artillery standing off completely - as in AR.33 at El Duda.

Nevertheless, 900yds is a bit of a headline red herring. That was the distance used based upon experience not a definitive must be distance.

[Sheldrake]

According to Anti-Aircraft artillery 1914-1955 by WW2 Light AA Gunner Brigadier Routledge OBE TD p119-120 3.7" guns were used against tanks at Boulogne and Calais - but with mixed results.

When tanks from the German 2nd Panzer Division attacked the Boulogne perimeter they were engaged one troop of four 3.7" Guns from 4/2nd HAA Battery. Two tanks were knocked out before the batteries were overrun.

The defences of Calais included seven 3.7" guns from 6th/2nd HAA Battery. During the attack by the German army the HAA Guns engaged tanks but immediately subjected to heavy shelling and mortar fire and forced to disable their guns and retire to avoid capture.

The 19409 writing on the wall is that HAA can be used against tanks but is vulnerable to counter battery fire.

The corollary is that 88mm works well for the Afrika Corps because the British fight as unsupported brigade groups of tanks.

It is harder for the British to make HAA a decisive weapon in the desert because the Germans work in all arms battle-groupsas part of co-ordinated divisions which concentrate artillery fire.

[MarkN]

The comparison of Crusader armor performance against Grant armour performance is UTTERLY irrelevant to 1941 and Op CRUSADER.

There really should be a medal for stupidity on that level.
The firing trials were against the Crusader II tank. This was the most common British tank during the operation. It was found that the armour on the Crusader tank gave much less protection than was expected.
Jesus wept! Its not rocket surgery

Jesus wept! Its not rocket surgery

The firing trials compared the results against a Crusader II and a Grant. All the results tell us is that the American armor appears to be better than the British armor under the test conditions held.

It offers nothing to inform us of the events of 1941 and Op CRUSADER.

You really should be awarded a medal for stupidity on that level.

Indeed. So did the Germans. Although, I accept that 900yds was about reaching the limit of effective 2-pdr fire. But, other than the infamous 88mm, which German gun could reliably take out a Crusader CS at 900yds?

You remember that bit about the armour on the Crusader tank (above) giving much less protection than expected?

So what?

So other than the 88, the 5cm Pak38 would have no trouble at all, the 5cm L/42 should manage it no problem as would the 7.5cm L/24. The 4.7cm(t) should produce a hole and quite probably the 47/32 as well.

Really?

Not in the British documents I'm reading.

You're reading them wrong. Not really a surprise, you seem to have a great ability to read everything that comes before your eyes badly.
" A and D Companies watched a brief duel at 900 yards' range between an anti-tank troop and thirty tanks to the south which the tanks won."

From the NZETC, not a document but a post-war narrative.

German tanks were seen approaching Ed Duda from the west at 1 p.m. and lorried infantry from the south. After a brief delay 1 RHA and then a battery of 104 RHA engaged the enemy, but the rest of the garrison artillery was too far away. The four batteries of 6 Field Regiment could have thickened up the defensive fire very considerably had the groundwork for such co-operation been laid in the past two days; but 1 Essex had to do without this help. Even the I tanks at Ed Duda did not seem to the infantry to be doing much, and B Company of 1 Essex soon found itself facing fifteen German tanks about 300 yards to the west. A and D Companies watched a brief duel at 900 yards' range between an anti-tank troop and thirty tanks to the south which the tanks won. The next phase was a systematic destruction by the tanks of the rocky sangars of 1 Essex, an ominous development which Brigadier Willison at once reported to Scobie, asking if 7 Armoured Division could do anything to help. Scobie could give no assurance of this and told him Ed Duda must be held at all costs. A few I tanks ventured forward, several of them were hit, the rest drew back to hull-down positions in the rear, and from then onwards 1 Essex felt very much alone.

Ahhhh! The idiosyncracy of the English language!!!

Question 1: Was this "brief duel" at 900yds range or was the observer 900yds distant from the duel?
Question 2: If the latter, was it 900yds from A Coy's position, D Coy's or B Coy's?
Question 3: Why was the duel brief?

Documentary evidence: 1Essex war diary has no mention of 900yds at all.

It would have been able to kill panzers more effectively and at greater range than any other gun until the arrival of the Sherman and the M61 75mm shell. Does that help you dear?

Then why not suggest am 18" railway gun? I'm sure that would have made a mess too. The reasons why that is just a silly suggestion are barely different from the reasons why the 3-inch HAA wasn't used. It's just the scale of the logistic, technological and intellectual problems that differ.

I'm not interesting in proving anything to you. That would be a fools errand. You've already made up your mind and whatever evidence is presented will be ignored or somehow denied. For example, Col Drew's test results are argued away as some conspiracy to deceive the troops....

So why the fcuk do you keep dribbling on, keyboard hero.

Highlighting your incompetence and ineptitude is jolly good sport.

Why do you make it so easy will all your dribbling on, keyboard hero?

[MarkN]

According to Anti-Aircraft artillery 1914-1955 by WW2 Light AA Gunner Brigadier Routledge OBE TD p119-120 3.7" guns were used against tanks at Boulogne and Calais - but with mixed results.

When tanks from the German 2nd Panzer Division attacked the Boulogne perimeter they were engaged one troop of four 3.7" Guns from 4/2nd HAA Battery. Two tanks were knocked out before the batteries were overrun.

The defences of Calais included seven 3.7" guns from 6th/2nd HAA Battery. During the attack by the German army the HAA Guns engaged tanks but immediately subjected to heavy shelling and mortar fire and forced to disable their guns and retire to avoid capture.

The 19409 writing on the wall is that HAA can be used against tanks but is vulnerable to counter battery fire.

The corollary is that 88mm works well for the Afrika Corps because the British fight as unsupported brigade groups of tanks.

It is harder for the British to make HAA a decisive weapon in the desert because the Germans work in all arms battle-groups as part of co-ordinated divisions which concentrate artillery fire.

Indeed. Looking at penetration tables, the 3-inch and 3.7-inch HAA guns would appear to be effective weapons in an ATk role. If only it were that simple.

[Gooner1]

According to Anti-Aircraft artillery 1914-1955 by WW2 Light AA Gunner Brigadier Routledge OBE TD p119-120 3.7" guns were used against tanks at Boulogne and Calais - but with mixed results.

When tanks from the German 2nd Panzer Division attacked the Boulogne perimeter they were engaged one troop of four 3.7" Guns from 4/2nd HAA Battery. Two tanks were knocked out before the batteries were overrun.

The defences of Calais included seven 3.7" guns from 6th/2nd HAA Battery. During the attack by the German army the HAA Guns engaged tanks but immediately subjected to heavy shelling and mortar fire and forced to disable their guns and retire to avoid capture.

The 3.7" gun didn't have any sights to engage ground targets. Hitting tanks, therefore, would have depended on a combination of extremely good judgment and luck.
Why Home Forces didn't expedite the production of suitable ground sights to turn the 3.7" gun into a proper all-round weapon, I don't know.

The 19409 writing on the wall is that HAA can be used against tanks but is vulnerable to counter battery fire.

The corollary is that 88mm works well for the Afrika Corps because the British fight as unsupported brigade groups of tanks.

It is harder for the British to make HAA a decisive weapon in the desert because the Germans work in all arms battle-groupsas part of co-ordinated divisions which concentrate artillery fire.

The British Artillery weren't just motoring about the desert with their thumbs stuck up their arses.

"On November 22 the main attack began. Omar Nuovo had fallen very easily in the morning, and the British tanks then came over to Libyan Omar, where three of the four Italian companies surrendered with little resistance. The assault on the German positions began late in the afternoon, and the 88-mm guns knocked out 17 infantry tanks before dark. As usual, the 88-mm guns were vulnerable to British artillery, and a combination of artillery and tanks silenced them just before nightfall."
The Development of German Defensive Tactics in Cyrenaica—1941
Military Intelligence Service, Special Series No. 5, October 16, 1942

"The four 88-mm attached to the Regiment had participated in the first frontier action. After opening up at 2,000 yards they knocked out 12 tanks, 2 of them infantry tanks struck at 1,320 yards. British artillery then forced the 88-mm guns to withdraw (it will be noted increasing that the chief fear of the Germans is British artillery).
<>
In the Capuzzo action of the second day 88-mm guns, firing through a mist, knocked out eight infantry tanks, including one hit in the turret at 550 yards. British artillery, however, forced the crews of the 88-mm guns to take cover and British tanks meanwhile approached to within 330 yards and damaged three of the four guns. The one intact 88-mm and two 20-mm guns knocked out three more British tanks at ranges between 275 and 350 yards, "
Report from I./Flak-Regiment 33

"The majority of our actions, once the withdrawal began were of a counter-attack nature and were nearly always held up by these anti-tank gun screens, which, because of their numbers and very clever concealment, were difficult to neutralize with the amount of artillery at our disposal.
The use of the 8.8cm. gun in the boldest possible manner had a considerable effect on these operations. This gun was often moved into position, particularly on the flanks of our armoured formations, to within 1,500 yards of our tanks. Their casualties must have been very high amongst crews and many of their guns were knocked out, but the damage they did, even to our Grant tanks, was considerable."
Notes From Theatres of War No.10 October 1942.


A couple more on how the Germans saw British Artillery:
" There has been much emphasis in reports on the good cooperation between British tanks and artillery (85-mm. (3.40-inch) and 105-mm. (4.20-inch)) which is very mobile as close-support artillery.
"Artillery fire is usually very accurate and is often directed by three armored cars. Fire is accurate even against moving columns, and when it is opened, the troops are much worried. In general no serious effect was produced on the tanks, except for the discomfort caused by the closing of the slits.
<>
"In contrast to the English, we still lack mobile close-support artillery."
German Methods of Warfare in the Libyan Desert
Military Intelligence Service, Information Bulletin No. 20, July 1942

"“Artillery shooting is good both in range and accuracy. At the beginning of the war its fire was over-schematic; but it has become more flexible. The effect of the 25-pr. gun-howitzer is comparatively slight, as the calibre is too small and the splinter effect poor. The lack of medium artillery is one of the principle weaknesses of the British Army”
Manual of the British Army April 1942.

[Sheldrake]

According to Anti-Aircraft artillery 1914-1955 by WW2 Light AA Gunner Brigadier Routledge OBE TD p119-120 3.7" guns were used against tanks at Boulogne and Calais - but with mixed results.
......to disable their guns and retire to avoid capture.

NOTE 1. The 3.7" gun didn't have any sights to engage ground targets. Hitting tanks, therefore, would have depended on a combination of extremely good judgment and luck.
Why Home Forces didn't expedite the production of suitable ground sights to turn the 3.7" gun into a proper all-round weapon, I don't know.

The 19409 writing on the wall is that HAA can be used against tanks but is vulnerable to counter battery fire.

The corollary is that 88mm works well for the Afrika Corps because the British fight as unsupported brigade groups of tanks.

It is harder for the British to make HAA a decisive weapon in the desert because the Germans work in all arms battle-groupsas part of co-ordinated divisions which concentrate artillery fire.

NOTE 2 The British Artillery weren't just motoring about the desert with their thumbs stuck up their arses.

"On November 22 the main attack began. Omar Nuovo had fallen very easily in the morning, and the British tanks then came over to Libyan Omar, where three of the four Italian companies surrendered with little resistance. The assault on the German positions began late in the afternoon, and the 88-mm guns knocked out 17 infantry tanks before dark. As usual, the 88-mm guns were vulnerable to British artillery, and a combination of artillery and tanks silenced them just before nightfall."
The Development of German Defensive Tactics in Cyrenaica—1941
Military Intelligence Service, Special Series No. 5, October 16, 1942

"The four 88-mm attached to the Regiment had participated in the first frontier action. After opening up at 2,000 yards they knocked out 12 tanks, 2 of them infantry tanks struck at 1,320 yards. British artillery then forced the 88-mm guns to withdraw (it will be noted increasing that the chief fear of the Germans is British artillery).
<>
In the Capuzzo action of the second day 88-mm guns, firing through a mist, knocked out eight infantry tanks, including one hit in the turret at 550 yards. British artillery, however, forced the crews of the 88-mm guns to take cover and British tanks meanwhile approached to within 330 yards and damaged three of the four guns. The one intact 88-mm and two 20-mm guns knocked out three more British tanks at ranges between 275 and 350 yards, "
Report from I./Flak-Regiment 33

"The majority of our actions, once the withdrawal began were of a counter-attack nature and were nearly always held up by these anti-tank gun screens, which, because of their numbers and very clever concealment, were difficult to neutralize with the amount of artillery at our disposal.
The use of the 8.8cm. gun in the boldest possible manner had a considerable effect on these operations. This gun was often moved into position, particularly on the flanks of our armoured formations, to within 1,500 yards of our tanks. Their casualties must have been very high amongst crews and many of their guns were knocked out, but the damage they did, even to our Grant tanks, was considerable."
Notes From Theatres of War No.10 October 1942.


A couple more on how the Germans saw British Artillery:
" There has been much emphasis in reports on the good cooperation between British tanks and artillery (85-mm. (3.40-inch) and 105-mm. (4.20-inch)) which is very mobile as close-support artillery.
"Artillery fire is usually very accurate and is often directed by three armored cars. Fire is accurate even against moving columns, and when it is opened, the troops are much worried. In general no serious effect was produced on the tanks, except for the discomfort caused by the closing of the slits.
<>
"In contrast to the English, we still lack mobile close-support artillery."
German Methods of Warfare in the Libyan Desert
Military Intelligence Service, Information Bulletin No. 20, July 1942

"“Artillery shooting is good both in range and accuracy. At the beginning of the war its fire was over-schematic; but it has become more flexible. The effect of the 25-pr. gun-howitzer is comparatively slight, as the calibre is too small and the splinter effect poor. The lack of medium artillery is one of the principle weaknesses of the British Army”
Manual of the British Army April 1942.

RE 1. I think I answered this on post #16 in mid November and posts #323 and 321 when you raised the same question. Soldiers are practical people. It is easier to engage with gunsights than without, and I have great admiration for the 3.7" detachments defending Boulogne under fire, but sights can be improvised.

RE 2 Thank you for the excellent examples of 88s neutralised by field guns. However, practically for a lot of the time the British Artillery did seem to be as fgood as driving about thumb up bum. The decision to decentralise artillery to under command of brigades robbed the British of the great capability of aritllery concentrate fire where it was really needed.

[MarkN]

The British Artillery weren't just motoring about the desert with their thumbs stuck up their arses.

Nope, they weren't. But they weren't being lead, tactically speaking, very well - just like the entire British Army - and thus they were somewhat less effective than they could have been.

Now, I don't know where you got your quotes from (your references don't mean anything to me), but they're interesting. Why? Let's go back a few steps. You wrote...

The Germans deliberately lobbed shells from afar to locate any (hidden) A/Tk guns, first neutralised them with field guns or Pz.IV rounds and then advanced. The British ignored any enemy A/Tk guns - if they saw them - and pressed ahead regardless.

Notes from Theatres of War March '42:
"German tactics at El Duda. - in the armoured attack on El Duda, the German tanks cruised about very slowly outside the effective range of the 2-pr., continuously shelling the position with their 75mm guns. They gradually goaded our anti-tank guns to fire, and, when satisfied that all had been located, they knocked them out quickly with fire from gun tanks and supporting artillery. Then, just before dusk, the tanks moved forward with infantry close behind and overran the centre of the position."

Now why couldn't the British just do the same?

The British had CS panzers (just like the Germans had the Pz.IV) to lob shells with the accuracy required to encourage opposing ATk gunners to expose themselves - without having the accuracy to take them out efficiently.
The British had field artillery from afar and gun tanks on the charge (just like the Germans had AR.33 and Pz.II and Pz.III at El Duda) to deal with those ATk once they had been identified.

Very kind of you now to post some interesting quotes identifying the British field guns being a menace to the Germans, to being capable and effective in taking out German ATk guns (bit different to your earlier handwaving) and pointing out how they did it: send in the pantsers to get shot up, then eliminate the ATk with field guns!!!!

The question is not: "Now why couldn't the British just do the same?", the question is why didn't the British just do the same?

[Gooner1]

RE 1. I think I answered this on post #16 in mid November and posts #323 and 321 when you raised the same question. Soldiers are practical people. It is easier to engage with gunsights than without, and I have great admiration for the 3.7" detachments defending Boulogne under fire, but sights can be improvised.

Without good sights, you've mainly just got a conspicuous target though.
Still it would be interesting to know what the Germans thought, if anything, about the 3.7" guns they encountered in the direct fire mode.
They may have contributed something to the defence at Knightsbridge and El Adem ..

The decision to decentralise artillery to under command of brigades robbed the British of the great capability of aritllery concentrate fire where it was really needed.

Yes undoubtedly. Depending on the situation though, each tank regiment might only have one battery of artillery to support it. Eight guns to support maybe fifty tanks, of which maybe six were CS tanks. Hence the stream of requests from M.E. for HE ammunition for the 2-pdr. Every tank needed to be able to respond to anti-tank guns and soft targets with HE.

[Gooner1]

[The British had CS panzers (just like the Germans had the Pz.IV) to lob shells with the accuracy required to encourage opposing ATk gunners to expose themselves - without having the accuracy to take them out efficiently.
The British had field artillery from afar and gun tanks on the charge (just like the Germans had AR.33 and Pz.II and Pz.III at El Duda) to deal with those ATk once they had been identified.

When the German anti-tank gunners decided to reveal themselves through firing, the probable result is the British tanks with holes in them (and probably burning).
That is the difference.

Very kind of you now to post some interesting quotes identifying the British field guns being a menace to the Germans, to being capable and effective in taking out German ATk guns

Check out Stanley Christopherson's diaries for a Crusader CS tank taking out an anti-tank gun.
Begs the question what do you think the artillery in support and the CS tanks would be doing when the tank regiment was being engaged by anti-tank guns?

The question is not: "Now why couldn't the British just do the same?", the question is why didn't the British just do the same?

Surely the question should be "why should they expect a similar result?"

[MarkN]

[The British had CS panzers (just like the Germans had the Pz.IV) to lob shells with the accuracy required to encourage opposing ATk gunners to expose themselves - without having the accuracy to take them out efficiently.
The British had field artillery from afar and gun tanks on the charge (just like the Germans had AR.33 and Pz.II and Pz.III at El Duda) to deal with those ATk once they had been identified.

When the German anti-tank gunners decided to reveal themselves through firing, the probable result is the British tanks with holes in them (and probably burning).
That is the difference.

So what you're saying, in a roundabout way, that the British gunners were too quick to reveal themselves by firing too early whilst the Germans had the 'nerve' to wait longer. I believe there is quite a bit of commentary along those lines in the diaries.
That is the difference.

Very kind of you now to post some interesting quotes identifying the British field guns being a menace to the Germans, to being capable and effective in taking out German ATk guns

Check out Stanley Christopherson's diaries for a Crusader CS tank taking out an anti-tank gun.
Begs the question what do you think the artillery in support and the CS tanks would be doing when the tank regiment was being engaged by anti-tank guns?

In the context of comparing to El Duda, the question is why is the tank regiment being engaged before the enemy ATk screen has been knocked out?

The question is not: "Now why couldn't the British just do the same?", the question is why didn't the British just do the same?

Surely the question should be "why should they expect a similar result?"

Surely the question should be "why shouldn't they expect a similar result?"

[Sheldrake]

RE 1. I think I answered this on post #16 in mid November and posts #323 and 321 when you raised the same question. Soldiers are practical people. It is easier to engage with gunsights than without, and I have great admiration for the 3.7" detachments defending Boulogne under fire, but sights can be improvised.

(1) Without good sights, you've mainly just got a conspicuous target though.
Still it would be interesting to know what the Germans thought, if anything, about the 3.7" guns they encountered in the direct fire mode.
They may have contributed something to the defence at Knightsbridge and El Adem ..

The decision to decentralise artillery to under command of brigades robbed the British of the great capability of aritllery concentrate fire where it was really needed.

(2) Yes undoubtedly. Depending on the situation though, each tank regiment might only have one battery of artillery to support it. Eight guns to support maybe fifty tanks, of which maybe six were CS tanks. (3) Hence the stream of requests from M.E. for HE ammunition for the 2-pdr. Every tank needed to be able to respond to anti-tank guns and soft targets with HE.

RE 1 An HAA Equipment 88mm/3.7" gun at 2,000m subtends roughly the same angle as a 50mm or 6 pdr Anti tank gun at 1000m - and is harder to hit.

Re 2 The point about concentration of artillery fire is that the battle is not a series of regimental duels. In the example you have given an armoured regiment supported by a lone artillery battery - which could provide two fire units to take on individual anti tank guns. The problem is that good anti-tank defences did not have one or two anti tank guns. Anti-tank guns were deployed in fours, sixes and twelves to cover killing zones.

Cunning commanders and staff deployed their forces so that at the point of main effort maybe two regiments will be fighting, but with the support of ALL of the divisional artillery. In the post WW2 British army, a battlegroup attack would normally call on the whole regiment of three or four batteries.

Re 3. The six 3" CS in the crusaders tanks were nothing like as useful as a troop of 25 pounders. With a maximum range of 1,800 they lacked the range to provide over-watch. The 3" howitzer is an area weapon. Christopherson may have had a lucky hit, the PEr even at 1,500m is far greater than the size of the target. Even if grouped together as a battery of six their feeble range limits the the area that they can provide supporting fire. CS tanks range of 1,800m = C. 10 square kilometers that can be targeted. A troop of 25 Pounder can hit targets within 320 square km.

[MarkN]

Hence the stream of requests from M.E. for HE ammunition for the 2-pdr.

I'd be interested in seeing evidence of that.

[Urmel]

The British Artillery weren't just motoring about the desert with their thumbs stuck up their arses.

"On November 22 the main attack began. Omar Nuovo

Oh Jesus. So when I roll this out as an example how things can be done you p*ss all over it, but when it suits you, you roll it out.

Also, despite all your expertise, you seem to be unaware that this was an I-tank attack with the tanks subordinated to an infantry brigade. It does nothing to address the point Sheldrake and others have been making repeatedly.

But of course you know that, and you are at this stage to the Commonwealth section of this forum nothing but a common troll and time waster.