Different German Oil Strategy

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
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Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#166

Post by Hanny » 12 Jan 2019, 23:38

somua33 wrote:
20 Mar 2018, 19:25


If you are planning a war, it's self evident why you would want a big stock pile of oil before it starts. Converting oil from coal is horrendously expensive in resources. All that coal used could have powered European industry to a number of possible effects.
Japan ( with a fraction of the industrial base and income of the Reich) had this problem, here is a good summary of how they went about creating a stockpile http://fireonthewaters.tripod.com/JapanOilPuzzle.pdf
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#167

Post by ljadw » 13 Jan 2019, 11:34

Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Jan 2019, 19:33
ljadw wrote:
12 Jan 2019, 18:20
The USSB figure is inflated :
Japanese stocks were
in March 1941 48,9 million barrels
in March 1942 38,2 million
in March 1943 25,3 million
in March 1944 13, 8 million
in (March ? ) 1945 4,7 million .
Source : Pacific War online Encyclopedia .
Hmmm, unsourced internet content or USSBS? Gee, I wonder which source to accept at face value?
I have my doubts about the reliability of the USSBS,given what we know about their source for their publications about Germany ,source who was Speer the liar .The use of Speer as source has given generations of historians a false picture about the German war economy,picture which lasted til the publication of The Wages of Destruction .
We don't know what the Japanese sources of the USSBS were (IF they used any Japanese sources ) ,but,if these were on the level of the German sources, we should have a lot of reasons to be very sceptical .


Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#168

Post by Hanny » 13 Jan 2019, 12:58

ljadw wrote:
13 Jan 2019, 11:34

I have my doubts about the reliability of the USSBS,given what we know about their source for their publications about Germany ,source who was Speer the liar .The use of Speer as source has given generations of historians a false picture about the German war economy,picture which lasted til the publication of The Wages of Destruction .
We don't know what the Japanese sources of the USSBS were (IF they used any Japanese sources ) ,but,if these were on the level of the German sources, we should have a lot of reasons to be very sceptical .
There is no doubt that your confusion is the result of your inability to do the conversion of brrls to tons.

Your website source material was Cohen, Jerome B. 1949. Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction, he also helped write the USSBS oil report and is using the USSBS numbers with small revisions, mostly concerned with estimates of consumption, amounts held by the IJN and not reported to the japaanese government, in his book he writes Japan went to war with an oil reserve of fifty-one million barrels.

Unlike you, he could convert brrls to tons.

We do know the Japanese sources sources used by USSBS because Cohen uses them in his book.

Not a single number you converted is correct. Not a single claim of inflated numbers is correct. And lastly your claim " the highest reserve was 43 million barrels" was incorrect.

But what really worries me is the absence of any references to hoplites.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#169

Post by ljadw » 13 Jan 2019, 20:53

Your converting figures are not correct .There is no proof for the 6,6 million ton figure .A ton of oil was sometimes 6,55 barrels, sometimes 7,58 barrels .
And,the figures I have given are from March 1941,1942, etc , not from December 1941 .
51 million barrels at the start of the war is impossible, as 3 months later,the stocks were only 38 million barrels : how do you explain a decrease of 13 million barrels in 3 months ?
Last edited by ljadw on 13 Jan 2019, 21:08, edited 1 time in total.

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#170

Post by ljadw » 13 Jan 2019, 21:07

Paul Lakowski wrote:
12 Jan 2019, 22:35
ljadw wrote:
12 Jan 2019, 13:58
Paul Lakowski wrote:
12 Jan 2019, 04:36
4 million tons reserve stockpiled makes sense prewar and is doable.

German merchant fleet could shift 1/4 million tons in one sortie. Perhaps a million tons per year from foreign sources covered by credit, while the cost of product should be MAYBE 100 million RM per year. From 1934-39 that's 2/3 billion RM for 6 MILLION TONS fuel over and above historical rates..

WESTWALL required 200,000 workers [34-39] and 3 BRM investment plus 1.7 million tons steel and 10 million tons concrete . SHIPPING 6 million tons of fuel should reduce this WW to 78% of these figures, UNLESS bilateral trade arrangement can be hammered out. Instead of WW more synthetic fuel and plants could be built .

Balance of the WW concrete , steel and labour can erect 1.4 additional tons fuel storage, bring the prewar capacity to 3.8 million tons surplus fuel storage. In theory there was a built in 2 million tons gap between oil production and refinery capacity.
I like to see the proof that there were sufficient idle German tankers to transport an additional 250000 tons of oil .
Why should Germany build more synthetic plants to have more oil reserves (= IDLE oil ) and no West Wall ?Besides, the construction of the WW started only in 1936 .
About the synthetic oil industry ,it produced in 1933 170000 ton, in 1934 150000, in 1935 240000,in 1936 500000, in 1937 650000,in 1938 1,2 million, in 1939 2,2 million.
There is no proof that 1,2 million tons were possible before 1938 and if possible that it would be produced .
Synthetic oil costed more than imported oil/ crude domestic,thus the demand was limited, but the demand for other oil was also limited :the imports were going up from 2,65 million in 1933 to 5,1 million in 1939, but British imports for the same period were on the 10 million + level .
WW construction was underway since the early 1930s .

USSBS reports hydro/FT produced million tons in 1938.
BENZOL increased from 1/3 million tons in 1935 to 1/2 million tons in 1938.
In 1938 2 million tons was produced in coal tar distillation. This feed the hydrogenation plants in 1938 and as by product also produced 180k oil. LOW TAR produced 1/4 million tons [mostly diesel] in 1938.

Indigenous synthetic fuel production.
1936 1.85 million tons = surplus 446 k tons
1937 2.195 million tons = surplus 353k tons
1938 2.755 million tons = surplus 728k tons
1939 3.876 million tons= surplus 166k tons
1940 4.747 million tons

In 1939 2.4 million tons fuel stockpiled.

synthetic oil capacity at out break of war 4.638 million tons.

ALL USSBS.
I do not believe the American figures :
Eichholtz,who is the authority , gives for 1939 a total of 2,2 million ton of synthetic oil and, Das Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944 PO 310 ,gives 1,268 ton of synthetic oil for 1939 and for 1936 476000 ton .
Source : Faktor Oil 9 By Stokes and Karlsch ) German edition PP 204/205 .
And, the WW was NOT under construction since the early 30s,as the region was demilitarised and fortifications were forbidden .

Paul Lakowski
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#171

Post by Paul Lakowski » 14 Jan 2019, 03:13

Belief is a dangerous concept in study of history, but Your entitled to your opinion. I go with USSBS !

As to the others there were so much different programs so I have no problem with your figures....as to WW I had a German doc on previous hard drive. The guy has digital NARA archive and it showed ORIGINAL detailed German plans through 1935-1940 etc, etc, how much invested money concrete labor etc.

So I am more comfortable with his figures.

Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#172

Post by Hanny » 14 Jan 2019, 10:27

ljadw wrote:
13 Jan 2019, 20:53
Your converting figures are not correct .There is no proof for the 6,6 million ton figure .A ton of oil was sometimes 6,55 barrels, sometimes 7,58 barrels .
Proof is the website you used as source, it sets out the methodology for calculating the 2 sets of oils in the table.
ljadw wrote:
13 Jan 2019, 20:53
And,the figures I have given are from March 1941,1942, etc , not from December 1941 .
Your link to the source, does not contain March in the table you have posted from, the only reference to March is:
From the link
By 13 March 1941, the Japanese had managed to stockpile about 42.7 million barrels of oil

The link then gives totals of the crude and refined in a table. Usingb the conversion rate of barrels to tons given in gthe link.

Crude 20,857/6.55=3184, refined 28,036/7.58=3698 is 6.9 million tons. So your claim of 6 million being inftaed, as to your linked source thatb claims 6.9 million, has math error on your part.

Your Jan figures dont appear on the website either.



http://fireonthewaters.tripod.com/JapanOilPuzzle.pdf
IJN stockpile
(converted into barrels) as of December 1, 1941

Av gas 2,980,000
Isooctane 170,000
Motor gas 88,000
Diesel fuel 440,000
lubricants 126,000
Held on ships/bases 5,802,000
Other lubricants 88,000

Total 9,694,000/7.58 in ton= 1278891

Crude oil 9,041,000
Fuel oil 22,894,000

Total 31,935,000/6.55 in tons is 4875572

Total Oil stocks of japan Dec 1 1941 was 6154463 tons.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#173

Post by ljadw » 14 Jan 2019, 21:04

There is no proof that the 5,8 million barrels distributed to ships and bases ( this was the oil in the southern zone ) were crude oil or refined oil . No one knows and it is thus impossible to convert it in tons .
The correct enumeration should be :
Fuel Oil : 22,9
Crude : 9
Av gas : 3
Products : 5,8
distributed to ships and bases
Others : 0,3
Total : 41 million barrels, not included motor oil and diesel fuel which were not reported .
Source - Japanese oil puzzle PP 17/18 .
Last edited by ljadw on 14 Jan 2019, 21:31, edited 1 time in total.

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#174

Post by ljadw » 14 Jan 2019, 21:28

Paul Lakowski wrote:
14 Jan 2019, 03:13
Belief is a dangerous concept in study of history, but Your entitled to your opinion. I go with USSBS !

As to the others there were so much different programs so I have no problem with your figures....as to WW I had a German doc on previous hard drive. The guy has digital NARA archive and it showed ORIGINAL detailed German plans through 1935-1940 etc, etc, how much invested money concrete labor etc.

So I am more comfortable with his figures.
We know that the USSBS used,for a lot of reasons, the figures doctored by Wagenführ ,Speer's statistician and spin doctor >
We know also that the USSBS conclusions were wrong ,conclusions as
German economy was throughout most of the war ,undermobilized .
And
Speer rationalized the German war economy and eliminated most of the worst inefficiencies in the previous controls.
The reason for the USSBS failure is that its members came to Germany as victors to a defeated country, unhindered by any knowledge,and as baggage ignorence, naivity, bias and arrogance.
Even Friedrich von Hayek made the same mistake by saying that the US successes were obtained by the collaboration of the industrialists with the state and the German successes in spite of the state . He parotted the fables of Speer .
As the USSBS was so mistaken about Germany, why would they be better about Japan ?

Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#175

Post by Hanny » 15 Jan 2019, 10:58

ljadw wrote:
14 Jan 2019, 21:04
There is no proof that the 5,8 million barrels distributed to ships and bases ( this was the oil in the southern zone ) were crude oil or refined oil . No one knows and it is thus impossible to convert it in tons .
The author does not share your view. he uses it as refined. See his maths at end of paper with a graph of oil resource by quarter.

And now, drum roll, i do the impossible.

Its either crude or refined, (Authour uses as refined) but if its crude it increases stocks .6154463+120366 to a higher number of 6274829
5,802,000/7.58=765435.3
5,802,000/6.55=885801.5

Total Oil stocks of japan Dec 1 1941 was 6154463 tons.If its as the author claims refined.
Total Oil stocks of japan Dec 1 1941 was 6274829 tons.If its not as as the author claims refined, but crude.
ljadw wrote:
14 Jan 2019, 21:04
The correct enumeration should be :
No it would not be.
Last edited by Hanny on 15 Jan 2019, 12:15, edited 2 times in total.
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Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#176

Post by Hanny » 15 Jan 2019, 11:02

ljadw wrote:
14 Jan 2019, 21:28

The reason for the USSBS failure is that its members came to Germany as victors to a defeated country, unhindered by any knowledge,and as baggage ignorence, naivity, bias and arrogance.
Ignorance, naivety, bias and arrogance, and inability to use math, as a tool for problem solving is certainly where your coming from. It is and was not true of the USSBS.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Peter89
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#177

Post by Peter89 » 15 Jan 2019, 15:06

It's so funny when Christianmunich argues that Soviet and Western sources are biased and stupid, and when ljdaw dismiss the Western sources as biased and arrogant, but the cherry on the cake is when jesk quotes German diaries as source of alternate history.
Last edited by Peter89 on 15 Jan 2019, 16:30, edited 1 time in total.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#178

Post by Hanny » 15 Jan 2019, 15:34

Peter89 wrote:
15 Jan 2019, 15:06
It's so funny when Christianmunich argues that Soviet and Western sources are biased and stupid, and when ljdaw dismiss the Western sources as biased and arrogant, but the cherry on the cacke is when jesk quotes German diaries as source of alternate history.
True, which tends to show this is no place for a gentleman. :D
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#179

Post by ljadw » 15 Jan 2019, 16:14

Peter89 wrote:
15 Jan 2019, 15:06
It's so funny when Christianmunich argues that Soviet and Western sources are biased and stupid, and when ljdaw dismiss the Western sources as biased and arrogant, but the cherry on the cacke is when jesk quotes German diaries as source of alternate history.
I did not say that Western sources were arrogant and biased, but that winners were and are arrogant and biased : Galbraith came to Europe with the conviction that the American economic system was more efficient than the German one .
The arrival of the USSBS in a destroyed Europe was as the Ugly American 13 years later .
The ignorance of the USSBS about Germany was striking, it was also striking about Britain, France, etc , but its ignorance about Japan was much bigger: how many members of the USSBS had visited Germany and Japan, how many spoke/understood German/Japanese ?
And, about the Japanese oil stocks : the Japanese used tons, not barrels, the USSBS converted the tons in barrels ( always something hazardous ) and now we are discussing if the convert of barrels to tons again is correct, instead of searching if the USSBS used the correct Japanese ton figures, or if the Japanese figures were correct .During the period between the capitulation and the arrival of the Americans, the Japanese did not remain idle : they destroyed as many of the remaining documents ( a lot were already destroyed by US air attacks ),the result was that the USSBS was forced to use what the Japanese and the AAF had not destroyed . As we don't know what was lost, we can't be certain that what was remaining,was reliable .

Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#180

Post by Hanny » 15 Jan 2019, 16:34

ljadw wrote:
15 Jan 2019, 16:14
the Japanese used tons, not barrels, the USSBS converted the tons in barrels ( always something hazardous ) and now we are discussing if the convert of barrels to tons again is correct, instead of searching if the USSBS used the correct Japanese ton figures, or if the Japanese figures were correct
Incorrect the Japanese used the metric system of kiloliters, they did not use tons, which was easily transferred into industry standard terms as barrels or tons. Nothing hazardous in the maths.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

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