Different German Oil Strategy

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Post Reply
Peter89
Member
Posts: 2369
Joined: 28 Aug 2018, 06:52
Location: Europe

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#196

Post by Peter89 » 17 Jan 2019, 11:05

Nah this is not so simple. War economy of the Axis is not the same as war economy of the Reich. The political pressure increased on the minor Axis nations and on the occupied territories after 1942. In 1941 the Hungarian Minister of Defence Nagybaczoni-Nagy Vilmos wrote in his memoir that Hungarians were "allowed" to take part in the conquest of Yugoslavia and the SU, but in 1942 their contribution was "demanded" by the Germans, and from 1943 it was "obligatory"; he strongly opposed this and therefore had to resign shortly thereafter.

If you take a look at the trade balance between Germany and his peers, you can see a steep rising of debt of Germany. Such drain could not be achieved without very strong political power, which Speer enjoyed.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Hanny
Banned
Posts: 855
Joined: 26 Oct 2008, 21:40

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#197

Post by Hanny » 17 Jan 2019, 11:26

ljadw wrote:
17 Jan 2019, 10:10

I know of Abelshauser and I am sceptical about Harrison .
But, is there anyone who has read "Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft '' ( by Eichholtz ) ? Notwithstanding the usual,expected and obligatory comments about fascists and capitalists, it is considered as a must, on the same level as The Wages of Destruction .
So you know how its taught in both countries, and US war College, but disagree with them all.

Eichholtz is an Eastern German Marxist. His writtings, from the cold war period and beyond, reflect that perspective.

Where one type of economist looks at Nazis going East for more land, insufficient land, as a cause of the war, ie not enough land for the population, another looks at it as too many Germans for the land they already have.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.


Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#198

Post by Richard Anderson » 18 Jan 2019, 04:43

Hanny wrote:
17 Jan 2019, 09:47
ljadw wrote:
17 Jan 2019, 09:31
''The German economy during the first three years of the war was a ''butter and bullets '',one operating in a leisurely,semi-peacetime fashion .''
After this absurdity, it is very mysterious that there are still people believing inconditionally or not,the claims of the USSBS .


This quote comes fromn
''The Rathenau and Speer system of War Production '' (thesis for the Army and General Staff College at Fort Leavensworth )1975, on P 133,note 202 referring to USSBS ,23 .
Hanny wrote:Yes i know where it comes from, which is why i asked, "If were going to quote, can we at least get the quote right".
It might also help if then Major Wissinger had gotten his reference correctly and in context. The phrase is actually in Report No. 3, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy (also something he did not make clear, since he actually references Reports No. 1, 2, and 3 in his bibliography, but does not say which when he means in the footnote), on page 9, not 23. What the authors of the report actually said was:

"According to German statistics, civilian consumption in 1939 was above the 1929 level and had only fallen slightly by 1941. This shows that Germany entered the war with a "guns and [emphasis in original] butter" philosophy which was continued well after the initial defeats in Russia."

I suggest that instead of poo-pooing the USSBS, ljadw might want to actually demonstrate that he/she has actually read any part of the USSBS, rather than secondary sources faultily referencing those reports. :roll:
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Hanny
Banned
Posts: 855
Joined: 26 Oct 2008, 21:40

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#199

Post by Hanny » 18 Jan 2019, 15:31

Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Jan 2019, 04:43

"According to German statistics, civilian consumption in 1939 was above the 1929 level and had only fallen slightly by 1941. This shows that Germany entered the war with a "guns and [emphasis in original] butter" philosophy which was continued well after the initial defeats in Russia."
Its worth noting who gave the USSBS the statistics, Rolf Wagenführ head of the Department of Planning Statistics, was the senior economists and statisticians of Speer's ministry, and its him and the Nazis own records that showed what find of economy they ran. How we got him is quite intresting

htps://www.ireneswu.com/single-post/2016/09/29 ... al-Product

Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945 von Rolf Wagenführ. Rolfs own acount of the Nazi economy, very little different from USSBS. But hey what would the head of the Nazi economics branch know about what kind of economy they had.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15589
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#200

Post by ljadw » 18 Jan 2019, 20:13

Everyone knows that Wagenführ was the spin doctor of Speer and that his figures are unreliable .
Nazi Germany ( by Jane Copland ) :

''historians have relied almost entirely on the industrial indices compiled by Wagenführ:between 1939 and 1941 these appear to show both a low level of armaments production and a catastrophic collapse in labour productivity .But both these findings are open to serious technical criticism .'' P 185 .
Of course Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege differed very little from what the USSB said : the USSB parotted Wagenführ and Speer .
But the claims from Speer/Wagenführ have been proved to be false, by Overy and Tooze .

Hanny
Banned
Posts: 855
Joined: 26 Oct 2008, 21:40

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#201

Post by Hanny » 18 Jan 2019, 21:02

ljadw wrote:
18 Jan 2019, 20:13
Everyone knows that Wagenführ was the spin doctor of Speer and that his figures are unreliable .
Nazi Germany ( by Jane Copland ) :
Nope, no one knew that in 1945. No one thought his figures were unreliable, since his book was a core teaching text for decades. Nazis had s[pin docters and economists, tJane has confused the two. Jane Copland is a PR manager and writes an online blog about ww2.https://blog.thepensters.com/author/jane-copland/
ljadw wrote:
18 Jan 2019, 20:13
''historians have relied almost entirely on the industrial indices compiled by Wagenführ:between 1939 and 1941 these appear to show both a low level of armaments production and a catastrophic collapse in labour productivity .But both these findings are open to serious technical criticism .'' P 185 .
Of course Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege differed very little from what the USSB said : the USSB parotted Wagenführ and Speer .
Your using Jane Caplan who edited Nazi Germany, and wrote none of it. Its actualy written by Adam Tooze. Why is it you refuse to quote correctly?.

P185 continues, "New Data reconstructed from previous unused archival sources suggest a far more optimistic account of the mobilisation of German Industry. Chronic inefficiency was not central the problem for German industry. The real problem was the glaring disparity between Germany extremely difficult strategics ituation and the material resources at Germanys disposal."

Why is you always quote out of context?.
ljadw wrote:
18 Jan 2019, 20:13
But the claims from Speer/Wagenführ have been proved to be false, by Overy and Tooze .
Except they both have done no such thing. They have offered a different perspective of what the economic indices may mean.
Last edited by Hanny on 18 Jan 2019, 21:08, edited 1 time in total.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15589
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#202

Post by ljadw » 18 Jan 2019, 21:05

For the criticism by Tooze, see :No room for miracles,German industrial output in WWII assessed .
And, 2 eminent German professors ( Scherner and Streb ) did the same in " The Mirage of the German Armament miracle in WWII ',in the abstract summary, they wrote the following :
'Based on a revision of output and labour productivity series of the German armament industry in WWII,we show that the so-called German armament production is only a statistical construct produced by the manipulation of Speer and his statisticians . '
2 German professors accused Speer and Wagenführ of manipulation .
As the USSBS accepted eagerly the manipulated figures from Speer/Wagenführ, the conclusion can only be that the USSBS report is good for under the Greyhound bus .

Hanny
Banned
Posts: 855
Joined: 26 Oct 2008, 21:40

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#203

Post by Hanny » 18 Jan 2019, 21:12

Wow, from proof of being wrong, to mere criticism....
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15589
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#204

Post by ljadw » 18 Jan 2019, 21:15

Hanny wrote:
18 Jan 2019, 21:02
ljadw wrote:
18 Jan 2019, 20:13
Everyone knows that Wagenführ was the spin doctor of Speer and that his figures are unreliable .
Nazi Germany ( by Jane Copland ) :
Nope, no one knew that in 1945. Jane Copland is a PR manager and writes an online blog about ww2.https://blog.thepensters.com/author/jane-copland/
ljadw wrote:
18 Jan 2019, 20:13
''historians have relied almost entirely on the industrial indices compiled by Wagenführ:between 1939 and 1941 these appear to show both a low level of armaments production and a catastrophic collapse in labour productivity .But both these findings are open to serious technical criticism .'' P 185 .
Of course Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege differed very little from what the USSB said : the USSB parotted Wagenführ and Speer .
Your using Jane Caplan who edited Nazi Germany, and wrote none of it. Its actualy written by Adam Tooze. Why is it you refuse to quote correctly?.

P185 continues, "New Data reconstructed from previous unused archival sources suggest a far more optimistic account of the mobilisation of German Industry. Chronic inefficiency was not central the problem for German industry. The real problem was the glaring disparity between Germany extremely difficult strategics ituation and the material resources at Germanys disposal."

Why is you always quote out of context?.
ljadw wrote:
18 Jan 2019, 20:13
But the claims from Speer/Wagenführ have been proved to be false, by Overy and Tooze .
Except they both have done no such thing. They have offered a different perspective of what the economic indices may mean.
Tooze wrote the following in the abstract summary of No room for Miracles ..: ''......The Wagenführ index is poorly documented,inconsistent in its coverage and the manner of its construction results in a serious biased depiction of the war effort,particularly between 1939 and 1941 . ''
Tooze said that Wagenführ was seriously biased in his depiction of the war effort before Speer .
Scherner and Streb said that the figures from Wagenführ were manipulated ( and we know why ) , but still you are defending these manipulated and biased figures .

Hanny
Banned
Posts: 855
Joined: 26 Oct 2008, 21:40

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#205

Post by Hanny » 18 Jan 2019, 21:28

Since you refuse or are unable to quote correctly, and in context, i can assume your unable to understand economics as thats a tad more complicated.

Tooze book does not contain the economic evidence to support many of his claims. Nor does it contain enough evidence to replace existing teaching of the subject. And he cites the USSBS extensively.

What else did Tooze write? "It is conventional in histories of the Third Reich to counterpose rearmament to the 'civilian' objectives of the regime as though they were mutually exclusive alternatives, a view often summarized as a choice between 'guns or butter'. And there is an undeniable truth in this."

Here is how its taught to students in UK for GSCE level http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesi ... rev1.shtml
Full employment - the idea that everyone should have a job. By 1939, there was virtually no unemployment in Germany.
Beauty of Work - the Nazis set up the SdA (Beauty of Work) to help Germans see that work was good, and that everyone who could work should. In fact - because the Nazis had abolished the trade unions, banned strikes, and given more power to the industrialists - real wages fell and hours were longer under Hitler.
Re-armament begun in 1935 - the idea of 'guns before butter'.
Autarky - there was an unsuccessful attempt at making Germany self-sufficient.

When you get to University http://www.richardjevans.com/lectures/
Or you can purchase his trilogy and educate yourself to pretty much the same standard.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Third-Reich-Tr ... 0140911677

If Wagenführ numbers were deceiving anyone, its was the Nazis during the war, who were deceived by their own numbers, as they used them for planning what could and what could not be done. Rather than a decades long plan to fool economist of the future.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#206

Post by Richard Anderson » 18 Jan 2019, 23:23

Why do I suspect that he only Googled "Wagentfur, Speer, criticism"? "Jane Copeland"? Seriously?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Boby
Member
Posts: 2762
Joined: 19 Nov 2004, 18:22
Location: Spain

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#207

Post by Boby » 19 Jan 2019, 00:15

Why do I suspect that Hanny never read a paper by Jonas Scherner?

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#208

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Jan 2019, 03:09

ljadw wrote:
18 Jan 2019, 21:15
Tooze wrote the following in the abstract summary of No room for Miracles ..: ''......The Wagenführ index is poorly documented,inconsistent in its coverage and the manner of its construction results in a serious biased depiction of the war effort,particularly between 1939 and 1941 . ''
Tooze said that Wagenführ was seriously biased in his depiction of the war effort before Speer .
Scherner and Streb said that the figures from Wagenführ were manipulated ( and we know why ) , but still you are defending these manipulated and biased figures .
An abstract is a summary. :roll: Meanwhile, speaking of manipulation and bias, what Tooze actually wrote in his abstract is, rather than your clumsy distortion, is:

On closer inspection, however, both Wagenfuehr’s production index and his employment figures are suspect. On the production side Wagenfuehr’s data understate the footprint of the Wehrmacht in the German economy. His armaments index requires careful reinterpretation and extension, if it is to provide an adequate description of arms production before 1942. At the same time Wagenfuehr’s indices understate the level of investment in German industry. Combining these biases his index seriously understates the output of the all-important metalworking sector early in the war. Added to which his employment data exaggerate the degree of conversion to military production in the early years of the war. The result is a highly distorted picture of the performance of German industry between 1939 and 1942. As an alternative this paper proposes that we make use of the comprehensive estimates of industrial turnover, value added and turnover compiled by German industrial statisticians in collaboration with the research teams of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. These suggest a far more plausible story about the development of German industrial production between 1939 and 1942, which avoids the implausible choice - between undermobilization or productivity disaster - that dominates the existing literature.

In other words, Tooze explicitly notes the problem with Wagenführ's figures, while simultaneously implying the USSBS figures were much better. Oh, and also trashing the idiotic notion that the USSBS was simply parroting Wagenführ, when they did no such thing. Wagenführ was one of many statisticians interrogated by the USSBS (briefly, after he was kidnapped in Berlin the Soviets kicked up a fuss and the Americans returned him). BTW, he is actually mentioned just eleven times that I can find by the USSBS in The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15589
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#209

Post by ljadw » 19 Jan 2019, 07:48

Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Jan 2019, 04:43


"According to German statistics, civilian consumption in 1939 was above the 1929 level and had only fallen slightly by 1941. This shows that Germany entered the war with a "guns and [emphasis in original] butter" philosophy which was continued well after the initial defeats in Russia."

And, as one could expect from the USSBS, this quote is wrong, as it ignores,fails to consider the fact that 40/50% of the production of consumption goods was for the Wehrmacht, NOT for the civilians .
Source : Abelshauser P 527 of Kriegswirtschaft und Wirtschaftswunder .

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15589
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#210

Post by ljadw » 19 Jan 2019, 07:57

Hanny wrote:
18 Jan 2019, 21:28
Since you refuse or are unable to quote correctly, and in context, i can assume your unable to understand economics as thats a tad more complicated.

Tooze book does not contain the economic evidence to support many of his claims. Nor does it contain enough evidence to replace existing teaching of the subject. And he cites the USSBS extensively.

What else did Tooze write? "It is conventional in histories of the Third Reich to counterpose rearmament to the 'civilian' objectives of the regime as though they were mutually exclusive alternatives, a view often summarized as a choice between 'guns or butter'. And there is an undeniable truth in this."

Here is how its taught to students in UK for GSCE level http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesi ... rev1.shtml
Full employment - the idea that everyone should have a job. By 1939, there was virtually no unemployment in Germany.
Beauty of Work - the Nazis set up the SdA (Beauty of Work) to help Germans see that work was good, and that everyone who could work should. In fact - because the Nazis had abolished the trade unions, banned strikes, and given more power to the industrialists - real wages fell and hours were longer under Hitler.
Re-armament begun in 1935 - the idea of 'guns before butter'.
Autarky - there was an unsuccessful attempt at making Germany self-sufficient.

When you get to University http://www.richardjevans.com/lectures/
Or you can purchase his trilogy and educate yourself to pretty much the same standard.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Third-Reich-Tr ... 0140911677

If Wagenführ numbers were deceiving anyone, its was the Nazis during the war, who were deceived by their own numbers, as they used them for planning what could and what could not be done. Rather than a decades long plan to fool economist of the future.
The nazis were not deceived by the Wagenfuür's numbers,as these were only used for propaganda aims .Propaganda by Speer and for Speer .
And about autarky: it is very questionable to say that it was unsuccessful .

Post Reply

Return to “German Strategy & General German Military Discussion”